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Accounting disclosure, financial transparency, ownership structure and corporate governance: 
implications for internal and external WVB Jordanian credit risk assessments 
By Abdullah A.K. Al-Khawaaldah Bani Hasan (Ash-Shu^avree As-Salafi) 
Creditworthiness is a quality that is important to all stakeholders of an organisation, 
especially bondholders. It is posited that good corporate governance practices assist the 
confidence that stakeholders have in an organization's ability to generate the strong cash 
flows that are needed to meet financial obligations, which in turn should enhance credit risk 
assessments. Much research has been conducted into rating assessments, but these have 
largely been directed at developed markets and they have not generally been focused on the 
impact of good corporate governance practices and procedures. The primary focus of this 
research is to address this issue through an investigation into the impact of key factors upon 
the credit risk assessments of listed companies on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) in 
Jordan, as assessed by World'vest Base Inc. (WVB) credit risk assessment scores for 
Jordanian companies between 2005 and 2007 inclusively. 
Drawing upon insights from agency (including management disciplining and wealth 
redistribution hypotheses), stewardship, stakeholder, signalling, legitimacy and the diffusion 
of innovation theories, this thesis investigates the determinants of WVB credit risk 
assessments of Jordanian firms under five headings: accounting and financial aspects, market 
and regulatory perspectives, influence of ownership structure, financial 
transparency/disclosure and corporate governance factors. To achieve this, an array of 
modelling techniques is used in order to provide a more comprehensive picture. They include 
bivariate analysis, one-way analysis of variance, ordinary least square regressions for 
numerical scores, binary logistic regressions, and ordinal logistic regression. 
The results demonstrate that accounting and financial factors have a significant impact on 
credit risk assessments but not capital intensity. Profitability is positively associated with 
credit risk assessments, while leverage and loss propensity have a negative association. With 
respect to market and regulatory factors, size and Tobin's Q are positively associated with 
credit risk assessments. By contrast type of sector and audit are not related to credit risk 
assessments. Foreign ownership enhances ratings, whilst institutional ownership has a 
negative impact. Also, insider ownership and family ownership have some importance. It was 
surprising to find that whilst financial transparency and disclosure variables are significantly 
associated positively with credit risk assessments in some models, they were generally not 
significant across other models. Nevertheless, the study finds empirical evidence to support a 
degree of association between credit risk assessments and corporate governance factors. 
There is also a positive association between board size and credit risk assessments, but the 
most important aspect of corporate governance for Jordanian firms is board expertise. 
The originality of this thesis also embraces the inclusion not only of externally published 
W V B risk assessments in the Jordanian context, but also internal numerical ratings that were 
made available with kind permission from the WVB agency for the purposes of this research. 
The question is whether there are insights that can be gained fi-om such internal ratings that 
have not hitherto been made available to other researchers. The answer is in the affirmative, 
for role duality on the board of directors is evidently more important to WVB's own internal 
numerical rating assessments than is evidenced by the WVB externally published credit risk 
assessments. Specifically, the significance of corporate governance (role duality) is missed by 
multivariate models that are based solely on externally published data. Furthermore, financial 
transparency and disclosure variables reveal more (albeit moderate) support for the more 
refined internal scores of WVB than for the external assessment ratings. Finally, family 
ownership is also important to WVB's internal scores. Thus, this research has enabled deeper 
insights to be gained into credit risk assessment determinants within the Jordanian context. 
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C H A P T E R ONE: INTRODUCTION 
L I General Introduction 
The credit risk assessment of a firm plays an important role not only in evaluating accounting 
and fmancial information in order to provide a rating, but also through the rating itself in 
adding to the information set available to bondholders and other stakeholders of the firm. It is 
purported that investors need this credit rating (CR) to increase their ability to make useful 
decisions. 
So, the importance of a fmn's CR is recognized through the provision of usefiil information 
for all stakeholders. The disclosure of ratings is particularly pertinent in an emerging capital 
market where information is at a premium and represents an under-researched area. 
Additionally, research into ratings, whilst although extensive in general, is less common with 
respect to world'vest base (WVB) ratings, for indeed WVB whilst being a prominent agency 
in some regions, makes valuable credit assessments of companies particularly in the Middle 
East which has not been researched extensively in this regard. Thus, to examine CRs of listed 
Jordanian companies is an important reason for the choice of topic for research. Great 
concern has been directed to the scandals that happened recently either in the Asian or 
Western markets. One of the major reasons for these scandals is the lack o f good fmancial 
transparency and disclosure which can be enhanced by a good corporate governance system. 
In the same vein, emerging markets direct their attention to these changes and begin to 
perform some reforms to implement good corporate governance (CG) system. Many changes 
have happened in the Jordanian environment in the last few years, among them: extensive 
economic reforms by adopting a privatisation policy of its public sector companies, the 
issuing of a package of laws and regulations required for more stability in the Jordanian 
economy, and assistance in applying corporate governance rules in most listed corporations 
by issuing its code of ethics. These changes have led to consequential changes in the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) which has witnessed a massive increase in the volume of traded 
shares. But the impact of corporate governance on credit risk assessments has been under-
researched. 
The corporate governance mechanism effect on credit ratings of the controlling performance 
of management leads to agency costs because of the conflict between the two parties, namely, 
managers and shareholders, and also between bondholders and shareholders. In order to 
reduce the agency conflict between those parties, recommended practices have been required 
by Standards and Poor's (2002), dealing with (1) ownership structure and influence, (2) 
financial stakeholder rights and relations, (3) financial transparency and information 
disclosure, and (4) board structure and processes. The importance of the these 
recommendations has been recognized in the US-based research by Ashbough-Skaife et al, 
(2006), and in this thesis their work is being extended. There are two defining aspects to the 
originality in this thesis. Firstly, new variables are added that relate both to company 
ownership structure, namely, govenunental ownership, family ownership and foreign 
ownership and to corporate governance variables, through the inclusion of role duality and 
board size. Governmental ownership is potentially important for Jordan since it is an integral 
part of the Middle East and it is close to the focus of attention in world politics and 
economics. Family ownership is added to the analysis to reflect an important aspect of 
ownership structure which reflects the cultural environment of Jordan. Foreign ownership is 
an additional dimension because of its importance to an emerging market, namely that of 
Jordan. Secondly, it is not just the inclusion of new variables that makes this work distinctive, 
but through the high quality of data this thesis explores both internal WVB sources as well as 
external ratings. The access to numerical data scores generously allowed by the WVB 
agency, which are not otherwise available to the public nor historically to other researchers, 
has enabled this research to make fine distinctions between CR categories than would 
otherwise not be possible. 
In the last decade of the previous century most Jordanian firms began to benefit from the 
widespread work of credit rating agencies (CRAs), with recent developments in the Jordanian 
capital market, such as the privatisation policy of public sector companies, the application of 
corporate governance, economic reforms, and the issuance of many laws and regulations that 
aim to increase stability in the Jordanian economy, such as the companies law (no.22/1997) 
and securities law (no. 76/2002). A l l these economic reforms enjoyed by Jordan in securing 
political and economic stability have led to a massive increase in local and foreign 
investments, with implications for information disclosure to meet investor needs. 
Fast changes in global businesses affect most countries and Jordan is no exception. These 
developments impact upon the needs of Jordanian users of CRs' information given to 
different stakeholders including, for example, bondholders, investors and shareholders. Due 
to the nature of the provision of that information they may look forward to receiving high 
quality information about the financial and accounting position which may help them in their 
decisions. Consequently, CR assessments have expanded in Jordanian corporations as an 
effective tool for supporting required new information in assisting investors. 
Accordingly, stakeholders in Jordan have arguably depended more on rating agencies to 
satisfy their needs by providing the required information through CRAs. Many studies have 
discussed credit rating in many countries, for example US (Blume et ai., 1998), UK (Abams, 
M and Hardwick, P, 2003) and Australia (Gray et al., 2006), but regarding Jordanian firms 
this research did not find any such study, although only two studies (to be discussed later) 
investigated the role of corporate governance and the CR. So, this study, which is applied to 
Jordanian firms, fills a research gap, additional to the many objectives, which wi l l be 
mentioned in the next section. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The focal point of the current study is an examination o f the impact of ownership structure, 
financial transparency and disclosure and corporate governance on the CRs of all the 
Jordanian listed companies from 2005-2007 which have CRs from WVB. Particulariy, the 
objectives of this research are as follows: 
• The first objective is to evaluate the impact o f market and regulatory factors upon the 
CR o f Jordanian firms, after allowing for firm specific factors. 
• The second objective is to examine the extent to which the varied dimensions 
pertaining to ownership structure (including under-researched aspects, such as family 
and foreign ownership) impact on the CRs of Jordanian firms. 
• The third objective: is to evaluate the role of financial transparency and disclosure for 
the CRs of the Jordanian listed companies. 
• The fourth objective is to investigate the effects of good corporate governance 
practices and procedures which other researchers have demonstrated to impact upon 
firm performance and firm value (but not necessarily investigated the impact on CR), 
in order to determine whether they also have a strong influence on CR. And 
• The fifth and final objective is to explore the determinants of both internal 
(unpublished) and external (published) WVB scores in the Jordanian context. 
To achieve these objectives, many questions wil l be raised. These questions wil l be 
discussed in the next section. 
1.3 Research Questions 
The main research question is: what factors determine the intemal and external WVB credit 
ratings in Jordan? 
The subsidiary research questions flow from this main question: 
1) What are the general features of WVB CRs? How prevalent are they in Jordan? Which 
sector has a higher propensity of WVB ratings? 
2) Which accounting and financial variables are important to CRs? Is fmancial leverage a key 
factor? 
3) Is there a strong link between CRs and market and regulatory variables? 
4) What are the effects of ownership stmcture? Are there specific factors, such as family 
ownership, which influence CRs? 
5) What is the association between financial transparency and disclusre and CR? Is the 
attribute of better timeliness of reporting linked to higher CRs? 
6) How do corporate govemance factors impinge upon credit ratings? Does good corporate 
govemance practice improve ratings? 
7) Finally, do the intemal WVB scores, vis-a-vis their externally published ratings, provide 
deeper insights into the determinants of CR through the identification of differences in 
variable impact that are otherwise hidden beneath the external CRs? To answer these 
questions, five main hypotheses wil l be formulated. 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
In reflection of the study problem, the independent variables should be identified and 
theorised in order to formulate testable hypotheses. This study have five sets of basic 
hypotheses are developed in the current study to examine the relationship between (i) 
accounting and financial aspects, (ii) market and regulatory perspectives (iii) influence of 
ownership structure, (iv) financial transparency and information disclosure, and (v) corporate 
governance factors and their impact upon WVB credit risk assessments internal and external 
assessments. These hypotheses wi l l now be presented. 
L4.1 Accounting and Financial Category 
The main hypothesis related to the accounting and financial variables are: 
HI: There is a significant relationship between CRs and firm accounting and financial 
variables of the Jordanian listed companies. 
This hypothesis classified into four sub hypothesis: 
1.4.LI Leverage 
Hl-1: There is a negative relationship between leverage and CR. 
1.4.1.2 Profitability 
Hl-2: There is a positive relationship between profitability and CR. 
1.4.1.3 Capital Intensity 
Hl-3: There is a positive relationship between capital intensity and CR. 
L 4 . L 4 Loss Propensity 
Hl-4: There is a negative relationship between loss propensity and CR. 
L4.2 Market and Regulatory Category 
The main hypotheses related to the market and regulatory variables are: 
H2: There is a significant relationship between CRs and firm market and regulatory 
variables in the Jordanian listed companies. 
This hypothesis classified into four sub hypothesis: 
1.4.2.1 Firm Size 
H2-1: There is a positive relationship between a firm's size and its CR. 
1.4.2.2 Growth Opportunities 
H2-2: There is a positive relationship between growth opportunities and CR. 
1.4.2.3 Sector Type 
H2-3: There is a positive relationship between type of sector and CR. 
1.4.2.4 Audit Type 
H2-4: There is a significant relationship between the type of audit and CR. 
L4.3 Ownership Structure Category 
The main hypothesis related to the ownership structure variables is: 
H3: There is a significant relationship between CRs and firm ownership structure 
variables in the Jordanian listed companies. 
This hypothesis classified into six sub hypothesis: 
1.4.3.1 Blockholder Ownership 
H3-1: There is a significant relationship between blockkholder's ownership and CR. 
1.4.3.2 Institutional Ownership 
H3-2: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and CR. 
1.4.3.3 Insider's Ownership 
H3-3: There is a significant relationship between insider ownership and CR. 
1.4.3.4 Governmental Ownership 
H3-4: There is a significant relationship between governmental ownership and CR. 
1.4.3.5 Family Ownership 
H3-5: There is a significant relationship between family ownership and CR. 
1.4.3.6 Foreign Ownership 
H3-6: There is a significant relationship between foreign ownership and CR. 
1.4.4 Financial Transparency and Disclosure Category 
The main hypothesis related to the financial transparency and disclosure variables is stated as 
follows: 
H4: There is a significant relationship between financial transparency and disclosure 
and CR. 
This hypothesis classified into two sub hypothesis: 
1.4.4.1 Working Capital Accruals 
H4-J: There is a significant relationship between working capital accruals and CR. 
1.4.4.2 Timeliness of Earnings 
H4-2: There is a significant relationship between timeliness of earnings and CR. 
1.4.5 Corporate Governance Category 
Most of the corporate governance variables can be explained by the agency theory, 
especially, from the bond holder perspective. 
The main hypothesis related to the corporate governance variables is: 
H5: There is a significant relationship between CR and firm corporate governance 
variables in the Jordanian listed companies. 
This hypothesis classified into five sub hypothesis: 
1.4.5.1 Independent of Directors 
H5-1: There is a significant relationship between board independence and CR. 
1.4.5.2 Role Duality 
H5-2: There is a significant relationship between role duality and CR. 
1.4.5.3 Board Competency (Expertise) 
H4-3: There is a significant relationship between board expertise and CR. 
1.4.5.4 Board Stock 
H5-4: There is a significant relationship between board stock and CR. 
1.4.5.5 The Size of the Board of Directors 
H5-5: There is a significant relationship between size of board and CR. 
1.5 Summary of Methodology 
According to this current study, the author wi l l depend on secondary data collection, as it is 
suitable to both the research question and its purpose (descriptive and explanatory). The 
sources of this data are threefold: 
Firstly, the researcher utilized the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) database. The set of 
financial information included in the study is taken from firms' financial statements during 
the period 2005-2007. 
Secondly, the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) database for Jordanian firms was used in 
order to extract data for their corporate governance arrangements. 
Thirdly: the sources o f the data wi l l be either internal numerical data, or external credit risk 
assessment data from the World'Vest Base (WVB). Fortunately, for each firm a separate 
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numerical score was also supplied by the rating agency and so instead of using only an 
ordered logistic regression model for four categories, I wi l l also able to apply ordinary least 
squares, which was able to capture finer distinctions in the assessments. This is a substantial 
advantage over many of the previous studies that have been reviewed earlier, for instead o f 
just a couple or several categories, I utilised hundreds of distinctly separate (numerical) 
ratings. 
Many techniques wi l l be used in the current study. Bivariate analysis is used for each 
independent variable's association with CR, by using parametric and non parametric tests. 
The parametric tests wi l l include: the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient (r), to 
measure the association between the dependent variable and each continuous independent 
variables; the t-test and Levene's test, which determines the association between the 
dependent variable and dichotomous independent variables; and one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), which tests differences in mean values between groups. 
A non-parametric test wi l l include: the Spearman's rank correlation which will be performed 
for the same purpose of Pearson correlation; the Mann-Whitney U-test, which is the non-
parametric equivalent of the t-test; for a parametric test, the Pearson product-moment 
correlation is used when the normality assumption is satisfied, whereas Spearman rank 
correlation (for non-parametric tests) is performed for continuous independent variables, i f 
the assumption of normality is violated.; the t-test (parametric) and Mann Whitney (non-
parametric) test are used to examine the impact of dummy variables on the CRs. 
The availability of continuous numerical credit risk assessment scores obtained directly from 
WVB enables more rigorous statistical testing to be undertaken. The ordinary least square 
(OLS) technique has been applied to develop the firm rating model, which suffers as 
explained before from some problems in its assumptions. The structure of CRs, however, 
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presents several econometric issues. First, the external (but not internal) WVB ratings are 
discrete rather than continuous. Second, there is a natural ordering to the ratings—AA is a 
higher rating than A, which is a higher rating than BBB. Third, the ratings' categories are not 
necessarily evenly spaced—the BBB rating category, for example, is broad. Logistic 
regression is (LR) used for model formulation and is specific to a binary classification 
problem (high/ low rate); it is known to exhibit better generalization behaviour than least 
squares regression. According to the logistic regression, we use an alternative classification 
scheme that partitions CRs into two categories—BB categories, as the indicator of higher 
credit risk, and the remaining lower categories. According to the LR, the study wi l l 
summarize the relationship between the dependent and independent variables using the 
natural logarithm of the ratings' odds-ratio. 
We use the marginal effects model by calculating the marginal changes in the probability of a 
firm receiving a BB category of CR as a result of a one standardized unit change in each of 
our independent variables. 
Finally, the ordinal logistic regression (OLR) model is used as an extension to the binary 
logistic regression model (LR) for ordinal multi-class categorization problems, such as, 
category 4 (BB3-BB), category 3 (B3-B), category 2 (C3-C) and category 1 (D). Hence, it is 
obvious that ordinal logistic regression is an interesting and pertinent technique to model 
credit risk assessments in the Jordanian environment given multiple categories of credit risk 
assessments. As to ordinal logistic regression, a similar methodology applies except that an 
order ranked list (1 , 2, 3, and 4) of categories operates and parameter coefficients {Jis) are 
determined for paired orderings down the risk categories. 
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1.6 Research Motivation and Importance 
During the last decade, the Jordanian capital market began to undertake various measures to 
influence the Jordanian economy. These included new laws, to attract more foreign 
investments to the Jordanian capital market, but investors need to be reassured of the credit 
worthiness of companies. Thus CRs play an important role in emerging capital markets. But 
the main reasons for the motivation and importance of this study are, fu^tly, that there has 
been no extensive research into the effect of corporate governance on credit risk assessments, 
and, secondly, that has not been such a study on CR applied to Jordan. It is expected that this 
study wi l l complement the previous studies in this new area of CR which has largely been 
overlooked. Consequently, this study adds a new value to both researchers and practitioners 
in Jordan and may open up a new direction for future research into other dimensions. In 
addition, the results of this research study wi l l be disseminated to stakeholders, managers and 
other interested parties. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The organisation of the current study is as follows: Chapter One provides the introduction to 
this research study; Chapter Two discusses the theoretical background to the study, drawing 
upon a review of the relevant literature. Chapter Three discusses in detail the limitations of 
CRs in order to show their history and their contemporary importance, characteristics, 
regulations, and impact on capital markets. In addition, the aims, meaning and nature o f 
corporate governance are illustrated to show not only its importance to the study, but also to 
identify potentially important corporate governance variables that can be expected to have an 
impact on CR. Chapter Four presents prior empirical studies on CR, including those 
focussing on the effect of corporate governance on CR. Chapter Five presents an overview of 
regulatory aspects within the Jordanian environment and its stock market, the Amman Stock 
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Exchange (ASE). In addition, the study highlights the current application of corporate 
governance systems in Jordan to highlight the importance of studying the impact of corporate 
governance systems on CR. Chapter Six discusses different research philosophies, methods 
and approaches to illuminate the appropriate methodology for the current study, and proceeds 
to discuss the research design, including methods and models for subsequent analysis. 
Chapter Seven contains five sections that explore different categories of the research 
hypotheses drawing upon prior theoretical and empirical research. Chapter Eight presents an 
array of univariate and multivariate models to establish the determinants of CRs of Jordanian 
listed companies. Finally, Chapter Nine summarizes all the study and presents the main 
findings and conclusions, as well as limitations and recommendations for ftiture research. 
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C H A P T E R TWO: L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W ON T H E O R E T I C A L 
BACKGROUND AND P E R S P E C T I V E S 
2.1 Introduction 
Theory is a system of logically coherent, explicitly not conflicting, statements, 
interpretations and concepts concerning a selected aspect of reality, that are formulated so 
that it is possible to derive testable hypotheses from them" (Metez, 2000). The objective of 
this chapter is to present credit ratings theories to discuss their important role in determining 
optimal CR characteristics, and to explore the background of the relationship between CRs 
and ownership structure, corporate governance and financial transparency and a firm's 
financial performance, according to the relevant theories. 
Many research studies have addressed the subject of CRs, drawing upon various financial 
theories with many different variables (Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). To address this issue 
various theories could be considered, including those pertaining to agency, stakeholders, 
stewardship, signalling, innovation and legitimacy. It may be instructive to begin with agency 
theory and problems of information asymmetry, which needs to be minimized. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 deals with agency theory including 
management disciplining, and the wealth transfer hypothesis; section 2.3 pertains to 
signalling theory; whilst section 2.4 focuses on stakeholder theory; section 2.5 is devoted to 
stewardship theories; in section 2.6 there is a review of irmovation theory, whilst legitimacy 
theory is addressed in section 2.7; and, finally, section 2.7 summarises the chapter. 
2.2 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.5) define the agency relationship inside the firm as: "A 
contract imder which one or more person (the principal) engages another person (the agent) 
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to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent". The agency problem exists here because the agent does not behave 
perfectly in the interest of the principal. They describe the agency costs as the sum of 
monitoring costs by the principal, bonding costs by the agent, and the residual loss which is 
the reduction in the principal welfare as a result of the differences between the agent's and 
the principal's decisions. Jensen and Meckhng (1976) discuss agency costs as the key tool in 
evaluating alternative designs of principal-agent relations. 
Given the existence of the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976), agency theory is 
used widely in the credit ratings' literature because of information asymmetry between 
principal (owners) and (agent) managers. This information asymmetry arises between 
ownership and management because ownership is distanced from a company's operations, yet 
at the same time they need managers for the company's business according to the 
management disciplining hypothesis. 
Another important issue related to the agency problem is the existence of information 
asymmetry between a firm's outsiders and insiders. Internal managers know better than 
outside investors about their firm's prospects, risks and values. This difference in information 
between these two groups wi l l affect the cover of servicing debt interest and principal 
repayment through future cash flows based on the continuation of the firm. This leads to the 
wealth transfer hjqjothesis, which suggests that firms that have a lower CR are more likely to 
have a stronger conflict between bondholders and shareholders because of transfer of wealth 
to shareholders. 
Thus bondholders do not prefer lower credit ratings (with implications for lower earnings and 
future cash flows) to higher credit ratings (stronger income or future cash flows). This is for 
the reason that all bondholders wi l l be looking to CR's reports that wi l l provide them with 
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more information about the firm's future cash flows. Therefore, credit ratings can reduce the 
perceived conflict between stakeholders, including bondholders, and shareholders, who wi l l 
hope for a higher CR, which would make it less cosdy for the conflict between them. 
But there are two pertinent hypotheses which we wi l l explore below, namely, the 
management disciplining hypothesis, which deals with relationships with management, as 
well the wealth redistribution hypothesis, which focuses upon conflict between shareholders 
and bondholders. 
2.2.1 Management disciplining hypothesis 
The separation between the two parties (owners and managers) creates an agency problem. 
The managers seem nearly always to be trying to obtain more benefits from the company. 
Managers make decisions that increase their self-wealth at the owners' account. This conflict 
between owners and managers gives rise to agency costs, which are the costs of monitoring 
the management's behaviour in relation to firm output, arising from contracting between 
these two parties (Watts, 1977). 
CR is regarded as an effective tool for monitoring the control of the company using reports 
issued by the CRA, which impartially assesses the level of the company's CR. By providing 
an improved rating is one of the various monitoring devices used to reduce agency costs 
(Gonzalez, 2004). Consequently, the CR mechanism works to mitigate the severity of the 
problem of information asymmetry between agents and principals, because the managers 
then have an incentive to try and show the company's best profile, indicating that they are 
acting in the interests of owners. 
On the other hand, owners would want to encourage and stimulate managers to earn a better 
score from the CRA, which should help mitigate conflict between all stakeholders. In 
17 
particular, CRs should allay the conflict between shareholders and bondholders, because of 
fears o f wealth transfers between them (Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). 
Many researchers apply agency theory to credit rating because of information asymmetry 
problems between agents and principals, reflected in many hypotheses being developed in 
the CR literature using agency theory. Examples include studies by White (2001), Steeman 
(2002), and Gonzalez (2004). The results tend to suggest an association between the size of 
the firm and an increase in agency costs. Therefore, agency theory predicts a positive 
relationship between CR and firm size. 
However, there are criticisms directed at agency theory perspectives by some researchers, 
and among these are criticisms that the directors are acting according to their selfish interests, 
and some individuals are risk self-serving. Some authors, replying to this assertion, indicate 
that there is an over-emphasis on the motivation of managers to act in the owners' interests, 
because o f external (e.g. takeovers) and internal pressures (e.g. employment issues). 
Similarly, bad publicity can affect a manager's reputation. A l l the above should reduce 
agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985; Arrow, 1985; Barney 
andHesterly, 1996). 
Moreover, agency theory ignores the role of managers of a firm, who try and have strong 
motives to conceal some information, especially concerning matters of competitiveness 
(Hirsch et al. 1990; and White, 2001). In the same way, managers have incentives to achieve 
high CRs so as to differentiate themselves from managers of other companies. Consequently, 
agency theory ignores the managers' incentives to withhold positive information (Steeman, 
2002). Furthermore, agency theory cannot provide non-financial solutions to managers, even 
i f they may try to obtain high CRs (Gonzalez, 2004). 
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A higher CR reduces information asymmetry and improves the fmancial outcome arising 
fi-om a reduced agency theoretical effect. So, agency costs are reduced via the CR impact. 
Consequently, organizations have widely accepted compliance work with the mandatory 
agency credit ratings' requirements, and voluntarily have attempted to improve the grade of 
their CR. As a result, this has led managers to reduce agency costs by achieving the aim of 
the organisation to obtain a higher CR fi-om an agency. 
This aim of a high CR should motivate managers to apply standard mandatory CR 
requirements. Consequently, it can be expected that credit rating practice wi l l be associated 
with some variables, such as frnn characteristics, ownership structure and matters related to 
the board of directors through the impact of agency theory and corporate governance 
(Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). 
The entry into financial markets needs to be competitive with preference to high CRs, which 
should reflect a reduce agency conflict between principal and agent, with the CR being used 
as a monitor to constrain the actions of agents. As a result CRs can solve and reduce costs of 
this agency problem through monitoring the agents via the level of CRs, a tool of pressure on 
the agent to improve firm performance and attaining better of CRs (Steeman, 2002, 
Gonzalez, 2004). 
2.2.2 Wealth redistribution hypothesis 
Another important principal-agent conflict is that between managers and shareholders. 
Managers may avoid investing in profitable projects when their ownership inside the firm 
decreases. Also they may reduce their efforts in searching for these profitable projects, and 
this wi l l decrease the firm's performance and encourage managers to concentrate on their 
benefits rather than the shareholders' benefits. Therefore, management may try to extract 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits from the fmn, while transferring some or all of the 
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costs incurred to the outside shareholders. An important source of such benefits to them may 
be managerial empire building and entrenchment (Murphy, 1985; Jensen, 1986). 
Empire building is closely tied to the argument that managers prefer building less risky, 
diversified firms with lower leverage, so they can reduce the uncertainty of their human 
capital investment (Amihud and Lev, 1981), and lessen the probability of bankruptcy and 
employment risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984). To that 
end, managerial interests are naturally aligned with those of creditors. Yet, the natural aim of 
managers and creditors to reduce firm riskiness may sometimes be in direct conflict with 
shareholder interests. This relationship was first formalized by Black and Scholes (1973) 
who regard leveraged equity as a European call option on firm's assets. 
In this classic view, the realignment o f managerial and shareholder interests inevitably 
damages creditor interests. In market-oriented governance regimes, this realignment is 
largely done by making management a residual claimant in the firm through equity-based 
compensation plans. This behaviour can be eliminated by spending some of the firm's 
resources in different ways. This may include auditing, formal control systems, budget 
restrictions and incentive compensation systems. The main goal of these methods is to align 
the interests of managers and shareholders. 
Managerial discretion is also controlled by a variety of disciplinary mechanisms, such as 
independent boards and external pressures from competitive markets, including capital and 
product markets (Koke and Renneboog, 2005), and the markets for corporate control 
(Manne, 1965) and managerial labour (Fama, 1980). In stakeholder-oriented systems, where 
ownership and credit supply is more concentrated, the active involvement of risk-averse 
stakeholders in the monitoring of management has historically provided a substitute for these 
devices. 
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The firm may restructure its assets to optimise both their use and value, thereby creating 
added value, as classic mechanisms to improve firm operating and financial performance 
through increases in fiiture cash flows simultaneously leading to a decrease in the conflict 
between bondholders and shareholders. But the wealth transfer hypothesis proposes that 
shareholders of credit rated firms may expropriate the value of bondholders through a 
disproportionate distribution of debts across future cash flows firms. In the USA some 
researchers have presented documentary evidence of wealth transferred from bondholders 
involving substantial many millions losses to shareholders, because the firms' operations had 
utilised large debts to acquire 'weak' assets. However, firms should also consider gains to 
shareholders through assets well utilised for income generation (Parrino, 1997). 
Maxwell and Rao (2003) also present evidence consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis 
associated with losses to bondholders, and measured by the negative abnormal monthly bond 
return. There are two potential sources of wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders. 
Firstly, a lower CR may result fi-om a loss of collateral and liquidity of the firm, as assets are 
reallocated to the cover firm's liabilities. Also, firms may differ widely in their and interest 
coverage ratios. Secondly, the lower CR eliminates benefits of prior diversification when 
cash flows were imperfecdy correlated, and reflects a reduced fiature dissimilarity of cash 
flows between different operations of the firm, and is therefore likely to be positively 
associated with value losses to bondholders. 
Shifts may also occur to the benefit of shareholder, pressure groups on management. On other 
hand, there may be an induced seniority effect, in which owner's long term debt is more 
likely to be exposed to the transfer of wealth to the owner's short term debt, whereby shorter 
maturity debt becomes effectively senior to longer maturity debt (Shastri, 1990). The classic 
motivation for corporate value creation by assigned high credit ratings is to redeploy the 
firm's assets to achieve a higher valuation. As long as it can improve the firms' performance 
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and increases the cash flow and debt servicing ability, it can create value for both 
shareholders and creditors. 
I f firms are assigned a better rating, it is likely to be correlated with their ability to generate 
more healthy fiiture cash flow streams, a lower cash flow volatility, a reduced default risk and 
an increased capacity to meet due payments in a timely manner. The CR's effect is likely to 
be stronger where there is a clear relationship between the future cash flows and these ratings. 
Thus, it is customarily conjectured that bondholders gain more from high assessment ratings 
than from lower ratings assessments. However, these high ratings' deals tend to create new 
injections of cash flow and wealth via cash flow operating efficiencies leading to new loans 
from bondholders. Then, bondholder reassurance of making gains must come from mere 
redistributions of shareholder wealth, whereby an increase in bond prices coincides with an 
offsetting reduction in share prices, thus guaranteeing the right to wealth redistribution (Levy 
and Samat, 1970; Higgins and Schall, 1975; Galai and Masulis, 1976; Berger and Ofek, 
1995). 
Liquidity as well as cash flow is very important to the operations of a firm, for i f some event 
has a negative effect on the cash flows, this leads to reduced liquidity which in turn may 
hamper its fmancial manoeverability and hence its future cash flow. The firm may seek to 
reverse these effects by wealth redistributions through new financing expressions, but it may 
require more debt fmancing. Thus, this behaviour tends to increase default risk, as well as 
reduce the collateral available to bondholders. Furthermore, i f the company is exposed to 
distress or a depression in the future, it can realise assets, and financial distress costs may be 
reduced. Consequently, this suggests that bondholders receive greater benefit from a new 
higher CR assessment, because these firms are perceived to provide large future cash flows. 
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Therefore, bondholders can derive benefit by financing from equity, a perspective which is 
supported by agency and signalling theories (Dermis and McConnell 1986; Faccio and 
Masulis, 2005). I f a fu in attracts a lower CR this resuh can have an adverse effect on equity, 
due to bad news on the firm's future expected cash flows made known to the market. This 
may also deteriorate bondholder sentiment (Myers and Majluf 1984; DeAngelo, DeAngelo 
and Rice 1984; Mitchell and Stafford 2000; Skaife at al., 2006). Should the bondholders 
distinguish between the weak and strong firms, and how important is it to distinguish 
between the business risk and the asset risk effects, associated with business operations, and 
financial risk effects associated with financing operations? This distinction from the 
perspective of bondholders is formalized by Shastri (1990). 
The interest coverage as a measure for financial risk is extensively applied by Standards and 
Poor's and Moody's as a determinant for CRs. The financial operations of the firm provide 
some evidence as to the default risk through the implications of any reduction in the future 
cash flows to the firm, and also provide an indication of the extent to which the firm wi l l pay 
its debts in the future. However, this measure is used by many financial market participants 
and credit rating agencies for financial and default risks, for clearly lower CRs arise fi-om 
greater financial risks the firm and higher CRs fi-om lower fmancial risks. 
As result a firm, with a higher CR, which achieves a lower fmancial risk, consequently serves 
to reassure bondholders, because a decrease in financial risk increases bondholder wealth. 
The overall change in financial risk wi l l be affected by the level of confidence in the firm by 
all stakeholders, including bondholders (Shastri, 1990). 
A credit ratings' agency is there to give its professional evaluation of the firm's ability to 
cover service costs, including its regular debt obligations and principal repayments. Yet, the 
firm's individual financial characteristics and its financial default risk are not accurately 
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known. But the financial obligations can indirectly have an effect on the credit risk through 
their impact on the future cash flows, which benefit from efficiency gains associated with the 
ability o f the firm to perform well to attract a high credit rating especially when the firm has 
applied good corporate governance procedures and practices (Bhagat et al., 2005). 
Jensen (1986) and Wulf (2004) present an agency theoretic fi-amework of the conflict 
between management and all external stakeholders, in which the managers can drive the firm 
towards an expansion of the business without a scenario analysis of positive net benefits, but 
instead characterized by different forms through empire building or other arrogant managerial 
behaviour, consequently driving the firm to an increased default risk and a lower CR. Yet, the 
larger firms are better placed than the smaller firms in that the managers of their firms work 
to improve the performance through a proper planned expansion of the businesses with 
beneficial ramifications on their CRs (Billett, King and Mauer, 2004). 
Firms should create profits and secure the stability of future cash flows to the firm, whose 
higher future cash flows should lead to a reduction in the conflict between bondholders and 
shareholders by limited competition between them through achieving good CRs by means of 
an decrease in the likelihood of underpayments by such firms and by collecting more loans 
from bondholders at low interest (Chang, 1998). But the asymmetric information and strong 
votes by shareholders may lead to conflict between all stakeholders and managers and 
between bondholders and shareholders; in addition information leakages; uncertainty in the 
timing of the payments to lenders, and greater industry focus, all of these make it more 
difficult for it the bondholder and increase the likelihood of conflict between the interest 
groups (Faccio et al., 2006). 
The risk of takeover by shareholders of other firms have an effect on the management 
decisions of the disciplining target management, and shareholders can use their voting power 
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to drive managers to undertake possibly riskier investments or other financial 
reconfigurations which may harm bondholders' interests. In addition, the management 
behaviour may be characterised towards empire building, and their desire to achieve greater 
wealth at the expense of other parties. Consequently, the managers are influenced by 
shareholders as they pressurize management to be more confident in lending support to 
strategic investment with implications for risk, which might very well lead to more hostility 
between all stakeholders, especially between bondholders and shareholders, because of the 
likely wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders, and these can lead to lower credit 
ratings through lower perceived future cash flows (Loughran and Vi jh , 1997;Schwert, 2000; 
Bhagat et al., 2005). 
Improved cash flows by changes in debt to equity reconfigurations can provide great 
economic rewards to the firm through the benefit of tax allowances by the govenmient on the 
current and future debt payments to the bondholders. Consequently, such firm benefits have 
implications for gains in financial markets (Fama and Miller, 1972). But many researchers 
have debated how such capital restructurings benefit the firm, and instead these tax benefits 
may very well have no influence on debt to equity reconfigurations, especially for firms that 
consistently alternate between new debt and equity issues (Bartholdy and Mateus, 2003). 
These tax allowances can be more valuable through better corporate governance, and 
minimised agency costs through a reduction in the conflict between all stakeholders. 
However benefit fi-om tax deductions can be achieved through improved cash flows to the 
extent that they improve profits also and thereby through reduced risks of tax losses which 
may otherwise delay tax deductibility of interest, and increase the fiiture after tax cash flows 
to all stakeholders (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Miller, 1977; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). 
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2.3 Signalling Theory 
Another theory that may provide an explanatory framework for credit rating is based on 
information asymmetries in the market. Managers generally have better information about 
their firms than do outside investors, i.e. there is asymmetric information. Companies that 
have performed better than others may have more incentives to achieve a higher CR to signal 
their good performance and screen themselves from companies performing less well 
(Akeelof, 1970). A signal is defined by Megginson (1997) as "an action that imposes 
deadweight costs on the signaller in order to convey value to the poorly informed outsiders 
(investors)". This signal is credible i f it is prohibitively costly for a weaker firm to attempt to 
mimic. However, managers cannot simply aimounce that they have good news because every 
other manager has the same incentives to do so. Many large successful firms use far less debt 
than financial theory suggests; and this point has led to the development of signalling theory 
(Brigham and Houston, 2004). 
Also shareholders wi l l be doubtful about any self-serving statement which can be proven as 
time passes. One solution to this problem is for managers who have good news, typically 
those of high-value firms, to signal it to the investors by providing them through credit 
agencies with information pertaining to the ability of the firm to create higher future cash 
flows through a "higher credit rating", or a "lower credit rating", in the case of low value and 
low performance firms. 
The signalling model developed by Ross (1977) provides a theory for the determination of 
the financial structure of the firm based on the asymmetric information problem between 
well-informed managers and poorly informed outsider shareholders. This model is based on 
the idea that managers have clear incentives to use signals to differentiate their firm from 
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weaker competitors. One of these signals may to be to achieve a good level of CR as 
evidence of the firm's ability to create strong fiiture cash flows to the firm. 
Well-informed insiders, according to this theory, tend to convey the firm's positive 
information to the poorly informed outsiders in order to enhance the financial market's 
response to their performance. Therefore, the managers and directors wi l l be able to attract 
investments and to reassure bondholders through higher credit ratings, which wi l l have 
significant impacts on the frnn value (Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). 
Megginson (1997) states that the signalling model explains market responses to the different 
types of security issues. Debt issues signal good news and mean that managers are confident 
about the future, which is to be followed by the firm's good performance. However, equity 
issues signal bad news and could mean that earnings wi l l fall in the future and this is to be 
followed by the firm's poor performance. The CR gives a signal about the firm's ability to 
cover debt servicing and principal repayments in the future to the bondholders through the 
future cash flows to the firm. The point about CRs is that they aid the managers in important 
distinguishing themselves from others on dimensions, such as quality and performance 
(Fight, 2001). 
Gonzalez (2004) emphasizes that for companies, which previously have had lower CRs, 
failure to improve later wi l l be regarded by the market, including bondholders, as a signal 
that the delay to improve exposes financial solvency issues (bad loans) which are harmful. 
Similar arguments can be found regarding profitability and signalling effects may be different 
across industries (see Boot et al., 2006). Regarding credit rating, firms may improve 
performance in the CR to provide more reassurance to all bondholders (Skaife et al., 2006), 
and other parties, to distinguish themselves from the others. High CRs give a sign of the 
ability of the frnn to create strong future cash flows and provide financial stability, and so 
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they can use this signal in order to differentiate themselves from those with lower CRs 
(Steeman, 2002). 
A credit rating can help reduce the asymmetric risk, through a reduction in the asymmetry of 
information through assigning new information to investors about a firms' creditworthiness 
through strong anticipated future cash flows to cover the debt interest and repayments, since 
the CRs is essentially a certifier (Steeman, 2002). 
Reduced information asymmetries between investors and issuers of debt demonstrate a basic 
role for CRs in presenting this information to institutional investors, banks, or other firms. 
The issuance of bonds in any market is now heavily dependent on the degree of evaluation by 
widening the investors' pool and reducing adverse selection problems by access of firms to 
debt markets (see Steeman, 2002; White, 2001; Gonzalez, 2004). 
2.4 Stakeholder Theory 
Basically, stakeholder theory is used to help understand the groups and individuals influenced 
by the achievement of an organisation's purpose and those impacts may be economic, 
regulatory, technological, social, political and also managerial. The principle of this theory is 
that: "...businesses should be run not for the financial benefit of their owners, but for the 
benefit of all their stakeholders...it is an essential tenet that organisations are accountable to 
all their stakeholders, and that the proper objective of management is to balance stakeholders' 
competing interests" (Sternberg, 1997; p: 4). Consequently, stakeholder theory draws 
together all stakeholders with an organisation through the help or understanding of a group of 
individuals that can influenced by the activities of an organisation (Skaife et al. 2006). 
As Freeman's definition is broader, Clarkson (1994) alternatively defines stakeholders as 
"person or groups who either voluntary or involuntary become exposed to risk from the 
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activities of a firm". Consequently, under stakeholder theory, companies need the support 
from all their stakeholders to be able to survive and continue in the long run (Smith et al., 
2005). Skaife et al, (2006) indicate that there is a variety of motivations for management to 
improve credit ratings to a high level, and one of these motivations is to manage particular, 
arguably powerful, stakeholder groups. 
Sternberg (1997) rejects the use of stakeholder theory on the basis of four objections. Firstly, 
her argument is that the theory rules out the objective of the business, which is regarded as 
the maximization of long-term owner value. In addition, it makes trusteeship impossible 
because the obligation to balance stakeholder benefits overrides the specific obligations of 
trustees to their designated beneficiaries, and it also restricts the variety of organisations and 
organisational purposes as it recognises only one type of legitimate organisation i.e. one that 
balances stakeholder benefits. Secondly, the theory is incompatible with corporate 
governance for the theory explicitly denies that corporations should be accountable to their 
owners but instead should be accountable equally to all their stakeholders. As such, it licenses 
resistance to takeover bids that would benefit shareholders and permits the pursuit of empire-
building acquisitions. In addition, it impairs corporate governance because it requires 
managers to balance stakeholder interests thus violating the prior obligations of managers to 
owners. Thirdly, stakeholder theory undermines private property as it denies owners the right 
to determine how their property wi l l be used and denies the duty that agents owe to 
principals. Fourthly, and finally, balancing stakeholder benefits is an unworkable objective. 
She provided various reasons to support her fourth contention: the number of people whose 
benefits need to be taken into account is infinite because by definition, stakeholders include 
all those who can affect or are affected by the organisation; even i f stakeholder groups could 
be identified and restricted to a manageable number, it does not explain what should count as 
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a benefit for the purposes of balancing benefits and, finally, it does not provide guidance as to 
how the balance of benefits could be struck. 
However, Tumbull (1997) criticised Sternberg's first and second arguments because much of 
the empirical evidence does not seem to support this view. With regard to the third notion, 
Tumbull argued that stakeholder relationships can legitimate and protect the concept of 
private property, agency and wealth creation rather than undermine them. Despite the 
contradicting views on this theory, it is still recognised as an important key to social 
reporting. 
Thus, stakeholder theory concentrates on the relationship between managers and all 
stakeholders, including shareholders, while agency theory concentrates only on the 
relationship between managers and shareholders. It can be seen from the previous context 
that stakeholder theory is more general than agency theory, because stakeholder theory 
includes not only shareholders, but others, such as: bondholders, lenders, borrowers, 
customers, employees, and suppliers. Consequently, and within their set priorities, managers 
try to satisfy every group according to their relative importance, whether shareholders, 
employees or bondholders. As to CR, managers try to acquire support from the stakeholders, 
according to their importance, through attracting higher CRs from agencies, to achieve the 
greatest benefits to them as a group. 
However, three aspects o f stakeholder theory which may apply to credit rating can be 
identified as being either descriptive, instrumental or normative (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). The first, descriptive, is used to describe and explain specific firm characteristics and 
behaviors such as how board members consider the interests of corporate constituencies, i.e. 
stakeholders. The second, instrumental, is concerned with the connections between 
stakeholder management and the achievement o f corporate objectives, such as profitability. 
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The third one, normative, is used to interpret the function of the corporation and is related to 
moral and ethical guidelines. 
2.5 The Stewardship Theory 
Issues of CRs of firms are extended to include the accountability and responsibility o f 
corporations to their stakeholders. The stewardship fimction and its related interests between 
shareholders and bondholders can affect credit ratings. Yet the intention should be to reduce 
information asymmetry, which is hampered by the separation between ownership and control. 
One of the main criticisms that is directed to the agency theory is its assumption that the 
interests of managers are various fi-om those of principals (Lan et al., 998) and (Daily et al., 
2003). As a result a need has emerged for a theoretical framework that determines and 
explains those cases in which the interests of the agent are aligned with those of the principal. 
Davis et al. (1997; pp25-26) state that "the essential assumption underlying the prescriptions 
of stewardship theory is that the behaviours of the executive are aligned with the interests of 
the principals". 
Even in the case of competing objectives among different stakeholders, stewards who are 
motivated to make decisions in the best interest of the organizafional wealth and performance 
are often meeting those conflicting interests which- by all means- linked to organizational 
wealth and performance. 
According to stewardship theory, managers they are useless, since managers are considered 
trustworthy and take decisions in line with the organizational best interest by collecting the 
best ratings. It is so important to clarify that stewardship theory does not imply that 
managers do not have survival or income needs, but rather, managers as stewards realize the 
"collective ends" at which their own interests are best achieved by firstly achieving the goals 
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of the organization and its owners. In other words, the benefits that managers can achieve 
through individualistic and self-serving behaviors are lower than the benefits gained from 
pro-organizational behaviour. Stewardship theory therefore supports governance mechanisms 
that underpin and empower the firm's management and avoid mechanisms that monitor and 
control it. 
2.6 Diffusion of Innovation Theory 
Credit rating widens the gateway to the financial market attracting inter alia international 
investors, who have been informed accordingly through internet technology. Nowadays, 
competition between business organisations are changing at an accelerating pace, leading to a 
high level of uncertainty. This growing uncertainty is the result of greater customer 
expectations, the dilution of borders between competitive enviroiunents, and the move 
towards global competition. Innovation or creativity in the work place is often what keeps an 
organisation competitive (Katz and Kahn, 1978). Surviving in today's fast changing 
environment is not easy. By this I mean that innovation theory is able to cope with unstable 
and continuously changing demands and markets. 
Diffusion of innovation is "a process of spreading information amongst consumers, producers 
and countries, and consequent adoption of changed techniques of consumption, production 
and trade" (Ironmonger, 1983, p 53). Organisations operate in a continuously changing world 
due to rapid environmental change, including a high level of technological change, changes 
in local and international markets, increasing competition, governmental legislation and 
changes in relationships with customers, suppliers, unions and business partners. These 
changes, in a highly dynamic and complex environment, are forcing organisations to adopt 
new technologies and new ways of doing business in order to operate effectively. This 
represents a challenge for the managers of these organisations (Beckhard and Harris, 1987; 
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Paton and McCahnan, 2000). Innovation represents a vital tool for organisations operating in 
a changing and competitive environment such that some authors even proclaim "innovate or 
die" (Storey, 2000, p 347). 
Rogers (2003) defines innovation as the characteristics of a new idea and its affects the 
evaluation of it, and the decision to adopt it on the part of an organisation. Innovation is one 
of the most important competitive weapons that a modem organisation can hold in today's 
global competitive market. 
The inference of innovation theory is that certain investors /auditors are more likely to apply 
internet and other technology in collecting information on firm CRs. But it is this group of 
investors and advisors, namely, large international audit firms, institutional and foreign 
investors, and their demand for timeliness o f earnings which is more likely to pressurize 
firms to obtain higher CRs. It could also be suggested that rating agencies may look to the big 
audit firms to be assured more confidently of a firm's creditworthiness. Only innovative firms 
are able to cope with unstable and continuously changing demands and markets. To be 
audited by big audit firms adds authenticity to their innovative activities. According to 
innovation theory, entrepreneurial seek firms credibility to attain higher CRs through signals 
of audit quality and a big four audit can help support firms attaining higher CRs, because the 
CRAs depend on the audit report. 
A company may face pressure, to adopt an innovation, not only from customers, but also 
from other parties, such as institutional investors (Abrahamson, 1991; O'Neill et al., 1998; 
Guler et al., 2002). Institutional investors are more sophisticated and generally own enough 
technical expertise to monitor the mangers. Institutional investors have greater resources to 
access information including f i i l l reports by agencies on individual companies. 
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The timely diffusion of information on a firm's innovation is supportive of its CR which 
enables it more easily to the international financial markets (see Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
Foreign ownership pressure should play an important role in urging a company to adopt 
innovations. Innovation theory is also supportive of timeliness of earnings, and assists wealth 
creation (Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
Innovative companies are likely to be innovative in various ways, such as in their logistical 
operations as well as in brands, and gain a competitive advantage in a global market. These 
successful firms are more likely to attract a big audit firm. But innovative companies are also 
more likely to use computer technologies creatively, and efficiently diffrise financial 
information through the internet to attract foreign investors and institutional investors. The 
importance of information difftision of a higher CR, which is a part of that information flow, 
is also likely to be reflected in the value to the firm. 
2.7 Legitimacy Theory 
The word legitimate (Latin: lex, legis; law) refers to a matter legally acceptable to the 
authorities, but the notion of acceptance can be extended in meaning. Thus, legitimacy theory 
in thos contenxt stresses the importance o f societal acceptance in ensuring a company's 
survival. Underlying this theory is the notion that a company's actions can have an impact on 
the environment in which it operates. I f a company's activities are seen or perceived to have 
detrimental effects on the community, the public may react by boycotting the company's 
product or pressuring for government intervention. CR in this instance is provided to justify 
a company's continued existence. Legitimacy theory argues that an organization can only 
continue to exist i f the society recognizes it as acting within acceptable value systems (Rizk, 
2006). Based on this theory, organizations aim to get social approval, in other words to 
legitimize their actions (Patten, 1991; Mathews, 1993; Reich, 1998, Deegan, 2002). 
34 
Gray et al. (1995) argued that the manner in which a company operates and reports its 
performance is influenced by the social values in which it exists. That suggests the possibility 
of legitimacy being interpreted differently in different environments of which Jordan is but 
one, characterized by its culture, political system and government ideology. 
Apart from legitimising corporate activities, legitimacy theory can also be extended to 
legitimising managerial position. It may be assumed that management desires to signal that 
the company is being very well managed by a good team of management thereby supporting 
their continuance of employments, atatus and compensation, which may lead them to be 
focused on some key drivers, such as profitability. Legitimacy can be seen as a motivation for 
financial strength, which in turn should lead to a higher CR. That indirectly suggests 
legitimacy theory as an explanation for the level of CR. Thus, companies through a higher 
CR may attempt to legitimate themselves within their culture, society and political system. 
2.8 Summary 
Chapter four discusses the theoretical literature of CRs with respect to accounting and 
finance. The issue of CRs is concerned with the optimal assigned level of CR to represent a 
firm's ability to cover its debt servicing and principal repayments and its consequential 
indirect role affecting the firm's value. 
CRA's assessments cover the real world; and financial distress costs in the real world play an 
important role in determining the optimal CR. Agency problems arise since the agent wi l l not 
typically behave perfectly in the interest of the principal, and may have a consequential 
impact upon the agency costs of debt and equity. Also, the existence of information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders has a key role in determining the optimal CRs. 
The management disciplining hypothesis recognises this information asymmetry arising 
between ownership and management because ownership is distanced from a company's 
35 
operations, and yet at the same time they need managers for the company's business. So, 
agency theory is used widely in the CRs literature because of information asymmetry 
between principal (owners) and agent (managers). 
The ability of the firm to create future cash flows and reduce the conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders through wealth redistribution assumes importance through 
many studies evidenced by literature reviews in the recent years. Higher CRs have been 
shown to provide better results for shareholders and bondholders, yet previous studies have 
been unable to explain fiilly the conflict between bondholders and shareholders. The 
relationships between bondholders and shareholders have a strong impact on the equity and 
bond markets through the transfer of wealth between them. The wealth transfer hypothesis 
proposes that shareholders of credit rated firms may expropriate the value of bonds through a 
disproportionate distribution of debts across future cash flows of firms. 
The classic motivation for corporate value creation by attracting a high CR is to redeploy new 
sources of finance to higher valued firms. As long as this incenrive improves firms' 
performance and increases cash flow and debt servicing ability, it creates value for both 
shareholders and creditors. 
Stakeholder theory focuses on the relationship between managers and all stakeholders. It can 
be seen from the previous context that stakeholder theory is more general than agency theory, 
because stakeholder theory includes not only shareholders, but others, such as: bondholders, 
lenders, borrowers, customers, employees, and suppliers. Consequently, managers try, within 
their set priorities, to satisfy every group according to their relative importance. As to CR, 
managers try to acquire support from their stakeholders, according to their importance, 
through attracting higher CRs from agencies, to achieve the greatest benefits. 
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The firm depends on its fiiture cash flows, and i f information through CRs impacts 
expectations o f the future cash flows and their ability to cover the servicing of the interest 
debt and principal repayments, these emit a positive signal, which should lead to more trust in 
the firm from stakeholders, especially bondholders and shareholders, and reduce the conflict 
between them. I f the future cash flows are less than those that would enable frnn to cover its 
interest and principal repayments, these a emit negative signal, which would indicate default 
risk or bankruptcy, and a deeper conflict between bondholders and shareholders. Signalling 
theory can support this argument. 
One of the main criticisms that is directed to agency theory is its assumption that the interests 
of the manager is not aligned with those of the principal. As a result a need for a theoretical 
framework that determines and explains those cases in which the interests of the agents are 
aligned with those of the principals has emerged. Stewardship theory therefore supports 
governance mechanisms that underpin and empower the firm's management and avoid 
mechanisms that monitor and control it. The stewardship function and its related interests 
between shareholders and bondholders can affect credit ratings through reduced information 
asymmetry, which is hampered by the separation between ownership and control. 
Innovative companies are likely to be innovative in projects and brands and gain a 
competitive advantage in a global market. These successftil firms are more likely to attract a 
big audit firm. But innovafive companies are also more likely to use computer technologies 
creatively and efficiently to diffuse financial information through the internet to attract 
foreign investors and institutional investors. The importance of information diffusion is also 
likely to reflect in the value and CR of the firm. 
Legitimacy theory stresses the importance of societal acceptance in ensuring a company's 
survival. Underlying this theory is the notion that a company's actions can have an impact on 
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the environment in which it operates. CR in this instance is provided to justify a company's 
continued existence. Thus, companies with a higher CR may attempt to legitimate themselves 
within their culture, society and political system. 
The next chapter presents a brief review of the definition and concepts of credit rating and 
corporate governance. 
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C H A P T E R T H R E E : C R E D I T R I S K ASSESSMENTS AND 
C O R P O R A T E G O V E R N A N C E : DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
3.1 Introduction 
Currently, CR represents one of the most important fmancial issues due to the recent 
economic crises. Evaluating the fmancial trustworthiness for companies is a major concern 
for CRAs which represent one of the key communication vehicles in providing an 
independent evaluation of the probability of default on bond issues, as such providing 
information to debt-market participants additional to publicly available sources (e. g., Reiter 
andZlebart, 1991). 
Many advantages can be obtained fi-om CR information and can be passed on to different 
stakeholders including, bondholders, investors and shareholders. Meanwhile, various 
stakeholders need adequate information about the companies' financial abilities. This in turn 
pushes these companies to provide the required information about the ability of firms to cover 
debt and about the strength of their future cash flows available to those stakeholders. 
CRAs play an important role in the functioning of credit markets for a wide range of 
stakeholder groups, namely, investors, regulators and a range of other parties who make use 
of CR. There is clear evidence of the increasing importance of CRs through the CRAs as they 
play an important role in capital markets through the identification of the debt of a company 
and its ability to satisfy the credit fmanciers and other investors alike, which can send either a 
positive or negative signal to them about the quality of the firm's credit situation. 
Structured finance ratings represented 43% of Moody's global ratings income in 2009 
(Moody's, 2009a). There is a trace of average margins was 38.3% for the full-year 2009, and 
the two big players in the CR market show that plenty of companies take their ratings 
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seriously and are willing to pay substantial sums for the agency ratings of their debt, and so 
the industry is assuredly a lucrative business. For example, it can be noted that Moody and 
Fitch were investigating in recent years an annual growth rate up to 17%, while standards and 
poor (S&P) alone achieved 14.5%, and thus the success of these agencies through their 
classificarions is closely linked to the organization of the fmancial markets. 
The income of the rating agencies continues to increase. This indicates a great success 
significant in the development of their business, and CR has become very important in the 
globalizafion of financial markets, and in debt management of corporations. On a worldwide 
basis, issuance of rated public securities has risen at a compound annual rate of 27% over the 
period 2050 to 2009 (Moody's, 2009). The importance of CRs and the success of the 
agencies have also been closely linked to the role that they play in regulation. Ever since the 
1930s, the distinction between investment grade and sub-investment grade debt has been very 
important and the rating decisions made by the agencies have had a direct influence on the 
value of debt instruments available to certain banks and insurance companies (Sylla 2001). 
In addition, the credit crunches that have been happening in the developed markets increase 
the searching rate for a system that monitors the different parties of the companies. Therefore, 
many companies apply good corporate governance systems to f l i l f i l this role through their 
ability to achieve the balance between the different powers inside and outside the companies. 
Applying a good corporate governance system may represent a signal for good financial 
positions for the company which leads the various CRAs gives these companies a high rating 
(Skaife et al., 2006). Thus, the application of corporate governance rules may have an impact 
on the adoption of higher credit ratings, a proposition that is of key interest in this thesis. 
Therefore, this chapter shows the basic concepts of credit ratings in order to demonstrate its 
contemporary importance. Further, the nature of corporate governance wi l l be discussed not 
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only to show its importance to the study but also to identify potentially important corporate 
governance variables that can purportedly be expected to have an impact on credit rating. 
Section 3.2 discuses the nature of credit rating, its main advantages and disadvantages and the 
impact of credit rating on capital market. Corporate governance systems are presented in 
section 3.3. Finally, section 3.4 provides the summary of the chapter. 
3.2 The Nature of Credit Ratings: 
3.2.1 The concept of credit rating 
A number of studies have provided defmitions of credit ratings o f various CRAs, such as 
Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch, as well as definitions by the agencies themselves 
(For example, Belkaoui, 1980; Cantor, 1994; Steeman, 2002; Fight, 2001; Gonzalez, 2004). 
These wi l l be discussed shortly. It is important to appreciate that CRAs provide views to help 
investors identify risks, particularly on the most serious default, indicate the quality of long-
term debt through the agency's unpublished forecast, and estimates through the 
characteristics of future cash flows relevant to the type of funding (Belkaoui, 1980). 
Cantor (1994) has succinctly regarded CRA as reflecting their opinions about the firm's 
ability to cover service interest and repayment through the likelihood of default risk or late 
repayments. In the words of Steeman (2002, pp. 22-23.): "Credit ratings are the very structure 
of the marketplace. They are the risk language that we all speak and rely on." The grades are 
pertinent, for it can be said that CRAs give their opinion about long-term debt as a score to 
both high investment grade or low speculative grades and can assess the likelihood of default 
risk leading to bankruptcy (Steeman, 2002). A credit risk rating, from CRAs, provides an 
opinion of the future ability, legal obligation, and willingness of the obligor to satisfy timely 
payment of debt serving to investors, and reflect on the possibility that they might lose money 
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according to whether there are Hkely to be strong future cash flows (Fight, 2001). CRs aim to 
measure the creditworthiness particularly pertaining to the expected future cash flows' ability 
to service interest and capital repayments, and the focus of a firm's creditworthiness is 
primarily upon the implications of the ratings for default risk (Gonzalez, 2004). 
As seen earlier, there are several definitions of CRs from CRAs, and as has been noted many 
of these agencies are primarily concerned with the likelihood of default as a basis for their 
opinions. There are thus no large differences between the agency-specific definitions, and as 
a result researchers tend to depend on the big three agencies' definitions (see Steeman, 2002, 
pp 22-23): 
"A credit rating is Standard and Poor's opinion of the general creditworthiness of an obligor" 
(Standard and Poor's) 
"Issuer ratings are opinions of the ability of entities to honour their financial obligations" 
(Moody's). 
"Ratings are an assessment of the issuer's ability to service debt timely" (Fitch) 
In other words, a rating informs the investor of the degree o f risk or safety of an investment 
in a specific security. The definitions for credit rating can be extended fiirther. For example 
" credit rating is Standard and Poor's opinion of the general credit worthiness of an obligor, or 
the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a particular debt security or other financial 
obligation, based on relevant risk factors" (Standard and Poor's, 2002). 
"... an opinion on the credit rating industry of the future ability and legal obligation of an 
issuer to make timely payments of principal and interest on a specific fixed income security" 
(Moody's, 2006). 
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Steeman (2002) shows that all the CRAs use a categorical factor to explain the firm's ability 
to service debt and capital repayments as they fall due. The rating agencies begin with 
number or a key to indicate the relative standing within the major categories for the 
likelihood of the firm's ability to make relevant payments. For example. Standards and Poor's 
(S&P) use a key + / - and Moody's use a number (1 , 2, 3 . . . ) to indicate the relative standing 
within the major categories. Some systems are modified through letter grades, and there are 
some differences between agencies in their uses of these letters. For example Standard and 
Poor's uses letters that locate the firm on a spectrum of credit quality from the very highest 
(AAA) to (AA) to (A) and to the very lowest (D). Moody's, however, distinguish capital from 
small letters. For example, they use letters that locate the firm on a spectrum of credit quality 
fi-om the very highest (Aaa) to (Aa) to (A) and to the very lowest (D). World 'vest base 
(WVB) CR uses a letter system with numbers also: for example, a very high CR, A A A , to 
A A to A A l , to AA2 to D the lowest credit rating. 
Consistent with the above, when the estimate is more likely to reflect default risk (lower CR) 
the imply evidence that interest on debt is very unlikely to be covered and thus principal 
payments may not be met. A WVB CR in the A A A rating category indicates an extremely 
strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal, and is of the highest quality. Ratings 
A A A , A A l , and AA2, reveal a very strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal and 
differ only by a small degree fi^om the higher rated companies. A, A l , and A2 show a strong 
capacity to pay interest and repay principal, although it is somewhat more susceptible to 
adverse effects of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than debt of higher 
rated categories. (BBB) including B B B l , BBB2, and BBB3, reveal an adequate and medium 
grade capacity to pay interest and repay principal, although normally they suggest that 
adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a 
weakened capacity to pay interest and repay principal than debt in higher rated categories. 
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(BB category) including B B l , BB2, and BB3, indicate a reduced near-term vulnerability to 
default than other speculative issues, however, a firm is regarded as facing ongoing 
uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial or economic conditions, which could 
lead to an inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and/or principal payments. (B category) 
including B l , B2 and B3 reveal a greater vulnerability to default, but suggest that the firm 
currently has the capacity to meet interest and principal repayments. Adverse business, 
financial or economic conditions wi l l likely impair the capacity or willingness to pay interest 
and repay principal. Specifically B l = "Speculative"; B2= "Speculative at best"; B3= "very 
speculative". (C category) including C I , C2 and C3, express a current identifiable 
vulnerability to default and identify that the firm is dependent upon favourable business, 
financial and economic conditions to meet timely payments of interest and a repayment, of 
principal. Highly speculative in the event of adverse business, financial or economic 
conditions, " i t is not likely to have the capacity to pay interest and repay principal"=Cl; " i t is 
probable the company wil l not likely have the capacity to pay interest and/or repay principal" 
=C2; " i t is very likely that the company wi l l not have the capacity to pay interest and repay 
principal" =C3. As to the D rating, payment is in default, and the firm is technically, or 
actually, in bankruptcy' . 
CRAs have two categorical factors, comprising an investment grade and a speculative grade, 
each of these categories includ many sub-categories to clarify the firm's ability to meet 
commitments from their creation of fiiture cash flows. Categories are differentiated yet can be 
grouped A A A to BB3 as investment grade, and from Bl to C3 as speculative grade. Investors 
in firms are always looking to the investment grade, where the internal regulation and 
policies support this grade. As a result when the furn is downgraded to a speculative grade. 
see http://www.wvb.com 
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this may very well lead many investors to change their investment policies and possibly sell 
their assets directly; given this change in credit risk and lower perceived future cash flows to 
the firm indicate its default risk or bankruptcy potential (Steeman, 2002) (full details of the 
rating scales used by the main agencies are included in Appendix 2-1). 
On the one hand, the CRAs purport to provide superior information about the ability of 
corporations (or even governments) to make timely repayment of principal and of interest on 
borrowings from the generation of future cash flows; on the other, there are some problems 
regarding the accuracy of the estimates for CRs from these agencies. Yet, Strauss (2002) has 
stated that "Credit ratings are the very structure of the market-place. They are the risk 
language that we all speak and rely on". 
Many investors have lost money from acting on implied agency recommendations on CRs, 
which later found not to be accurate and so there can be lawsuits against the CRAs on 
account of their lack of precision in their estimates of CRs (Partnoy 2001). In the Maurice 
Quinn v. McGraw-Hill case in 1998, Circuit Judge Diane P. Wood commented on her 
decision to dismiss the case, as follows: "While it is unfortunate that Quinn lost money, and 
we take him at his word that he would not have bought the bonds without the Standard and 
Poor's "A" rating, any reliance he may have placed on that rating to reassure himself about 
the underlying soundness of the bonds was not reasonable." 
According to Partnoy (2001), credit rating agencies exercise their free speech and considered 
opinions, disclaiming responsibility to recommendations to buying or selling. Consequently, 
the CRAs are protected from any kind of prosecution because they only provide their views 
and opinions. However, the CR processed has experienced many historical steps, which wi l l 
be discussed in the next section. 
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3.2.2 History of credit ratings 
Although it was as early as the 16th century, when the Dutch created their first government 
bonds, and the 17th century when the Bank of England was founded, it was not until the 18th 
and 19th centuries that the UK became the central economy of the world (Sylla 2001). But 
the early years were without the benefit of agency ratings. 
During the nineteenth century when the USA experienced noticeable economic growth, the 
US issued sovereign bonded debt to build canals and other infi-astructure projects, but largely 
withdrew from this activity after nine states defaulted in the early 1840s (Sylla, R. 2001). As 
the country grew local govenmients replaced states as bond issuers but they were dwarfed by 
the private sector through the corporate bond market. A separate branch of the development 
of the credit rating industry started by Louis Tappan who established the first mercantile 
credit agency in New York in 1841, when he founded the Mercantile Agency fi-om his own 
extensive records of credit-worthiness of his dry goods and silk customers. In the wake o f the 
banking crisis of 1837, this was subsequently purchased from Robert Dun in 1859 (Sylla 
2001; Cantor and Packer 1995a). By 1900 its reports covered more than a million businesses 
(Norris 1978). 
A similar mercantile rating agency was formed in 1849 by John Bradstreet, who published 
the world's first ratings book in 1857. In 1933, the two agencies were consolidated into Dun 
and Bradstreet and merged with RG Dun and Company in 1933 to form Dun and Bradstreet. 
But although these credit-reporting agencies provided commercial information to subscribers, 
they did not rate bonds; they became the owner of Moody's Investors Service in 1962 (Sylla 
2001). 
The first CRA in the worid was established in the 1909 in US by John Moody for the 
American railway companies bond rating (Partnoy, 1999; Sylla 2001). John Moody issued 
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the fu-st CR to cover the creditworthiness of bonds Railway Company to help bondholders in 
their investment decision (Fight, 2000). CRs used to cover only estimate ratings in the United 
States because it had the largest bond market than anywhere else in the world, and there were 
rising levels of income in the US which by 1909 broadened the investor base through the US 
corporate bond market, essentially US railroad bond market (Sylla 2001). This remained so 
for 50 years, and during this time the ratings industry was smaller than today, being confmed 
to the railway sector (Sylla, 2001). Moody's did not rate US state and government bonds until 
1919 but earlier in 1910 they extended their coverage to utility and industrial bonds. In the 
1920s, Moody's alone rated more than 3,000 issuers in the US (Moody's, 1997). At that time 
the number of competitors was very small. Moody's and Poor's were publishing standard 
statistics, and in 1924 Fitch Publishing Company joined the market (Sylla, 2001). 
When Henry Poor became editor in 1849 of the Joiunal o f the American Railway his 
publication, which was called the Deployment of Information to Investors, helped with 
financial information disseminated by the financial press and specialist journals and 
contained information on property assets, liabilities and revenues of railway companies (Fight 
2000). Henry and his son, John, specialized in the deployment guide (for manual railway) in 
1868. The company continued and through business combinations formed with S & P in 
1941. This company was controlled by McGraw Hi l l in the 1960s which still copyrights 
material from the publishing company today. S & P remains one of the largest agencies in the 
world to assess the eligibility for credit. 
After the First World War, USA became the worid's fu^t financial centre; large US market 
attracted many investors from different countries, who needed ratings for their investment 
decisions. Thus, CRAs emerged to help investors through the provision of investment 
47 
information, and consequently CRAs supplanted the functions previously performed by 
investment bankers (Moody's 1997). 
In 1962 Dun and Bradstreet took over Moody's and disposed of them in September 2000 
when they became freestanding with a market capitalisation of $5 billion (Sylla, 2001). Duff 
and Phelps entered the bond rating market much later in 1982 and McCarthy, Crisanti and 
Maffer had been founded in 1975 and acquired by Xerox Financial Services before it was 
merged into Duf f and Phelps in 1991 (see Cantor and Packer, 1995), then merged with IBCA, 
the only UK credit rating agency in 1997. The combined entity was subsequently bought by a 
French company FIMLAC. In June 2000, Fitch IBCA bought Duff and Phelps. In December 
2000 Fitch absorbed Thomson Bank Watch (White, 2000). 
The 1920s and 1930s witnessed prosperous period for the CRAs. There was much activity in 
the bond markets in this period, and high volatility; public information and disclosure were 
scarce; and investors depended on the opinion of CRs regarding the strength of firm's 
financing arrangements. Investors supported CRAs through subscribed services until the 
1970s (Partnoy 2001). 
In the early 1970s the US capital markets were opened up to financial globalisation after a 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and the introduction of a floating exchange rate. 
Linked to this expansion of the CRAs was the essential role which they played owing to an 
increasing number of international companies which had started issuing bonds in the US 
market, and more foreign capital being used to invest in economic development projects 
(Sylla 2001). CRAs collectively changed their model of funding: they began to charge issuers 
for rating their debt securities. The rationale behind this move was: (1) they needed more 
resources for their international expansion which could no longer be covered by subscriber 
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fees; and (2) it solved the 'free rider* problem, i.e. ratings information was leaked to non-
subscribing investors and thus reduced the CRAs' income (Sylla, 2001; Coffee, 2006). 
The rapid development of the Asian capital markets, and the development of the EU single 
market created the need for CRs to be provided to assist new investors fiinding long term 
debt, which would help firms grow their business and increase their competitiveness as well 
as raise their contribution to global economic growth, which in turn led to the expansion of 
NRSRO through standards and poor's, the first rating agency to open an office outside the US 
(Fight, 2000). This was a successful time due to improvements in key economic indicators 
which helped the Internationally Recognised Statistical Ratings Organisation (NRSRO) to 
flourish again and achieve an excellent performance. NRSRO covered the global markets 
with around 130 agencies world-wide, but this number may have been closer to 150 (Estrella 
et a/., 2000). 
World'vest Base Inc CRA, with its office in the US, had and still has a strong focus on the 
Asian and Middle East market, providing ratings and services, having been founded in 1985 
with subsequent offices in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Egypt, Mexico, Thailand and China. In 
1998, WVB established its first data collection centre outside the USA, in the Prague-Czech 
Republic, which was followed by the opening of another international office in Malaysia. The 
company was reorganized under the Financial Intelligence Service Ltd, and since 2001 WVB 
has started to expand its data coverage to include the USA, and indeed is still headquartered 
there in Chicago^. 
Initially WVB only rated commercial paper, but soon it started rating debt as well. It now 
provides many ratings worldwide and employs a strong work force. It expanded rapidly in all 
• http://www.wvb.com 
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product lines (corporate, structured, and financial ratings), and it not only sell ratings and 
ratings' information, but also has an investment evaluation and consultancy service. WVB's 
data are originally offered through an exclusive markedng agreement with Telekurs NA and 
then with Standard and Poor's. 
Since 1997, W V B has provided data directly to customers and through other distributors, 
such as Bureau van Dijk Publishing. In that period, through the quality of its data provision 
and customer service, WVB now supplies data to some of the world's leading investment 
banks, consulting firms, exchanges, government agencies and specialized information re-
distributors. Since the beginning of 1999, WVB has also made significant in-roads into the 
financial portals' market. Since 2003, the company has expanded its database services to 
include specialized databases on private companies for Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos 
and Cambodia. During that same period the company has also created value-added products 
in the fields of credit and business risk rating, and analysis^. 
3.2.3 Importance of credit rating 
"There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There's the United States and 
there's Moody's Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, 
and Moody's can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it's not clear 
sometimes who's more powerful" (Friedman, 1996). 
The importance of CR has increased in the recent years for many reasons. This is attributed to 
the increasing pressures on companies and managers of firms to reach higher levels of 
accountability resulting from an increase in the level of competition between companies, and 
an increased desire of various stakeholders to obtain a justifiably high credit rating from one 
' http://www.wvb.com 
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or more agencies approved by Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation 
(NRSRO). Therefore, companies compete with each other to get higher scores. The first goal 
of a firm's financing strategy is to achieve the desired rating from one of NRSROs, indicating 
financial soundness, efficiency of internal control systems and more general managerial 
competence, providing a good signal to the external environment (e. g. investors) through the 
level of CR (Cantor, 1994; Gonzalez, 2004). A number of researchers have illustrated the 
importance of CR in finance (for example, Sherwood, 1976; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; 
Belkaoui, 1983; Ederington et al., 1987; Pottier, 1998; Pottier and Sommer, 1999; Gabbi and 
Sironi, 2002; Gonzalez, 2004). 
Hsueh and Liu (1993) and Gabbi and Sironi (2002) argue that CR is very important as a 
determinant of bond spread and bond yield; so the firms hope to be assigned high bond 
ratings for the best price and to earn lower yields. On the other hand, firms with lower CRs, 
namely for speculative grade bonds from below BBB or unrated bonds, wi l l be obliged to 
cover debt service and repayment at higher interest. As a result, the CRAs are the 'gateway to 
the financial market' through which CRs reflecting the firm's ability to create the required 
future cash flows (Cantor et al, 2007). Investment guidelines typically require a high CR of 
target firms, and consider investment in firms of lower CRs, or non-rated, would represent a 
substantial investment risk, (Cantor et al., 2007). 
CR can give a significant signal to all stakeholders, including bondholders, because CRs 
reflect the opinion of fmancial analysts and experts, and can be a significant determinant o f 
the risk premium (Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979). In recent years, CRs have become increasingly 
important and have attracted the attention of public capital markets and stakeholders many of 
which require a rating. Stakeholders, including bondholders need more complete information 
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about the firm's ability to cover debt interest, and consequently when this is not supplied the 
funding of unrated bonds can cause more difficulty (Kerwer, 2005). 
White (2001) has argued that the importance of CRs is related to the problem of how lenders 
determine a furn's creditworthiness; in particular how they assess the future cash flows' 
ability to cover debt interest in a timely manner and repayments at maturity. Steeman (2002) 
argues that because CR is an independent assessment of firms' quality, CRs have become a 
cost efficient and trusted way to convey information to investors. Boot et al., (2006) suggest 
that CR is a tool of coordinating mechanisms in the financial market through monitoring the 
role of CRAs. Moreover, CR plays a role of an informafion equalizer about the investment 
decisions o f institutional investors. Generally, CRs are "focal points" through an increase in 
the size o f the firm's stakeholder base, resulting from greater reliability of pertinent firm's 
information. Based on the above, the significance of credit rating wi l l be discussed in the next 
section. 
3.2.4 The significance of credit ratings 
Credit rating represents the link between those who need the credit rating information, 
namely, stakeholders, and those who provide a credit rating assessment for the firms, i.e. a 
credit rating agency. This link is important to f i rm users especially investors who demand 
from these external parties that they provide ratings' information on the financial status of the 
firms, including their ability to meet their financial obligation and generate future cash flows. 
This in turn may influence on the accounting and financial management functions in these 
firms through the policies which they should follow to achieve this goal and in addition to 
help the firms tap the financial markets. 
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Different levels of credit ratings differentiate firms as set out in the reports by a particular 
credit rating agency. So, not surprisingly, the use and the impact of credit rating on firms 
have grown significantly and increasingly in line with creditworthiness (Gonzalez, 2004). 
3.2.5 The characteristics of credit ratings 
A credit rating can be used as a means of providing stakeholders - investors and issuers- with 
an assessment which shows the firm's financial creditworthiness at a particular point within a 
credit rating range, but it also offers new opportunities to present information by providing 
insights into expected future cash flows and other quality information related to the firm 
(Gonazalez, 2004; Champsaur, 2005; Skaife et al., 2006). Jacobson et al., (2000), Frost 
(2006), and Skaife et al., (2006) have illustrated that, it is most important to present 
information to stakeholders about a firm's operations, highlighting the role o f the credit rating 
agency, since: 
• The credit rating provides an assessment about the ability of the firm to meet its financial 
obligations, which is not found in any financial statement; 
• The credit rating agency uses a methodology to help establish a credit rating through its 
market reputation as a guide to differentiating good from poor investments; 
• The credit rating agency directly draws on an array of financial and non-financial 
information; 
• The credit rating agency updates assessments on credit ratings for firms, which helps 
investors in making financial decisions concerning those firms. 
Many advantages can be gained by both the firm and its investors, from using its credit 
rating. These advantages wil l be shown in the next section. 
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3.2.6 Advantages of using credit ratings 
A credit rating is important both for internal and external use. The credit rating increases the 
possibilities in managing business businesses through quality information. Regarding internal 
use by managers, a credit rafing assessment provides objective business information on the 
firm and the firm's ability to cover service interests and capital repayment through the current 
and expected fiiture cash flows, and may reflect, for example, the nature of the business 
activities from a local to global orientation induced by competitive pressures and the needs of 
the stakeholders especially issuers of finance. As to external use by different stakeholders, 
especially investors, a credit rating assessment helps meet the needs of those who require 
assessments on the future cash flows to assess the firm's financial strength, its performance, 
including the quality o f its fiiture cash flows. It reflects a rating agency's opinion of an 
entity's overall creditworthiness and its capacity to satisfy its financial obligations and needs 
of the stakeholders (Skaife et al., 2006). 
A credit rating assessment has a clear role for both firms and stakeholders. It enables the 
credit rating agency to provide useful financial information to a large number of stakeholders 
of the f irm, and thus should lead to an increase in share price liquidity (Skaife et al., 2006) 
and should lower the cost of capital through a reduction in uncertainty deriving from better 
information (Graham and Harvey, 2001; and Kisgen, 2006). Additionally, a credit rating can 
enhance the reliability of particular financial information pertaining to the firm's ability to 
cover debt obligations and provide reassurance for investors in the process, who might 
therefore become more confident of their securing the firm's financial needs through loans to 
the firm, especially when it attracts the best grade from the credit rating agency (Skaife et al., 
2006). 
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According to this view, most firms should compete with each other to earn a better score 
from the credit rating agency to the benefit of its various stakeholders. These advantages can 
be viewed from the stakeholders' point of view. A number of researchers have illustrated 
these advantages (Sherwood, 1976; Belkaoui, 1983; Edemgton et al. 1987; Nayar and Rozeff, 
1994; Pottier and Sommer, 1999; White, 2001; Steeman, 2002; Gonzaliz, 2004; Boot et al. 
2006; Skaife et al. 2006) which include: 
o An increase in the size of the firm's stakeholder base, resulting from greater reliability 
of the firm ability to create current and future cash flows; 
• An increased peace of mind for bondholders from threats of wealth-transfers from 
themselves to shareholders; for when a firm earns the best grade it most fully assures 
investors of the strongest anticipated future cash flows to the firm; 
• A rating guarantees future loan flow to the f irm fi-om bondholders; for a firm which 
earns a better rating fi-om various agencies is more likely to be supported by its 
bondholders; 
• It enhances the reputation o f a firm in the financial markets, Therefore, when an 
agency announces a good rate it enables a firm to keep its current investors and also 
attract new investors to the firm; 
• It can motivate a firm to increase its effectiveness through competition between firms 
to earn a higher grade. In turn, it may lead to the credit rating being raised and i f 
correctly assessed to an improved firm performance; 
• The provision of ratings' information to bondholders, helps them make the right 
decisions about debt servicing; 
• A better and objective gauge of the ability of the firm to meet fmancial commitments 
through future cash flows to all stakeholders, especially bondholders; 
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• The use of credit ratings in this real-time environment enables the investor and analyst 
to access rapidly the information provided by the credit rating agencies, instead of 
waiting several months to get some of this information fi-om the traditional routine 
corporate financial reporting procedures; 
• An ease in the search for required information about the ability of the furn to create 
the necessary fiiture cash flows. The credit rating agencies provide clear and timely 
assessments, which allow users to search easily for specific data of the ability of the 
firm to cover debt interest and capital repayments. As a result of these advantages 
arising from a credit rating, many researchers typically go on to discuss the effect of 
the credit rating on the organisation and its stakeholders through the financial market. 
This impact of credit rating on financial markets is discussed in the next section. 
3.2.7 Impact of credit ratings on the capital markets 
Many changes in the business environment have caused pressures on changing CRs. 
Examples of these changes are: the increase rate of complexity in operating businesses, the 
growth and globalization of capital markets and the rapid growth of knowledge-based 
industries. Accuracy in CRs is very important for it is reflected on financial markets through 
CRAs that act as a gateway to the financial markets in a similar way to securities' analysts, 
although not auditors. 
Therefore, the reputation of the agency is established through accurate CRs. An objective 
evaluation of CRs can assist financial markets so there is a need to provide adequate and 
useful information on CRs to investors, because the investors do not have the fundamental 
knowledge of CRAs to penetrate the information complexity of firms (Coffee, 2006). 
Evaluations assist all stakeholders and users. Financial statements and other statements are no 
longer enough to meet the needs of all users, and so a CRA wi l l supply a report providing 
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valid and pertinent additional information on the organisation (Sherwood, 1976; Belkaoui, 
1983; Ederington et al., 1987; Pottier, 1998; Pottier and Sommer, 1999). Therefore, it can be 
said that credit rating wi l l help in improving the efficiency of financial statements in specific 
and accounting in general terms. 
KJiger and Sarig (2000) focus on the effect of capital market reactions o f stock and bond 
prices through changes in CRs, including interactions between the external value of 
outstanding debt and any inverse impact on the value of outstanding equity. They call for 
greater o f use of CRs capital market, more frequent credit ratings and less aggregated 
announcements of rating change. 
A credit rating effect on stock return, fi-om a change in the level of CR, on the day of the 
announcement of a change in bond rating can be either positive or negatively; indeed, 
downgrades of CR are bad news for all stakeholders, including bondholders and shareholders 
(Holthausen and Leftwich, 1992; Matolcsy and Lianto, 1995; Barron et al., 1997). On the 
other hand, some authors have argued that bond downgrades have a negative effect on excess 
stock returns, but not for all bond downgrades; consequently, these effects depend on the 
degree of downgrade (see Goh and Edderington, 1993). These impacts are useful in raising 
awareness of the potential impact of these CRs on capital markets. For example, Estrella 
(2000) and Van Duyn (2002) expect usefijl expansion in firm coverage by CRAs in the near 
future as usefiil information to all stakeholders, not just investors. He also shows that the 
formation of CRs has spread widely in the financial markets and wi l l increase in the future. 
But consequent upon the rapid widespread use of the CRs as a medium of information for 
financial markets, stakeholders are beginning to question high CRs and thus the suitability 
and quality of CRs score. 
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The issues of relevance and usefulness of CR assessments have become very vital in today's 
corporate environment as well for the regulatory bodies, especially due to crises and failure 
of some major corporations. Therefore, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) believes 
that their bilateral monopoly of the financial markets by Standard and Poor and Moody's is a 
real threat through their negligence in determining the degree of real financial stability, as in 
the case o f Enron and WorldCom, for their evaluations could have previously been more 
accurate (SEC, 2003b). 
CRs have been described as "information equalizers" in their very important roles that are 
crucial to understanding companies' risks and potentials, especially concerning fiiture cash 
flows; and are important for new bond issues, because all investors should be looking to the 
CRs as a criterion for investment decisions and reviews on pricing, thus demonstrating the 
key role of CRs in presenting such information to investors (see Nayar and Rozeff, 1994; 
Gonzalez, 2004; Boot et al, 2006). 
Furthermore, there is a relationship between CRs and yield spreads, as realized yields on new 
debt issues reflect the quality of credit ratings via the cost of debt and price adjustments on 
the financial markets. So CRs are important determinants of the differences in yield spreads, 
for credit spreads rise as ratings deteriorate, and capital markets seem to validate the agencies' 
decisions by pricing lower rated bonds at higher average yields, and for new debt issues 
higher rated bonds at lower bond yields (see Altman, 1989; Cantor, 1994; Cantor and Packer, 
1995; Sengupta, 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). 
Credit ratings play a strong pivotal role in the financial capital market since they are 
important to all stakeholders, including investors who are looking to the CRs as guides to the 
credit risk of an issuer. As such they also demonstrate their key role in presenting this 
information to institutional investors, banks, and firms. Consequently, credit risk 
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management of an organisation is founded upon CRs, and the issuance of bonds in any 
market is now heavily dependent on the outcome of this evaluation. 
The credit quahty of an issuer is perceived from the CR; more specifically, CRs play a 
verification fianction in the fixed income markets by providing a clear assessment of credit 
through an alphabetical rating of debt, w^hich indicates the degree o f investment or 
speculative grade within a narrow sub-category (Steeman, 2002). The regulation of CR wi l l 
be discussed in the next section. 
3.2.8 Regulation of credit rating 
There has been much debate about whether the rating industry is organized or not, and their 
relevance to the financial markets; indeed some authors have argued that the rating industry 
should not be organized in the USA, and should be out o f the financial system ftilly. This is 
because the regulation of the rating industry affects the whole global economy, prevents 
competition by its market monopoly through its regulations, and arguably increases the risk 
of conflicts of interest. Yet, firms depend on CRs to indicate their creditworthiness in their 
ability to service debt interest and repayments (Partnoy, 1999; White, 2001; Steeman, 2002). 
The agencies themselves argue that they serve an important fiinction in capital markets a 
view reiterated by others, for example: 
"Credit ratings are the very structure of the marketplace. They are the risk language that we 
all speak and rely on." (Strauss, 2002) 
In addition, they argue that taking CRs out of regulation would be extremely disruptive and 
unnecessary as "replicating the expertise, experience, commitment and objectivity of the 
large agencies would be difficult i f not impossible to achieve" (Dominion Bond Rating 
Service, 2003). 
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CRs have an effect on the information to debt-market participants beyond publicly-available 
sources through its measurement of the firm's ability to repay and meet contracted debt 
obligations. Today, amidst immense economic progress, and a complexity of corporate 
groups in existence, the financing strategy of the firm has, as the first goal in its aim, to 
achieve a desired rating fi-om the rating agencies in order to give a signal to all the 
stakeholders, e.g., issuers, investors, regulators and different parties with in the firm's 
environment (see Reiter and Zlebart, 1991; Cantor, 1994; Gonzalez, 2004). 
In recent years, after many financial crises in the world, for example, the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, the collapse of giant firms, such as Qualcomm, Parmalat and the US energy 
corporation Eru^on, and especially the last subprime mortgage crisis in the US (Shipman, 
2007), it has been revealed that CRAs have demonstrably been unable to issue an early 
warning about such firms. This major criticism of these agencies is especially reinforced in 
that in most cases there have been many downgrades after the reflection of these events on 
the financial markets, which have increased significantly in spite of the success of the CRAs. 
These events have led to a backlash of criticism from various quarters on the performance of 
these agencies, because of large losses in the case of bonds, especially to investors. For 
example, four days before the Enron collapse the three big agencies had provided an 
investment grade for the US energy corporation, Enron. After the recent global fmancial 
crisis, SEC in the US and IOSCO started investigations into the role of CRAs to reconsider 
this issue. 
Most CRAs strive to acquire NRSRO recognition as this is a crucial prerequisite to grow their 
market share, because NRSRO has become global and a requirement to enter the markets by 
firms and attracting investors. From 1975 to 2003, only three CRAs had been granted 
NRSRO status: Standard and Poor, Moody's, and Fitch Ratings. After these, the SEC was 
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allowed to give NRSRO to some other agencies, such as A M Best and Dominion Bond 
Ratings Services, and two Japanese agencies (Japan Credit Rating Agency Ltd and Rating & 
Investment Information Inc). In 2007 two small US based agencies (Egan-Jones Ratings 
Company and LACE Financial) joined NRSRO ranks. 
From 1997-2005, SEC undertook several attempts to define the criteria, and in 1997 
published proposed guidelines for NRSRO recognition that have not been formally adopted, 
after which came substantial criticism about the procedures and condifions for granting 
designation based on recognition and status of the agency Within the US unspecified criteria 
this had produced an artificial barrier to entry for new rating agencies, which has determined 
the impact on competition in the financial markets (SEC, 2005). 
In March 2005, the SEC issued a proposed definition of NRSRO, and this put up for public 
discussion. On July 12 2006, SEC developed recognition criteria through NRSRO on the 
passing of the 'Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2006'. Barton (2006, p i 8), commenting 
on this, said "Despite this, given the position of the large credit rating agencies within US 
regulation it seems very unlikely that any significant changes wil l be made to the industry". 
However, given a wide range of issues under review, the SEC has argued whether or not 
CRAs should exist at all. The SEC has new authority to impose disclosure and filing 
requirements on CRAs seeking registration, prevents an increased ratings based on the 
requirement of the buyer to purchase another service fi-om the CRA, and it also prevents any 
government of a similar organization fi-om following its own NRSRO methodology and bring 
different information to the market. (SEC, 2003) notes that the NRSRO are under review. 
In 2007, after the subprime crisis, Christopher Cox, the Chairman of the SEC, testified at the 
US Senate Banking Committee in September 2007 that the SEC is examining whether the 
NRSROs were "unduly influenced by issuers and underwriters of structured products to 
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diverge from their stated methodologies and procedures for determining CRs in order to 
publish a higher rating" (Cox 2007). 
Later in 2008, and again following the subprime crisis it reviewed its code of conduct and 
published a consultation report on the role of CRAs in structured finance markets through 
IOSCO (2008) including specific recommendations to ensure the quality and integrity of 
structured finance ratings, such as prohibiting analysts from making proposals or 
recommendations regarding the design of structured finance products that the CRA rates, and 
requiring additional disclosures regarding the methodology and assumptions used to rate 
structured fmance products. 
In February 2008, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR, 2009) published 
a Consultation Report on the role of CRAs in the structured finance market to establish 
whether formal regulation of CRAs within the European Union should be introduced by the 
European Commission. A central repository for information is to be established to enable 
ratings to be assessed fi^om raw data and for summary information in to be published. 
The CRs issued by all main regulatory agencies, such as Standard and Poor's and Moody's, 
are widely accepted by the financial markets because of their expertise in CR and the 
perception by market of their being unbiased evaluators. Arguably, there are only three rating 
agencies that can be considered true global players; they are Standard and Poor's, Moody's, 
and Fitch (Steeman, 2002) 
Moody's ratings industry focuses on the default risk, and thus reflects on the probability of an 
expected loss arising fi-om inadequate fiiture cash flows to the firm which is greater for 
assessments in the speculative grades. Investors look at the investment-grade bonds through 
reference to the higher ratings of credit agencies to determine the allocation of their savings 
and to be reassured of the ability of firms to cover repayments through fiiture cash flows; and 
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firms prefer an investment grade being assigned following the application of the regulations, 
because this leads to a reassurance for investors regarding fiiture loan provision (Croyhy et 
al., 2006). 
3.2.9 Determinants of the credit rating process 
There are two types of rating "issue-specific credit ratings", and "issuer credit ratings". In the 
"issuer credit rating" category, there are counterparty ratings, corporate CRs, and sovereign 
CRs. The second class of rating is an "issue-specific credit rating". The rating agency looks to 
the creditworthiness of the guarantors^ and the quality of the collateral provided by the firm to 
cover contractual interests and capital repayments according to the maturity structure of 
payments. 
In general, CRAs process quantitative and qualitative information when formulating their 
rating of a firm's financial condition and legal analysis. However, the qualitative 
information used to perform the rating of financial strength is normally obtained fi-om a 
combination of both public financial sources and the firm's fmancial reports. The qualitative 
information analysis and private information are concerned with the quality of management 
and include a thorough review of the firm's competitiveness within its industry as well as the 
expected growth of the industry and its vulnerability to technological changes, regulatory 
changes and labour relations (Cantor and Packer, 1995). 
The rating process of the assessment of management includes meetings with the management 
of the issuer to review the firms review operating and financial plans, policies and strategies, 
to investigate how likely it is that it wi l l achieve its operational success, and its risk tolerance. 
A l l the information is reviewed and discussed by a rating committee with appropriate 
expertise in the relevant industry, which then votes on the recommendation. The issuer can 
appeal against the rating before it is made public by supplying new information. The rating 
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decision is usually issued four to six weeks after the agency is asked to rate a debt issue. 
Usually the ratings are reviewed once a year based on new fmancial reports, new business 
information and review meetings with management. A "credit watch" or "rating review" 
notice is issued i f there is reason to believe that the review may lead to a credit rating change. 
A change of rating has to be approved by the rating committee. 
While the rating agencies use similar methods and approaches to rate debt, they sometimes 
come up with different ratings of the same debt investment. Solicited or unsolicited CRs use 
same methodology and procedures (Fight, 2001), but it is different for solicited ratings which 
are made in co-operation with the f u m and depend on the interviews and contracts with the 
issuer, while unsolicited ratings depend on information that the credit agency collects, mainly 
fi-om the public domain (Steeman, 2002; Fight, 2001). 
The rationale for obtaining CRs has traditionally been viewed in the finance literature to be 
classified as economies of scale in information collection and the reduction of agency cost in 
the issuance of debt (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Mil lon and Thakor, 1985). The 
investors look to the CRs as the level of safety to guarantee for payment of its loans in the 
future, consequently, the CRA's reputation in the bond market plays a role of checks on the 
underwriter's reputation (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990). 
Cantor (1995) argues that in addirion to putting an agency's reputation at risk, inaccurate 
ratings might expose the credit agency to costly legal damages. However, the threat of legal 
liability for rating agencies has not yet materialized. Informal regulation is ever present. 
Specifically, market forces, confidence and judgement are by far the most significant 
regulatory influences affecting the ratings industry. No rating agency can afford to lose its 
market credibility, since ultimately it is merely a formal mechanism for expressing credit 
opinions (Fitch 2006). 
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Cantor (2001), now employed by Moody's, confirms that the CRA industry is subject to 
moral hazard. Every rating agency has a business incentive to assign high ratings to issuers, 
who are fi"ee to choose among the agencies. This incentive is offset by a rating agency's need 
to maintain its reputation in the market with investors, who drive the issuers' demand for 
CRs. Pressure on issuers to "shop" for the highest rating is increased by their use in 
regulation. Such practices could undermine the reliability of ratings over time. 
3.3 The Nature of Corporate Governance 
3.3.1 Introduction 
A credit assessment of improved financial strength is enhanced by corporate governance 
(CG) systems that aim to protect the various interests of stakeholders by balancing between 
these interests and those of owners and management. This issue of corporate governance is 
now discussed. Of course, management should maintain the assurance of their shareholders, 
but there is especially during times of rapid growth and also during downturns a more 
challenging role of management in running the corporations. They, in turn may try to find the 
best possible ways to maximize the wealth of the shareholders subject to meeting the basic 
needs of other stakeholders. But after many crises, which has led to businesses downfalls, 
(such as Bank of Credit and Commerce, Maxwell, WorldCom and Eru-on) the trust between 
the shareholders and their management is being questioned. Therefore, companies try to find 
a system which would guarantee the non-repetition of such crises again. As a result of this, 
corporate governance wi l l be the suitable solution to this problem expressing the organized 
relationship between managers and shareholders of the corporation. 
3.3.2 The nature and meaning of corporate governance 
Many studies have expounded the concept of corporate governance. The role of corporate 
governance inside firms follows the UK report fi-om the Cadbury Committee (1992 and 
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2004), whose authors define corporate governance as "the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled" (Cadbury, 2000). This is confirmed by others, such as Stapledon 
(1996) and Werder and Grundei (2001). These authors perceive corporate governance as "the 
framework to monitor the performance of these objectives and strategies" (Stephanie, 2005), 
and their definition means that the principles of best practice of corporate governance are 
congregating worldwide and each country only differentiates itself in applying corporate 
governance. Blair (1995) defines corporate governance by "the whole set of legal, cultural 
and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded companies can do, who 
controls them, how the control is exercised and how the risk and returns from the activities 
they undertake are allocated". 
In addition, the relationships between firms and their associated parties, particularly 
shareholders, are represented by many authors. For example, Parkinson (1994) defmes 
corporate governance by "the process o f supervision and control intended to ensure that the 
company's management acts in accordance with the interests of shareholders". Similar views 
pertaining to shareholders are expressed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who have identified 
"the relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
the corporation. Those parties include: the shareholders, the management and the board of 
directors." 
Further, some authors focus on the firms' stakeholders. Dahya et al. (1996, p71) define 
corporate governance as "the manner in which companies are controlled, and in which those 
responsible for the direction of companies are accountable to the stakeholders of these 
companies". A ftirther definition identifies "the system of checks and balance, both internal 
and external to companies, which ensure that companies discharge their accountability to all 
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their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activities" (Solomon and Solomon, 2007, p. 14). 
Good corporate governance systems have paradoxically been derived from the adverse 
impact that has happened fi-om the financial crises on various companies. The loss o f 
confidence of most investors towards the companies due to their inability to pay their debts 
has affected their credit ratings negatively. Consequently, most of these companies have 
begun to search for a system that enables them to monitor their activities effectively. 
Corporate governance has increased in importance in the last few years through the need to 
improve the rules of managing a corporation, and to increase the quality of the corporate 
operations and fijnctions through effective board performance. According to Mallin and 
Hussain (2003) corporate governance provides the board of directors with better rules and 
procedures. Furthermore, the importance of corporate governance is reflected in increased 
creditworthiness made more apparent in the financial statements of the corporation. Several 
authors, namely, Macdonald and Beattie (1993), Sheikh and Rees (1995), and Demirag and 
Solomon (2003) have highlighted the importance of corporate governance and the need for its 
application, due to these factors: 
• the separation of ownership and control, which is even more pronounced due to the 
geographical dispersion of shareholders, and the role of institutional investors in the 
generation of sometimes excessive short-term interests to the detriment of the 
longer-term economic and performance of the corporation; 
• collusion by some managers in expropriating other stakeholders' fiinds and their 
exertion of excessive power on the corporation; 
o the lack of clarity in a fi-amework for defining the role of the directors and the 
mechanism for controlling their behaviour; 
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• weaknesses in the role of internal and external auditors, such as lack of 
independence from the external auditors; 
• inadequacy in financial reporting standards such as a carelessness in interpretation, 
in meeting the needs of the organisation; and 
• a lack of flexibility in addressing new problems that a corporation may 
unexpectedly face. 
After this summary o f the importance of corporate governance, it is instructive to consider 
the views of authors, who identify problem areas in corporate governance. According to 
Whittington (1993) there are three problems related to corporate governance and the demand 
for information. Firstlly, shareholdings can be dispersed. Consequently, there can be high 
monitoring costs, especially with the existence of institutional investors. There is a need for 
control mechanisms to be extended upon directors, especially to protect smaller shareholders. 
Secondly, there can be a lack of auditors' independence, and also the external auditing 
process may not be performing its function properly which may lead to more creative 
accounting so that the financial reporting process may not be fulf i l l ing its role. Thirdly, too 
many small shareholders, in comparison to professional investors, would allow reporting be 
evaluated by the latter group and may indicate a tendency for the former not to monitor the 
information. Consequently, the demand for corporate information is related to the type of 
investors (see Whittington, 1993). 
It can be noticed that there is no agreed definition of corporate governance. However, all 
these definifions shed light on relationships between the firm's management, its board of 
directors, shareholders and stakeholders as mentioned by OECD (2004). A l l these parties wi l l 
be discussed in the next section. 
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3.3.3 The different corporate governance parties 
First of all, according to (Tricker, 1984) it is important to determine the parties who may 
impact on corporate governance. Basically, there are four main parties in the context of 
corporate governance: 
Firstly, the ownership structure: this embraces a combination of rights and responsibilities 
regarding a specific property into which money is invested through a separate corporation. 
Often the ownership is distanced from the management of the business. Furthermore, the 
growth of the corporation and its ownership wi l l normally lead to more complexities which 
require a separation between who owns the money invested and who runs the business. This 
separation between ownership and managers, who make the key decisions, necessitates a 
transfer of power from owners to managers (Monks and Minow, 2003). This separation 
highlights differences in personal interests, goals and strategies, and can impact on 
shareholder wealth which can create conflict in the relationship between shareholders and 
management. 
Secondly, the corporate directors can yield much power in making and taking decisions, 
which should enable the business to be run more effectively. But this power sometimes 
suffers from conflicts of interests, especially for family companies on account of certain 
family members being on the board of directors, and of course there can be non-family 
directors too, whose decisions taken and recommendations made can be compatible with 
their own interests, but perhaps contrary to the interests of the owners. 
Thirdly, managerial conflicts within a corporation can be more prevalent as a result of the 
diversification of a corporation's activities, and especially where there are many subsidiaries 
to the corporation. According to White (2004), strong conflicts can then arise between 
managers of corporations and associated interest groups. 
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Fourthly, institutional shareholders can have conflicting interests to other shareholders, with 
ramifications for the performance of the corporation. The latter arises because o f conflicts 
between owners and managers arising as a result of separation between them. Institutional 
shareholders tend to concentrate ownership in the hands of a few shareholders. 
Consequently, firms may instead try to disperse the ownership between many types of 
shareholders. Corporate governance may help reduce conflict of interest between owners and 
managers (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Donaldson and Davis, 1994), since: 
• corporate governance regulates the relationship between parties to the 
organisation; 
• it regulates the manager's behaviour in the corporation; 
• it provides instruments for effective monitoring and rewarding executive 
performance and actions; and 
• it allows selection of a superintending committee to protect the interests of 
shareholders. 
In 1999, the OECD issued the principles of corporate governance, which represent a guide by 
which each company should follow. These principles are; 
• the corporate governance framework should protect the rights of shareholders and 
their ownership interests; 
• the corporate governance framework should ensure equitable treatments of 
shareholders, including equal rights to those of minority parties or foreigners; 
• the fi-amework of corporate governance should help develop efficiency and 
performance of corporations in the market and new laws should ensure strong bases 
for corporate governance; 
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• the corporate governance fi^mework should determine the fiinction and 
responsibilities of the board of directors, ensuring the board of directors' 
accountability to shareholders, and assist in the monitoring role of managing 
corporate performance on behalf of shareholders through effective corporate 
governance; 
• the corporate governance framework should promote good accounting practice in 
relation to the reporting of financial statements and internal performance, 
measurement and control; and finally, 
• the corporate governance fi-amework should ensure cooperation between the 
corporation and its stakeholders through a clear definition of the legal rights of 
stakeholders and effective and well defined contractual laws between agent 
(directors/managers) and principals (shareholders). 
3.4 Summary 
Credit rating is an evaluation process that enables investors to share financial and non-
financial information regarding the ability of firms to cover debt interest and capital 
repayments in a timely marmer. Regulation has played an important part in establishing the 
success of the credit rating industry through NRSOR as one of the major sources of 
information for investors. Corporate governance increases this regulatory importance but at 
the same time competition is restricted by the difficultly of obtaining NRSRO status. 
This chapter has reviewed the credit rating industry, including its history, and some key 
current issues that face the industry. Many steps and procedures have been taken by the credit 
rating agencies during the last ten years to improve the performance of credit ratings as 
measures of relative risk for the protection of the investors, but are they not intended to 
provide a measure of the absolute level of risk of an organisation or track all points through 
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the business cycle. The credit rating market is dominated by three major companies through 
NRSOR, although more credit rating information is required about the financial markets, for 
both domestic and foreign investors. Credit ratings appear to be relatively stable because 
credit ratings attempt to rate "through the cycle", but there is evidence that when ratings do 
change they are downgraded more frequently than upgraded; whilst changes and ratings of 
new issues tend to be procyclical, which have an enhancing effect on trading volume and 
value. 
Standard and Poor's (2002), the international credit rating agency and financial services 
company, has undertaken systematic and comprehensive research into disclosure and 
international corporate governance patterns of major public companies around the world. 
They recommend that the use of sound principles of corporate governance wi l l improve 
credit rating information which is timely, cost efficient and relevant to investors. This 
underlines again the importance of corporate governance and the informational content of 
credit ratings (Standard and Poor's, 2002). 
Consequently, this chapter has provided an introduction to the nature of both credit rating and 
corporate governance to underpin the main objective of the study. Recognising both concepts 
wi l l aid this investigation into the influence of applying recommended corporate governance 
codes of practise in the Jordanian environment on the credit rating of the Jordanian listed 
companies. Many corporate governance variables wil l be chosen from previous literature as 
being potentially important for use in explaining credit ratings. This relationship between CR 
and corporate governance wi l l be discussed in detail in Chapters Four. 
After discussing the nature of credit rating and corporate governance, the next chapter wi l l 
present the empirical studies related credit rating and corporate governance. 
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C H A P T E R F O U R : E M P I R I C A L E V I D E N C E O N C R E D I T R A T I N G 
AND C O R P O R A T E G O V E R N A N C E 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last decade especially, many firms have grown to be more strongly interested in 
obtaining a higher CR, and compete with one another to that aim. In attempting to fu l f i l l the 
wishes of all stakeholder companies, in response pressure fi-om them, aspire to a higher CR in 
order to expand their investor base and to generate an increase in the share price. 
The main aim of a corporate CR is an independent assessment of a firm's ability to generate 
future net cash inflows. These future cash flows affect the creditworthiness of the firm to the 
extent that they can cover debt service costs and principal repayments to bondholders in a 
timely fashion. So, the anticipated future cash flows to the firm are very important in 
measuring CR as they indicate the ability of the firm to meet its financial obligations. But it is 
not just about future cash flows, for a CRA depends on a variety of different information 
from public and private sources through both quantitative and qualitative corporate 
information. The CRA analyses those information using different methods to obtain final 
results on the CR, which represent to a large extent the opinion of the agency's rating about 
future cash flows to the firm and reflects the agency's opinion regarding the entity's 
creditworthiness pertaining to its financial obligations (Standard and Poor's, 2002; Gray et 
al., 2006; Skaife et al, 2006). 
Many studies wi l l be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. Summary tables of all studies 
discussed in this chapter are presented at the end of each section. These tables provide further 
details of samples and methodologies used and a short overview of research results. This 
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chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the determinants of credit ratings studies 
including prediction o f credit ratings and bankruptcy. In section 4.3 corporate governance 
aspects are reviewed. Section 4.4 is devoted to the corporate governance effect on credit 
ratings. Finally section 4.5 covers the summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Studies which Examine the Determinants of Credit Rating 
This section considers studies that examine the determinants of CRs, and how they relate to 
both rating systems and rating agencies. As has been mentioned briefly, many discuss the 
process of CR applying financial accounting information to both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, which depend on the availability of the firm's information. These studies discuss 
and try to create an acceptable model of approach. They assume that the grades assigned by 
financial analysts of CRAs can be used to investigate the determinants of CR. Some of these 
studies try to compare products of CRAs, firm's CRs, different models, capital market 
conditions, accounting information and fmancial information. Many studies use different 
measures for credit rating, such as sovereign credit rating, and model long-term credit rating 
and short-term credit rating and so on (Poon, and Chan, 2008). 
Most of the literature review discusses the determinants of CRs fi-om the perspective of an 
entity rating for firms as well as a component CR (bond rating) through the use of different 
statistical models to differentiate between various grades of CR from different CRAs. 
Consequently, many studies have used different fmancial ratios to distinguish between low 
and high risk corporations through the use of Multiple Discriminate Analysis (MDA). 
Indeed, some studies have used M D A models to explain fuin bankruptcy, such as the classic 
one by Horrigan (1966) in the United States. Although most studies use MDA, other models 
have been developed, such as, ordered probit models, logistic models, a multidimensional 
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scaling approach (MDS) and factor analysis. For example, a multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
technique has been used for predicting firms' default, such as in studies by Mar-Molinero et 
ai, (1996), and Mar-Molinero (2001). Also Cheung (1996) has used an ordered probit model 
to explain CR by assessing various microeconomic factors. 
Most studies have either made a comparison between different techniques or assessed the 
determinants of CRs, but few studies have used prediction models to test how effectively 
credit ratings of the major CRAs actually are in predicting the probability of default. These 
studies have shed light on determining whether or not bond ratings can predict fmancial 
distress, that is, whether low-rated firms are more likely to default than high rated bonds. 
Research prediction accuracy regarding the correct model continues. Some models can be 
particularly complex but, of course, perfect prediction accuracy of credit is not possible. Yet, 
tendency towards sophistication is arguably preferred to a more conventional methodology, 
although the role of the analyst in making judgmental decisions as part of the ratings' input; 
is still needed. 
Pons and Kimball (1991) present a model for predictive accuracy of lower CRs of defaulted 
issuers. They investigated the predictive accuracy of different classifications using Moody's 
CR application data during the period from 1970 to 1990. They found that on average, when 
default occurs, over the last twenty-one years, 4.2% of speculative-grade issuers defaulted 
within one year, which is compared with a rate between 4.2% and 0.07% of investment-grade 
issuers. On average, about 0.12% of issuers rated Aaa defaulted to 19.71 % of issuers rated B. 
The default rates for five year holding periods climbed uniformly, and for the average default 
rates for ten-year holding periods and fifteen-year holding periods the same pattern held 
confirming the intended objective of their study which showed that ratings do have predictive 
power for financial distress. 
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The CRs should reflect future cash flows to the firm, and gives the likely result of exposed 
corporate bankruptcies, although CR agencies argue that ratings do not infer corporate 
bankruptcy risk. A higher CR is a result of perceived strong fiiture cash flows to the firm, and 
favourable financial accounting assessments. At the same time, a lower rating is more closely 
related to default, through poorer anticipated future cash flows than a higher rating (Gray et 
al., 2006). 
Prediction of bankruptcy should clearly have a crucial impact on a firm's CR. So, bankruptcy 
models play an important role in measuring and monitoring credit risk (Stein, 2002). Many 
previous studies contain a number of different measures and different models, which use 
financial accounting ratios and different information dependent on the available information 
on companies to predict a firm's credit rating and possible bankruptcy. Altman (1968) who is 
the pioneer for this branch of research explained corporate bankruptcy status in the US based 
on a set of accounting and financial variables and thereby improved the accuracy of 
traditional ratio analysis. 
Given small differences in categorization classes, prediction of CRs is more complex than the 
prediction of bankruptcy, and tries to quantify the relationship between financial and 
industry data and CRs. Studies of bond rating prediction models for at least 40 years have 
been published, attempting to model agency credit ratings using financial ratios, non financial 
data, and qualitative information. A wide range of different methodologies has been used, 
which have evolved and become more sophisticated over time. Like the bankruptcy 
prediction models presented in the last review, CRs predictor models are vital for assessing 
and monitoring risk, A number of early studies have developed a statistical model based on 
historic and publicly available information, which helps in predicting the credit rating and 
chose either a regression-based approach (Pogue and Soldofsky 1969; West 1970) or 
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multivariate analysis (Horrigan, 1966). These studies assess credit rating applying available 
financial accounting information to both qualitative and quantitative methods, for example, 
through the use of a number of fmancial ratios such as net working capital, long-term 
debt/assets, and net income/total assets to replicate CRs. The relationship between CR and 
financial and industry data is widely reported in literature studies, and analysed through 
categorical dependent variables through appropriate econometric techniques. 
Accordingly, Horrigan's (1966) two-step analytical approach was the first and main early 
study in this area to estimate and determine the characteristics of the bond issuing firms in 
order to predict their bond rating based on their financial ratios and characteristics of the 
bond rating. He used ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression on 9 grades of bond ratings 
with various combinations of variables, from selected accounting data, to predict the ratings 
of newly issued bonds as well as any changes in bond rating from 1961-1964. He could 
explain 65% of variation in the dependent variable and found that total assets had the most 
significant impact on bond ratings. The result of these predictions was correct for 58% of the 
Moody's rating and for 52% of Standards and Poor's rating. However, since Horrigan's 
study there are scores of studies that have extended his initial research using more 
sophisticated statistical techniques, such as logistic regression and probit models as discussed 
later, and a wider range of accounting and non-accounting variables. 
In a classic paper, Pogue and Soldofsky (1969) used logistic regression analysis for the top 
four bond ratings as the dependent variable and selected accounting variables as the 
independent variables. They used only two of four rating categories at a time and assigned 
numerical values (1 ,0) for the dummy dependent variable to two of the CR categories for 
bonds. This was in order to predict the probability o f the odds ratio through the independent 
variables, namely, profitability, size, risk and leverage, and to differentiate between the two. 
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So, the model was based on the difference between an upper (Aaa and A) rating and a lower 
(Caa, and C bond) rating for which they coded the ordinal bond ratings onto an even interval 
scale, despite the fact that different rating grades do not fall at equal intervals on a scale from 
a low to high probability of default. Their study was based on small sample sizes of 10 bonds 
in each rating category. This study reports on more highly significant effects of leverage and 
profitability on bond ratings. 
Discriminant analysis was first proposed by Fisher (1936) as a discrimination and 
classification technique. This was applied to credit rating by Horrigan (1966), but was later 
criticised by West (1970) as it mainly used only accounting variables as the independent 
variables, and there was a lack of reference to previous research in this area. Fisher (1959) 
went on to look at the determinants of the risk premium on corporate bonds. West (1970) 
developed a statistical model based on historic and publicly available information, which 
helped in predicting the CR using a regression-based approach, based on financial accounting 
information, namely, financial ratios representing four independent variables. These 
independent variables are of particular interest and represent reliability, capital structure and 
marketability. He applied a logarithmic estimation using bond ratings as in the dependent 
variable as Fisher's study. This study's R-square result was higher than Horrigan's results, 
with R-squares ranging 0.7 to 0.8. Furthermore, the simpler zero-one classification of Pogue 
and Soldofsky (1969) was not a criticism of the West and Horrigan models. Horrigan used 
accounting-based measures; indeed. Philips (1975) and Ross (1976) observed that bond rating 
processes rely on the firm's accounts. By contract West largely used market-based measures 
for the selection o f the independent variables. 
West's (1970) four ratios for the prediction of CRs correctly predicted 63% of Moody's 
ratings for a 1961 cross-section. Ang and Patel (1975) provided predictive evidence about the 
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bond rating method, the result of these predicting approximately 60-80% of their classified 
sample of 30 bond ratings correctly. The result of these studies succeeded in correctly 
predicting credit rating in the holdout sample for 55% of cases for Horrigan (1966) and 62% 
for West (1970). 
Throughout the late 1970's and 1980's a variety of studies used MDA to predict bond ratings. 
The first was Pinches and Mingo (1973, 1975) and Altman and Katz (1976) followed a two-
step approach for the allocation of rating to particular bond issues. In the first study, they 
used six variables after screening a set of potentially important independent variables such as 
size, leverage, long-term and short-term capital intensity, return on investment, earnings' 
stability, and debt coverage. They developed a bond rating model using factor analysis to 
determine the most appropriate financial and accounting variables to use for the subsequent 
multiple discriminant analysis. They found six factors encapsulating various measures, 
namely, issue size, long-term debt to total assets, net income to total assets, years of 
consecutive dividends, net income plus interest to interest, and subordination status taking a 
zero-one dummy variable. Subsequent research also used multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA) to classify bonds into rating classes. 
The second study [see Pinches and Mingo (1973); 1975] used multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA) to analyse five Moody bond rating categories (i.e. Aa to B bond ratings) using 
financial ratios as input factors by constructing linear fiinctions for categorizing bonds within 
rating categories, and differentiating between them via the 'between categories group 
variance'. Their model performed very poorly for Baa rated bonds, for which their model 
accurately predicted only 69% of the sample. Although using M D A gives different results for 
rating categories, the ordinal nature of CRs from higher ratings to lower ratings does not 
necessarily capture distinctions, such as A A A ratings reflecting more creditworthiness for the 
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firm than A A . But their new approach allowed them to slightly increase their prediction rate. 
As a result Pinches and Mingo (1973) succeeded in predicting approximately 69% of their 
sample correctly (compared to West's (1970) 63%). 
Accordingly, Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998) also used an ordered probit methodology to 
categorize rated bonds according to Standard and Poor's rating categories. They investigated 
the accepted view of the hazard problem of default based on panel data for studying grades 
issued by rating agencies; they also used their model for studying changes in rating standards 
over time, using explanatory variables, such as interest coverage. For some the US credit 
rating assessments downgraded for both rating agencies, by persistently lowering perceived 
CR quality on by raising standards. Their findings supported the latter explanation. 
Jackson and Boyd (1988) modelled bond rating behaviour using probit analysis. Gentry et al., 
(1988) also used probit analysis to estimate a model with a high classification accuracy using 
ratios and cash flow components. These models generally classify 55% to 65% of the hold-
out sample correctly. Blume et al., (1998) findings disappeared, and in some cases, have been 
reversed. However, Reiter and Ziebart, (1991) concluded that poor performance of the 
models may be due to a prediction problem rather than an inaccurate agency estimated credit 
ratings. O f course, there are homogeneity issues, since these different findings were caused 
by different samples, it is impossible to determine which theory is correct; fiirthermore 
findings from investigations into Standard and Poor's ratings cannot be generalised for other 
CRAs, apart from the use of non-investment grade bonds and different methodologies 
(Amato and Furfine, 2004). 
Ederington (1985) used an unordered multinomial logit model in his comparison of bond 
rating models comparing this to each of the statistical methods discussed so far. An 
unordered model allows the relative importance of different independent variables to vary 
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across rating classifications but does not make use of the a priori knowledge that bond ratings 
are ordered. Ederington found that the ordered probit and unordered logit outperformed the 
models estimated using ordinary least square (OLS) and multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA). The logit model performed best in the estimation sample where 70% of ratings were 
correctly classified, and on average probit and logit analysis correctly classified and about 
14% more of the ratings than OLS or MDA. Gentry, Newbold and Whitford (1988) also 
compared these three methods in the analysis of bankrupt firms using cash flow data and 
confirmed the superiority of probit. 
According to Matolcy and Lianto (1995), Blume et al (1998), and Gray et al., (2006) in the 
recent years credit rating assessments have increasingly downgraded rather that upgraded for 
both major rating agencies, by raising standards applied and by persistently lowering 
perceived CR quality. Matocly and Lianto (1995) used a cross-sectional regression approach 
to examine credit rating on a sample of non-financial Australian firms, by assessing how CR 
revisions were important to the stock prices through the incremental information content 
associated with the ratings. The main result of their study was a significant effect for 
incremental information content on the abnormal performance of a downgrade, but not for 
upgrades. 
Cheung (1996) studied the relationship between the Canadian provincial debt ratings and 
several economic variables. She used an ordered probit model to explain the CR levels by 
analysing the relationship between economic variables and credit ratings by Standard and 
Poor's, and that the level of the CR depends significantly on the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Poon et al., (1999) analysed the determinants of Moody's bank ratings in June 1997 through 
a sample of 130 different Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSRs). This was timely due to 
Moody's Investors Services (MIS) offering a new rating service for BFSRs in 1995. This 
81 
study developed a suitable methodology by developing logistic regression models that help to 
explain and predict BFSRs through many accounting and financial variables. The main result 
of this study was to establish a relationship between bank's financial strength rating and 
selected variables, such as profitability, loan provision ratios, dimensions of risk, short term 
debt rating (STDR), and long term debt rating (LTDR). 
Neural networks have also been used in CR studies. They are quantitative techniques 
motivated by the operations of the human brain as being influential in problem solving. 
Gately (1996, p. 147) defined neural networks as "an artificial intelligence problem solving 
computer program that learns through a training process of trial and error". Therefore, neural 
networks' building requires a training process, and the linear or non-linear variables in the 
training procedure help distinguish variables for a better decision-making outcome. In the 
credit ratings area, neural networks can be distinguished from other statistical techniques. A 
few credit rating models using probabilistic neural nets have been investigated (Dutta and 
Shekhar, 1988; Singleton and Surkan, 1990; Kim and Lee, 1995; Moody and Utans, 1995; Tu 
1996; Chaveesuk et al., 1997; Shin and Han, 1999; Daniels and Kamp, 1999; Piramuthu 
1999; Maher and Sen, 1997; Griffiths and Beynon, 2005; Kim, 2005). Dutta and Shekhar's 
(1988) study differed from earlier research as other studies usually predicted a wide range of 
rating categories. They used financial ratios and a qualitative measure to model bond ratings 
and compared results using classification techniques, such as linear regression model and a 
neural network. They distinguished between two groups o f bonds: A A and non-AA. The 
neural network classified more correctly bond ratings than the linear regression model. In 
addition, whenever the neural network model misclassified a bond, it was o f f the mark by at 
most one rating class whereas the regression model was often o f f by several rating classes. 
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Singleton and Surkan (1990) used seven different fmancial ratios to compare the performance 
of a neural network with an M D A model. The neural network model had the highest correct 
classification rate when compared with the M D A model. Moody and Utans (1995) and 
Daniels and Kamp (1999), showed that neural networks can classify 60% - 70% of the 
observations correctly. By comparison, where the same data have also been used to estimate 
models using logistic regression, the results ranged from 60%-62%. 
Chaveesuk et al., (1997) argue that, of the available statistical approaches, logistic regression 
is very well suited to modelling bond ratings. They compared results using a neural network 
with logistic regression and found that there is not much difference between the best neural 
network design and the best logistic regression model. 
Kwon et al., (1997) developed the use of neural networks as a prediction modelling technique 
for credit rating by using an ordinal pairwise partitioning approach to improve the predictive 
performance of their neural network, which gave better results than conventional multivariate 
disciriminant analysis. 
As with Dutta and Shekhar (1988) they showed that a neural network performs slightly better 
than the logistic regression in terms of correct classification. When the methods misclassified 
a bond, the logistic regression misses by more classes slightly more often than the network. 
Discriminant analysis has better classification ability but worse prediction ability, whereas 
logistic regression has a relatively better prediction capability. 
Models for CR prediction have also been applied by Kim (2005). His study applied an 
advanced approach to predicting bond ratings based only on publicly available information 
that help to capture a dynamic relationship between input and output variables through many 
intervening variables. The main result of this study was that bond ratings could be predicted 
quite accurately, and critical variables were identified successfully. 
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However, there are some studies which have used prediction models for non-corporate 
ratings. Similar methods have been applied to predict municipal bond ratings as a determinant 
for the credit rating. Accordingly, researchers have sought to investigate this relationship, one 
of the earliest studies having been conducted by Carleton and Lemer (1969) using multiple 
discriminant analysis. Loviscek and Crowley (1990) also used ordered probit models which 
were shown to be superior to discriminant analysis. 
By looking at the use of the CR as a dependent variable and independent-related variables, 
Liu and Seyyed (1991) examined the impact of socioeconomic characteristics and bond 
ratings of a municipal bond issuer on its borrowing cost. Results of the study implied that 
borrowing costs are significantly affected by revenues, indebtedness and unemployment 
figures. In the Commonwealth of Virginia, Badu et al., (2002) found a negative relationship 
between CR and net interest cost for municipal bonds. 
Cantor and Packer (1996) examined the relationship between CR and determinants by 
analysing the rating assigned in the year 1995 through two rating agencies, namely. Standard 
and Poor's and Moody's. Testing various determinants for their influence on the actual 
rating, they used different economic factors, such as growth of GDP, income per capital, 
external debt, external balance, fiscal balance, inflation rate, indicators for economic 
development and default history on foreign currency debt. They examined the CRs of 49 
sovereign bonds through the use of ordinary least squares regression analysis, and concluded 
that the different economic variables had a clear impact on sovereign CRs. They concluded 
that only per capital income, GDP growth, inflation, external debt, economic development, 
and default history play an important role in determining a country's rating. Bennell et al., 
(2006) indicate that using neural networks for investigating sovereign CR are much better 
than ordered probit model, which considered the most successful econometric approach. 
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Adams et al., (2003) used multinomial logit and probit model for examining the determinants 
of CRs in the UK insurance industry. They also investigated which insurance companies were 
more likely to seek a rating. For this purpose they used firm characteristics variables, such as 
leverage, profitability, liquidity, grow^, company size and business activity. A l l these 
variables were significant in the determinants of the CR of the UK insurance firms; 
specifically they found that CRs were positively related to profitability, liquidity, growth and 
business type, and negatively related to leverage, company size and reinsurance. 
In a recent study, Ashbaugh, Skaife et al., (2006) used bond rating models as a basis for their 
selection of firm characteristic variables, and which focused on the impact of the strength of 
corporate governance characteristics on the CR of the firm. Their use of firm characteristic 
variables comprised leverage, return on assets, consecutive losses in the past two years, size, 
subordinated debt and capital intensity. A l l these variables along with selected governance 
variables were demonstrated to be significant in explaining CR differences. They found that 
credit ratings were negatively associated with the number of block holders and CEO power, 
and positively related to takeover defences, accrual quality, earnings' timeliness, board 
independence, board stock ownership, and board expertise. 
Gray et al. (2006) used a similar approach to Blume et al. (1998). They used an ordered 
probit model to examine the relationship between CR and explanatory variables to categorize 
Standard and Poor's rated bonds for the period 1995-2002 on a sample Australian firms.. The 
main result o f their study indicated that both leverage ratios and interest coverage had the 
most pronounced effect on credit ratings, whilst they also gave importance to the effect of 
profitability variables and industry concentration on credit rating, and the effect of financial 
variables on credit rating in discriminating between A- and BBB- ratings. Their results also 
confirmed Blume et al., (1998) findings of increasing rating standards, which puts slightly 
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more weight on the theory that Standard and Poor's ratings' standards have indeed become 
more stringent over time. Appendix 4.1 contains a summary of previous studies. 
The next section wi l l briefly review of the literature according to the ownership structure, 
financial transparency and corporate governance and how they affect on credit ratings. 
4.3 Review of Literature Considering Corporate Governance and its 
Relationship with Credit Ratings 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This section reviews several contributions from previous studies, joining together two 
subjects, namely CR and corporate governance. Many previous studies have investigated a 
corporation's CR by relating it to many variables, such as firm characteristics, and the cost o f 
debt, (for example, see Horrigan, 1966 and Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979). These studies ignored 
the governance mechanism. Yet, corporate governance was introduced to safeguard the assets 
of the firm and the interests of stakeholders, such as shareholders and bondholders. 
Governance mechanisms are designed for regulating the relationship between managers and 
stakeholders, and controlling management behaviour in line with the interests of 
stakeholders. So, corporate governance attempts to address conflicts between managers and 
shareholders and between shareholders, and bondholders. 
4.3.2 Why does corporate governance affect a firm's credit rating? 
CRAs were established for the assessment of a firm's CR through standards and mechanisms 
based on a firm's ability to generate future net cash inflows to the firm. Consequently, the 
distribution of future cash flows between stakeholders, especially to bondholders is 
important. Rating agencies' assessments depend on the creditworthiness of the firm which in 
turn reflects its ability to cover debt service costs and principal payments to bondholders 
86 
through the probability of sufficient future cash flows. Consequently, a firm's rating depends 
on the strength of the fiiture cash flows to the firm, and the likelihood of attaining future cash 
flows to the firm. A greater likelihood of default wi l l lower its rating as a result (Ashbough-
Skaife et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, it is pertinent to refer back to the seminal works of Jensen and Meckling (1967) 
and Watts (1977) regarding the separation between principal (owners) and agent (managers), 
because ownership may be distanced from control o f a corporation's operations, yet at the 
same time there is a role for managers of a firm's business. This separation between two 
parties (stakeholders and managers) creates an agency problem. 
This separation leads to information asymmetry problems between them and creates a moral 
hazard problem. Consequently, managers try to increase self-wealth by decreasing owners' 
wealth through consumption of perquisites, empire building, shirking, and overcompensation. 
Therefore, the conflict between both parties gives rise to agency costs, which are the costs of 
monitoring the management's behaviour in relation the firm's output, arising from 
contracting between these two parties. 
According to the above, agency theory seeks to explain the separation of ownership and 
control in corporate organisations, and identify information asymmetry problems between 
managers and stakeholders and between bondholders and shareholders, leading to two types 
of agency conflict, which can lead to an increase in the risk of firm default with its effect on 
all stakeholders, especially bondholders, because of reduced fiiture cash flows to the firm and 
its inability to service payments of debt which may in the end decrease in its value. 
Therefore, a higher default risk is a reflection of a lower CR triggered by CR assessments of 
lower future cash flows to the fum (Ashbough-Skaife et a/., 2006). 
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An agency theory framework posits a conflict between two types, firstly, between managers 
and shareholders, and secondly, between stakeholders, especially, between shareholders and 
bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Watts, 1977). This conflict between 
shareholders and bondholders is heightened by possible changes in future cash flows, arising 
because shareholders have incentives to undertake transfer o f wealth to themselves by 
different methods at the expense o f bondholders. However, the default probability associated 
with the variance of fiiture cash flows can change as a result o f wealth-transfer effects by 
shareholders to themselves that can take different forms. Bondholders would bear higher risk 
of default because of the change in fiiture cash flows and suffer a worse situation compared 
with shareholders (Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, Ashbough-Skaife et al., (2006) have argued that the corporate governance 
mechanism effect on CRs of the controlling performance of management leads to agency 
costs because of the conflict between the two parties, namely, managers and shareholders, 
and also because of the conflict between bondholders and shareholders. In order to reduce the 
agency conflict between those parties, recommended practices have been required by 
Standards and Poor's (2002), dealing with ownership structure and influence, financial 
stakeholder rights and relations, fmancial transparency, and board structure and processes. 
Corporate governance arose to address the regulation of the relationships between all parties 
to an organisation, such as managers, shareholders and bondholders, through mechanisms and 
roles for independent monitoring of management to increase firm value by effective positive 
managerial decision-making and by a reduction in opportunistic management behaviour. 
Corporate governance directives should fetch benefits to all stakeholders by more effective 
managerial decision-making through limiting opportunistic management behaviour. 
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On the other hand, weak corporate governance mechanisms have an effect on the distribution 
of fiiture cash flows to the firm through the default risk of payments to stakeholders that 
result from weaker governance. Weak governance leads to greater default resulting in a lower 
rating from agencies and so corporate governance plays a role in the application of better 
mechanisms to mitigate conflict between the interests of all parties, such as managers, 
shareholders and bondholders. 
Thus, the corporate governance mechanism plays an important role in the regulation of the 
relationship between managers and all stakeholders. Additional importance is attached to the 
regulation of the relationship between bondholders and shareholders through better 
monitoring of management (Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). 
So, some authors have argued that some elements of governance mechanisms can have a 
negative impact on bondholders, such as when shareholders or subsets of shareholders are 
more likely to obtain more power in their hands (Fitch Ratings, 2004). Some parties to a firm 
can exercise power to influence the management o f the f u n by obtaining priority in 
distribution payouts and preferential treatment of other parties o f the frnn, such as 
shareholders, through dividend or share re-purchase or through greenmail to bring about a 
stock price increase to stave o f f an unwanted takeover (Dann and DeAngelo, 1983). 
Consequently, some elements of corporate governance structure may give shareholders more 
power in influencing management decisions to invest in riskier projects, and engage in 
ownership structure changes leading to a negative effect on bondholders' interests. Use o f 
this shareholder voting power can harm bondholders, by default of their expected fiiture cash 
flows, and also the frnn through an inferior risk profile, which can result in a lower CR. 
Shareholder rights, affecting wealth-transfers from bondholders to themselves because o f 
shareholder practices, influence whether firms, for example, wi l l approve a merger or 
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acquisition according to shareholder interests with potentially harmful effects on 
bondholders. Consequently, bondholders can be less secure and do not generally benefit from 
shareholders having greater power from governance mechanisms because of the implications 
of default risk for bondholders and credit rating (Asquith and Wizman, 1990; Warga and 
Welch, 1993; Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). Many variables can be mentioned in terms of 
corporate governance. The next section discusses this issue. 
4.3.3 Corporate covernance attributes 
According to various authors, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gibson (2003), Singh and 
Vinnicombe (2004), and Al-Khouri (2005), many developing countries do not have much 
concern for the importance of corpoprate governance, yet there should be concern given the 
ways in which corpoprate governance is applied in the developed countries, especially the 
U.S.A and many of the European countries, and given the publications of empirical studies, 
which have highlighted the role of corpoprate governance in improving corporate behaviour. 
The more immediate challenge for the researcher is to determine the main variables, which 
pertain to corporate governance. 
As the role of corpoprate governance because more prominent, many studies look for 
investigating empirically the relationship between corpoprate governance and many different 
aspects, such as: company performance (e.g., Kato and Long, 2005; Kula, 2005; Zheka, 2006; 
and Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), company value (e.g., Al-Khouri, 2005; Shen et al., 2006; and 
Huang et al., 2007) and the effect on CRs (e.g., Sengupta, 1998; Bhojrajand Sengupta, 2003; 
Ashbough-Skaife., et al,. 2006). The previous studies on corpoprate governance tend to focus 
on one attribute, e.g., board independence, as opposed to studying a broad set of governance 
attributes intended to protect stakeholders' claims to firms' resources (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Sengupta 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2000; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). The 
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main objective of presenting these studies is to recognise the variables of corpoprate 
governance that have been examined. 
Skaefe et al., (2006) suggest that some variables may 'complement' each other in supporting 
stakeholders, whereas other governance factors may be regarded as 'substitutes'; yet their 
conclusions reveal that only governance variables may give rise to an 'omitted variables' 
problem. 
In the light of such recommendations and of key corpoprate governance practices in Jordan it 
is important to select appropriate governance attributes that can be measured. It is essential 
therefore to focus on which variables represent the key features of good governance practices 
for Jordanian firms. Furthermore, Standard and Poor's international agency has under taken 
systematic and comprehensive research on corpoprate governance patterns, including 
'ownership structure and influence', 'financial transparency and disclosure', and 'board 
structure and processes' (Standard and Poor's, 2002). They suggest that corpoprate 
governance attributes impact on firms' CRs. 
4.3.3.1 Ownership structure and influence 
Ownership refers to the combination of rights and responsibilities regarding a specific 
property. Yet, owners of companies typically do not manage the firm's assets especially in the 
case of large-public corporations. This leads to issues arising fi-om a separation between those 
who own the businesses and those who run them. Professional managers (agents) are hired to 
operate the firm creating the potential for moral hazard problems between shareholders and 
their agents. This separation wi l l transfer the power fi-om shareholder to management who 
should be able to run the business more effectively (Monks and Minow, 2003). Agency-
theoretic issues wil l be considered in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Institutional investors are considered as an important part of the corpoprate governance 
mechanisms, for institutional ownership is effectively a block-holder in the corporation with 
significant power to monitor the corporation executives (Lin et al., 2007). Large institutional 
investors or block holders prefer to hold a more significant proportion of stock than 
individual investors, and wi l l likely gain a strong equity or debt position in the business, 
which may to some extent constrain the fi-eedom of companies in their decision-making. As 
such, they have an incentive to collect information and monitor managers which helps them 
in avoiding the free-rider problem. Institutional investors can monitor a firm's executives 
better than minority shareholders, to ensure that management practices lead to maximisation 
of firm value. They can be seen as the informed investors and they have ability to influence 
the firm's operations through pressure on management or in some cases even force out 
specific managers from the board using their special voting rights in the firm (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Ownership structure, according to Al-Ajlan (2005), represents an important 
factor in shaping the corpoprate governance systems in any country. 
There are many factors, which have an effect on ownership structure in different countries, 
such as, culture, law, strategies, objectives and regulations (Stephanie, 2005). Consequently, 
there are some differences in the ownership structures between countries due to various 
factors, which shape ownership structure. Accordingly, Thomson and Pederson (1997; cited 
in Al-Ajlan 2005) argue that the differences in legislation from coimtry to country affect 
companies' financial structure and consequently have an effect on the ownership structure. 
Additionally, there are differences in the capital market regulations in some developed 
countries. Also, there are many types of ownership structure, which include internal and 
external constituents, such as, ownership from outside (outside driven), ownership 
concentration (dominant or a large part of the ownership by the management), and ownership 
situation (inside driven). Thus, dispersion can generate conflict between different parties to 
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the corporation. Concentration of ownership refers to the group who has the most influence 
among the equity owners; consequently it reflects the power of shareholders to influence 
managers. Concentrations of ownership are likely to affect corporate control. Ang et al., 
(2000) point out that as the ownership structure changes, the agency cost varies accordingly. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no relationship between firm performance and concentration 
of shareholders. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988a) find a non-linear relationship between 
the ownership of board members and firm performance. Pedersen and Thomsen (1998) 
examine the relationship between industry characteristics and ownership structure, their 
findings revealing a significant impact of industry characteristics on ownership structure. 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) proceed to investigate the link between the owner identity 
(including institutional investors, family, bank, corporations and government) and economic 
performance, their fmdings indicating strong evidence o f a non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance, and evidence that identity of the owners can 
have an impact upon f i rm performance and strategy. Table 4-1 presents the main ownership 
variables. 
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Table 4- 1: Different categories of ownership structure 
Deflnitions of ownership categories 
Dispersed (diffuse) 
ownership 
No single owner owns more than 20% of the company's shares. 
Dominant (concentrate) 
ownership 
One owner (person, family, company) owns a sizable (voting) 
share (20% < share> 50%) of the company. 
Personal/family ownership One person or family owns a majority of the shares of the 
company. 
Managerial ownership Top management of the company owns the majority of the 
shares. 
Government ownership The local government owns a majority of the company. 
Institutional ownership The institution, such as a bank or insurance company, owns the 
majority o f the shares of the company. 
Foreign ownership A foreign multinational owns a majority of the shares of the 
company. 
(Source: Pederson and Thomson 1997, adapted) 
4.3.3.2 The Board of directors' structure and presence 
The role of the corpoprate governance inside firms generally follows the U K report fi-om the 
Cadbury Committee (1992 and 2004). The effectiveness of a board is buttressed by its 
structure and procedures through the appointment o f auditors, and the nomination and 
remuneration committees, and its regularity and fi-equency of board meetings. The board of 
directors is an important part of corpoprate governance. Fama (1980, pi94), and Fama and 
Jensen (1983) defined the board "as a market-induced institution, whose most important role 
is to scrutinize the highest decision makers within the firm". 
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Boards are accountable to shareholders, and are delegated by shareholders to monitor 
executives and to report on managerial activities to the shareholders (Aguilera, 2005). Due to 
the impossibility of calling widespread shareholders from different places to monitor 
managerial activities, so shareholders must rely on the board of directors to monitor 
executives to protect their interests by ensuring that companies are transparent and even to 
enable the shareholders to evaluate directors. A board of directors can influence firm 
governance, since its ability and position is related to the most important part of corpoprate 
governance through its link between shareholders and managers (Aguilera, 2005). 
Previous research on board structure has focused on board size, board composition, board 
committee and leadership structure. Ashbaugh et al., (2006) examined board composition and 
structure, and observed that the effectiveness of a board is buttressed by the role and 
independence of non-executive directors, director compensation and evaluation. However, 
their results suggest the need for more audit committees and independent directors, who 
should enable the firm to perform better and to provide greater credibility to earnings than 
firms with relatively more inside directors. There are empirical studies in several disciplines, 
which have investigated whether changes in board structure can influence outcomes that have 
significant implications for shareholders' interests of particular invests is a study by Young 
(2000), who examined the applicability of the Cadbury report on UK companies, which 
indicated that there had been changes in board composition through increased demand for 
non-executive directors, which have been more pronounced in firms classified as having 
excessively manager-dominated boards. 
According to the above, superior firm performance is a result of the firm adopting better 
corporate governance than its rival in the market (Klapper et al., 2004). In a nutshell good 
corpoprate governance generates better firm performance (Chen et al., 2007), for firms that 
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have more independent directors wi l l generally perform better than firms with more inside 
directors. On other hand, there are some researchers with adverse results, such as Baysinger 
and Butler (1985) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), who find no significant relationship 
between outsiders on the board, board composition and selected corporate performance 
measures. 
Less conflict of interest among participants of a corporation leads to better performance of 
firm value. Baysinger and Butler (1985) argue that certain factors are important to increasing 
firm performance through good corpoprate governance, including agency control costs, such 
as, corporation law, product and capital market competition and the structure of the 
managerial labour market. Agarwal and Knoeber (1996) add a fourth reason, namely, the 
debt policy of the firm. They perceive that directors are worried about the market's perception 
of their abilities, but that greater transparency of the firm's specific situation is opened to the 
market so that shareholders wi l l trust their judgement in maximising firm value. 
The board, composed of a numbers of directors, provides a bridge between shareholders and 
managers, and thus can be defined as "the link between the shareholders of the firm and the 
management entrusted with undertaking the day-to-day operations of the organization" 
(Taylor, 2001, p. 137). There are differences between inside directors and outside directors in 
the extent to which they can override management decisions that threaten shareholders' 
interests, for boards composed largely of inside directors are less able to override them. The 
board is held accountable to its shareholders, and are delegated by shareholders to monitor 
executives and report the managerial activities to the shareholders (Aguilera 2005). Yet, 
insider directors are work-related to the CEO, but board independence increases the board's 
overall power in its dealings with the CEO. 
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Board composition wil l influence the monitoring ftinction of the board. Investors consider the 
monitoring role of the board which, i f composed almost entirely of independent directors, is a 
sign of good corporate governance (Black et al., 2001 and 2002). There are some studies 
which have equated structural board independence with board power, while others have 
discussed how CEOs exploit structural bases of power to maintain ultimate control over the 
board. 
Independent directors or outside directors are important for no-one can effectively monitor 
the executives' self-dealing activities or replace the poor performing CEOs and top 
management, i f necessary (Black et al., 2001 and 2002). CEOs may use their leadership 
position on the board to dictate the agenda of board meetings and otherwise minimize dissent 
(Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). Independent directors are noted for their ability to bring greater 
transparency, accountability and efficiency to corpoprate governance (Aguilera, 2005; Lin et 
al., 2007). 
On the contrary, a board controlled by a greater proportion of independent directors has 
greater propensity to replace the CEO with poor performance than a board which is 
dominated by a greater number of insiders (Fich et al., 2006). Furthermore, independent 
boards limit the concealment of negative outcomes in letters to shareholders (Abrahamson 
and Park, 1994). There is some evidence to support putting CEO pay more at risk through 
board independence and reducing the adoption of incentive plans that falsely appear to align 
management's and shareholders' interests (Westphal and Zajac, 1994). 
The scandals and new legislation have had a significant effect on the board structure in the 
USA, which has led to a reduction in multiple directorships and fewer cases of interlocking 
directorships, and board size becoming smaller and more independent (Chhaochhari and 
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Grinstein's, 2004). Outside directors are helpful in determining the board's effectiveness in 
corporate governance (Pritchard, 2002; Ferris et al, 2002; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Through using 969 firms obtained from Standard and Poor's database as at 1996, Griffi th 
(1999) finds strong evidence of a non-linear relationship between insiders on the board and 
firm value. Yet, there are some studies which have found no significant relationships between 
board of directors and firm performance/value. Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) study the 
relationship between firm performance and independent governance variables, such as board 
size, number (and proportion) of the independent directors, board tenure, pay, leadership 
structure, board committee and find no significant relationship except for the proportion of 
inside directors. They proceed to suggest that "there may be some critical threshold for the 
appropriate number of executive directors; one that enables those who are not over-stretched 
with executive responsibilities better to fu l f i l their boardroom roles and, thereby, enhance the 
firm performance" (Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004 p. 270). 
Klein (1998) examines the relationship between composition of the overall board and firm 
performance, and the result of this study is of no significant relationship between composition 
and fum performance. Table 4-2 presents key variables relating to the board of directors. 
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Table 4-2: Summarises the most important factors which are related to the board of 
directors 
Definition of board of directors' variables 
Board size The number of members who serve on the board as directors 
Board composition The number of outside (non-executive) directors or the number o f 
inside (executive) directors to the total number of directors. 
Board duality The chairman of the board serve at the same time as CEO 
Family representing in 
the board 
The number of members who belong to the same family in the 
board 
Foreign member in the 
board 
The number of foreign members on the board to the total number of 
the directors. 
Cross-holding of 
directorship 
The director on the board o f one company who sits on another 
board(s) of another company. 
(Source: Pederson and Thomson 1997, adapted) 
4.3.3.3 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
Financial transparency should radically deal with asymmetric information arising from the 
role-separation of management fi-om providers of long-term capital (Merton, 1987). This 
should have a beneficial effect for shareholders through a reduction in the cost of equity 
(Botosan, 1997) Furthermore, there may be additional beneficial effects through a reduction 
in perceived uncertainty by investors (Coles et al., 1995). 
Accordingly CR is regarded as an effective tool for monitoring the company using reports 
issued by the CRA, which impartially shows the level of the company's CR. In the context o f 
CR, it can be noticed that credit rating is one of the various monitoring devices used to reduce 
agency costs (Gonzalez, 2004). Consequently, CR works to mitigate the severity of the 
problem of information asymmetry between agents and principals, because managers have an 
incentive to try and show the company's best profile, indicating that they are acting in the 
99 
interests o f stakeholders, in particular owners. On the other hand, owners would want to 
encourage and stimulate managers to earn a better score from the CRA. As to owners and 
management, managers should work with owners to earn the best grade fi-om the CRA, which 
should help mifigate conflict between all stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976 cited by 
Skaife et al., 2006). A higher CR reduces information asymmetry and improves the financial 
outcome arising fi-om a reduced applied agency theoretical effect. So, that reduces agency 
costs via the credit rating impact. Consequently, organizations have widely accepted 
compliance work with the mandatory agency credit ratings' requirements, and voluntarily 
have improved the grade of their CR. As a result, this has led managers to reduce agency 
costs by achieving the aim of the organisation to obtain a higher CR fi-om an agency. 
This aim of a high CR motivates managers to apply standard mandatory CR requirements. 
Consequently, it can be expected that credit rating practice wi l l be associated with some 
variables, such as firm characteristics and financial transparency disclosure effects via agency 
theory (Skaife et al., 2006). 
External monitoring is costly, and so clearer financial transparency can be beneficial in 
mitigating such monitoring costs with the consequential agency theoretical reduction in the 
cost of equity. Accordingly, a number of authors have stressed the importance of providing 
high quality information (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000 and 2005). As to the cost of debt, 
Sengupta (1998) found that better disclosure reduced the cost of debt. But it is not just the 
provision of information that is important, for investors need to be assured that good 
governance practices are established within companies, so that they can rely on that 
intermediation. That assurance can be translated into a lower cost of equity (Barth and 
Landsman, 2003). 
100 
Clearly, good corpoprate governance practices should help prevent expenditures on excessive 
perquisites by insiders of a corporation, and hence should result in higher net cash flows 
being available for shareholders. Implications for the cost of equity and debt capital have 
already been addressed to some extent by other researchers, as indicated above, but a more 
comprehensive understanding is arguably needed. But i f pre-suppositions are acceptable, then 
there should be strong link between corpoprate governance and CR, for the corpoprate 
governance related drivers of risk-reduction (of the cost of equity and debt) are similar to 
these of CR enhancement (Gomper et al., 2003 and Dumev and Kim, 2005). 
It has been posited that there is a direct link between the issuance of information, that is both 
pertinent and timely, and a higher CR being assessed. Indeed, Sengupta (1998) investigated 
this proposition by evaluating Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) 
disclosure ratings of firms, and found that firms with higher disclosure ratings were charged 
lower interest rates on their debt. He argued that the lower cost was due to a reduction in 
information risk which in turn reduced the credit risk perceived by their bondholders. 
Furthermore, the enhancement of information disclosure might be effected by the 
enlargement of institutional shareholders and account their own needs and preferences. 
But there are mechanisms that can protect external stakeholders from the ful l extent of the 
consequences that would otherwise arise from financial expropriation. These have been 
identified, for example, by La Porta et al., (2000) as good corpoprate governance practices, 
which should be able to keep the cost o f capital relatively low and the credit rating relatively 
high. La Porta et al., (2000) assert that good disclosure practices, of high financial 
transparency, reduce the risk of financial expropriation by insider-managers, and they make 
the point that it is the non-diversifiable element of that risk that is pertinent to widely 
diversified shareholders. But the temptations facing managers are greater when their own 
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investment opportunity set is restricted. So, in a recession managers have fewer good 
investment opportunities and are arguably more likely to be compensated through financial 
expropriation. The stronger the economy, and the stock market, the wider their own 
indulgence in such behaviour, (see Johnson et al., 2000; Dumev and Kim, 2005). It follows 
that there is a negative association between managerial expropriation and overall stock 
market performance, which would suggest that investors would demand a higher rate of 
return by way of compensation. Yet, good corpoprate governance should mitigate such 
effects, and should beneficially impact upon CRs accordingly. 
Good disclosure practices, with high financial transparency, should also lead to a reduced 
cost of equity through a reduction in stakeholder cost associated with monitory the behaviour 
of insider-managers. Lombardo and Pagano (2002) argue that such costs are necessary to 
safeguard the expectation of a sufficient return on investment emanating from the strategic 
and operational decision of the insider-managers. Once again, a higher return is demanded by 
stakeholder, as compensation. However, good fmancial transparency obviates the need for 
close monitoring of managers by stakeholders, and lessens costs associated with the time and 
effect o f such monitoring. This should feed through into a lower cost of capital and a higher 
CR. 
As many studies have shown, good corpoprate governance practices may reduce the 
information asymmetric induced agency costs particularly pertaining to the quality of 
financial information provided. A number of authors, namely. Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991) and Leuz and Verrcchia (2000), posit a negative association between downside risks 
with beneficial repercussion for the raising of new capital on the stock markets. 
Standard and Poor's (2002) suggest that attributes of corporate governance impact on firms' 
CRs, which incorporates research into corporate reporting under the two related themes of 
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transparency and disclosure. The key characteristics of Standard and Poor's transparency and 
disclosure measurements, rankings and methodology are based on an assessment of the 
qualitative aspects of corpoprate governance pracfices of a company. Transparency and 
disclosure rankings are developed fi-om an analysis of company annual reports and their 
sample covers companies in emerging markets (Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern 
Europe, and Afiica) as well as developed markets (Europe, developed Asia, and the US). 
According to the above, its own corporate financial transparency disclosure practice could 
help the fum attain a higher rating leading to a reduced cost of capital, yet many researchers 
find a negative relationship between the corpoprate governance level and the cost of capital. 
Reverte (2007) indicates that the better governed firms wi l l generally enjoy a lower cost of 
equity capital in Spanish capital market. Chen et al., (2009) find evidence that firm-level 
corpoprate governance has a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity capital. 
Regarding the cost of debt component, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., (2006) find that weak 
governance can result in firms incurring higher debt fmancing costs after controlling for firm-
specific risk characteristics. 
4.3.4 Corporate governance literature in Jordan 
There is no evidence of empirical studies on CR related to institutional ownership, or 
ownership structure in Jordan. However, earlier smdies examining the Jordanian market have 
considered the impact of ownership structure on firm valuation (Al-Khouri, 2006), default 
risk (Zeitun and Tian 2007), and the effects of ownership concentration and board 
characteristics on performance (Aziz and Mahmoud, 2009). 
Zeitun and Tian (2007) investigated the effect of ownership structure on firms' financial 
performance and default risk. Their sample was composed of 59 Jordanian firms listed on the 
ASE for the period from 1989 to 2002. The study used two pooled regression models. The 
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first model uses firm's financial performance including return on assets, return on equity, 
market-to-book, and Tobin's q as dependent variables, while the second model is a logit 
model to capture the probability of default. The empirical results show that there is evidence 
of a positive relafionship between ownership concentration and firms' financial performance, 
and there is a negative relationship between government ownership and firms return on 
equity. The second model shows a positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
the probability of default; on the contrary, government ownership has a negative effect on 
firms' probability of default. Finally, only growth and profitability have a significant impact 
on the probability of default. Zeitun and Tian (2007) conclude that reducing goveniment 
ownership may increase firms' financial performance, but this may induce some firm to be 
bankrupted. Their study was extended by Zeitun (2009) to an analysis of the impact of 
ownership structure on the performance of Jordanian firms fi-om 1989-2006 and he found a 
negative association between concentration and firm performance. 
Al-Khouri (2006) explores the relationship between the identity and concentration of 
different blockholders and firm value for 89 industrial and service firms listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period 1998-2001. The study examines the role of block 
holders (institutional investors who are not on the board of directors versus institutional 
investors who are on the board of directors), the ownership of the board of directors, and the 
financial policy (capital structure) of the firm, in controlling managerial actions which lead, 
on average, to better firm valuation in the emerging market of Jordan. The result of the 
simple regression showed a significant and positive relationship between the ownership of the 
board of directors and firm value. Also, the study found a positive and significant relationship 
between firm value and ownership by institutional investors whether or not they are on the 
board of directors. However, there was no significant relationship between ownership by 
management and firm value. The results of the piecewise regression analysis indicated a 
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positive and significant relationship among the ownership of securities above 25% by the 
board of directors and firm value. 
Aziz and Mahmoud (2009) examined the effects of ownership concentration and board 
characteristics on the performance of firms domiciled in Jordan through employing two OLS 
regressions on a sample of 103 firms listed on the ASE the for financial years 2002-2005. 
The results find that ownership concentration, multiple directorships and board size are each 
positive and significant in determining firm performance, by both accounting-based and 
market-based performance measures. Their results are in-line with earlier studies on 
Jordanian market (Al-Khouri, 2006; Zeitun and Tian, 2007; Aziz and Mahmoud 2009). 
Appendix 4-2 presents a summary of previous studies. 
4.3.5 Studies that examine tlie impact of corporate governance on credit ratings 
There are some studies, which investigate the effect of corpoprate governance on bond rating 
and the cost of debt financing, such as those by Sengupta (1998) and Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003); but according to these studies the set of variables excluded corpoprate governance 
factors. According to Sengupta (1998), who explored the impact of corporate disclosure 
quality on the cost of debt, there is a significant relationship between corporate disclosure 
quality and yields on new debt issues, and a significant negative relationship between 
corporate disclosure quality ratings and the cost of debt financing. 
On the other hand, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) investigated the effect of corpoprate 
governance on bond ratings and yields. They demonstrated a positive relationship between 
credit ratings and two corpoprate governance variables, namely, the number o f outside 
directors on the board and the proportion of institutional ownership, and a negative 
relationship between these variables and bond yields on new debt issues. They further found 
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that the higher the institutional shareholdings, the higher are the ratings on their new bonds 
and the higher is the ownership of outside directors on the board. 
However, there is a study by Ashbough-Skaife, et al., (2006), which is worthy of special 
consideration and which extends the two studies discussed above. They investigated the 
effect of many corpoprate governance variables on credit rating, and is broader in scope than 
any previous study, for they also investigate two areas of conflict, namely, between 
shareholders and managers and between shareholders and bondholders. They found that a 
firm's CR is positively associated with the degree of financial transparency, board 
independence, board ownership, board expertise and weaker shareholder rights, and 
negatively associated with the presence of block holders with more than 5% ownership, and 
CEO board power. 
Corporate governance fi-om the perspective of bondholders is very important, because the 
bondholders, who provide a major source of capital. Accordingly (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Fitch Ratings, 2004; and Ashbough-Skaife, et al., 2006) have conducted investigations into 
the relationship between stakeholders and managers, between shareholders and bondholders, 
and the impact of conflict between them on CR, the cost of equity capital, management, 
shareholders, bondholders and share value. 
Fitch Ratings (2004) investigated credit policy, evaluating corpoprate governance from the 
bondholders' perspective, and investigated the relationship between shareholders and 
bondholders as a result of the conflict between them. But although good corporate 
governance can help provide higher CRs through mechanisms to monitor management who 
in turn to create strong ftiture cash flows to firm, firms with governance factors that 
strengthen shareholder rights might find it difficult to attract bondholders. This is due to 
conflicts between them, including wealth transfers fi-om bondholders to shareholders. 
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Generally, Klock et al., (2004) and Ashbough-Skaife, et al., (2006) found that corpoprate 
governance gives shareholders more benefits through wealth redistribution effects from 
bondholders to shareholders. 
The past four decades have witnessed the increased importance of CR for many different 
parties who depend on reports from rating agencies. This importance of credit rating 
motivates many researchers to discover this area, and its potential usefiilness for both 
corporations and stakeholders (Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). Table 4-3 summarises to key 
previous corporate governance and credit rating studies. 
Table 4- 3: Summary of two key previous studies of corporate governance and credit 
rating 
Study Independent variables corpoprate 
governance 
Main results 
Bhojraj 
and 
Sengupta 
(2003). 
number of outside directors on the 
board and institution ownership; 
positive relationship between credit ratings 
and the number of outside directors on the 
board and the proportion of institutional 
ownership; 
Ashbough-
Skaife et 
al., (2006). 
Four components of corporate 
governance as used by standard and 
poor's: ownership structure and 
influence, financial stakeholder 
rights and relations, financial 
transparency, and board structure and 
processes; 
credit rating negatively associated with 
number of block holders and CEO power 
on the board, and positively related to 
weaker shareholders rights, degree of 
financial transparency, overall board 
independence, board stock ownership and 
board expertise; 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter reviews previous studies which discuss the subject of credit rating. These studies 
are classified into two parts. The first dealt with empirical studies which examine the 
determinants of CR either in one country or in more than one country and applying different 
models. The second expand the first group of studies in another direction by investigating the 
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key factors that impact on CR, namely, via the corporate governance mechanism. Many 
empirical studies have studied the relationship between corpoprate governance and different 
f irm aspects but they tend to avoid CR and focus instead upon other factors, such as f irm 
performance and stock price. The corporate governance literature pertaining to Jordan as an 
emerging market is also reviewed. 
The results of these various studies are summarised and reveal the need for further 
examination of the effects on CR of potentially important factors, namely, ownership 
structure, financial transparency (including disclosure) and corporate governance. It is found 
that to the best of the author's knowledge there are no other studies on the impact on CR of 
this combination of factors within the Jordanian environment. Finally, regarding the impact 
of the corporate governance effect on CR outside of Jordan, only two studies investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance, ownership and/or fmancial transparency, and CR. 
Thus, in this chapter previous pertinent empirical literature has been reviewed which forms 
the backdrop to this study. 
The next chapter presents a brief review of the Jordanian listed corporations and their 
environment, including the role of the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). 
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C H A P T E R F I V E : T H E JORDANIAN ENVIRONMENT AND S T O C K 
M A R K E T 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the Jordanian environment and to 
obtain a brief insight into some aspects of the environmental, cultural and economic factors 
of Jordan. Furtheremore, determining the characteristics of the selected county helps in 
recognising the importance of credit rating and corporate governance in the Jordanian 
environment. 
Jordan is an interesting choice as a result of the changes in the Jordanian economic 
environment, the newly established Jordanian capital market, and the developments o f 
technological communication investments, which provide a suitable environment for the 
current empirical investigation of this study. This chapter wi l l discuss aspects of the general 
framework of the Jordanian environment, and an overview about the Amman Financial 
Market (AFM), which contains three different parts: Amman Stock Exchange (ASE), Jordan 
Securities Commission (JSC) and Securities Depository Centre (SDC), wi l l be presented. 
Before discussing these issues, background about Jordan, its economy, the investment 
environment and the privatization programme wi l l be described. The next sections w i l l cover 
these aspects. 
5.2 Geography and Location 
Jordan has a strategic location; it is located in the middle of Arab Civilizations. It lies at the 
heart of the Middle East. Jordan is a part of the richly historical Fertile Crescent region. 
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Its borders are Syria in the north, Iraq in the north east, Saudi Arabia in the South East and 
the West Bank and Philistine in the West. Thus, Jordan, as an Arab country is considered to 
have a strategic location which shares the longest border with Philistine and the West Bank. 
Furthermore, Jordan is strategically positioned at the convergence of Asia, Africa and 
Europe. (See Appendix 5-1) 
5.3 Socioeconomic Overview 
According to the World Bank, Jordan is classified as a lower middle income country. The 
currency has been stable with an exchange rate fixed to the U.S. dollar since 1995, and the 
capita GDP was approximately 1,961 JD for 2007". 
Jordan's highly literate, well-educated population combined with socio-economic reforms 
undertaken in the last 20 years have produced remarkable growth rates, with a 7 per cent 
increase in the GDP in 2005, and growth from 5.6 per cent in 2006 to 5.0 per cent in 2007. 
However, a study conducted by the Department o f Statistics (DOS) in 2005 illustrated that 
the general unemployment rate stood at 14.8 per cent: 12.8 per cent for men and 25.9 per cent 
for women. The proportion of people unemployed for a year or more stands at 20.9 per cent 
while the proportion o f unemployed persons between the age of 15 and 24 years of age stands 
at 53.8 per cent^. 
Private investment reached US$2.5 billion in 2006, compared to US$1.05 billion in 2005, and 
US$589 million in 2004, and 3 billion in 2007. The fastest growing sectors in 2006 were 
manufacturing (16.7%), construction (13.1%), telecommunications and transport (11.8%), 
electricity and water (10.7%)), wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels (9.9%)), and the 
''http://www.imf.ora/extemal/np/ms/2007/043Q07.htm 
^ Jordanian Department of Statistics: http://www.dos.gov.io/dos home a/main/index.htm 
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financial and real estate sectors (9.4%)^. Jordan's Human Development Index ranked as ninth 
among nineteen countries in the Arab region, where seven of the eight higher-ranking 
countries were the beneficiaries of revenues from oil and gas exports. Latest figures of 
economic growth show the relatively high standard of sustainable development that the 
country has been able to attain and sustain in the past ten years despite the rapid economic 
growth^. In Jordan, there are three separate powers including: (1) legislative power: bicameral 
national assembly consists of: house of notables (the senate): 55 seats appointed by the 
monarch for a four-year term; and House of Representatives: 110 seats, six of which are for 
women, elected for four-year terms. The last election took place in June 2007 and the next is 
being held in 2011, (2) the Juridical Power: the legal system in Jordan is based on Islamic 
Law and French Codes, consists of the Court of Cassation and Supreme Court (Court of Final 
Appeal). In addition, religious and personal courts are available for Muslims and Christians 
in Jordan and (3) executive power: which is accountable to a legislative power, and which is 
vested in the Council of Ministers, which is appointed by the King. 
The Jordanian economy combines both negative and positive aspects. Suwaidan (1997) 
argued that the limited natural resources, small size of domestic markets, political conflict in 
the region more than five decades, and the reliance on foreign aid are examples of negative 
aspects. Meanwhile, the positive aspects include the high level of human resources 
development, an efficient infrastructure, a free-market policy, several major tourism sights 
and an open-minded leadership. 
Statistical data issued by the Jordanian Department of Statistics indicate Jordan's major 
exports commodities are clothing, phosphates, fertilizers and potash, while the major imports 
^ http://www.dos.gov.io/dos home a/main/inde.\.htm 
' http://www.iiz-dvv.de/index.php7anicle id=208&clang=l 
111 
commodities are crude oil , textile, fabrics, machinery and transport equipment. The primary 
export partners are USA (29.3%), Iraq (15.5%), India (8.5%) and Saudi Arabia (5.9%), while 
the primary import partners are Saudi Arabia (21.1%), China (8.1%)), Germany (7.2%), USA 
(6.3%) and South Korea (4.1%). In 2008, the total exports were $ 4,226 billion, whereas the 
total imports were $ 8,681 billion. The value of national exports was estimated by 37.7 % and 
the re-exports was 29.4 % during 2008 compared to 2007. In contrast, the value of imports 
has risen by 23.2 % during 2008^ 
The Jordanian economy has shifted in this period to the capitalisation which encourages 
creafivity and skills of its people; this led to strong stabilization, structural reform programme 
and dramatic progress in boosting exports and reducing imports through increased GDP. 
According to this policy, the economy is market-driven and aimed to attract both Arabic and 
foreign capital to invest on the Jordanian projects. Therefore, it has shifted the structure of 
Jordanian economic activity from depending heavily on external relarionships and aids, into 
concentrating more on the restructuring of internal affairs and the consolidation of Jordanian 
external trade relations with regional and international countries. 
The deficit in the trade balance has risen by 14 % during 2008 compared to 2007, therefore 
the imports coverage by the exports stood at 46.1 % during 2008. Meanwhile, the imports 
coverage by the exports was 45.3 % during the first eleven months which means an increase 
by 0.8%). Furthermore, Jordan is dependent upon other countries for oil and gas supplies. Iraq 
has been a key supplier, but during the last decade Jordan has benefitted from supplies of oil 
from Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries. Nevertheless, Jordan has during the last five 
' Source: C I A - The World Factbook-Jordan: hltps://www.cia.gov/librarv/publications/the-world-
Factbook/geos/io.html 
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years revitalised its agreement with Iraq concerning oil imports. As to natural gas supplies, 
northern Jordan has been pipe-linked with Egypt via the port of Aqaba^. 
The Jordan government adopted a comprehensive economic reform program, with the 
International Monetary Fund in 1999 to increase the economic development and performance 
rates and to correct the structural imbalance in the economy and to reduce the impact of the 
Gulf Crisis. The package of economic reform includes; liberalization of trade and capital 
flows, banking and fmancial sector reform, public enterprise reform and privatization. In 
addition, it takes multiple steps to make the Jordanian securities market free from the 
restrictions. Among these steps: encouraging the investments of private savings, increasing 
investors' protection and enhancing the banks' role in simulating the capital markets through 
the estabhshment of mutual funds (Goussous, 2002a). 
The Jordanian economy succeeded in achieving a number of positive indicators. For example, 
since 2000 the economic growth has been improved through light manufacturing products 
exports. The government has increasingly paid attention to economic issues. The top 
priorities were economic development and reform, integration with the international economy 
and creating favourable investment climate. In this context, in December 2001, Jordan started 
Free Trade Agreement with the U. S. A, wi l l take effect on all goods and services by 2010 
(Oviatt, B., 1988). 
This agreement undertakes more open markets in different sectors such as communications, 
construction, fmance, health, transportation and services, in addition to updating the 
economic and financial regulations to international standards and protecting intellectual 
' Source, and for further information, see U. S. Department of State: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: 
http://www.state.g0v/r/pa/ei/bgn/3464.htm 
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property (Central Bank of Jordan, 2000), this agreement with U. S. A, and EU, the countries 
in the region have significant effects on the diversity of Jordan's economy. 
Jordan is moving from the traditional economic resources ( i . e. exports of phosphates and 
potash, overseas remittances and foreign aid) to a more open market and private-sector 
development plan. In addition, information technology and tourism are other promising 
growth sectors. Aqabe Special Economic Zone, which is under a low tax regime, is 
considered to be a fi-amework of private sector economic growth. The government's efforts to 
improve the economy have achieved significant results. Appendix 5-2 illustrates the main 
economic indicators during the period 2001-2008. 
5.4 Economic Indicators 
Appendix 5-2 shows that the Jordanian economy has achieved a remarkable performance 
during the last eight years (from 2001 to 2008). The GDP at current market prices increased 
fi-om JD 6363 million in 2001 to JD 141864 million in 2008. Furthermore, the growth rate of 
GDP at constant market prices increased from 5.3% in 2001 to reach 5.6% in 2008. 
Moreover, the growth of most economic sectors has led to the growth of GDP. Indeed, this 
growth was reflected in the per capita GDP in real terms, which grew by 4.6% in 2005, 
maintaining the same recorded real growth as in 2004 (see Central Bank of Jordan, Annual 
Report, 2005). For the inflation rate, it has increased from 1.8%) in 2001 to reach 14.6%) in 
2008. However, this increase is still at a satisfactory level. In addition, the currency has been 
stable with an exchange rate fixed to the U. S dollar since 1995 at JD 0.708-0.710 to the 
dollar. 
Some factors impact negatively on the economy, such as the terrorism phenomena, 
overspending, Asian crisis and decline of international oil prices. These factors have 
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impacted negatively on the economy. Additionally, the attack on World Trade Centre in New 
York in 11'** September 2001 has a detrimental impact on trading and the Jordanian economy. 
Consequently, Jordan has adopted comprehensive economic reforms in order to improve its 
economic performance through setting up the appropriate legislative and legal environment 
for economic activity that wi l l attract foreign and local investors. The establishment of a 
favourable investment envirormient is essential in order to improve the country's economic 
performance. 
In 1997 Jordanian economy has shifted from public towards privatisation which encourages 
the private sector and a redefmes the role of the government in the economy. When the 
Executive Privatization Unit was established with aims to enhance enterprise efficiency, 
reduce the Jordanian government's stake in public sectors by selling its shares to technically 
advanced strategic investors, deepen and develop the financial market through public share 
offerings reduce subsidies and consolidate public fmances. According to this policy, the 
economy wil l become market-driven and aim to attract both Arabic and foreign capitals to 
invest in the Jordan projects. Therefore, the private sector role increased again in this period 
and the public sector role began to diminish (Goussous, 2002a; Kanaan and Kardoosh, 2002). 
The benefits amount from privatization program counts more than $1 billion. Most of the 
privatized companies in Transport, Electricity, Water and Telecommunications are sold 
through investor sales, asset sales, liquidations as well as long term leases, while the other 
either through majority or minority initial public offerings. The goverrunent commenced its 
privatization system, which removed its direct participadon in the production sectors and 
allows the private sector to manage these in a more efficient and cost- effective maimer based 
on fijlfilling certain criteria. 
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By 2000 the government continued to improve the legislative and structural environment of 
the ASM, to enhance the disclosure and transparency on the one hand, and protect investors' 
rights on the other. Additionally it applied comply with the International Financial Reporting 
Standards. As a result of all these steps undertaken by the ASE beside the economic reforms 
steps applied by the government, the market capitalization grew remarkably from 5 billion JD 
in 2001 to 26 billion JD in the 2008. The following sections wi l l discuss the Framework of 
Jordanian Financial Market structure to recognize the basic characteristics and the regulations 
which monitor its transactions'". 
5.5 The Framework of Jordanian Capital Market (JCM) 
This section discusses the legal framework of the Jordan exchange structure, the type of 
securities and the listing and trading rules. 
5.5.1 Amman Financial Market (AFM) 
This section discusses the legal framework of the Jordan Financial Market and addresses the 
empirical evidence for the development of the Amman Stock Market (ASM), and the 
development of the Jordanian capital markets, polices, and programmes. 
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) is considered to be one of the up-to-date emerging 
exchanges with a market capitalization of 226.30 of the country's GDP at the end of 2008. 
The foreign ownership represents 49.2% of the listed stocks". 
The role of A F M was secondary until 1999. During that period, its main role was to facilitate 
the re-emergence of Jordan's capital market by providing leadership to market institutions. 
www.menaFn.com/updates/research center/Jordan/.../ci040109.pdf 
" http://www.isc.gov.io/overview.asp 
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educating potential investors, and strengthening the legal, regulatory, and operational 
infrastructure. 
At the same time, Jordan's economic restructuring program, in particular privatization of 
state-owned companies, accelerated the growth of the market. The main objectives of A F M is 
mobilizing savings by encouraging security investments, by monitoring the market to ensure 
transparent and fair trading in securities and to deter fraud, regulate the granting issuance and 
trading of securities through applying disclosure requirements in accordance International 
Accounting Standards, provide the necessary data and statistics to growth and development 
A F M objectives and protecting rights o f minority shareholders. 
5.5.2 Development of the Jordanian Capital Market 
The History of Jordanian Capital Market can be summarised as follows: 
The History of Capital Market can be summarised as follows 
1930s Trading in Securities started informally. 
1976 Amman Financial Market (AFM) was established. 
1978 A F M started operations. 
1997 Capital Market Reforms introduced. Securities Law issued. 
1997 Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) was established. 
1999 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was established. 
1999 Securities Depository Centre (SDC) was established 
2002 New Securities Law Issued. 
Source: www.ammanstockexchange.com 
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5.5.3 Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
The Jordan Securities Commission is a public regulatory body in the capital market, 
established in October 1997. The JSC aims to supervise the issuance and the dealing in 
securities, regulate and monitor the activities and operations of its members under its 
supervision, regulate and supervise the disclosure of information related to traders, securities, 
issuers, and to safeguard major shareholders, investors and others from irregular market 
practices. The JSC undertakes many responsibilities to achieve these objectives such as: 
adopfing accounting and auditing standards of its members and organizing information 
disclosure related to securities and their sources to increase the confidence of investors and 
achieve transparency in the market in accordance with International Standard of financial 
disclosure covering and to accounting and auditing standards; approving the regulations 
organize and control the business activities and operations for the entities that fall by laws of 
the ASE; Financial services companies; the SDC; preparing organizes laws and regulations 
on securities' short sales; and granting licenses issued under the law'^. 
5.5.4 The Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
The SDC deals with transferring ownership on ASE (and related issues) and facilitates local 
and international investment including: the SDC was established on May 10, 1999 under the 
Securities Temporary law, its aims are registering, ensuring safekeeping, transferring 
ownership on ASE, depositing, clearing, and settling securides among brokers. The SDC is a 
not-for-profit institution, independent financially and administratively, recognized by the 
association of national numbering agencies for issuance of International Security 
http:// www.isc.gov.io 
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Identification number in Jordan according to the (ISIN) numbering scheme for all shares and 
has been nominated to develop the Jordanian capital market associated with ASE in order to 
create an efficient market; and to facilitate attracting local and international investment, 
reducing the cost of investment and raising the efficient settlement system in Jordan, SDC 
has prepared many software such as: registry system for registering securities, depository 
system records each deal's accounts on the shareholder register, clearing system that prepares 
the trade contract between broker-dealers, settlement system by trades on the delivery versus 
payment principle'^. 
5.5.5 Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
ASE, previously known as Amman Bourse is the second of the three entities established on 
March 11, 1999, and it is a private sector, not-for- profit making legal entity, with fmancial 
and administrative autonomy, that is the only party authorized to act as an organized market 
for trading securities in Jordan. It may carry out all legal actions including concluding 
contracts and acquiring and disposing of movable and immovable property. 
Regarding the trading system, all the traded securities either listed or not listed traded in ASE 
must be traded via the electronically integrated marketplace system which replaces the 
traditional open outcry trading system. 
http://www.sdc.com.io/arabic/index.php 
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"igure 5- 1: The Price Series for the A S E Indices fromZOOl to 2008 
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Figure (5.1) shows the developments in the prices based on the above measured price index 
from 2001 -2008. 
The performance of the ASE during 2005, 2006 and 2007 is reflected in the increase in the 
market capitalization value of the companies traded in 2005 comparing with 2004, and in 
2007 comparing with 2006. 
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Figure 5- 2; Market capitalisation from 2001 to 2008 
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According to all of these steps and indications which strengthened the Jordan economy, the 
number of investors, namely, foreigner's investors increase during 2005-2007. In addition, 
ASE indices have increased and the trading volume and value as well. Indeed, in year 2008, 
market capitalization to GDP was about 226.3 per cent. Consequently, the confidence in the 
ASE has increased which enables the ASE to be one of the largest stock markets in the region 
that permits foreign investment either from the international institutions or individual 
investors. 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) can be classified into two parts: the primary market and the 
secondary m a r k e t T h e market where securities are initially issued according with the 
provisions of laws, and regulations. After issuing in the primary market, the stock is then 
sold to the public in the secondary market. The primary market is divided into stock market 
and the bond market. The secondary market is the market in which securities are traded 
according to the provisions of laws and regulations, where previously issued securities are 
hup//: www.ammanstockexc.com 
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bought and sold. A new classification was implemented in accordance with the directives for 
listing securities on ASE for the year of 2000, whereby the secondary market is divided into 
first market, second market, third market, stock market, bond market and transactions o f f the 
trade, in line with international standards. The part of the secondary market through which 
trading takes place in securities is governed by special listing rules according to the directives 
for listing securities on the Amman Stock Exchange. According to this directive in article 3 
and 5, the companies transferring their shares fi^om the second market to the first market must 
fiilfil various conditions, including: the net shareholders' equity must not be less than 100% 
of the paid-in capital; the paid-in capital or the market capitalisation must not be less than two 
million JD; the company must have made net pre-tax profits for at least two fiscal years out 
of the last three years preceding the transfer of listing; and the company must have distributed 
profits or shares at least once over the last three years'^. 
Companies that apply for listing of their shares on the second market must fu l f i l the 
following two conditions: the net shareholders' equity must not be less than 50% of the paid-
in capital; and a f i i l l year must have elapsed since the company was granted the right to start 
its business'^. 
The part of the secondary market through which trading takes place in unlisted securities on 
the ASE through new directives, upon obtaining the right to start business, a company can 
file an application with the ASE to trade its shares through this market. Under this new 
concept, trading shares on ASE of newly established companies shall be permissible, upon 
completion of the set-up phase and initiation of business. The stock market is simply the part 
of the secondary market through which trading in common stocks takes place. The bond 
" www.ammanstockexc.com 
" www.ammanstockexc.com 
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market is that part of the secondary market through which trading in development bonds 
takes place. The commission on bonds (JOD 0.45-0.95 per thousand) is lower than the stocks' 
commission (JOD 5 - 7.4 per thousand). However, the bond market at the ASE is very small 
in comparison to the stock market. Off-the floor trading transactions are the part of the 
secondary market in which inheritance and inter-family transactions take place. These 
transactions are executed through the legal department o f the SDC; it serves the purpose o f 
legal transfers through inheritance transactions which shall be done through the SDC as of the 
same date (see ASE Annual report 2000, Newsletter, Issue no. 11 June 2000). 
5.6 Professional Accounting and Auditing in Jordan 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) has become important for Jordanian companies after 
the significant changes in the Jordanian economy. Jordan has made several attempts to close 
the compliance gap in both accounting and auditing professions. Open trade agreements such 
as the free trade agreement with EU and USA need to link the requirements of corporate 
financial reporting with IAS, consequently a more professional accounting system is needed 
in Jordan (World Bank 2002; Al-Shiab 2003). 
Jordan is one of the lASC developing country members, which since 1988 have experienced 
fundamental changes in economic strategy and policies through improvements have been 
made in the accounting and disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies. A new 
accounting law has been drafted and modem legislative framework for auditing profession 
has been issued through the enactment of the Audit Law No 73 of the year 2003. Moreover, 
IAS implies understandable and high quality standards which help users of financial 
statements in Jordan to take their decisions properly. Hence, lASs adoption is one of the most 
essential requirements for responding to changes in capital markets and trade (World Bank 
2002; Al-Shiab 2003). 
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Companies Act No. 22 for 1997 mentioned that shareholding companies must prepare their 
financial statements in accordance with GAAP. International Accounting Standards were 
applied in Jordan from 1998 under The Securities Law No. (23), for the year 1997. However, 
Jordanian Association o f Certified Public Accountants (JACPA) is responsible for organising 
the accounting profession in the Jordanian context. 
In 2007, Amman Stock Exchange has achieved extraordinary levels of indicators which are 
considered to be the highest since the establishment of the Amman Financial Market in 1978. 
The market capitalization to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio of was about 226.3 percent 
for 2008. This ratio is one of the highest ratios in the world, and it is one of the largest stock 
market in the region that permits foreign investment, which reflects the significant 
contribution o f the ASE in the national economy, through legislative and technical 
developments in ASE and significant improvements in the transparency and the control of the 
capital markets, specifically, the issuing of the new securities law no. 67 for the year 2002 
(World Bank 2002; Al-Shiab 2003). 
Many changes have been made for the accounting profession and audit in Jordan due to the 
economic developments. JACPA is an association of chartered accoimtants that develops 
educational and professional standards for its member, companies act no. 22 of 1997 and 
securities law no. 23 of 1997 gave considerafion, authority and more power to JACPA". 
Many steps are undertaken to improve the professions of accounting and auditing. Among 
these steps are the organising of national and international conferences regarding the 
accounting and auditing standards (Suwaidan, 1997; Al-Shiab, 2003). The adoption of 
international accounting and auditing standards is the major responsibility of JACPA. The 
application of such standards wi l l enhance the credibility of financial statements for the 
investors. 
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Auditing in Jordan today is more organised than any time before because, as pointed out 
above, the new Jordanian regulations include the Companies Acts and the JSC's requirements 
with more detail to guide, control, improve and protect the audit profession and the auditors' 
rights. Tlie first audit office was George Khader's firm, opened in Jordan in 1944, 
international audit firms, Deloitte Touche, Arthur Andersen and Grant Thornton had 
established professional contracts with Jordanian audit companies Saba and Co., Dajani and 
Ala'eddin and Co. and Talal Abu-Ghazaleh respectively (Suwaidan, 1997). These three audit 
firms were considered the largest and the most important audit firms in Jordan. 
(Al-Shiab, 2003) stated that "No doubt, the application of IAS wi l l make for the preparation 
of dependable and trusty financial statements which are reliable and comparable to 
international standards and wi l l make a difference to international investors". Due to these 
improvements, Jordan as an emerging market can be chosen as suitable context for the 
current study. 
The notion of corporate governance and credit rating becomes more interestingly in the 
recent years as discussed in chapter two. Next section introduces general view about credit 
rating and corporate governance practises and its implications in the Jordan context. 
5.7 Corporate Governance and Credit Rating in Jordan 
5.7.1 Credit rating in Jordan 
Credit ratings in Jordan were initiated during the 1990s, namely, in 1995 Jordan became the 
first rated Arab state, during the Asian financial crisis and during other periods of financial 
stress. The top three international rating agencies in Jordan are —Moody's investors service 
rating (Moody's), Standard and Poor's ratings (S & P) services and Fitch. Additionally, 
world'vest base inc. (WVB) has a strong interest in ratings within the Middle East, including, 
Jordan. 
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A report by E standards Forum (2009)ranks Jordan in either the 2nd or 3rd quintile of the 
global indices benchmarking for political, economic, business, and human capital 
dimensions. This gives recognition to the reforms made in economic and fmancial 
liberalization, since King Abdullah I I came to office. The report goes on to observe that the 
sovereign credit ratings in Jordan are: Moody's Ba2/Stable, and Standard and Poor's 
BB/Stable'*. 
Capital Intelligence (CI), the leading international emerging market rating agency, 
announced on 23/08/08, that Jordan's credit rating was changed from a risk to an investment 
rating. Jordan's long- and short-term foreign and local currency ratings are ' B B ' and 'BBB-', 
respectively. The short-term ratings for sovereignty debt are also unchanged at 'B' for foreign 
currency and 'A3' for local currency obligations. The CI assessment of credit outlook is one 
of stability. 
Capital Intelligence also notes the change in the foreign currency rating which reflects a 
significant increase in external solvency and liquidity ratios, which indicate strong repayment 
capacity and an increased resilience to external shocks. Jordan's ratings have responded to the 
way in which the economy has been well managed and the commitment and progress 
regarding fiscal and structural reforms. 
The statement commended Jordan for the way in which the economy is growing strongly, but 
notes that: 'accelerating inflation and a worsening external environment pose major risks to 
the short-term outlook. Real GDP increased by an aimual average of 6.6% in 2001-07, 
compared with 3.2% in the second half of the 1990s, and rose by 6% year-on-year in the first 
half of 2008. The current account deficit was equivalent to 18% of GDP in 2007 and is 
" http://www.estandardsforum.org/iordan/standards 
http://www.estandardsforum.org/iordan/standards 
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projected by Capital Intelligence to reach 19% of GDP this year (making it one o f the largest 
in the world) and to narrow to a still-high 11.6% of GDP by 2010' (Ibid). 
For further information focusing more on the company law relating to credit rating and 
corporate governance (see Appendix 5-3). 
5.7.2 Corporate governance in Jordan 
Many studies have been conducted worldwide, especially in the U.S.A and Europe, to 
highlight the role of corporate governance in improving different aspects of corporations. The 
majorities of these studies and investigations have been conducted after collapses in various 
businesses across the world, and have produced many recommendations, which reflect upon 
many countries worldwide, including Jordan. These have produced many troubles which are 
highlighted with many Jordanian firms such as Petra Bank (Malkawi 2008). 
The corporate sector is typically important to the economy of a country. Although 
corporations began to apply corporate governance for the protection of their businesses and 
for the safeguarding of shareholders' investments, they have supported economic 
effectiveness and increased opportunities from new investments with the help of laws and 
regulations of the country (Aljazy, 2005 and Malkawi 2008). 
Good corporate governance practices in Jordan may provide a means of enhancing its 
competitiveness to attaining high level of credit rating which in turn wi l l lead investors to 
increase their investments in the Jordanian companies (Malkawi 2008). Consequently, good 
corporate governance reflects Jordanian firm's ability o f an entity's overall creditworthiness 
and its capacity to satisfy its financial obligations. Therefore, credit rating agencies are 
concerned that weak governance can impair a firm's financial position and leave bondholders 
vulnerable to losses (Fitch Ratings, 2004). The last decade has seen Jordanian corporations 
apply principles of corporate governance, consistent with western countries to monitor their 
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activites and increase the number of their investors. Any processes to prevent the purchase or 
sale of securities of the corporafion based on insider information from the directors or another 
insider, which are considered, invalid through internal procedures and regulations undertaken 
by the issuer to prevent such transactions. According to the securities law (n.76/2002) and 
companies' law (n.22/1997), the current situation of corporate governance in Jordan is 
summarized below: 
5.7.2.1 Ownership structure 
Ownership structure is characterized by a number of features. 
• private shareholdings and institufional shareholding are each around 50% ; 
• no taxes are levied on dividends and capital gains on shares held by foreign 
investors; 
• the proportion of newly privatized corporations constitutes about 5% to 10% of 
shareholdings; and 
• ownership structure varies according to the extent to which a corporation is 
privatized. 
5.7.2.2 The rights of shareholders'^ 
Specific rights of shareholders are given below: 
• to have financial statements available for at least two weeks before the annual 
general meeting; 
• to have access to published externally audited annual statements in the daily 
newspapers, one of which would be in the English language and the other in 
Arabic; 
19 http://www.estandardsforum.org/iordan/standards/principles-of-corporate-govemance 
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• to participate in voting at the general meeting; 
• to be able to block shares for at least one day before to the annual general meeting; 
• to vote as partially paid up shareholders, while bearer shareholders can attend the 
meeting, but they are not allowed to vote; 
• according to the bye-laws, shareholders can be elected as members of the board of 
directors; 
• to have the power to approve the distribution of dividends at the annual general 
meeting and power to propose higher dividends than those proposed by the board; 
• pursuant to a request by 10 percent of the shareholders vote, the board of directors 
or auditors must attend an extraordinary general meeting; 
• to give their approval to large transactions; 
• to have the right to add items to the agenda by any shareholder representing 5 per 
cent of capital until three days before the annual general meeting; and 
• to have access to corporations' audit report, income statements, and balance sheet 
for the previous three years and information about share classes. 
5.7.2.5 The equitable treatment of shareholders 
• any shareholders can register his /her opposition at the annual general meeting and 
can attend at the last moment; 
• in the case of mergers with any corporation, the shareholders can withdraw fi-om 
the merger corporation; 
• the shareholders can file a complaint against any violation of the law from an 
administrative agency; 
• shareholders, holding at least 10% of capital, have the right to request an inspection 
of the corporation and to ensure that procedures are followed correctly, and that 
decisions are not unfairly favoured, on condition that shareholders; 
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• any shareholders owning 5% of share capital has the right to complain to the SDC; 
• any business transactions between the shareholders and the corporation must be 
disclosed to all shareholders; and 
• shareholders, owning at least 5%, may stop decisions related to shareholders. 
5.7.2.4 The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
There are several features pertaining to the role of stakeholders: 
• those who share in the gains to the lower of the 10% of profit or the equivalent of 
one year's salary can be considered as stakeholders; 
• stakeholder's rights are protected by specific laws or contract; 
• they may access the legal process to obtain redress, for any violation of 
stakeholders' rights; and 
• stakeholders, such as bondholders and employees, have the right to obtain 
information by law, including inspecting financial statements. 
5.7.2.5 Disclosure and transparency 
• any corporation of 100 shareholders or more must publish an annual report, a semi-
annual report, and a quarterly report to be reviewed by the auditors after 45 days 
after publishing the reports and 90 days after the end of the respective period; 
• a corporation with less than 100 shareholders must publish an annual report; 
• all the above must be published in two daily newspapers; 
• stock market and legal regulations require corporate disclosure about various other 
matters, for example, board remuneration (although executive remuneration is not 
reported) and share- class voting rights; 
• corporations must submit annually to the ASE a statement with names and details 
of board members and senior managers, including nationality; 
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• Jordanian Accounting Standards must ensure that financial statements conform to 
IFRS (IAS); 
• the annual general meeting appoints the auditors for audited annual and semi-
annual financial statements and sets their compensation; 
• any errors and misrepresentation, any resulting loss related to shareholders and 
errors for compensation are under the responsibility and hence liability of auditors; 
• after the end of the contract, any auditor may not become an employee or board 
member at the corporation for three years; 
• the internal auditors are entrusted to protect the corporation from any negligent 
oversights and it is their responsibility to establish control procedures and review 
annual reports and prospectuses; and 
• i f there is no non-executive director on the board, outsiders should be hired because 
some members of the committee should be non-executives. 
5.7.2.6 Responsibilities of the boar^'^ 
• a minimum of three board members are required for Jordanian corporations, and 
single tier boards must be comprised of an odd number of members; 
• an employee must have served a two-year term in the corporation before being 
appointed as a board member; 
• designation of the directors is through the aimual general meeting and renewable 
for three years, according to competence, and remuneration is set as well as 
provisions for replacement; 
http://www.estandardsforum.org/iordan/standards/principles-of-corporate-govemance 
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• the directors submit a curriculum vitae to the annual general meeting, which 
includes three years' previous experience and with a list of corporations to which 
they are associated; 
• often the CEO or managing director and chairman are the same person; 
• there is a clear difference in the compensation of executive and non-executive 
directors. Executive directors receive an annual share of profit based on 10% of net 
income. Non-executive board members each receive travel expenses and attendance 
fees; 
• the board of directors is under a legal responsibility to the shareholders for any 
distortion or forgery of corporate information; 
• each fiscal year the board of directors is discharged from accountability and 
authority at the annual general meeting; 
• any fraud, action or breaches of regulations by directors make them personally 
liable, but the government rather than shareholders initiates action of the power of 
law; 
• the board must take the interests of employees into account according to the 
corporate law; 
• the board of directors is basically responsible for monitoring interests of 
shareholders and for the implementation of the corporation's objectives, set by the 
annual general meeting, and its key officials; 
• there are no rules that govern "independence" of the board; and 
• it is possible for the directors to serve of on a maximum two boards, one of which 
as a managing director, on condition that they own at least 10% of the corporation. 
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More difficulties are faced by non-executive board members, especially in relation to the 
audit committee, because the information pertaining to it is not available to them, but most 
directors have fiill access to relevant information, because they are executives or other 
insiders. Appendix 5-4 summarises the fmal conclusion attained by the report. 
5.8 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the important features of the Jordanian market and 
presented important issues that serve the credit ratings and corporate governance (ownership 
structure) debate in Jordan. The discussion showed that Jordanian firms follow the IAS 
(international accounting standards) and this may add more reliability to the Jordanian data. 
In addition, this chapter showed that firms in Jordan can issue bonds as a source of financing 
but the bond market is not as developed as the stock market. 
In 1998 the Jordanian fmancial market was transformed into a modem capital market with a 
new legal framework, which included new regulations requirements imposed upon 
companies listed on ASE. For the first time by Jordanian regulations, the listed Jordanian 
companies were required to apply IAS in periodic financial statements. The underlying aim 
of the accounting regulation modifications in Jordan was to create an attractive investment 
climate to encourage both domestic and foreign investors. In addition, due to the Jordanian 
government commitment to the WTO in 2000 the Jordanian govenmient has commenced a 
process reform of its telecommunications and postal sectors. The changes in the Jordanian 
regulatory and its telecommunications systems result in changes in the credit ratings 
assessments. 
Therefore, the current study targets the Jordanian credit rating practices before the new crises 
in 2008. However, despite these recent developments in the Jordanian financial market, the 
annual report is still the only well-established method for investor relations. Therefore, it is 
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regarded as the main focus of the current empirical investigations with respect to Jordan. In 
particular, this study w i l l examine the level of credit rating practices in the Jordan credit 
ratings before 2008, which includes the levels of credit rating in 2005 and 2007. Also this 
study wi l l examine the level of the credit raring assessments by Jordanian companies in 2005-
2007. 
The ASE has developed greatly since its establishment and has succeeded in accomplishing 
several of its goals by mobilising capital into the productive sectors of the economy. ASE 
appears to be well organised, attractive, and well managed with much potenrial for growth. 
In 1997, a new security law was enacted to reflect the development of systems and the 
sophisticarion o f new products and participants. The new law established an independent 
Jordanian Securities Commission with broad and well-defined powers to organise, develop, 
and monitor the securities market. The new law also established other key institurions, 
participants, and pracrices. 
Despite the accomplishments so far, ASE has much room for improvement to become a 
regional fmancial market in the fixture. There are several comparative advantages in this 
market, which should be fiirther developed in order to improve its efficiency and to attract 
intemarional investments, thereby increasing the depth o f the market and enabling it to better 
compete at emerging markets level. 
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C H A P T E R SIX: R E S E A R C H M E T H O D O L O G Y 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research methodology used in the present study to investigate the 
relationship between credit risk assessment and corporate governance, ownership structure, 
financial transparency and disclosure. In this research I follow a positivistic approach, 
utilizing quantitative data. It is necessarily applied in nature using a real data-set. In my 
research model the dependent variable is the credit rating. The independent variables relate to 
accounting and financial aspects, market and regulatory factors, ownership structure, 
financial transparency including disclosure and also corporate governance. The sections 
which follow explain the rationale for my research approach. The methodological steps of 
this research are summarised in Appendix 6-1. 
6.2 Research Philosophies 
This section elaborates on the philosophical stance of the present research. Research 
philosophy is very important to researchers in their understanding of the appropriate direction 
for their research. Saunders et at. (2007) illustrate the meaning of research philosophy as the 
understanding for the assumptions of the idea that constitute the research under study. These 
assumptions wil l underpin the research strategy and the methods that wi l l be part o f that 
strategy (Saunders et at., 2007). 
Three reasons can be identified for this choice of research philosophy: First, it can refine and 
specify the research methods to be used in the study. This includes the type of evidence 
gathered and its origin, the way in which evidence is interpreted, and how it helps answer the 
research questions posed. Second, knowledge of research philosophy can enable and assist 
the researcher to evaluate different methodologies and methods and avoid inappropriate use 
135 
and unnecessary work by identifying the limitations of particular approaches at an early 
stage. Third, knowledge of research philosophy can help the researcher be creative and 
irmovative in either selection or adaptations of research methods (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). 
6.3 Positivistic Versus Phenomenological 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge, and it 
concerns what constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study. Epistemology endeavours 
to vindicate a belief of the reality, starting with a psychological fact. So, the aims of 
epistemology are to relate knowledge to reality, and to explore the validity of knowledge. 
Epistemology, or theory of knowledge, refers to the development of knowledge, which 
encompasses both posifivism and phenomenological. Some authors, such as Obasi (2002), 
argue for the validity of one position and often for the invalidity of the other, based upon the 
extent to which either approach is able to conduct an appropriate method of investigation and 
analysis. 
Consequently, there are broadly two classifications of epistemology, and there are important 
differences between them, which wi l l now be explored under the two headings: positivism 
and phenomenological. This research follows a positivistic approach. 
A positivistic philosophy assumes things can be studied as hard facts e.g. a firm's credit risk 
assessment and the relationship between these facts can be established as scientific law. 
According to Saunders et al. (2007) "only phenomena that you can observe wil l lead to the 
production of credible data". For positivists, such laws have the status of truth and social 
objects can be studied in much the same way as natural objects. The basic reasoning of 
positivism assumes that an objective reality exists (such as a firm's ownership structure) 
136 
which is independent of human behaviour and is therefore not a creation o f the human mind. 
Therefore, the appHcation of positivistic research is through objective methods. 
To explain more about positivistic research, some authors (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), have 
depicted its characteristics as follows: 
• reductionism: in order to understand the problem better, it should be reduced into the 
simplest possible elements; 
• causality: social science should support the identification of causal explanation (e.g. 
good corporate governance practice beneficially influencing credit rating) and 
fundamental laws that explain regularities in human social behaviours; 
• cross-sectional analysis: variations are made across samples to identify the result 
clearly; 
• independence: the researcher must be independent from what is being observed so 
that other researchers using my data-set would draw the same conclusion; 
• hypothesis and deduction: science proceeds through a process of hypothesis testing 
and then deducing what kind o f observations wi l l demonstrate the truth or falsity of 
these hypotheses, which i f not rejected lead to fundamental laws; 
• generalization: from selected samples of sufficient size inferences are made about the 
whole population; 
• value-freedom: the data should be in an objective manner (e.g. numerical data), rather 
than being dependent on human beliefs and interest; and 
• operationalization: concepts are operationalized in a way that allows facts to be 
measured quantitatively. 
According to the above, a positivistic philosophy offers the same features as the natural 
sciences, both seeking to produce sets of generalized laws. Social reality, which may be 
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applied to the whole of society/industry through the laws described on the basis of observed 
phenomena, exhibit expected behavioural characteristics. Consequently, according to Parsa 
(2001), a positivistic philosophy takes an approach, which seeks to understand causality 
within society, without direct reference to the opinions of actors within society, whose 
approach is on the basis of generaiizable behaviour. 
According to Parsa (2001) considers the extent to which the use of a positivistic tradition is 
related to the extent to which the data can be collected in a quantitative format (and this is 
very much the case in this research); and the extent to which the approach can be divorced 
from subjectivity on the part of the respondent^researcher; for indeed the statistical results 
should not in any way be influenced by whoever conducts the research. 
As Saunders et al. (2007) explain phenomenology is an epistemology that provides an 
alternative to the traditions and foundations of positivism for conducting disciplined inquiry. 
For the phenomenological researcher, reality is not a rigid thing; instead it is a creation of 
those individuals involved in the research, which is not the case in this study because 
researchers do agree on the reality of the (mainly poublished) credit risk assessment levels. 
This definition leads to a short way of expressing the meaning, being the opposite philosophy 
to positivism, and as such has been described as a phenomenological philosophy. Parsa 
(2001) argues that there is an illogical underpinning of decisions based on the philosophy of 
phenomenology. Phenomenology is concerned with establishing and searching for a 
'warranted acceptability', that is, evidence that is valid and sound proof for the existence of 
phenomena. This is in contrast to the positivist approach of making claims to absolute truth 
through the establishment of generalisation and laws. 
Now a qualitative method requires data in the form of words rather than numbers. As such, 
qualitative methods refer to the many methods of collecting data, such as, participant 
138 
observation, case study, focus group and interviews. So, the interpritivistic philosophy is 
more usually related to qualitative methods, which attempt to generate theory and find 
meaning within a research problem. This approach might have been useful i f I had studied 
how firms respond to their credit risk assessments in their financial strategies and policies. 
Interviews with finance directors would have created useful insights. However, the focus o f 
this research is upon the determinants of the WVB ratings. 
There are differences between the philosophy of epistemology and the philosophy of 
ontology. Epistemology begins with reality by illustrating knowledge as a psychological fact, 
whilst ontology is concerned with the assumptions that are made about the nature of reality, 
and looks at consistency between divergent information. Obasi (2002) illustrates that 
ontology seeks to connect psychological fact (knowledge) with reality. However, the 
philosophy of ontology contains two positions: objectivism and subjectivism, each of whose 
aspects wi l l be discussed briefly, as follows: 
To some extent the objectivistic philosophy, to which financial data are well suited, is close 
to the positivistic philosophy in that both search for interpreting the phenomena in an 
absolute manner without any existence to the emotion or feelings of the researchers. So, this 
philosophy portrays the position that social entities exist in reality external to social actors, 
who are concerned with their existence. The core point in this philosophy would be the 
separation of the researcher from the studied cases. Therefore, the researcher must be value-
fi-ee and view the problem externally. 
The subjectivistic philosophy is related to the interpretivistic philosophy, in which both are 
related to the perceptions of the individuals in the interpretation of the phenomena, and 
interrogate the attitude of these individuals and their motivations. My attitude to a WVB 
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credit rating score has not influenced the way in which that score is analysed. Consequently, I 
have not adopted a subjective philosophy. Appendix 6-2 summarises the entire philosophies. 
6.4 Qualitative Versus Quantitative Methods 
Any scientific practice in the world is originally devised from theories and depends on the 
underlying philosophies and assumptions. Research methods deal with the process used in 
scientific inquiry, which have been categorised broadly into quantitative and qualitative 
methods. These methods can be presented as follow: 
A major objective of quantitative research has been to study natural phenomena in the 
universe, by use of theories and hypotheses with recourse to mathematical models and their 
different measures. Consequently, it is the relationship between natural phenomena and 
scientific investigation that tends to fall within the framework o f systematic quantitative 
research. There is a strong relationship between mathematical expression and empirical 
observation especially statistically through centralized measures and fundamental 
coimections within quantitative research (Saunders et al. 2007). According to Johnson and 
Onwueegbuzie (2004, p. 19), the strengths of quantitative research include: generalization of 
research findings; it is 'less time-consuming' in data analysis; and it provides researchers 
with independence in the research results. 
The weaknesses o f quantitative research include: 'the focus on theory or hypothesis testing 
rather than on theory or hypothesis generation' deprives the researcher from evaluating 
phenomena as they occur; it allows, for subsequent direct application to specific local 
situations, individuals, and contexts. 
Qualitative research relies on reasons behind various aspects of behaviour, particularly 
depending on field observation. Consequently, qualitative research involves 'an in-depth 
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understanding of human behaviour and the reasons that govern that behaviour'. Accordingly, 
Johnson and Onwueegbuzie (2004, p. 20) and Kumar Raj (2009, p. 23 ) have revealed some 
strengths and which include: 'to penetrate fronts, discover meaning, and reveal the subtlety 
and complexity of cases or issues through attention to detail, the ability to embrace both 
verbal and non-verbal behaviour; to encompass natural environments and processes; to 
contextualize the framework within situations; to provide a close fit between theory and data, 
because theory is generated from the empirical data; 
And some weaknesses which include: 'findings may be unique to the relatively few people 
included in the research study', for knowledge produced may not be generalized to other 
settings; and sometimes results are 'subjective, lacking in precision, biased and 
idiosyncratic'. 
In this study I do not undertake qualitative field observations. The disadvantage of this 
omission is that some case studies might have provided insights from directors of corporate 
boards through interviews. However, this was not practicable to undertake in addition to the 
extensive quantitative research. 
Many researchers argue that an integration of the quantitative and qualitative research 
methods is useful and necessary to give a more complete picture of the social world, while 
some researchers differ from this viewpoint by believing that the philosophies that underpin 
each of the approaches are so divergent that they cannot be reconciled within a research 
project. However, as noticed before, there are differences and comprehensions between the 
two methods (see Table 6-1). 
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Table 6- 1: Link between philosophies and method 
Philosophy 
Question Quantitative Qualitative 
Epistemology 
What is the 
relationship of the 
researcher to that 
researched? 
Researcher is 
independent from that 
being researched. 
Researcher interacts 
with that being 
researched. 
Ontology 
What is the nature 
of the values? 
Reality is objective 
and singular, apart 
from the researcher. 
Reality is subjective 
and multiple as seen by 
participants in a study. 
Axiology 
What is the rule of 
the values? 
Value-free and 
unbiased 
Value-laden and biased 
(Source: Adapted from Collis, J and Hussey R 2003) 
However, numerical and ordinal secondary data are used for credit rating and independent 
variables (for accounting and financial, ownership structure, financial transparency and 
disclosure and corporate governance), are measurable. It follows that a quantitative approach 
is chosen to investigate the effect of corporate governance, ownership structure and financial 
transparency on W V B credit risk assessments. 
6.5 Induction Versus Deduction 
The research approaches affect the methodology that should be conducted in the current 
study. The researcher is faced with alternative paths, including two approaches, namely a 
deductive approach and an inductive approach. 
The inductive approach has many characteristics (Saunders et al., 2007), such as: 
• it allows the use of a small sample when studying phenomena; 
• as a result of determining the theory after collecting data, it provides more flexibility 
in the explanations of the study phenomena; and, 
• people have a role in interpreting the cause-effect link between the variables rather 
than the unthinking research objects, who respond in a mechanistic way to certain 
circumstances'. 
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However, in this study I am looking for an unbiased objective interpretation that can be 
mechanistically verified by statistical testing. I am not looking for a plausible opinion that 
generally matches the facts, but more concrete evidence. 
Following this discussion, there appears for us some main differences between the deductive 
and inductive approaches to research, as summarised in the next table (Table 6.2). 
Deductive approach Inductive approach 
Scientific principle Gaining an understanding of the 
meanings humans attach to an event 
Moving from theory to data 
Moving from data to theory 
The need to explain casual relationships 
between variables 
A close understanding of the research 
context 
The collection of quantitative data 
The collection of the qualitative data 
A highly structured approach 
A more flexible structured approach 
Researcher independent of what is being 
researched 
A realisation that the researcher is part 
of the research process 
The necessity to select samples of 
sufficient size in order to generalise a 
conclusion 
Less concern with the need to 
generalise 
(Source: Saunders et al., 2007). 
Following a deductive approach usually begins with a theory related to the subject of study. 
Potentially important key variables are identified, put into suitable hypotheses accordingly 
and theoretical relationships between them are suggested, then operational hypotheses are 
proposed and tested rigorously (Saunders et al., 2007). So, this deduction leads to a 
conclusion, explaining the strength of the relationship and contributing to a new 
understanding. 
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According to Saunders et al, (2007), the deductive approach has many characteristics, such 
as: 
• ' i t explains the causal relationship between variables; 
• it often uses a quantitative paradigm in the collection of data; 
• it allows the testing of hypotheses through applied controls; 
• it enables facts to be measured quantitatively through concepts (variables) being 
operationalised; 
• it tends to be efficient in the number of key variables, so problems as a whole are 
better understood, since they are reduced to the simplest possible elements; and 
• it applies samples for social study then allows generalizations to the whole 
population'. 
In this study, identified hypotheses, which are underpinned by the relevant literature, are 
tested in order to establish the relationships between corporate governance, ownership 
structure, financial transparency and W V B credit ratings which are measured quantitatively. 
Hence, a deductive approach is adopted. Figure 6-1 summarises the philosophical stance of 
the present study. 
Figure 6- 1: The philosophical stance of the present study 
Research 
depends on 
empirical 
evidence 
Positivism 
Type of 
data 
collected is 
numerical 
f Quantitative 
Source: adapted from descriptions found in Saunders et al. (2007). 
Collecting 
data to test 
theory 
Deduction 
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6.6 Data Sources and Analysis 
6.6.1 Data sources 
Data collection methods are very important for research analysis, because there are different 
methods for this purpose. But, before discussing the data collection techniques, we should 
determine the purpose of the research first to help in choosing the appropriate way to collect 
the data. There are three types of research according to purpose, including exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory research, which wi l l be explained in some detail. 
6.6.2 Exploratory research 
According to Saimders et al., (2007), this type of research is usefiil, when researchers are 
unsure about the nature of the problem, which they plan to study. So, it suits the more highly 
innovative industries, which place a high priority to discovering new ideas from this research 
(Hair et al., 2007). The characteristics of this type are: clarifies the nature o f the problem to 
be solved, can be used to suggest or generate hypotheses, includes the use of pilot studies, 
used widely in market research. 
6.6.3 Descriptive research 
Descriptive research, unlike exploratory research, is often confirmatory, which means that it 
is used to test hypotheses (Hair et al., 2007). According to Hair et al., 2007 and Saunders et 
al., (2007), descriptive research is mainly related to the narrative examination. The main 
characteristics of this type are: provides general frequency data about populations or samples, 
does not manipulate variables (e.g. as in an experiment), describes only the "who, what, 
when, where and how", cannot establish a causal relationship between variables, associated 
with descriptive statistics. 
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6.6.4 Explanatory research 
Explanatory or causal research, attempts to discover causality, which refers to the dependence 
of one event or variable (the effect) on another event or variable (the cause) (Hair et al., 
2007). According to statistical science, the cause is called the set of independent variables 
and the effect is called the set of dependent variables. As a result, explanatory research wil l 
depend on theoretical support for explaining the relationship between the variables, and also 
formulation of the hypotheses, which test this relationship. According to the above, the 
purpose of the current study wi l l be both descriptive and explanatory. 
6.6.5 Type of data sources 
Data collection may involve either primary or secondary data or both, which wil l be 
explained in some detail. 
6.6.5.1 Primary data 
The primary data is a term for data collected on source which has not been subjected to 
processing or any other manipulation. Primary data can be input to a computer program or 
used in manual analysis procedures such as gathering statistics from a survey. Further, 
primary data could be qualitative or could be quantitative. 
6.6.5.2 Secondary data 
Unlike primary data that are collected by the investigator conducting the research, secondary 
data are data collected by someone other than the user. Common sources of secondary data 
for social science include censuses, surveys, organizational records and data collected 
through qualitative methodologies or qualitative research (Saunders et al., 2007). 
According to Saunders et al., (2007), secondary data have many advantages, which include: 
• 'avoiding respondent fatigue'; 
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• more confidence because they depend on public sources; 
• enormous saving in time; and 
• potential for comparative analysis, 
They also discuss some disadvantages to secondary data, which include inter alia: 
• 'aggregations and definitions may be unsuitable'; 
• 'misalignment of purpose, when it does not match the researchers' need', and 
• 'access to the data may be difficult or costly'. 
According to the current study, the author wi l l depend on secondary data collection, as it is 
suitable to both the research question and its purpose (descriptive and explanatory). The 
sources of this data are threefold: 
Firstly, the researcher utilise the ASE database. The set of financial information included in 
the study is taken from firms' financial statements during the period 2005-2007. 
The reasons for choosing this period are: 
i . The data for the period 2005-2007 are updated for the ASE. Hence, this gives the 
opportunity to update the empirical evidence of CRs decision making in the ASE. 
i i . The three year period is selected in order to minimise the missing observations for the 
credit rating variables. 
Compared with other studies related to investigating corporate governance aspects and the 
CRs (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Skaefe et al., 2006), albeit for US firms instead, the 
criteria for selecting the sample of the study are: 
147 
i i i . The proposed sample includes firms from the ASE during the period 2005-2007. 
iv. Banks are excluded from the sample because of a different rating system. 
v. Firms are selected on the condition that their main activities are concentrated in the 
ASE. 
v i . The study includes only firms whose financial statements are available on the ASE 
database. 
Further details of the sampling procedure are provided later (see Table 6.6). 
Secondly, the JSC (Jordan Securities Commission) database for Jordanian firms is used in 
order to extract data for their corporate governance attributes. 
Thirdly: the WVB internal and external scores are used as generously supplied by WVB. 
Fortunately, for each firm a separate numerical score is also supplied by the rating agency 
and so, instead of using only an ordered logistic regression model for four categories, I am 
also able to apply ordinary least squares, which enabled me to capture finer distinctions in the 
assessments. This is a substantial advantage over many of the previous studies that have been 
reviewed earlier, for instead of just a couple or several categories, for part of my analysis I 
utilise hundreds o f distinctly separate numerical values for WVB's internal ratings, i.e. those 
that are not published, as opposed to the published ordinal WVB rating levels, which I also 
analyse. 
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6.7 Variables' Measurements 
6.7.1 Measurement of dependent variable (credit risk assessments): 
External organisations (e.g. Moody's, Standard and Poor's or Fitch) develop a credit rating for 
firms so that other interested parties can use these figures to assess a particular firms credit 
standing. My initial sample is of listed Jordanian firms that were rated by World'Vest Base 
(WVB) between 2005 and 2007. WVB is selected because of its coverage of Middedle 
Eastern firms. The data for the current study are from these sources: for CRs, the source is 
World'Vest Base and for other variables, the sources are the armual reports made available on 
the ASE. WVB reports of CRs are assigned a credit assessment score and measure the 
likelihood of a company failing to honour its commitments 12 months following the 
calculated CRs. A firm is given a numerical score which is then divided into 20 distinct risk 
groups based on a firm's eight CRs score. The current study draws upon the long-term CRs 
according to WVB credit risk ratings for using four groups fi-om classes represented by letters 
arrayed downwards fi-om B B l (the best rating) to D (payment is in default-bankruptcy), 
details of which are given in Table 6-3. 
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Table 6- 3: W V B Ratings and Numerical Scores 
W V B Ratings 
numerical scores 
and 
Comment 
(BB category): when DS > 
5.25 and DS <= 5.65 then 
B B l ; when DS > 4.95 and 
DS <= 5.25 then BB2; when 
DS > 4.75 and DS <= 4.95 
then BB3. 
Less near-term vulnerability to default than other 
speculative issues, however, faces ongoing uncertainties 
or exposure to adverse business, financial or economic 
conditions which could lead to inadequate capacity to 
meet timely interest and/or principal payments. 
(B category): when DS > 4.5 
and DS <= 4.75 then B l ; 
when DS > 4.15 and DS <= 
4.5 then B2; when DS > 3.75 
and DS <=4.15 then B3. 
Greater vulnerability to default, but currently has the 
capacity to meet interest and principal repayments. 
Adverse business, financial or economic conditions wil l 
likely impair the capacity or willingness to pay interest 
and repay principal. 
BI=="Speculative"'; B2=" Speculative at best"; B3= '"very 
speculative". 
(C category); when DS > 3.2 
and DS <= 3.75 then C I ; 
when DS > 2.5 and DS <= 
3.2 then C2; when DS > 1.75 
and DS <=2.5 then C3. 
A current identifiable vulnerability to default and 
dependent upon favourable business, fmancial and 
economic conditions to meet timely payment of interest 
and repayment of principal. Highly speculative in the 
event of adverse business, financial or economic 
conditions, " i t is not likely to have the capacity to pay 
interest and repay principar'=Cl; " i t is probable the 
company wi l l not likely have the capacity to pay interest 
and/or repay principal" =C2; "'it is ver>' likely that the 
company wil l not have the capacity to pay interest and 
repay principal" =C3. 
(D category): 
1.75. 
when DS <= Payment is in default, and is technically or actually in 
bankruptcy. 
Sours: with adopted http://www.wvb.com/news/companv/vievv/id/200907131 
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In the current study the multiple ratings were initially collapsed into four categories, namely, 
category 4 (BB: BB1-BB3), category 3 (B: B1-B3), category 2 (C: C1-C3) and category 1 
(D) to obtain a sufficient number of observations in each category, and because some of the 
higher ratings were not present (see Table 6-4). 
Table 6- 4: Credit risk rating classifications 
W V B Category W V B Debt Rating Assigned Rating Score 
BB B B l 4 
BB2 4 
BB3 4 
B B l 3 
B2 3 
B3 3 
C I 2 
C C2 2 
C3 2 
D D 1 
6.7.2 The determinants of the CRs-measurement of independent variables: 
This section discusses the measurement of the independent variables that determine the 
CRs. The model contains seventeen continuous variables namely leverage, profitability, 
capital intensity, firm size, growth opportunity, blockholders ownership, institution 
ownership, insiders ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, family 
ownership, working capital accruals, timeliness, board independence, board expertise, 
board stock and board size. In addition, the model contains four dummy (or nominal) 
variables: loss, industry type, audit quality, and role duality. 
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The selected independent variables consist of five categories. The first category relates 
to accounting and financial firm characteristic and consists of 4 variables; the second 
category is related to market and regulatory factors and consists of 4 variables; the third 
category is related to ownership structure and consists of 6 variables; the fourth group is 
related to financial transparency and disclosure and consists 2 of variables, while the last 
category relates to corporate governance factors and consists o f 5 variables. 
The proxy firm-specific explanatory variables are included in the rating models based on 
a survey of prior research on the determinants of corporate credit ratings for firm 
characteristics variables (e.g., Horrigan, 1966; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; Boardman and 
McEnally, 1981; Lamy and Thompson, 1988; Ziebart and Reiter, 1992; Blume et al., 
1998; Adams et al., 2003; Galil 2003; Pettit et al., 2004; Altman and Rijken, 2004; 
Doumpos and Patsiouras 2005; Demirovic and Thomas, 2007), or studies on corporate 
governance (e.g. Dann and DeAngelo, 1983; Baysinger and Butler 1985; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 1991; Jensen 1993; Gordon and Pound 1993; Nesbitt 1994; Agrawal and 
Knoeber 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Opler and Sokobin 1997; Klein 1998; Bhagat 
and Black 2000; Imhoff 2003; Yermack 2003), or studies on corporate governance and 
credit ratings (e.g. Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Skafe et al., 2006). The 
independent variables were determined by critically reviewing the pertinent literature as 
outlined in the literature review chapter. Table 6-5 summarises the operationalistion of 
the independent variables that determine CR. 
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Table 6- 5: Measurement of independent variables 
Variables Abbreviation Description 
Accounting 
and 
financial 
aspects 
Leverage LEV Total debt divided by total assets. 
Profitability PM Net income before extraordinary 
items divided by net sales. 
Capital 
intensity 
CAP_INTE Gross fixed assets divided by 
total assets. 
Loss 
Propensity 
LOSS 1 i f the net income before 
extraordinary items is negative in 
the current and prior fiscal year, 
0 otherwise. 
Market and 
regulatory 
factors 
Firm size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets. 
Growth 
opportunities 
TSQ Tobin's q. 
Industry type TYPSECT 1 i f firm is a financial sector, 0 
otherwise 
Audit quahty AUD_BIG 1 i f the company is audited by a 
big four company, 0 otherwise. 
Ownership 
structure 
Blockholders BLOCK % of shareholders who hold 5% 
or more ownership. 
Institution 
ownership 
INST_OWN % of shares held by institutional 
investors. 
Insider's 
ownership 
INSID_OWN % of shares held by insiders 
(managers not directors). 
Government 
ownership 
GOV OWN % of shareholdings owned by 
government. 
Foreign 
ownership 
FOR_OWN % of shareholdings owned by 
foreign. 
Family 
ownership 
FAML_OWN % of shareholdings family 
owned. 
Financial 
transparency 
and 
disclosure 
Timeliness TIMELINESS negative one times the squared 
residual from the following 
regression 
RETj = P0 + PI NIBEj + P2 LOSS, + 
/?3 NIBEi * LOSSi + P4A NIBEi + e 
Working capital 
accruals 
WCAQ scaled working capital accruals 
(SWCA) for year t are expressed as a 
linear combination of the scaled cash 
flows (SCF) for year's t - 1 , t and t +1, 
respectively: SWCA, = a + PiSCF,_ i 
+ P2SCF, + P3SCF, + 1 + e,. 
Corporate 
governance 
Board 
independence 
BRD_IND Number of independent directors 
on the board. 
Role duality R_D 1 i f the CEO is the chairman at 
the same time, 0 otherwise. 
Board 
expertise 
BRD EXPERT Number of independent directors 
that hold seats on other firms' 
boards. 
Board stock BRD_STOCK Number of directors that own 
stock in the firm. 
Board size BRD_SIZE Number of the members on the 
board. 
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6.7.2.1 Measurement for financial transparency and disclosure variables 
Two proxies can be used to measure financial transparency and disclosure: timeliness 
and working capital accruals. 
The financial transparency aspect of disclosure is important to establish the impact of 
earnings on the returns of the companies. I f those earnings closely map onto the returns then 
this is an indication o f transparency of the accounting data. However, i f the relationship is 
weak, the transparency is poor. A measure is required to establish what we might mean by 
poor or good transparency. There is a logical argument that the timeliness of the impact of the 
accounting data should have an impact on the CR (Skaife et al., 2006). There are several 
procedures that need to be followed to establish an objective measure of timeliness. First of 
all, the market returns on the shares need to be measured. This is achieved by taking the end 
of year price plus any dividends during the period and measuring the result as a proportion of 
the beginning of year price. Thus, the market return is established. Of course, the return can 
be affected by more general economic events that affect all shares and so the overall market 
impact needs to be separated out. It is common practice to adjust the returns by deducting the 
required beta-adjusted market return to arrive at the excess market return. The required return 
for this purpose is that derived by the capital asset pricing model. Thus, we take the equity 
risk premium and multiply by the beta coefficient to derive the firm's risk premium and add 
the risk free rate to the result (Sharpe, 1964). 
6.7.2.1.1 Timeliness 
The proxy for timeliness (see Skaife et al., 2006) is: negative one times the squared 
residual from the following regression 
RETj = /?„ + ^, NIBEj + LOSSj + NIBEj * LOSSj + p^A NIBEj + e 
Where 
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RETj= the market-adjusted return over the fiscal year for firm j ; 
NlBEj = net income before extraordinary items; 
LOSSj = one i f NIBE is negative, zero otherwise; 
A NlBEj = the change in net income before extraordinary items. 
For estimating the risk premium for Jordan, it has been established by Amoeteng and Kargar 
(2004), based on the International Finance Company's stock market database for the period 
1999 to 2002 inclusively, that the monthly mean percentage rate of return on the equity 
market for Jordan was 0.1192. However, this was a period of time when many stock markets 
experienced negative rates of return. For example, they cite Standard and Poor 500, FT 100 
and Nikkei each with negative rates of return. The actual unsystematic risks (standard 
deviations) of these three countries' monthly rates o f return were 5.1831, 4.5863 and 6.8141, 
respectively, compared with a standard deviation of 3.5454 for Jordan. This would suggest 
that Jordan has a lower risk premium than these other coimtries. One way to proceed is to 
take separate estimates of the risk premium for each country and estimate that for Jordan 
based on the size of its own risk relative to that of each of the other n countries. Hence: 
estimate of Jordan's risk premium = ( l / / j ) x Z (for all i = \ to n) [(risk premium for country 
/•) x (standard deviation of returns for Jordan)/(standard deviation of returns for country /)] 
Simulated risk premia for the US, UK and Japan have been estimated at 5.4%, 4.4% and 
3.3%, respectively (see Omran and Pointon, 2008). It follows that the estimate of Jordan's 
risk premium would be of the order of: 
(l/3)[0.054(3.5454/5.1831) + 0.044(3.5454/4.5863) + 0.033(3.5454/6.8141)] 
= 0.0294 = 2.94%. 
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It is also necessary to establish a figure as a proxy for the risk-free rate. Creane et al., (2003), 
who have undertaken an analysis of financial development in the Middle East, discuss the 
issuance of five year bonds by the Jordanian government with a market yield estimated at 4.5 
per cent. This is chosen for the proxy of the risk-free rate. It follows that the excess rate of 
return for firmj, RETj, is given by: 
RETj = r ^ y - [0.045 + 0.0294*pj], 
Where 
rAjis the actual rate of return for firm j, whose beta is Pj. 
Having established the excess rate of return, this can be regressed against earnings related 
measures, to establish residuals. It can be argued that the lower the value of the squared 
residuals the more timely the earnings' measures. This procedure, set out by Gu (2002) and 
cited and applied by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.. (2006), is designed to measure the extent to 
which earnings' measures do not explain excess returns. The procedure these researchers 
follow, and which we also adopt, is to multiply the result by minus one so that the negatively 
adjusted independent variable is hypothesised to be associated with timeliness. In other 
words, greater values of the revised independent variable suggest more timely earnings. 
6.7.2.1.2 Working capital accruals 
The scaled working capital accruals (SWCA) for year t are expressed as a linear combination 
of the scaled cash flows (SCF) for year's t - 1 , t and t +1, respectively: 
SWCA, = a + PI SCF,., + P2SCF, + P3SCF, + 1 + 8 , . 
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The regressions were run for each of the three sectors, namely, the financial, industry and 
service sectors. Then, the negative values of the current residuals (e/) are used to represent 
scaled working capital accruals, the proxy for transparency: 
SWAQ (transparency) = - ((e,^)"^ < 0. 
The proxy we use for transparency is slightly different from the one used by Ashbaugh-
Skaife el al., (2006). Firstly, following Dechow and Dichev (2002), they take the residuals 
from a regression of scaled working capital accruals against scaled cash flow terms for the 
current, previous and next years, respectively. The working capital accruals and the cash 
flows are scaled by the average total assets. Secondly, they derive the standard deviation o f 
the residuals based on the previous 3 to 5 years, and multiply by the factor of minus one to 
generate the correctly hypothesized sign. ^ ' 
The model in this thesis takes account of more recent transparency than the Ashbaugh-Skaife 
model, since it reflects the actual absolute deviation (fi-om zero) of the current residual rather 
than the standard deviation of the past three to five years. Thus, my modified procedure 
reflects a more contemporaneous measure of transparency. From the regression at step one, 
an equation is generated fi-om which to predict the working capital accmals and such 
predictions are compared with actual values to arrive at the residuals in the normal way. A l l 
values are then treated as negative, i.e. the final figures are minus one times the absolute 
values, in order to establish the correctly hypothesized sign. Based on the above proxy. 
Using Dechow and Dichev (2002) adjustments, similar to those by Ashbaugh-Skaife el al., (2006) to model the quality of the financial 
reporting of accruals, Francis ei a l . , (2005) demonstrate that there is a negative relationship between the quality of accruals and the cost of 
debt. In their work, control factors are included to accommodate the effect of other cost of capital related variables, such as size and book to 
market value. Furthermore, Prevost et al . , (2008) examine the impact of abnormal accruals on the yield spreads on corporate bonds, and 
conclude that, especially for speculative bonds, accruals which depart from normality are associated with a higher cost of debt. Clearly, this 
has implications for credit rating in that the behaviour of firms to try to distort earnings, by making them less value relevant, is unravelled by 
investors and reflected in the market price of tradable corporate bonds so that the C R should reflect the underlying earnings. 
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greater transparency should be associated with a higher quality of accruals, i.e. associated 
with a greater success in the extent to which the SWCAQ reflect the cash flows. 
Later in this chapter I wi l l explain how models wi l l be used to test the relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables. 
6.8 Sample Size. 
The strategy for sample selection is to select all companies listed on the ASE in December 
2005, 2006 and 2007, excluding banks and companies that do not have a WVB_CR. Table 6-
6 summarises the classification of the listed Jordanian companies from 2005-2007. 
Table 6- 6: Population of the study 
2005 2006 2007 Total 
Number of companies listed on ASE 212 237 255 704 
(-) Banks (16) (16) (16) (48) 
(-) Companies without a W V B _ C R (15) (27) (37) (79) 
Final sample of companies with a W V B _ C R 181 194 202 577 
6.9 Data Analysis 
There are some steps need to be followed, regarding: 
• Determining the nature of the data to be analysed: the nature of the data either is 
quantitative or qualitative. Since most of the collected data are numerical, the study 
158 
wil l utilise quantitative data analysis in investigating CR in Jordanian listed 
companies and in testing the relationship between credit rating and corporate 
characteristics, such as, ownership structure, fmancial transparency and disclosure and 
corporate governance. 
• Determining the type of the data for which there are two types of data: 
• Firstly, categorical data whose values cannot be measured numerically but can be 
classified into categories according to their characteristics. These categories either 
belong to two sets and are called dichotomous (or dummy data) or to more than two 
sets without ranking in order which are called nominal data. When the categorical 
data are placed in rank order, they are called ordinal data the CRs are ordered and, 
therefore, fall into this category; for example, A A A , 
AA1,AA2,AA3,A1,A2,A3,BBB1, BBB2, BBB3, B B l , BB2, BB3, B l , B2, B3, C I , 
C2, C3and D. 
• Secondly, quantifiable data, whose values are measured numerically. This type of data 
is classified into two sub-types: interval and ratio or continuous and discrete data. I f 
the relative differences between the two data values can be calculated then the data 
are called ratio data, otherwise they are called interval data. On the other hand, i f the 
data can take any value from the measurement scale they are called continuous data; 
otherwise, they are called discrete data, when they take only one of a finite number of 
values from that scale (Saunders, et al., 2007). According to the current study, there 
are 17 ratio and continous variables. Figure 6-2 summarises these types of data. 
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Figure 6- 2: Summary of the types of data and variables related to this study 
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Having recognised the type of data, the data are prepared, ready for analysis. Adapting data 
for analysis is an important step because it facilitates the analytical process, saves time and 
makes the results more reliable. However, preparing data includes processing data through 
statistical software. Firstly, data entry in an Excel sheet is to be compatable with the chosen 
statistics' software, which is to be used in analysing the data. In this study, analysis of the 
data is expected to be performed using SPPSS (V.17) and Statagraphics 5.Secondly, data 
coding wi l l be performed in this study. This includes identifying dichotomous and nominal 
variables, as well as continues variables at the same time as entering the data value. For 
example, a dichotomous variable taking on the value of '0 ' or ' 1' is used for a high or low 
rating; a continuous variable is used for the WVB internal numerical scores; and an ordinal 
score of 4, 3, 2, and 1 is used for BB, B, C and D credit risk categories, respectively. They are 
used in different models as explained later. Thirdly, the data have to be checked to ensure that 
the codes of the different variables are well defmed, and to check for any missing data in the 
sample of the study, to ensure that the data are well entered. 
6.10 Statistical Techniques 
Many techniques wi l l be used in the current study. Bivariate analysis is used for each 
independent variable by using parametric and non parametric tests. According to Cooper and 
Schindler (2001) and Saunders et al., (2007), parametric tests have some assumptions, which 
the researcher should be aware of, and include: 
• 'the observation must be independent; 
• the observation should be drawn from normally distributed populations; and 
• these populations should have equal variances. 
161 
6.10.1 Parametric tests 
The parametric tests wi l l include: 
• 'the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient (r), to measure the association 
between all the dependent variables and the continuous independent variables; 
• the t-test and Levene test, which determine the association between all the dependent 
variables and any dichotomous independent variables', and 
• One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), which tests differences in mean values 
between groups. 
6.11.2 Non-parametric test 
The non-parametric test w i l l include: 
• the Spearman's rank correlation which wi l l be performed for the same purpose of 
Pearson correlation on parametric test; 
• 'the Mann-Whitney U-test, which is conducted for the same purpose as the t-test on 
parametric data'. For continuous variables (i.e. firm size, leverage, profitability, 
growth opportunity (Tobin's q), capital intensity, block ownership, institution, 
insiders, government, family ownership, foreign ownership, timeliness, working 
capital accruals, board independence, board size, board expertise and board stock), 
correlation coefficients is used. Pearson product-moment correlation (a parametric 
test) is used when the normality assumption was satisfied, whereas Spearman rank 
correlation (non-parametric tests) is performed for continuous independent variables, 
i f the assumption of normality is violated. T-test (parametric) and Mann Whitney 
(non-parametric) tests are used to examine the impact of the four categorical variables 
(loss, sector type, audit type, and role duality) on the CRs. 
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6.10.3 The Regression Model 
As has been mentioned earlier, the availability of continuous numerical credit scores obtained 
directly from WVB enables more rigorous statistical testing to be undertaken. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) model of the current study can be illustrated as follow: 
y, = a+ P ,X„ + P2X2/ + . . . + P2i^2i/ +e, 
Where: 
Y: credit rating (numerical score), 
i = number of company, 
a = the intercept. 
P i . . . P21 = the coefficients of the independent variables. 
X1...X21 = the explanatory variables. 
£ = the error term. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) models wi l l be run by using SPSS V. 17, each model containing 
17 continuous variables (X| = Leverage, X2 = Profitability, X3 = Capital intensity, X5 = 
Company size, Xe = Tobin's q, X9 = Block holder ownership, Xio = Institutional ownership, Xn 
= Insider ownership, X12 = Governmental ownership, X13 = Family ownership, X14 = Foreign 
ownership, X15 = Working capital accruals, Xig = Timeliness of earnings, X n = Board 
independence, X19 = Board expertise, X20 = Board stock, and X21 = Board size) and 4 categorical 
variables (X4= Loss propensity, X7 = Type of sector, Xg = Audit type, and X18 = Role duality). 
Before running the regression model, it wi l l be essential to check the major assumptions o f 
regression, namely: normality of residuals, multicollinearity (see Gujarati, 2003), 
163 
homoscedasticity of residuals e.g. constant variance (Field, 2007), linearity of relationships, 
and independence of errors (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001). 
6.10.3.1 Assumptions Underlying Multiple Regressions 
Regarding the multiple regression techniques (parametric testing), there are some assumption 
which have to be checked before running the regression model, which performed using SPSS, 
namely, for normality, multicollinearity, linearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of the 
errors (Field, 2007). I f any of the latter assumptions are not supported, the results of the OLS 
model may be misleading and inefficient to the study unless they are properly 
accommodated. These assumptions can be illustrated as follows: 
6.10.3.1.1 Normality of Residuals 
Normality implies that errors (residuals) should be normally distributed (see, for example, 
Saunders et al, 2007). Technically, normality is necessary only for hypothesis tests to be 
valid. Then normality assumption can be tested by normality plots, such as: P-P plots and 
histograms for both the residual and dependent variable. Normality is achieved when there is 
a well defined symmetrical bell shaped curve to represent the distribution. 
6.10.3.1.2 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity implies that there is a linear relationship between two or more independent 
variables (Gujarati, 2003). When multicollinearity exists, it wi l l be difficult to differentiate 
the individual effects of the explanatory variables, and the OLS estimators may be biased and 
tend to have greater variances. Multicollinearity can be tested simply by using a correlation 
matrix of Pearson's product moment. When the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.80, it wil l be 
a matter o f concern for collinearity (Gujarati, 2003; and Field, 2007). 
Further, the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance value wi l l be used to check whether 
there is a collinearity problem between the independent variables or not, having performed an 
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OLS model. Saunders et al., (2007) and Field (2007) indicate that a large value of VIF (10 or 
above) and a very small value of tolerance (0.10 or below) indicate high collinearity. 
6.10.3.1.3 Homoscedasticity of Residuals 
The homoscedasticity assumption means that the variance of the error terms is constant for 
each observation (Saunders et al., 2007; Field, 2007). To examine the homoscedasticity 
graphically, one can look at plots of residuals versus predicted values, and notice i f the 
absolute residuals are becoming larger (more spread-out) as a function of predicted values 
(Field, 2007). 
6.10.3.1.4 Linearity 
The relationship between the dependent and independent variables should be lineeir 
(Saunders, et al. 2007). To examine this, one can look at the plots of the residuals versus the 
independent variable values. I f linearity exists, there wil l be no obvious clustering of positive 
residuals or a clustering of negative residuals. Linearity can also easily be checked through 
plotting each independent variable against the dependent variable and see how well does the 
fitted regression line represent their relationship from the graphs for checking linearity o f 
each independent indicate, most of the independent variables in the model do not have an 
obvious linear relationship with the dependent variable. In such cases transformation o f 
variables is undertaken. In such a situation, data transformation is required (Cook, 1998). 
Transformation of data the most common techniques used by many researchers. Moreover, 
Field (2007) states that log transformation is the most common way. Therefore, this study 
wil l transform the variables' data before implementing statistical tests for the proposed 
hypotheses. Consequently, the current study applies the transformation for independent 
variables as a result of not achieving the linearity assumption. 
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6.10.3.1.5 Independence of Errors 
The independence of errors assumption refers to a lack of correlation between errors, as 
pointed out by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001). The Durbin-Watson test is used to test the 
autocorrelation of errors. In particular, it measures whether adjacent residuals are correlated 
or not (Field, 2007). The test value varies between 0 and 4, and a value of 2 indicates 
uncorrelation of errors. Negative correlation occurs i f the value of the test is significantly 
above 2, while positive correlation occurs i f the value is significantly below 2 (Field, 2007). 
However, Field (2007) has argued that the number of explanatory variables in the regression 
model and the number of observation are major determinants of the value of the Durbin-
Watson test statistic. The problem here is that there is no exact acceptable value, by which 
independence of errors can be judged. However, Field (2007) pointed out a conservative rule 
that values less than I or greater than 3 are certainly cause for concern. Moreover, even 
values near two may be biased depending on the sample and the model. 
6.10.4 Other Modelling Techniques 
There have been a large number of studies over the last 40 years attempting to build models 
that accurately predict CR, as discussed in the literature review. 
According to the previous studies performed in the area of CR prediction, a wide range of 
different methodologies has been highlighted. These studies show that financial variables can 
be used to estimate between 55% - 70% of corporate bonds accurately. 
6.10.4.1 Logistic regression (LR) 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) technique has been applied to develop the firm rating 
model, which suffers as explained before from some problems in its assumptions. Logistic 
regression (LR) is used for model formulation and is specific to a binary classification 
problem (high/ low rate); it is known to exhibit better generalization behaviour than least 
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squares regression, as is observed empirically (Baesens, 2003; Lim et al., 2000; Van Gestel et 
al., 2004). 
6.10.4.2 Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) 
Further, the ordinal logistic regression (OLR) model (Johnson and Albert, 1999; McCullagh, 
1980; McCullagh and Neider, 1989) is an extension of the binary logistic regression model 
for ordinal multi-class categorization problems, like e.g., category 4 (BB3-BB), category 3 
(B3-B), category 2 (C3-C) and category 1 (D). Hence, it is obvious that ordinal logistic 
regression is an interesting technique to model credit ratings in Jordanian environment. 
Classifying the ordered logit into its constituent components adds more depth in the analyses 
of the data and provides new directions for explanation of the relationships between CR and 
different group determinants. 
Thus, we seek to map fmancial and industry variables to CRs, which are surrogates for 
creditworthiness. The structure of CRs, however, presents several econometric issues. First, 
the ratings are discrete rather than continuous. Second, there is a natural ordering to the 
ratings—AA is a higher rating than A, which is a higher rating than BBB. Third, the ratings' 
categories are not necessarily evenly spaced—the BBB rating category, for example, may 
traverse a wider range of fmancial and industry variables than the other categories. Kaplan 
and Urwitz (1979) and Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998) discuss many of these issues. 
According to the logistic regression, I use an alternative classification scheme that partitions 
CRs into two categories—BB categories, as the indicator of higher credit risk, and lower 
categories. We use the marginal effects model by calculating the marginal changes in the 
probability of a firm receiving a BB category of CR as a result of a one standardized unit 
change in each of our governance variables. 
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Two logistic multivariate analyses wi l l be used for examining the association between the CR 
and explanatory variables namely ordered logistic regression (OLR), and binary logistic 
regression analysis (LR). An analysis of the output from these models, together with the 
untransformed ordinary least squares (U OLS) and trasformed ordinary least squares 
(T OLS) models, wi l l represent one of the main contributions of the study. Together the 
models provide more thorough evidence on the determinants of CR. 
6.10.4.3 Logistic Binary Regression (LR) and Ordinal Logit Regression (OLR) Models 
According to the LR, the study wi l l summarize the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables in the following equation of the natural logarithm of the ratings' odds-
ratio. The same methodology wi l l be to different models, as follows: 
Model I : log of ratings' odds-ratio = / (control variables) + e. 
Model 2: log o f ratings' odds-ratio = / (control variables, ownership structure) +e. 
Model 3: log o f ratings' odds-ratio = / (control variables, financial transparency) +E. 
Model 4: log of ratings' odds-ratio = / (control variables, governance attributes) +£. 
Model 5: log of ratings' odds-ratio = / (accounting and financial variables, market and 
regulatory variables, ownership structure, financial transparency, governance attributes) +e. 
More formally. In [P/{\-P)] = f(Xi... + e 
= « + i r = i fii^i^^ 
l+expi-[a+ P i X i + - + PnXn] ) 
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where p represents the probability of being in category 1 and not category 0 for binary 
logistic regression, and X i , X i , ... X21 are: Leverage, Profitability, Capital intensity, Loss 
propensity. Company size, Growth opportunity. Type of sector. Audit type, Blockholder 
ownership. Institutional ownership. Insider ownership. Governmental ownership, Family 
ownership. Foreign ownership, Working capital accruals, Timeliness of earnings, Board 
independence, Role duality. Board expertise, Board stock and Board size, are before. 
As to ordinal logistic regression, a similar methodology applies expect that an order raiJced 
list (1 , 2, 3, 4) of categories operates and parameter coefficients {fis) are determined for paired 
orderings down the risk. 
According to the above, the dependent variable is the log o f the odds-ratio for the credit 
rating of the long term debt and which consists of two groups, namely, the (BB) categories 
group and the below categories to (D) category. Under logistic regression there are two 
grades, whereas ordinal logistic regression there several grades. 
By using the five previous models, the current study can indicate the effect of each group on 
CR. Four different categories can be used to measure the credit rating. Each category 
represents successive classes of risk. So the furns can be ranked according to their credit 
rating category. 
6.10.4.4 Marginal Effects 
The next stage is to assess the relative importance of key factors (x i , X2, X 3 . . . ) in the models. 
Their impact can be evaluated by calculating the change in probability of receiving a higher 
rated category arising from each ownership structure, financial transparency and disclosure 
and corporate governance on firm characteristic variable in turn. These are designated as the 
marginal effects for this model, which are the direct impacts of a unit change in the respective 
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variable, holding all other variables constant. In the case of the logistic regression we can 
write the probability of an assessment being in the higher category as: 
Probability (Y = 1) = (oddsratio) I (l+oddsratio) 
where 
exp(a + bX-^ + 0X2 + dX^ + • •) = odds ratio 
a, b,c,d, ... = respective coefficients. 
For a unit change in X, the partial change in the probability (Y = 1) is given by: 
dp _ d r expia+bXi+cX2+dX3+ - ) -. 
dX ~ dX*-l+exp(a+bXt_+cX2+dX3+ - y 
•- expia+bXi+cX2+dX3+-) -. 
~ ^ ' - [ l+exp(a+6Xi+cX2+dA '3+ " ) ] ' ' 2 -
= bpil-p) 
In the above formula for the marginal effects, the values of p and (\-p) are evaluated at their 
mean values for the in dependent variables. 
The essence of the marginal effects calculation is to assess the sensitivity of the upper credit 
rating category to a unit change in each CG on f i rm characteristic variable. This is important 
for firm because it shows the key factors and their role in helping to achieve a higher grade 
CR. Skaife et ai, (2006) also suggest an alternative approach is to evaluate the probability (y 
= 1) for both upper and lower quartile values of the independent variables, citing Agresti 
(2002). 
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6.11 Summary 
This chapter described the research methodology followed in the present study in order to 
examine the topic of corporate governance and CRs to accomplish its objectives and respond 
to the main research questions. In addition, the current study represents three years period 
country study namely Jordan that aims to investigate descriptively and empirically the 
determinants for WVB CR of the Jordanian listed companies. 
There are different philosophies of the research which is epistemology, ontology and 
axiology. The research methods which are either quantitative or qualitative, the research 
approaches that are either induction or deduction, the suitable methodology to this study that 
embraces the positivistic philosophy, quantitative method and deduction approach. The data 
sources sets out the proposed and analysis. This study is described how the research draws 
upon secondary data, the hypothesis tests. The nature of the data is quantitative, the type o f 
the data continuous, dichotomous and nominal, and the analysis of data descriptive analysis. 
Moreover, explaining the measurements of current study for both dependent and independent 
variables. Both parametric and non-parametric tests are performed to achieve the 
triangulation. Further, untransformed ordinary least squares (OLS), transformed ordinary 
least squares (T OLS), binary logistic regression (LR) and ordinal logistic regression (OLR) 
models wi l l be used to examine the relationship between CR and the explanatory variables. 
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C H A P T E R S E V E N : D E V E L O P M E N T O F H Y P O T H E S E S AND T H E 
R E S E A R C H M O D E L S 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of two sections. The initial hypotheses' development section wil l be 
discussed in relation to the theoretical background. The second section focuses on the 
research models. 
7.2 Hypotheses' Development 
In reflection of the study problem, the independent variables should be identified and 
theorised in order to formulate testable hypotheses, this study has five sets of hypotheses. The 
first and second, sets o f hypotheses represent the relationships between the accounting and 
financial category-variables, market and regulatory category-variables and CRs respectively. 
The third set of hypotheses investigates the relationship between CRs and a firm's ownership 
structure. The fourth group of hypotheses represents the relationship between CRs and a 
firm's financial transparency and disclosure. Finally the fifth group of hypotheses pertain to 
the relationship between CR and corporate governance. 
7,2.1 Accounting and Financial Category Variables 
The hypotheses, related to the accounting and financial variables, are developed below: 
7,2.1.1 Leverage 
Leverage provides the relationship between the capital provided by the creditors/banks and 
the equity from shareholders. The higher the ratio, the greater the risk there is o f a credit 
default (Doumpos and Pasiouras, 2005). So CRs would go down generally i f there is an 
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increase in leverage (Skaife et al., 2006). According to the wealth redistribution hypothesis 
there is an anticipated relationship between CRs and leverage. Highly leveraged firms wi l l be 
responsible for fulf i l l ing the bondholders' needs by attracting higher ratings from CRAs to 
make these bondholders more confident about the ability of the firms to observe their 
financial obligations towards them. 
When there occurs a better monitoring for management this wi l l tend to lead to bondholders' 
interests being generally aligned. As a result of lending agreements between bondholders and 
management of the firms, monitoring costs wi l l arise. These costs should be minimized and 
the conflict between the management and bondholders should be avoided i f possible. 
However, because of wealth-transfer effects, a reduction in future cash flows increases 
bondholders' default risk (Skaife et al., 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) Watts (1977) and 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) propose that agency costs wi l l be raised as the proportion of 
bondholders in the company's capital structure increase. 
One way for a reduction in bondholders' default risk is attaining higher CRs of these firms 
because the risk of default increases with leverage. Both the shareholders and bondholders 
would demand a higher CR. Both shareholders and creditors need more information to assess 
the financial ability in terms of cash generation of the high leverage company (Cantor and 
Packer, 1997; Blum, Lim and Mackinalay, 1998; Adam et al., 2003; Gray et al. 2006; Skaife 
et al., 2006). 
According to the signalling theory, highly leverage firms values reflect greater default risk, 
which lead to lower CRs which are bad signs for these companies in the market. In the same 
way, it can be argued that the low-leveraged companies may reflect decreased default risk; 
this leads to higher CRs revealing enhanced creditworthiness which is a good sign for 
stakeholders. Given the presence of debt there underlies a negative relationship between 
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leverage and CR, because high leverage lead to greater default risk, and increases the chances 
of financial bankruptcy. At the same time debts need to be serviced and as such restrict the 
cash flow of the company. This helps in disciplining management and ensuring that there are 
no unnecessary cash flow diversions. The debtors also act as good overseers of firm activity 
to protect their investments and as such endorse profitable investments while steering the 
company from wastefiil expenditure. Therefore, firms attaining higher CRs give stronger 
signals of the firms' ability to cover service debt and capital repayments through current and 
fiiture cash flows to the firm. Thus, for Jordanian firms the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hl-1: There is a negative relationship between leverage and CR. 
7.2.1.2 Profitability 
Profitability simply means a proper use o f resources o f the firm to generate income. The 
relationship between profitability and CR is important for many reasons. According to 
agency theory, any firm achieving a high profit is prone to earn a high rating from a CRA. 
This may indicate better fiiture operating cash flows for the fum, with benefits to 
shareholders and bondholders (Borthman, 1989; Bouzouita and Young, 1998; Adam et al., 
2003; Gray et al., 2006). The more profitable the frnn is, the lower the likelihood of default 
and of facing financial difficulties and bankruptcy. Consequently, lower default risk should 
lead to firms having higher CRs. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between 
profitability and CRs. 
High profitability should be a significant factor that affects a firm attaining a higher CR, and 
providing a strong signal to raise bondholders' confidence through a reduction in the default 
risk. According to legitimacy theory, highly profit able firms wil l legitimate themselves to 
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attain higher CR through creating future cash flows. Legitimacy theory suggests a positive 
relationship between the profitability of the furo and CRs. 
According to the management disciplining hypothesis, controlling shareholders prefer a f i rm 
to be able to create future cash flows to ensure that pay out dividends, or retain funds after 
covering for interest debt financing. On the other hand, managers of highly profitable 
companies are motivated to help attain a higher CR of the company to achieve their own 
personal advantages. This indicates a positive relationship between profitability and CR. 
According to the asymmetric information problems between the fum and its investors, such 
firms need higher CRs to minimize the information asymmetry, through an improvement in 
the future cash flows expected. Profitable firms are likely to have higher CR to reduce 
asymmetric information. 
The wealth redistribution hypothesis assumes that more highly profitable firms are financially 
stronger and are able to face default risk and bankruptcy costs than firms of lower 
profitability. This lead to higher CRs suggesting a reduced transfer of wealth between 
shareholders and bondholders through future cash flows to the firm and a positive 
relationship between profitability and CR. Finally, a highly profitable firm might expect to 
achieve a high CR from a CRA and keep its image intact in the Investors' mind. This research 
assumes a positive relationship between profitability and CR as is shown in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hl-2: There is a positive relationship between profitability and CR. 
7.2,1.3 Capital Intensity 
Capital intensity refers to the amount of gross fixed assets to the total assets owned by f i rm 
(Skaefe et al., 2006). The wealth redistribution hypothesis suggests that collateralized assets 
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can be used as a monitoring instrument to control managers, and prevent threats of 
transferring wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Lenders require collateral since it is 
considered an explicit promise over debt. Therefore, a positive relationship is expected 
between capital intensity and CR. 
A firm's value can be evaluated to some extent by a firm's current investment which is 
reflected by their proportion o f fixed assets and the firm's future investment, which is 
reflected by assets that are yet to be acquired (Myers, 1977). This feaUire which maximizes 
its benefit as collateralization for debt also increases the lenders' guarantee. Consequently, 
greater fixed asset ownership can assist in attaining higher CRs. 
Asset can make debt more secured. Also, tangibility of assets increases the liquidation value 
of the firm, and decreases the hazards of mispricing and the difficulties of financial loss in the 
case of bankruptcy. As to stakeholder theory, it can be assumed that companies with high 
fixed assets may have high CR and signal that to their stakeholders to reflect their high 
performance which increase their value and cash flow. Therefore, this theory also expects a 
positive relationship. 
Firms prefer debt over equity. This is due to the fact that debt is considered more secured, 
and has less agency costs. The demand for debt wi l l be covered by collateral assets, gives a 
better guarantee for bondholders and less transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders. 
Therefore, the more the capital intensity present, the lower the risk to debt-providers, and the 
more the secured debt, thus leading a firm to attaining higher CR, and so a positive 
relationship is expected between capital intensity and CR. This research wi l l follow these 
theories which expect a positive relationship between capital intensity and CRs represented in 
the following hypothesis: 
Hl-3: There is a positive relationship between capital intensity and CR. 
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1.2.1 A Loss Propensity 
Firms with a propensity for losses are expected to have lower ratings reflecting a loss of 
reputation and an increase in default risk suggesting worse improving future cash flows to the 
firm. When a firm incurs a loss it sends out a signal that the CR is likely to be lower. I f a f u m 
reports negative earnings in more than one year, the likelihood of default is expected to be 
greater. 
According to the above discussion, and because CR theories give positive implications for the 
relationship between profitability and CR, losses in net income are expected to have a 
negative impact on CRs. It shows the instability of the firm and w i l l make creditors feel 
insecure, accordingly for Jordanian fmns too, it is expected that there wi l l be a negative 
relationship between loss propensity and CR. 
By contrast, a highly profitable firm with a good CR can generate more confidence fi-om its 
stakeholders, and help them in making coherent investment decisions, which may lead to an 
increase in the capital market base of these firms. Under the disciplining management 
hypothesis, the bondholders act as good overseers of firm activity to protect their investments 
and as such endorse profitable investments while steering the company from wastefijl 
expenditure. But firms with lower current and future cash flows are likely to give a strong 
signal of their inability to cover their debt and capital repayments, which may lead to a lower 
CR. 
The wealth redistribution hypothesis assimies that loss fmns lead to default risk and 
bankruptcy costs. This would lead to lower CRs and an anticpated transfer of wealth between 
shareholders and bondholders through the future cash flows to the firm, implying a negative 
relationship between loss propensity and CR. Finally, a high loss firm may achieve a lower 
CR from a CRA and tarnish its image in the investors' mind. Thus, this research proposes a 
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negative relationship between loss propensity and CR as is shown in the following 
hypothesis: 
Hl-4: There is a negative relationship between loss propensity and CR. 
7.2.2 Market and Regulatory Category Variables 
The hypotheses, related to the market and regulatory variables, are developed below: 
7.2.2.1 Firm Size 
Firm size is represented by the total assets and has been extensively used in research related 
to determining CR assessments (for example: Pottier 1997, 1998; Blum, et al. 1998; 
Bouzouita and Young, 1998; Skaife, et al. 2006). 
Agency theory expects an important role for the relationship between a firm's size and CR, an 
enlarged size o f a f i rm increases information asymmetry between its stakeholders and 
management, with a consequential increase in agency cost. However, through maintaining 
better corporate governance practices, a f u m may reduce agency conflict with possible 
implications for creditworthiness and CR. 
CRs are monitoring tools because they can avoid such costs in the case of economies of scale. 
Large investors occupy this monitoring role in these firms through attaining higher CRs and 
this also reflects a positive relation between a firm's size and CRs. 
Large firms are less subject to default and bankruptcy risk (O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990) and 
should have the required resources and cash generating ability. They may minimize the 
concerns of their investors through their attaining higher CR assessments. According to 
signalling theory, i f large firms can, through information disclosure, convey to their investors 
more effectively their ability to enhance current and future cash flows, then large firms 
should have better CRs and be more desirable to institutional investors. 
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The wealth transfer hypothesis assumes that large firms are more diversified, have lower risk, 
a better reputation, more stable cash flows and fewer hazards assessed as default risk (Wing 
and Yiu, 1997) Thus these firms are in a stronger position to face bankruptcy and defauh risk 
and these lead to less transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Therefore, a 
positive relationship is expected between firm size and CRs (Skaefe et al, 2006). Therefore, 
the hypothesis relating to the firm size is: 
H2-1: There is a positive relationship between a firm's size and its CR. 
7.2.2.2 Growth Opportunities 
According to signalling theory, firms with high growth opportunities provide a positive signal 
about the firm's ftiture cash flows and hence institutional investors prefer to invest in high 
growth firms' rather than lower growth firms. In addition, high growth firms may bring more 
capital gains to institutional investors than lower-growth firms (Adams and Hardwick, 2003). 
Thus, a firm's growth rate is considered to be a positive signal for investors. Furthermore, 
firms with lower growth opportunities are more likely to fall into bankruptcy. Therefore, this 
indicates a positive relationship between growth opportunities and CRs. 
Growth opportunities indicate prospects for sound future cash flow performance and 
improved economic value. Consequently, the greater the perceived ability of the f irm to cover 
service debt and capital repajonents the higher the CR should be (Adams and Hardwick, 
2003). 
Pottier and Sommer, (1999) and Adams et al., (2003) fmd positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and CRs. Furthermore, legitimacy theory assumes that highly growth 
companies wi l l legitimate themselves through attaining a higher CR. 
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According to the asymmetric information hypothesis, firms with higher growth opportunities 
have higher CRs, which enable them to reduce information asymmetric problems between 
investors and firms, because higher CRs give more evidence about the ability of firms to 
generate greater future cash flows and cover interest on debt and capital repayments in a 
timely maner. Growth opportunities could be an indicator for the firm's success and the level 
o f its profitability. 
Growth opportunities also reduce transfers of wealth between shareholders and bondholders, 
according to wealth transfer hypothesis. This research wi l l thus propose a positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and CRs as represented formally in the following 
hypothesis: 
H2-2: There is a positive relationship between growth opportunities and CR. 
7.2.2.3 Sector Type 
In general, the Jordanian corporate sector can be divided into three major types, namely 
industry, fmance and service, and they all have different CR grades. Thus, a variety of 
characteristics may influence the grade of CRs within each sector. 
Funding requirements for asset needs are likely to vary by sector type. Firms within the same 
sector are likely to have similar types of assets; firms in the same sector may also face the 
same default risk because they share the same technology in production of similar goods and 
services as well as incurring similar costs for raw materials and labour (Skaife el al., 2006). 
Some sectors may be associated with scale economies, and thus be composed predominantly 
of larger firms. 
Particularly, Demsetz (1973) found that industrial sector type has a significant relationship 
with the level o f CR. Also, Iskander and Emery (1994) report that industry factors play an 
180 
important and significant role in the determination of CRs, after controlling for financial 
characteristics. 
Gray et al., (2006) reveal that firms in the same industrial field tend to have similar amounts 
of leverage. Also, Skaefe et al., (2006) argue that industry regulation has a strong positive 
effect on long-term debt capacity. This perhaps indicates lower agency costs of debt in 
regulated industries through attaining higher CRs associated with product and industry 
characteristics. The type of sector hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H2-3: There is appositive relationship between the type of sector and CR. 
7.2.2.4 Audit Type 
Audit quality refers to the degree to which audits of the fmancial reports of companies 
conform to applicable standards (Deis and Giroux 1992; Aldhizer et al., 1995; Krishnan and 
Schauer, 2001). DeAngelo (1981, p. 186) explains about "the market assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor wi l l both (a) discover a breach in the client's accounting 
system, and (b) report the breach", whilst Titman and Trueman (1986, p. 160) refers to the 
auditor and "the accuracy of information he supplies to investors". 
According to agency theory, the existence of auditors alleviates the conflict between all 
stakeholders including shareholders, bondholders and management as they tend to reduce 
information asymmetry through more information. Firms wi l l choose a level of audit quality 
whilst big auditors prefer to audit the clients that yield higher creditworthy to keep their 
reputations in the market, (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986; Haniffa, 1999). 
Large audit firms give good signals through auditor change prior to an initial public offering 
typically since a larger auditor possesses more credibility in the market. Consequently, the 
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appointment of big firms is a signal to the market that the audit process is performed 
effectively and they are deemed to provide information about the reliability of information 
pertaining to the ability of firms to generate greater fiiture cash flows (Arther C. Allen, 1994). 
Feltham et al. (1991) note that the cost of choosing a big auditor may outweigh the 
incremental benefits and auditor choice depends on a trade-off of costs and benefits. Also 
there can be a differential effect of client-specific risk across auditor types (Hogan, 1997). 
"fail to adequately reflect the underlying complexity of the choices which IPO firms face" 
Lee et al., (2003, p. 379). Using big auditor firms gives a good signal regarding earnings' 
forecasts after accounting for firm-specific risk (Lee et al., 2003). As result, using big audit 
companies may signal to their investors their ability to attain higher CRs and attract investors 
in these companies. 
According to stewardship monitoring theory managers are trustworthy people who act in the 
best interest of firms and shareholders, and audits help reinforce this view by monitoring the 
performance of the appointed steward (agent). Cleary, major audit/ accounting scandals 
invalidate this perspective. High audit quality would mean a higher level of assurance for the 
principal. The greater the agency conflict of interests between two groups (those who own 
stakeholders and managers) the greater the agency costs, and the greater the demand for 
audits of high quality. 
Only innovative frnns are able to cope with unstable and continuously changing demands and 
markets. To be audited by a big audit firm adds authenticity to their innovative activities. 
According to innovation theory, big four audit can help support firms attaining higher credit 
ratings because the CRAs depends on the four big audit report. 
The four big audit firms wi l l influence companies to provide more information to all 
stakeholders about a firm's creditworthiness because they have higher skills and better 
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experience; in addition seek to maintain their reputation in the market, thus such big audit 
firms tend to audit larger, less risky clients (Beatty, 1989). These large companies should 
legitimate themselves through their higher CR. Therefore, the expectation, according to 
legitimacy theory is to find a positive relationship between audit type and CR. The 
hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
H2-4: There is a significant relationship between the type of audit and CR. 
7.2.3 Ownership Structure Category Variables 
The hypotheses, related to the ownership structure variables, are developed below: 
7.2.3.1 Blockholder Ownership 
According to management disciplining hypothesis, the conflict between owners and 
managers arises because ownership structure tends to be widely diffused (Oviatt, B. 1988). 
Yet, there are opportunities to reduce this conflict because of dispersed shareholders, who 
demand protection over their residual claims through a mechanism that monitors 
management actions, and limits their opportunistic behaviour by protecting the interests o f 
owners through CRAs by providing more information. 
This aids the shareholders through enhanced fiiture cash flows of the furn (Skaife et al., 
2006). Therefore, the CR wi l l be a valuable source of obtaining the information for the 
various categories of diffused investors. 
With the separation between ownership and control it is proposed that the agency problem of 
conflict between the principal and the agent wi l l increase with widely held companies (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). To mitigate the severity of such problem, managers may be motivated to 
present, a good CR to their stakeholder i f possible. 
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On the other hand, when concentrated ownership allows these shareholders to exercise a 
positive influence over management to secure benefits (that are useful for their own interests) 
and to act as a catalyst to expand access to higher ratings from CRAs, this should help 
preserve their competitive advantage over others, and generate good future cash flows. 
As a result o f the above, it is widely held that many firms wi l l tend to aim for the best grade 
from agency ratings and thereby supply the shareholders with necessary information about 
the future cash flows of the firm. Research confirms this by showing a significant relationship 
between ownership diffusion and the CR (Bhojaj and Sengupta, 2003; Ashbough- skaife et 
al., 2006). 
According to the Jordanian context, the blockholder governance system is dominant; most of 
the Jordanian listed companies are concentrated (Al-Khouri, 2005). Based on the above 
arguments, the current study investigates the relationship between the blockholder ownership 
and CR for the Jordanian listed companies, through the hypothesis relating to blockholder's 
ownership: 
H3-1: There is a significant relationship between blockkholder's ownership and CR. 
7.2.3.2 Institutional Ownership 
Institutions that hold large equity stakes in a firm are very important to a well-functioning 
ownership structure. They have their own financial interests and independence, and can use 
their interests to guide towards best performance through liaising with management in their 
local policies of the firm in an unbiased way, and i f they observe any self-serving behaviour 
they can put pressure on management by using their voting power (Jensen, 1973; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1977). Institutional ownership is effectively a blockholder in a corporation with 
significant power to monitor the corporation executives (Lin et al., 2007) better than minority 
shareholders to ensure that management practices lead to maximisation of firm value. 
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Institutional ownership could be sensitive to a company's CR. The information asymmetry 
which arises from agency costs should be minimized between the companies and their 
institutions, and corporate governance activities are influenced by CR (Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al. 2006). 
According to management disciplining hypothesis, the existence of institutions alleviates the 
conflict between shareholders and management as they tend to encourage companies to attain 
higher CRs to reduce information asymmetry. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., (2006) argue that 
information asymmetry will be reduced by attaining higher CRs and this situation is expected 
by the investment fiinds through greater future cash flows to frnns. 
Gordon and Pound (1993) find that any change in institutional ownership structure by 
shareholders significantly influences a fum through use of voting outcomes. Shareholders 
have different interests, which may influence the management of a firm, especially if they are 
large owners such as institutions. 
Higher CRs may reduce the information asymmetry and enhance the stock market liquidity, 
which represent a good sign for the stakeholders. Therefore, signalling theory purports that 
higher CR is associated with a higher proportion of institutional investors. Future cash flows 
to the firm timely represent one of the very important requirements of institutional investors. 
The CRs by CRAs will be a very usefiil tool to help investors assess the probability 
distribution of future cash flows to bondholders (Ashbough-Skaife et al., 2006). 
According to legitimacy theory, company may attempt to legitimates themselves and be 
motivated to attain higher CRs for their institutional investors. According to innovation 
theory, a company may face pressure to adopt an innovation not only from customers, but 
also from other parties, such as institutional investors (Abrahamson, 1991; O'Neill et al., 
1998). Institutional investors are more sophisticated and generally own enough technical 
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expertise to monitor the mangers. It is found that institutional investor's pressure plays an 
important role in urging a company to adopt an innovation (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 
1997; Guler et al, 2002). Institutional investors have greater resources to access information 
including full reports by agencies on individual companies. Additionally, the internet 
provides direct access to information, by all stakeholders but institutional ownership would 
tend to motivate firms to attain higher credit ratings. 
The last few years have witnessed an increased in the percentage of the shareholdings in 
Jordanian listed companies in the hands of institutional investors (Goussous, 2002a; Kanaan 
and Kardoosh, 2002). Several major Jordanian private investor groups have acquired 
substantial equity in a number of privatized companies (ibid), and increased their proportion 
in listed Jordanian companies. Consequently, institutional investors can play a role in the 
governance of the companies; though information requests and requiring companies to gain 
their consent to many important board decisions. So, institutional ownership structure can be 
considered a significant influence on a firm's credit rating, as proposed by the following 
hypothesis: 
H3-2: There is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and CR. 
7.2.3.3 Insider's Ownership 
Insider's officers and directors' ownership refers to the holding of significant stock positions 
align strategically with management. They often oppose the shareholder-sponsored proposals, 
because of their acting according to their personal interests and not heeding to the interests of 
the owners, which may cause a moral hazard problem. This can lead to conflict between 
owners and managers according to the management disciplining hypothesis (see Skaife et al., 
2006). So, one way to allay this problem is through managerial ownership and improvements 
in the informativeness of earnings (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Warfield et al., 1995). 
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Consequently, entrenched management has a good chance of attaining higher CRs through 
creating better future cash flows to firm which would have a positive impact on the ability of 
to cover debt interests and capital repayment in a timely manner, and this represents a good 
signal for all stakeholders including bondholders. Therefore, inside ownership should 
increase the likelihood of attaining higher CRs for the firm. 
Agency theory suggests that the separation of ownership and control creates agency costs. 
Therefore, suitable insider shareholdings may reduce these costs. Also, outside block 
ownership, institutional holdings or concentrated ownership tend to mitigate agency costs by 
creating a relatively efficient monitoring process over managers, and thus positively affect a 
firm's performance (De Miguel et al, 2005). 
On the other hand, stewardship theory supports governance mechanisms, because the 
executives have incentives to ensure the principal's interests are aligned with their interests 
and empower the firm's management and avoid mechanisms that monitor and control it. 
Consequently, they are less likely to make decisions that may harm the interests of 
shareholders (Chen and Jian, 2007). 
Under the management disciplining hypothesis, convergence of interests between 
shareholders and managers through managerial ownership may prevent the squandering of 
shareholders' wealth. Insider ownership of significant stock positions tend to prevent the 
squandering of shareholders' wealth due to the consensus in interests between management 
and shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). According to Ashbough-Skaife et al., (2006) 
increasing insider ownership by those who hold significant stock positions leads to an 
enhancement in creating higher future cash flows and attaining higher CRs. 
Skaife et al. (2006) state that the percentage of insider officers and directors i.e. management 
is significantly associated with credit rating. Consequently, the larger management 
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shareholdings may influence CR as the managers seek to inform the stakeholders of their 
good performance. Therefore, managerial ownership reduces the shareholders' need for 
controlling and monitoring. In this regard, Ashbough-Skaife et al., (2006) mention that the 
lower the insider managerial ownership, the greater the agency problem. According to these 
proponents, insider ownership has a negative impact on CRs. 
Overall, the code of corporate governance in the Jordan allowed managerial ownership in 
Jordanian listed companies, which influence on the CRs of the Jordanian listed firms. 
According to the above, the hypothesis to accommodate this variable is as follows: 
H3-3: There is a significant relationship between insider ownership and CR. 
7.2.3.4 Governmental Ownership 
Government ownership of firms has had a long tradition in both developed and developing 
economies. Despite a wave of privatisation around the world in the past few decades, a 
significant proportion of the firm's assets around the world are still controlled by state-owned 
institutions. Government ownership represents a hybrid of dispersed and concentrated 
ownership. If the government is viewed as a single entity, state-owned firms have very 
concentrated ownership. 
Government ownership of firms poses special governance problems. Governments can use 
their state owned institutions to support excessive government spending and to favour 
borrowers that are less than creditworthy. The bureaucrat managers thus are not given strong 
incentives to perform, since they operate under soft budget constraints and other pressures, 
such as political influence or bureaucratic sectoral interests. 
Government ownership also reduces the monitoring incentives of private stakeholders, who 
would assume that their credits are guaranteed. In addition, government ownership thwarts 
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competitive forces, limits the effectiveness of government supervision in the firm sector 
(Caprio and Levine 2002), and tends to increase the opacity of firms' operations. Why does 
government ownership of firms have such implications for corporate governance? It would be 
helpful to gain insights by examining the rationale for government ownership of firms. There 
are several different theories of government participation in fums, which have different 
perspectives in both the existence and the role of government ownership frnns. 
Governments seek to maximise social welfare, but this can generate corruption and 
misallocation (Banerjee, 1997; Hart et al., 1997). According to this view, governments design 
public fmancial institutions to address market failures. However, since state-owned 
enterprises maximise multiple non measurable objectives, agency costs within government 
bureaucracy can result in low-powered managerial incentives (Tirole, 1994). Certainly, low-
powered incentives are not always bad Laffont and Tirole (1993) showed that, under some 
circumstances, a concern for quality calls for low-powered incentives. But given the incentive 
problems associated with the control of SOEs, the agency view concludes that the ultimate 
efficiency of SOEs depends on the trade-off between internal and allocative efficiency 
(Tirole, 1994). 
The characterization of high governmental ownership may not be enhancing shareholder's 
value, for state-owned firms channel resources to socially profitable activities, and public 
managers may exert less effort (or divert away more resources) than would their private 
counterparts. Instead, it will be achieving goals that are related to the nation (Mak and L i , 
2001). The agency view predicts that, in general, whilst state-owned fums serve social 
objectives and allocate resources where private markets fail, public managers of state-owned 
firms exert low effort or divert resources for personal benefits, such as career concerns, with 
an eye toward future job prospects in the private sector. Therefore, it is expected to find that 
companies with high government ownership have high CR. 
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According to the legitimacy theory an important assumption is that politicians are self-
interested individuals who pursue their own personal, political, and economic objectives 
rather than maximising social welfare. The main objective of politicians is to maintain voting 
support (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; La Porta et al., 2002). According to this view, politicians 
create and maintain state-owned firms not to channel funds to economically efficient uses, 
but rather to maximise their own personal objectives and legitimate themselves and hence 
differentiate themselves from the others. The result of this political interference is that 
resource allocation has litde or negative impact on economic growth and in turn on CR. 
Most listed Jordanian firms are state-owned companies, while, on the other hand some 
companies have a mixed ownership. Therefore, there is a need for examining the influence 
of this mixed structure of the Jordanian listed firms on CRs. Overall, the code of corporate 
governance in Jordan has allowed governmental ownership in Jordanian listed companies, 
which arguably has influence as the CRs of these listed firms. Despite the assumed 
importance of this variable (governmental ownership), as far as the author is aware it has not 
been investigated before in relation to CR assessments. So, depending on the above debate, 
the hypothesis will be: 
H3-4: There is a significant relationship between governmental ownership and CR. 
7.2.3.5 Family Ownership 
Cleariy, family firms refer to family-run businesses, sometimes small or medium sized firms 
as well as larger owner-managed businesses, and the latter are measured by the percentage of 
share capital owned by the family (Neubauer and Lank, 1998). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) give an exposition of the well-known agency theory whereby 
separation of ownership and control gives managers the freedom to expropriate non-
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pecuniary benefits at the expense of the owners of the firm. The separation of ownership and 
management lead to the dilution of control of the family in the business But in firms in which 
family ownership is concentrated, this can lead to little separation between them (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). According to the agency theory, management ownership concentration gives 
results better aligned to managerial and shareholder interests and this should lead to increases 
in firm's value. Consequently, firms with high family ownership should expect higher CRs. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that family firms lead to less separation between management 
and shareholders, and reduces agency problems but at the same time decreases financial 
performance and increases the cost of capital; because the management ownership is 
concentrated in one group and if this level rises above its optimum level, there may be a 
decreased interest of investors in diversification opportunities for the investor with a 
decreased market liquidity. 
Therefore, these firms should enhance their ability to create current and fiiture cash flows and 
attract more loans fi-om different investors. One way to achieve this is by increasing the level 
of CR assessments. Therefore, family fums have an incentive to legitimize themselves by 
attaining higher CRs. According to legitimacy theory, there is a positive relationship between 
CR assessments and family ownership. 
Moreover, according to signalling theory, family owned firms may try to attain a higher CR 
signal and their good performance to different investors to attract them to invest in these 
companies, despite negative attitudes of investors regarding large family ownership. 
Furthermore, family companies should justify their existence by legitimacy their activities. 
Therefore, these companies should enhance their communication with different stakeholders 
revealing how they adapt to the increasing pressure fi-om society and ensure survival and 
continuity within this society. One way to achieve this is by increasing the level of CR. 
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Consequently, it might be expected to find a positive relationship between companies with 
high family ownership and CR according to legitimacy theory. 
According to the Jordanian environment, many listed companies include family ownership. 
As far as the author is aware, no previous study has examined the association between CR 
and the existence of family ownership. Consequently, the current study fills the gap in the 
CR's literature by investigating this association. Therefore, the expected hypothesis will be: 
H3-5: There is a significant relationship between family ownership and CR. 
7.2.3.6 Foreign Ownership 
The competitive environment is changing at an accelerating pace, leading to a high level of 
uncertainty. This growing uncertainty is the result of greater customer expectations, the 
dilution of borders between competitive environments, and the move towards global 
competition. Some firms build barriers to inhibit competition, to gain access to markets, to 
improve the level of market support and to gain timely knowledge of events occurring in the 
market place. As the level of dynamics in business environments increases, the development 
of strategies that will differentiate the organisation from its competitors becomes the key 
success factor (Feurer et al., 1996). 
Consequently, a good CR may attract more foreign investors in these companies, which 
should lead to an increase in the value of these companies and decrease their cost of capital 
(Bekeart and Harvey, 2000). Additionally, attracting foreign investors may increase the 
foreign currency which is gready needed in developing countries (Managena and Tauringana, 
2007). Therefore, it will be expected that there will be a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and CR. Foreign owners arguably need more information about the ability of firms 
to cover interest debt and capital repayments and require more confidence about the ability of 
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management to meet their needs, and provide timely repayments for investors through current 
and future cash flows. 
Foreign owners may press companies to divulge otherwise private information and to depend 
on technology for communication as an important signal, because increasing companies' 
quality of information improve investors' abilities to estimate company' value. CRs 
assessments will be a very useful tool in providing the information and conveying it to the 
various shareholders and bondholders. 
According to the legitimacy theory, firms can legitimate themselves through the increased 
number of foreign ownership which represents a good sign for these companies in a globally 
competifive environment. Foreign ownership represents a sign of a good financial position 
and higher expected future cash flow, which influences a company's expected performance 
and CR. 
According to the innovation theory (Katz and Kahn, 1978), firms that hold CRs can be 
accessed by the international financial markets more easily, providing an incentive for firms 
to improve future cash flows. Foreign ownership pressure should play an important role in 
urging a company to adopt innovations. 
Although the importance of this variable (foreign ownership), has been stressed to the extent 
of the author's knowledge, it has been not investigated before in relation to CR assessments. 
So, depending on the above debate, the hypothesis will be: 
H3-6: There is a significant relationship between fitreign ownership and CR. 
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7.2.4 Financial Transparency and Disclosure Category Variables 
The hypotheses, related to the financial transparency and disclosure variables, are developed 
as follows: 
7.2.4.1 Working Capital Accruals 
Working capital is an important aspect of financial transparency disclosing cash flow 
information through statements of changes in working capital and changes in financial 
position. 
Financial transparency should radically deal with asymmetric information arising from the 
role-separation of management from providers of long-term capital (Merton, 1987). This 
should provide a beneficial effect for shareholders through a reduction in the cost of equity 
(Botosan, 1997), achieved by the provision of high quality information (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991), the creation of greater market liquidity and reduced transactional friction. 
Furthermore, there may be additional beneficial effects through a reduction in the perceived 
uncertainty by investors (Coles, Lowenstein and Suay, 1995). 
C R is one of the various monitoring devices used to reduce agency costs (Gonzalez, 2004). 
Consequently, C R works to mitigate the severity of the problem of information asymmetry 
between agents and principals. Managers have an incentive to try and show the company's 
best profile, indicating that they are acting in the interests of all stakeholders. They would 
like to attain a higher CR as evidence of the ability of the firm to cover capital repayments 
through strong current and fiiture cash flows assisted by sufficient working capital. 
Additionally, CRs should help mitigate conflict of wealth transfers between certain 
stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; cited by Skaife et al., 2006). 
According to the agency theory, conflicts between shareholders and bondholders arise as 
shareholders are able to transfer wealth from bondholders and reduce the current and future 
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cash flows to the firm. Thus may reduce the working capital and the level of internally 
funded projects which would have provided future income to meet the firm's debt 
commitments. A consequential reduction in interest cover may be responsible for an increase 
in the risk of default. Furthermore, shareholders may be supportive of managers investing in 
riskier projects, provided the expected shareholder return is commensurate. To compensate 
themselves from default risk bondholders may demand a higher rate of interest on the debt. 
The objective of the statement of changes in financial position is to enable an evaluation of a 
firm's liquidity and to evaluate the changes in the structure of the assets and the equity of the 
firm by reporting on the flows of funds into and out of the firm during the fmancial period 
(Davidson et al., 1979). Skaife et al., (2006) investigate the relationship between working 
capital accruals, a measure of financial transparency and CRs and find a significant 
relationship with firms' CRs. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4-1: There is a significant relationship between working capital accruals and CR. 
7.2.4.2 Timeliness of Earnings 
Timeliness of earnings refers to financial transparency in disclosing earnings which provide 
investors more relevant information which should help them assess the retrieval of their 
capital repayments and interest on debt. 
Innovation theory is supportive of timeliness of earnings. Firstly, for wealth creation firms 
need to be innovative (Katz and Kahn, 1978). Secondly, the diffusion of information an 
iimovation needs to be effected in timely manners since investors demand up-to-date 
pertinent information. 
Firms which achieve the required current and future cash flows may reduce wealth transfers 
from bondholders to shareholders through timeliness of earnings, according to the wealth-
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transfer hypothesis. It has been posited that there is a direct link between the issuance of 
information, that is both pertinent and timely, and a higher CR being assessed. Sengupta 
(1998) investigated this proposition by evaluating Association for Investment Management 
and Research (AIMR) disclosure ratings of firms, and found that firms with higher disclosure 
ratings were charged lower interest rates on their debt. They argued that the lower cost was 
due to a reduction in information risk, which in turn reduced the credit risk perceived by their 
bondholders. Furthermore, the enhancement of information disclosure might be effected by 
the enlargement of institutional shareholders on account of their own needs and preferences. 
Timeliness of firm's earnings and cash flows via financial reports rests on the premise that 
this information is pertinent to investors (Gu, 2002). Thus, timeliness captures the 
transparency of firms' financial reporting of earnings and cash flows and providing 
information to help investors to assess liquidity, solvency and wealth distribution in 
evaluating default risk associated with debt (Wild et al., 2003). 
Higher quality, more transparent information on earnings means less information asymmetry 
between the frnn and its bondholders, leading to less uncertainty about default risk which, in 
turn, should lead to higher CRs (Gu, 2002). Barth and Landsman (2003) provide empirical 
support for this claim in that they find that fmns with more value relevant earnings enjoy a 
lower cost of debt. 
Financial statement transparency encompasses the relevance and reliability of accounting 
information in assessing current financial and economic corporate conditions (Skaife et al., 
2006). The more information about the firm's current economic activities that is embedded in 
current earnings and the more precise that information (i.e., the more relevant and reliable it 
is). The more transparent the economic activities of a company is to its stakeholders, Skaife 
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et al., (2006) investigate the relationship between timeliness as measure for financial 
transparency and CRs and find a significant relationship. 
H4-2: There is a significant relationship between timeliness of earnings and CR. 
7.2.5 Corporate Governance Category Variables 
Most of the corporate governance variables can be explained by the agency theory, 
especially, from the bondholder perspective. 
The hypothesis related to the corporate governance variables are: 
7.2.5.1 Independent of Directors 
Board independence among all board of directors' characterisfics has received probably the 
greatest academic debate. To increase the performance and efficiency of the board of 
directors, a majority of members should be independent (Clarke, 2007). Basically, the 
existence of independent directors on a company's board should restrict opportunism by this 
company's managers and enhance their performance (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Agency theory supports the notion that boards of directors should include a majority of 
outside directors as they are independent of the management and are more willing to monitor 
the management effectively. On the other hand, stewardship theory suggests that control 
should be kept in the hands of inside directors as there is no need for independent monitoring 
devices on people who are considered trustworthy and committed. According to signalling 
theory, investors regard good monitoring procedures by the board of directors reflected in an 
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independent board, which can be regarded as a significant signal of good corporate 
governance (Black et al., 2001 and 2002). 
Firms face cost associated with the violation of statutory rules and regulations and might need 
to increase the proportion of independent directors to attain an optimal board, which would 
avoid violation risk damaging the company (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Weisbach, 1988), 
although Baysinger and Butler (1985) find no significant associations between board 
compositions, outsiders and various measures of corporate performance (see also Beasley, 
1996). However, there are some factors that may limit the benefits derived from using non 
executive directors such as the non executive appointments' process (Crowther and Jatana, 
2005) and tenure of the current independent (non-executive) directors in the same company 
(Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). These factors may influence the importance of the role of 
independent directors. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) investigated the effect of corporate governance on bond ratings 
and yields, and demonstrated a positive relationship between CRs and the number of outside 
directors on the board. In the same vein, Skaife et al., (2006) investigated the effect of many 
corporate governance variables (board independence and board expertise, inter alia) on credit 
rating, which was broader in scope than many previous studies. They interestingly found that 
a firm's credit rating is positively associated with the presence of the degree of board 
independence. 
In the Jordanian environment to provide for an independent presence and voice on the board, 
the C G code recommends that the board of directors should comprise at least one-third 
independent members of the board. The legal definition of independent directors reguires 
them not to have previously been an employee of the company; to have no family or business 
link with it; not to hold any cross directorships; not to represent any significant shareholders; 
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and not to have worked in the company for three years before. Consequently, the relationship 
between the board independence and CR is reflected in the following hypothesis: 
H5-1: There is a significant relationship between board independence and CR. 
7.2.5.2 Role Duality 
Role duality refers to two positions at the same time for the same person, and, in this context, 
the positions are the CEO and the chair of the board. The C E O has a fiill-time position and is 
responsible for the daily management of the company as well as implementing company 
strategies. However, the chairman is usually part-time and whose main responsibility is to 
ensure the effectiveness of the board (Weir and Laing, 2001). Nearly all best practice codes 
support the separation of the two positions which lead to a more independent board (Cadbury 
report, 1992). 
The separation of the C E O position from the chairman supports the assumption of agency 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) as duality may reduce the monitoring effectiveness at shareholders 
and hence make it easier for managers to exert self-interested behavior without any control 
over them. On the other hand the stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 
1997) regards managers as trustworthy people who are unlikely to achieve their personal 
interests at the expense of shareholders. Hence, this theory views CEO/Chairman duality as 
fostering strong and unified leadership (Heracleous, 2001). Accordingly there is a need to 
examine the relationship between role duality and CR, because of different results relating to 
the agency theory, stewardship theory and role duality. 
The Jordanian code calls for a balanced board, so that too much power is not vested in any 
one individual, which may compromise the quality of the board's decision making. 
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Consequently, it recommended the separation of the roles of the chief executive and 
chairman, so as to avoid concentration of power, and to serve as a balancing mechanism for 
the board. To the best of the author's knowledge, no previous study has examined the 
association between C R and role duality. This research will propose such a relationship 
between role duality and credit ratings as represented in the following hypothesis: 
H5-2: There is a significant relationship between role duality and CR. 
7.2.5.3 Board Competency (Expertise) 
Board expertise refers to some directors from within the board sitting on more than one board 
at the same time. This will help with transition experiences between these boards and should 
enable them to share information to collect the best grade fi-om the CR assessment. The 
availability of directors or chairperson on more than one board can influence the credit rating, 
because of transition experiences, which are gained fi"om other firms. 
On the other hand, this may have a negative impact when the other company did not 
recognise the importance of CRs. Also, cross holdings of directorship may put the company 
at a competitive disadvantage, and in the case of executive directors their existence on more 
than one board will make them less independent as they will be more sympathetic with others 
who are in a similar situation (Haniffa, 1999). 
According to agency theory, respectively regarding the conflict between the roles of directors 
when sitting on more than one board, this conflict is expected to impact on CR, because one 
person sitting on more than one board will affect board decisions due to the influence and 
power of this person through transferring this experience fi-om one corporation to another. 
But many researchers have argued that the competence and knowledge of board experts, 
leads to a better monitoring of the function of management and better decisions, and leads to 
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reducing default risk, so there is a significant relationship between this variable and CR, as 
demonstrated by Klein (1998) and Skaife et al., (2006). According to this result, the 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H4-3: There is a significant relationship between board expertise and CR. 
7.2.5.4 Board Stock 
Board compensation is identified as "executive compensation which plays a fundamental role 
in attracting and maintaining quality managers and provides motivate for executives to 
perform their duties in shareholders' best interests" (Bizjak et al., 2000). Moreover, key 
issues are whether board members are remunerated and motivated in ways that ensure the 
long-term success of the company, and the compensation contract of board of directors is 
designed to motivate the board of directors to attain good performance (Black, 2001). 
The 'board structure and process' component of governance, generally recognizes a 
compensation pack to board of directors as a reward depending on their performance (Skaife 
et al, 2006). Thus, compensation can be seen as an effective motivation to promote corporate 
executives to align their activities with the shareholders' or stakeholders' interest. In 
corporations, CEOs and executives prefer the less performance-sensitive compensation pack, 
for they bear less risk of poor performance that would reduce their compensation level. 
However, the board prefers to reward managers under a greater performance-sensitive 
compensation contract, since such a contract motivates managers to focus on the performance 
of corporation. Therefore, a gap of expectation of compensation contract exists between the 
board and the executives. Thus, to mitigate the gap of interest, there would be a dialogue 
between boards and executives to ensure the contract that can be accepted by board and 
executives. The process of making a compensation contract can be seen as a negotiation 
between board and executives (Ryan Jr. et al., 2004). 
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Bebchuk et al., (2002) argue in trying to reach an optimal contract, boards of director should 
hold stock in large and publicly held companies to minimize agency costs that exist between 
shareholders and board o f directors including executive and non-executive, (Jensen, 1993). 
Bedchuk et al., (2002) argue that under an optimal compensation contract, boards with 
greater ownership in the firm are more likely to be "attracting and retaining high quality 
executives, providing executives with incentives to exert sufficient effort and to make 
decisions that serve shareholders' interests, minimizing overall costs and provide a better job 
of monitoring management and fulf i l l ing their fiduciary responsibilities". 
Board stock has received very little attention in the credit rating issue despite its intrinsic 
importance, Skaife et al., (2006) argue that board stock might be an interesting variable to be 
considered in the CR issue because it wi l l indirectly reflect the monitoring role of the board 
of directors including independent and non-independent directors who are expected to try to 
attain a higher credit rating. Yermack (1998) finds evidence that smaller boards are more 
beneficial and more likely to dismiss a CEO after poor performance and inefficiency. 
The results of previous studies which examine the board stock (for example, Yermack, 2003) 
find a positive relationship between option awards and board stock associated with 
subsequent firm performance and firms' investment opportunities. Other studies examine the 
relationship between board stock and CRs. Skaefe et al., (2006) show a significant 
relationship between CR and board stock. Yermack (2003) shows that independent boards 
would more likely approve the higher performance sensitive compensation contract through 
paying more closely to stock performance through the use of options and other equity awards 
generally. In the current study we use board stock to predict a significant relationship 
between this variable and CRs. 
H5-4: There is a significant relationship between board stock and CR. 
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7.2.5.5 The Size of the Board of Directors 
Board size is an important aspect to consider, for it is shown to influence significantly the 
performance of the firm. According to management disciplining hypothesis, the relationship 
between shareholders and management can lead to a conflict between them, because of the 
separation of owners' equity from the management of the business, which requires better 
monitoring procedures to regulate this relationship. So, the size of the board of directors may 
be good for controlling and monitoring the fuin's actions. 
A board that is too large would arguably be of the order of 30 or more members; and, 
corresponding, a board that is too small would be of the order of to seven members, each 
adversely affecting the firm's organizational decision-making (Cascio, 2004). However, 
there is no consensus as to whether larger or smaller boards are better with respect to their 
impact on firm performance. Cascio (2004) finds some evidence that smaller boards are more 
beneficial but at the same time there is also evidence that larger boards are more effective. 
Increased board size may have a negative effect on the board's performance and on the 
strategic decision-making (Goodstein et al., 1994). In addition, Yermack (1996) and Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006), find that companies with a high board size experience a negative impact 
on their performance. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) recognise this and observe that a large board size may perform 
close monitoring, guide companies in the successfiil acquisition of skills and resources, 
reduce economic and technological uncertainties through the supply sifting of critical 
information about the contextual envirorunent to the firm, deal with troublesome authoritative 
CEOs, and provide an array of more specialized skills and opinions among its members 
compared with a small board. Therefore, increasing board size may attain a higher CR. 
According to the above, a diverse and enlarged board membership should intensify their 
desire to attain higher ratings from CRAs by increasing their ability to create future net cash 
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inflows to the firm, affecting firm performance to all stakeholders to attract more investors 
and satisfy shareholders' needs. 
The main legislation regulating corporate governance in Jordan is securities law no. 76/2002, 
and companies' law no. 22/1997, for regulating board structure and responsibilities, and the 
new Listing and Delisting Rules (see Sourial, 2004) which elaborate the enhancement of 
board practices within the framework of corporate governance. Public shareholding 
companies have a single tier board comprised of an odd number of members, with a 
minimum three and a maximum of thirteen. The directors must be shareholders. To the 
researcher's knowledge, there are no previous research studies relating to the determinants of 
CR which directly account for the board size for the study period. Therefore, this research 
wi l l propose such a relationship between board size and CRs as represented in the following 
hypothesis: 
H5-5: There is a significant relationship between size of board and CR. 
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7.3 Research Model 
The availability of continuous numerical credit scores obtained directly from WVB enables 
more rigorous statistical testing to be undertaken. Ordinary least squares (OLS), binary 
logistic regression (LR) and ordinal logistic regression (OLR) models wi l l be used to 
examine the relationship between CR and the explanatory variables. Two OLS models wi l l be 
used for numerical credit scores including the untransformed ordinary least squares (U OLS) 
and transformed ordinary least squares (T OLS) models of the current study, as follows: 
y, = a + p , ^ „ + P 2 ^ 2 / + . . . + P2 i^2 i /+e / 
where: 
Y: credit rating (numerical score), 
i = number to identify the company, 
a = the intercept. 
P i . . . P 21 = the coefficients of the independent variables. 
X1...X21 = the explanatory variables. 
E = the error term. 
Two logistic multivariate analyses wi l l be used for examining the association between the CR 
and explanatory variables, namely, ordered logistic regression, and binary logistic regression 
analysis. 
According to the logistic regression, the study wil l model the relationship between the 
dependent (the natural logarithm of the ratings' odds-ratio) and independent variables. The 
same methodology wil l be for the different models. 
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More formally. In [P/{l-P)] = f(X\... X,^ + £ 
P = l-t-exp(-[a-H PiXi + ••• + PnXn] ) 
As to ordinal logistic regression, a similar methodology applies expect that an ordered ranked 
list (1 , 2, 3, 4) of categories operates and parameter coefficients (Ps) are determined for 
paired orderings down the risk. 
According to the above, the dependent variable is the log of the odds-ratio for the credit 
rating o f the long term debt and which consists o f two groups, namely, the (BB) categories 
group and the below categories to (D) category. Under logistic regression there are two 
grades, whereas ordinal logistic regression employs several grades. 
The impact, in terms of the marginal effect, can be evaluated by calculating the change in 
probability of receiving a higher rated category arising from each corporate governance or 
firm characteristic variable in turn. These are designated as the marginal effects for this 
model, which are the direct impacts of a unit change in the respective variable, holding all 
other variables constant. In the case of the logistic regression we can write the probability of 
an assessment being in the higher category as: 
Probability (Y = 1) = {oddsratio) I {\+oddsratio) 
where 
exp(a + bXi + 0X2 + dX^ + •••)= odds ratio 
a,b,c,d, ... = respective coefficients. 
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For a unit change in X, the partial change in the probability (Y = 1) is given by: 
dp _ d r exp(a+bXi-HcX2+dX3-(-•••) -. 
~dX l+exp(a+fcXi+cX2+dX3+ - ) 
P exp(a-hbXi-hcX2+dA^3+-) -• 
'-[l+exp(a+6A'i-l-cX2+dX3+-)]''2-' 
= bp(,\-p) 
In the above formula for the marginal effects, the values of p and (1-p) are evaluated at their 
mean values for the independent variables. 
7.4 Summary 
Chapter seven represents the proposed hypotheses that evolve partly from the theoretical 
fi-amework presented in chapter four. These theories are the bases for the hypotheses which 
wi l l be tested to prove i f there is any relationship between the dependent variable (CR) and 
independent variables under various categories: accounting and fmancial aspects, market and 
regulatory factors, ownership structure, fmancial transparency and disclosure and corporate 
governance. 
Many hypotheses are mentioned to propose the relationship between CR and the independent 
variables drawing on the previous empirical literature review. The nature of some of these 
variables is discussed in the context of the Jordanian environment. Some of these variables 
have not been mentioned before in any literature review pertaining to CR, which adds to the 
contribution of this study. 
The next chapter wi l l discuss the univariate and multivariate analyses to determine the 
relationship between CR and the independent variables. 
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C H A P T E R E I G H T : UNIVARIATE AND M U L T I V A R I A T E 
R E G R E S S I O N ANALYSIS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter reports on the outcomes of the research methods used to achieve the specified 
research objectives of the study, as presented in Chapter One. The intention is to examine the 
determinants of the CRs for Jordanian companies listed in the Amman Stock Exchange 
(ASE). 
The results o f examining the hypotheses which were developed in chapter seven wil l be 
discussed. The analyses which wi l l be used to f i i l f i l this goal are: first, a descriptive analysis 
that relates to dependent and independent variables, univariate analysis which is related to 
independent variable descriptive of only one variable, bivariate and correlation analysis 
(between two variables), parametric and non-parametric tests, and one-way analyseis. Second, 
multivariate analyses are undertaken, which are related to all independent variables by using 
many statistical tools such as untransformed ordinary least squares (U OLS), transformed 
ordinary least squares (T OLS), binary logistic regression (LR), and ordered logit regression 
(OLR). 
8.2. Descriptive Analysis 
8.2.1. Descriptive Analysis for Dependent Variables 
Chapter six showed the measurements of the research variables. This section wi l l use the 
sample set to further show and discuss some descriptive statistics analyses for these variables. 
The descriptive stadstics include mean, standard deviation, median, minimum and maximum. 
The sample of this study includes all Jordanian listed companies which have CRs from the 
W V B agency over the period 2005-2007. According to the population of this study, the 
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percentage of Jordanian firms which have a WVB_CR 85% for 2005, 82%for 2006 and 79% 
for 2007. The CRs of this agency are spread from a minimum of category D to a maximum of 
category BB. The percentage of Jordanian firms with CRs scores from BB3 to BB is 9.45%, 
whilst for firms with CRs from B3 to B it is 10.4%, on the other hand 56.45% have CRs from 
C3 to C but 23.75% have a D credit rating. The mean for all Jordanian firm CRs is C2. It can 
be observed that a significant minority has a very low rating. (Table 8-1 presents the sector 
credit ratings). 
Table 8-1: The rating of different sectors in Amman Stock Exchange CRs Firms 
Sector company D C3-C B 3 - B BB3-BB Total 
Finance sector 19.63 55.71 12.79 11.87 100% 
Finance sector 
compared with all 
sectors 
7.45 21.14 4.85 4.51 37.95% 
Service sector 21.20 63.01 8.22 6.81 100% 
Service sector 
compared with all 
sectors 
5.55 15.90 2.08 1.73 25.26 
Industry sector 29.25 52.83 9.43 8.49 100% 
Industry sector 
compared with all 
sectors 
10.75 19.41 3.47 3.12 36.75% 
Total observation 23.75 56.45 10.4 9.45 100% 
The classifications of the sectors are as per the ASE. The table shows that CR firms are 
spread across the sectors but a large proportion of the sample comes from the following 
sectors: Financial (38%)), Industry (37%). This is mainly because of the ASE where some of 
these sectors have experienced a rapid growth. It can see that as to the CR in the BB3-BB 
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category there are more in the finance sector, namely, 11.87%, compared with service of 
6.81%, but as a proportion of all sectors in the same category it is 4.76% for financials, 
1.73% for service, and 8.49% for industry. 
It is quite interesting to note that on the D credit rating that a significant minority has a very 
low rating, namely 23.75% for all sectors, comprising financial 7.45%, service 5.55% and 
industry 10.75%, but as a proportion of its own respective compare with each sector the 
figures are: financial 19.63%, service 21.2% and industry 29.25%. We find that the financial 
sector has the majority from category C3-C for all sectors namely, CR 21.14%>, compared 
with service 15.9% and industry 19.41%, while within each sectors they are 55.7l%i for 
financial, 63% for service and 52.83 for industry. Finally, the B3-B category accounts for 
10.40%) of all categories, broken down into: financial 4.85%), service 2.08% and industry 
3.47%, and within each sector financials have 12.79%, service 8.22% and industry 9.43%,. 
8.2.2. Descriptive Analysis for Independent Variables 
8.2.2.1. Univariate descriptive statistics 
Table 8-2 shows summary statistics of the independent continuous variables in the study. The 
first variable is the size (total assets), that averages (median) total assets 42,802,317 JD 
(16,399,646 JD). Total assets for the sample range from 473,221 to 42,802317 JD with a high 
standard deviation of 8.361. Large firms gain from economies of scale and are stronger in 
facing default risk, enjoy high CRs, have lower risk, are likely to have a good reputation, 
have more stable future cash flows and face fewer hazards of being liquidated, while the 
average (median) capital intensity 0.08 (0.04), which means that 92%, of a firm's assets are 
fixed assets with a low standard deviation 0.249 and coefficients of variation 0.77. 
Unexpectedly, it has been noticed that industrial firms have lower fixed assets than non-
industrial firms. The average (median) leverage is 31.71% (29.00). Profitable firms are 
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stronger in facing financial distress and continuing in the fiiture than unprofitable firms. The 
mean for the net profit margin is 0.47,and its median is 19.10, with a standard deviation of 
0.744; net profit margin for the sample ranges fi-om 0.001 to 7.155, and finally the average 
(median) Tobin's q is 1.60 (1.41). Tobin's q for the sample ranges from 0.039 to 1.61 with a 
high standard deviation o f 0.751. Growth opportunities are considered to be an indicator for 
the firm's success and the level of its profitability; this encourages investors to lend to these 
firms which might present high growth rates or valuable growth opportunities in the firm's 
fijture. 
There is a substantial mean proportion of blockholders at 57%. The institutional mean 
shareholding is sizeable at 33%. Indeed agency theory states that the higher the proportion of 
large institutional investors or greater concentrated ownership, the greater the monitoring role 
of these investors, and therefore the greater the chance for better financial performance. By 
contrast, mean shareholding by insiders (officers and directors) is only 5%. There is some 
indication of family ownership with a mean of 13%, as well as foreign ownership at 10%, and 
a tiny governmental ownership at 2%. 
With respect to the financial transparency dimension, the average (median) WCAQ and 
timeliness values are -0.16% (0-.087%), and 0-.43% (0-.22%), respectively. Large values of 
working capital accruals and timeliness reflect a higher quality in financial reporting. On 
average, 33% of board members are independent, which indicates an important presence on 
the board. Additionally, 52% of board members have expertise through sitting on other 
boards. But attributes should, through the corporate governance mechanism, beneficially 
affect firm credit rating. 
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Table 8- 2: Summary statistics of independent continuous variables 
Variables Mean S.D. Max. Min. Median. 
Accounting and Financial Category 
L E V .32 .23 1.17 .002 29.00 
P M .47 .75 7.16 .001 19.10 
S I Z E 42802317 8.36 664791204 473221 16399646 
Market and Regu atory Category 
C A P _ I N T E N .080 .081 .35 .001 .04 
TSQ 1.61 .75 5.83 .039 1.41 
Ownership Structure Category 
B L O C K _ O W N .57 .227 1.000 000 .58 
INST_OWN .33 .271 1.000 000 .26 
INSID_OWN .05 .108 1.000 000 .004 
G O V _ O W N .02 .076 .999 000 .000 
F A M L _ O W N .13 .168 .79 000 .05 
F O R E N _ O W N .10 .185 .99 000 .000 
Financial Transparency Category 
W C A Q -.16 .185 000 -1.626 -.87 
T I M E L I N E S S -.43 .664 000 -7.010 -.22 
Corporate Governance Category 
B R D J N D .33 .153 .88 000 000 
B R D _ E X P E R T .52 .228 .43 000 000 
B R D _ S T O C K .85 .231 .93 000 000 
B R D _ S I Z E 8.27 2.166 13 5 5 
Note: L E V = leverage, PM = profitability, SIZE = company size, CAP INTEN = capital intensity, TSQ= 
Tobin's q, B L O C K OWN = blockholder ownership, rNST_OWN = institutional Ownership, 
INSID OWN = insider ownership, GOV OWN = governmental ownership, FAMILY OWN = family 
ownership, FOR OWN = foreign ownership, WCAQ= working capital accruals, TIMELINESS= 
timeliness of earnings, BRD_IND = board independent directors, BRD EXPERT= board expertise, 
BRD_STOCK= board stock, BRD SIZE = board size. 
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8.2.2.2 Bivariate and Correlation Analysis 
Table 8- 3: Bivariate analysis between C R and continuous variables 
Variables Pearson Spearman 
Accounting and Financial Category 
L E V .031 .049 
PM .049 .152*** 
C A P J N T E N .028 -.020 
IV arket and Regulatory Category 
S I Z E .438*** .702*** 
TSQ 137*** 
Ownership Structure Category 
B L O C K _ O W N .025 .016 
INST_OWN .134*** .165*** 
INSID_OWN -.072** -.010 
G O V _ O W N .001 .050 
FA]VIL_OWN .018 .060** 
F O R E N O W N .161*** .252*** 
Financial Transparency Category 
W C A Q .086** -.029 
T I M E L I N E S S -.011 -.037 
Corporate Governance Category 
B R D J N D .100*** .100*** 
B R D _ E X P E R T .173*** 
B R D _ S T O C K .154*** 129*** 
B R D _ S I Z E .288*** 275*** 
Note: *** significant at 1% and ** significant at 5%. 
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Table 8- 4: T-test and Mann Whitney tests for Nominal Variables 
Variables T-Test Mann Whitney test 
Mean T. value Mean Rank Z value 
T Y P S E C T 2.064*** -2.058** 
Financial 3.073 307.27 
Non-Financial 2.778 277.83 
A U D _ B I G 6.959*** -6.689*** 
Big 4 3.316 331.64 
NB4 2.385 238.45 
Role Duality 1.114 -1.114 
Yes 3.031 303.75 
No 2.847 284.75 
L O S S -3.419 -3.385*** 
Yes 2.505 249.98 
No 3.035 302.81 
Note: (1) *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. 
(2) TYP_SECT= type of sector, AUT_BIG = 4big audit, LOSS = loss propensity. 
Table 8-3 set out the relationship between the CR score and the pre-specified independent 
variables for testing Pearson product moment correlation and Spearman's rank order 
correlation coefficients which are significantly correlated with all groups variables. 
According to the Pearson product moment and spearman rank correlation coefficients, firm 
size (total assets) and growth opportunity (Tobin's q) are each significantly related to the CR 
score at \%, level of significance. So, larger firms with better growth opportunities, which 
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may be considered to be an indicator for the firm's creditworthiness, reflect better CRs, 
which should encourage investors to lend to these firms with confidence in their stability and 
future growth opportunities. Under the one criterion, namely, the Spearman rank order 
correlation coefficient, profitability is also significant at the 1% of significance, which is 
consistent with rational economic thinking. 
Also the table above shows the ownership structure variables, including institution and 
foreign ownership, which are significantly correlated with CR at the 1% significance level for 
both Pearson's and Spearman's correlation coefficients. Insider ownership is significant at 
the 5% level of significance (for the Pearson coefficient) and family ownership at the 5% 
level of significance (for the Spearman coefficient). 
According to the correlation analysis for the financial transparency related variables, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient indicates that the entire WCAQ variable is correlated 
significantly with CR at the 5 % significance level. Large WCAQ reflect a higher quality 
financial reporting, which has consequently led to higher CRs. 
Finally, the results for corporate governance demonstrate that these variables are each 
significant at the 1% level of significance and also the four variables namely board 
independence, board expertise, board stock and board size are each correlated at the level 1 % 
significance with CR for both Pearson and Spearman's correlation coefficients. Hence, the 
attributes of a larger board size, greater board independence, higher levels of board expertise 
a greater members of board members having a financial interest in the organization through 
stock ownership are beneficial to a higher CR score. 
Table 8-4 shows the results fi-om analysing the relationship between each dummy variable as 
an independent variable and CR as the dependent variable. The mean numerical CR score is 
significantly higher for financial firms than for that of the non-financials, at the 5% level of 
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significance under both the t-test and Marm-whitney test. This finding would suggest 
different underlying risks according to sector and different degress of financial strength. 
Audit type also has a significant relationship with CR at a significance level of 1% for both 
the t-test and Mann-Whitney test, revealing the benefits to better CRs arising from choosing a 
big four audit firm rather than a smaller audit firms. Finally, the occurrence of losses over 
two years bears a significant relationship with CR at the 1% level of significance under the 
Mann-Whitney test, revealing that greater loss propensity is associated with a lower rating. 
8.3 Multivariate Analysis: Ordinary Least Squares ( O L S ) Regression 
8.3.1 Assumptions Underlying Multiple Regressions 
Details of tests on the assumptions underlying the multiple regressions are given below: 
8.3.1.1 Normality of Residuals 
The residuals of the dependent variable are approximately normally distributed (See 
Appendix 8-1). I f this had not been the case, the analysis of the OLS results would have been 
potentially misleading. 
8.3.1.2 Multicollinearity 
According to the current study there is no multicollinearity problem between the continuous 
independent variables, because the correlation coefficients are less than 0.80, which is the 
crifical figure for practical purposes according to Gujarati (2003). This means that the 
explanatory variables are sufficiently independent of one another. 
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Table 8- 5; Correlation matrix for independent variables 
B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q 
A 
0.1 
37* 
0.2 
15* 
* 
0.0 
88* 0.0 
74* 
0.1 
73* 
* 
0.1 
62* 
* 
0.0 
14 
0.1 
71* 
* 
0.0 
31 
0.0 
37 
0.0 
74* 0.0 
21 
0.0 
17 
0.0 
30 0.0 
80* 
0.1 
55* 
* 
B 
0.0 
60 
0.1 
97* 
* 
0.0 
69* 0.0 
70* 
0.0 
46 
0.0 
22 
0.0 
39 
0.0 
77* 
0.0 
14 0.1 
83* 
* 
0.0 
72* 
0.0 
29 0.0 
10 
0.0 
15 
0.0 
53 
C 0.0 
85* 
0.1 
21* 
* 
0.1 
02* 
* 
0.2 
34* 
* 
0.0 
85 
* 
0.2 
62* 
* 
0.1 
18* 
* 
0.2 
69* 
* 
0.0 
19 0.0 
09 
0.0 
84* 
0.0 
54 0.2 
00* 
* 
0.2 
68 
D 0.0 
03 
0.0 
73* 
0.1 
44* 
* 
0.0 
43 
0.0 
37 0.0 
65 
0.0 
20 
0.0 
03 
0.0 
68 0.0 
26 
0.0 
49 
0.0 
64 
0.0 
75* 
E 0.0 
96* 
0.0 
91* 
0.0 
71 
* 
0.0 
47 
0.0 
32 
0.1 
35* 
* 
0.0 
36 
0.1 
67* 
* 
0.0 
16 
0.0 
37 0.0 
56 
0.0 
48 
F 0.6 
01* 
* 
0.0 
49 
0.1 
85* 
* 
0.0 
24 
0.3 
34* 
* 
0.1 
10* 
* 
0.0 
11 
0.1 
28* 
* 
0.0 
41 0.2 
08* 
* 
0.0 
94* 
G 
0.0 
54 
0.2 
17* 
* 
0.4 
01* 
0.3 
33* 
* 
0.0 
20 
0.0 
21 0.1 
58* 
* 
0.1 
11* 
* 
0.3 
20* 
* 
0.0 
39 
H 
0.0 
88* 
0.2 
17* 
* 
0.0 
70* 
0.0 
11 0.1 
41* 
* 
0.0 
56 0.0 
70* 
0.0 
68 0.0 
87* 
I 
0.1 
45* 
* 
0.0 
59 
0.0 
51 0.0 
78* 
0.0 
08 0.1 
59* 
* 
0.1 
5 
0.1 
14* 
* 
J 
0.1 
83* 
0.0 
36 0.0 
91* 
0.0 
94* 
0.0 
35 
0.2 
14* 
* 
0.0 
12 
K 
0.0 
35 
0.0 
37 0.0 
54 
0.0 
03 
0.1 
54* 
* 
0.0 
87* 
L 0.0 
85* 0.0 
82* 
0.0 
08 
0.0 
21 
0.0 
78* 
M 0.0 
10 0.0 
23 
0.0 
02 
0.0 
18 
N 0.0 
87* 
0.0 
68 
0.0 
31 
O 
0.0 
08 
0.0 
74* 
P 0.05 
Note: A= leverage, B= profitability, C = size, D= capital intensity, E= Tobin's q, F= blockholder, G= institutional ownership, 
H= insider ownership, 1= governmental ownership, J= family ownership, K = foreign ownership L= working capital accruals, 
M= timeliness of earnings, N= board independence, 0 = board expertise, P= board stock, Q= board size. 
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Tolerance tests are show in Table 8-6. The biggest variance inf lect ion factor ( V I F ) value is 
0.90 and the lowest tolerance ( W I F ) is 1.104; consequently no serious multicollinearity, 
between the independent variables, exists for this study. 
Table 8- 6; Multicoilinearity test for determinants of credit ratings 
Variables Variance Inflation Factor Tolerance 
LEV .788 1.269 
PM .812 1.232 
SIZE .518 1.931 
C A P J N T E N .820 1.220 
TSQ .900 1.111 
T Y P S E C T .787 1.271 
LOSS .771 1.296 
BLOCK_ O W N .479 2.089 
INST_ O W N .400 2.498 
INSID_ O W N .811 1.233 
GOV O W N .839 1.191 
F A M L _ O W N .663 1.508 
FOREN_ O W N .774 1.292 
WCAQ .905 1.104 
TIMELINESS .903 1.107 
A U D _ B I G .820 1.219 
B R D J N D .897 1.115 
R_D .816 1.225 
BRD_EXPERT .881 1.136 
BRD_STOCK .829 1.207 
BRD_SIZE .784 1.275 
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8.3.1.3 Homoscedasticity of Residuals 
The residuals appear to be randomly scattered around the ' 0 ' horizontal line (See Appendix 
8-2). This means that the current data are homoscedastic. The variabil i ty is not changing; 
otherwise the results o f the analysis would be misleading. 
8.3.1.4 Linearity 
Residual plots indicated some non-linearities, which are later corrected by transforming 
variables. A number o f log transformations are undertake in line w i th the recommendation by 
Field (2007). 
8.3.1.5 Independence of E r r o r s 
In this study the Durbin-Watson statistic for model 1, before transformation o f variables, is 
0.973 which is near to the lower boundary and so there is some correlation between residuals. 
Hence, the evidence seems to indicate that the model in this study does not fiilly meet the 
assumption o f independence o f errors (See Table 8-7). 
Table 8- 7: Durbin-Watson 
Model R R-Square Adjusted R-Square Std. Error o f the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .719' .517 .498 1.181351 .973 
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8.3.2 Results of the O L S Analysis 
Before evaluating the results, i t should be noted that the multiple regression analysis was run 
by using SPSS Version 17, for examining the relationship between credit rating and 
explanatory variables the from five groups, namely, accounting and financial, market and 
regulatory, ownership structure, corporate governance and financial transparency variables. 
8.3.2.1 F irs t Model 
The first model was run w i t h un-transformed data. The results o f this model are explained in 
the f o l l o w i n g tables: 
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Table 8- 8: Untransformed Ordinary Least Squares ( U - O L S ) model 
Variables Coefticient t-statisticv 
Accounting and Financial Variables 
L E V -1.304 -5.310*** 
P M 0.151 2.064** 
C A P J N T E N 0.518 0.736 
L O S S 0.171 -1.354 
Market and Regulatory Variables 
S I Z E 2.133 17.194*** 
TSQ 0.207 3.00** 
T V P _ S E C T 0.176 1.542 
A U D B I G 0.018 0.167 
Ownership Structure Variables 
B L O C K _ O W N 0.450 -1.434 
INST_OWN -0.604 -2.089** 
INSID_OWN 0.142 0.281 
G O V _ O W N -1.028 1.45 
F A M L _ O W N 0.802 2.223** 
F O R E N _ O W N 0.627 2.062** 
Financial Transparency Variables 
W C A Q 0.550 2.00** 
T I M E L I N E S S -0.025 -0.326 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BRD_IND -0.486 -1.426 
R_D -0.97 -0.125 
B R D _ E X P E R T 0.340 1.47 
B R D _ S T O C K 0.037 -1.56 
B R D _ S I Z E 0.052 -0.043** 
Constant -13.00 -14.2*** 
F-Ratio 28.22 
Adjusted R-square 49.8 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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8.3.2.2 Second Model 
As explained earlier, non-linearity between independent and dependent variables can cause 
too much positive or negative clustering o f residuals. B y transforming some variables, 
typical ly through log transforms, this potential problem can be much reduced. This model 
incorporates transformed data for variables-measurement. The results o f this model are 
explained in the f o l l o w i n g tables: 
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Table 8- 9: Transformed Ordinary Least Squares ( T - O L S ) model 
variables Coefficient t -statistic 
Accounting and Financial Variables 
L E V -1.766 -6.187*** 
PM 0.224 2.489** 
C A P J N T E N -0.016 -0.381 
LOSS 0.267 -1.657* 
Market and Regulatory Variables 
S I Z E 2.991 20.963*** 
TSQ 0.307 3.788*** 
T Y P _ S E C T 0.0175 1.079 
AUD_BIG 0.000 -0.002 
Ownership Structure Variables 
B L O C K _ O W N -0.116 -0.379 
INST_OWN 0.083 1.363 
INSID_OWN 2.534 4.224*** 
GOV_OWN -0.224 -1.256 
FAML_OWN 1.132 2.961*** 
FOREN_OWN 1.206 3.368*** 
Financial Transparency Variables 
WCAQ 0.538 1.845* 
T I M E L I N E S S 0.086 1.868* 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BRD_IND 0.217 1.742* 
R_D -0.352 -2.307** 
B R D _ E X P E R T 0.283 0.793 
B R D _ S T O C K 0.717 1.938** 
BRD_SIZE 0.069 2.365** 
Constant -21.00 -22.00*** 
F-Ratio 41.78 
Adjusted R-square 59.9 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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As indicated f r o m Tables 8.8 and 8.9, the adjusted R-squares were around 50% for 
untransformed data, wh ich improved to around 60% fo r the transformed data, comparable 
w i t h previous studies. That (Horrigan 1966; Thomas et al . , 1967; and Skaife et al., 2006) had 
R-squares o f 48%, 56%, 60% adjusted R-square o f the model o f the current study is 
acceptable. 
Accord ing to the accounting and financial variables o f the first category in first model, just 
leverage and prof i tab i l i ty have a significant relationship at a level o f 1% and 5% significance, 
respectively, w i t h CR, whi le three out o f four variables i n the second model were found to be 
significant and represented leverage, and prof i tabi l i ty and loss significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level o f significance, respectively. Thus, leverage, prof i tabi l i ty , and loss propensity are 
important determinants o f W V B credit risk assessment in descending order. 
Concerning the market and regulatory category, two out o f four variables in both models 
were found to be significant, the f indings providing evidence fo r the influence o f these 
variables on CR, and represent firm size and growth opportunities, which are associated and 
posirively significant at the level 1% o f in both models, except at 5% level o f significance for 
growth opportunities i n the first model w i t h CR. This implies that firm size and growth 
opportunities have a role to play i n the determination o f W V B credit risk assessments. 
As to the ownership structure category, four out o f six variables were found to have an 
impact on the CR in one or both models. For the un-transformed first model, institution, 
f ami ly and foreign ownerships bear a significant relationship wi th CR at the 5% level o f 
significance, whi le insider, f ami ly , and foreign ownership o f the transformed (second) model 
bear a significance relationship w i t h CR at the 1% level o f significance. 
Regarding the financial transparency category, only work ing capital accruals are associated 
w i t h C R at the 5% level o f significance, regarding to the first model, whi le the second model 
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both variables have a significant association wi th CR at the 10% o f significance. Thus, level 
W C A Q and timeliness variables impact on CR. 
Finally, w i t h regard to the corporate governance category, for the untransformed model only 
board size was found to have a significant negatively relationship w i t h C R at a level o f 5% 
significance. B y contrast in the second model, board independence (at 10%), board stock (at 
5%), and board size (at 5%) are significantly positively associated w i t h CR at the prescribed 
levels o f significance. Role duality is negatively associated w i t h CR (at 5%). 
8.3.3 Discussion of the O L S results 
As in the previous section, the untransformed and transformed models are used fo r this 
analysis. The focus here is on the significance o f the variables that influence the CR, 
discussed according to the different groups o f explanatory variables. 
8.3.3.1 Accounting and Financial Category 
Four accounting and fmancial variables have been introduced in the current study to examine 
their impact on CR. As summary o f the fmdings o f these variables is presented in Table 8.10 
Table 8-10: The Significance of Accounting and Financial Variables for C R s of 
Jordanian F i r m s 
Variables Bivariate Analysis Multivariate Regression 
Analysis 
P N P U _ O L S T _ O L S 
L E V ^ * * * ^ 
P M * * * ** ** 
C A P J N T E N 
L O S S ( * ) 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. 
P= Parametric (Pearson, t-test), N P= Non Parametric (Spearman, Mann-Whitney). 
225 
As indicated i n Table 8-10, three variables have been found to have a strong relationship wi th 
CR. The prof i tab i l i ty and loss variables demonstrate different results between bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. The reason for finding a potentially significant association between 
any independent and dependent variables in the multivariate analysis which not appear in the 
bivariate analysis is due to the possible impact o f the combination o f other variables in the 
multivariate analysis (OLS) on the significance o f this variable. On the other hand, when a 
significant association appears in the bivariate analysis which is not in the multivariate 
analysis, this may be due to the mult icoll ineari ty (even i f minor) between the independent 
variables which explain the lack o f significance o f this variable (Hosain et al., 1994). 
Where there are differences between the findings o f bivariate and multivariate analyses 
regarding some variables, the emphasis w i l l be given to the multivariate analysis for the 
determinants o f CR in the Jordanian context by examining groups o f variables 
simultaneously. 
Mult ivar ia te analyses have supported the influence o f leverage on the Jordanian listed 
companies' CR being significantly negatively related to CR at the 99 per cent level o f 
confidence and as expected, there is a clear inverse relationship between financial risk, as 
evidenced by the relative debt level, and the firm's CR. Bivariate and multivariate analysis 
indicate that loss propensity has a negatively significant effect on CR at the 99% and 90% 
level o f confidence, respectively. A negative effect supports the disciplining o f management 
hypothesis i n that managers would be constrained in their financial decisions, on behalf o f the 
company, because o f a lower CR caused by the losses incurred and would be disciplined to 
help enable the firm to perform better. 
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No empirical evidence, whether based on bivariate or multivariate analysis i n the current 
study, have been found to support the relationship between the Jordanian listed company's 
capital intensity and CR. One observation is that in the Jordanian data-set the level o f fixed 
assets appeared to be relatively small. 
Based on the above discussion overall , it can be noticed that the accounfing and financial 
category o f selected variables nevertheless is associated wi th CR. 
8.3.3.2 Market and Regulatory Category 
Four market and summarised regulator variables were investigated in the current study, 
results are in Table 8-11. 
Table 8-11: The Significance of Market and Regulatory Variables for C R s of Jordanian 
F i r m s 
Variables Bivariate Analysis Multivariate Regression Analysis 
P NP U O L S T O L S 
S I Z E * i f * *** *** *** 
T S Q **if *** ** *** 
T Y P S E C T *** 
T Y P A U D *** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. 
P= Parametric (Pearson, t-test), N P= Non Parametric (Spearman, Mann-Whitney). 
I t can be seen f r o m Table 8-11 that all the market and regulatory variables have a significant 
impact on CR at the presented levels and mainly at the 99% level o f confidence in both 
bivariate and multivariate analyses-except type o f sector and type o f audit variables which 
have a significant influence in only the bivariate analysis. 
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The results o f the bivariate and multivariate analyses reveal a positive relationship between 
the f i r m ' s size and CR. A l l these results are statistically significant at the 99% level o f 
confidence. The results show that larger the size o f the total assets o f Jordanian listed 
companies is an important criterion in determining a higher CR. This supports the signalling 
theory, wh ich assumes that large f i rms are stronger when facing bankruptcy and financial 
distress through the creation o f future cash f lows to the firm. Thus, there is an incentive for 
larger companies to attain higher CRs since this should reduce the cost o f capital on account 
o f the lower perceived credit risk their. In addition, for most o f these large companies the 
benefits o f high CRs should be reflected in the provision o f provide future cash f lows to all 
stakeholders, including bondholders. 
Tobin 's q (TSQ) is a proxy used to measure the growth opportunities. The results o f bivariate 
and multivariate analyses are highly significant, namely, at the 99% level o f confidence. 
Concerning this growth potential variable, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate 
that Jordanian listed companies w i t h higher growth potential generally have higher CRs as 
reflected in the positive relationship between the firm's CR and growth opportunities. This 
positive and significant effect gives support to the argument o f signalling theory, which is 
undervalued on plainly uru-ecorded. Companies wi th high growth may signal that to their 
investors to illustrate their high expected performance which should result in their higher 
f i i ture profi ts , consequently attracting a higher CR. Also, firms w i t h greater growth 
opportunifies might have lower leverage ratios enabling f i rms to reduce expensive default 
risk and reduce the risk o f expropriation o f wealth to shareholders f r o m bondholders. Indeed, 
the correlation between growth opportunities and leverage is negative (-.074) although the 
mult icol l inear i ty is not an issue fo r this data-set. 
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Type o f sector and audit showed incongruous results between bivariate and multivariate 
analyses. Only bivariate analysis indicates a significant association between type o f sector 
and audit and CR o f Jordanian listed companies. Type o f sector bears a significant level (at 
the 99%, 95% confidence level) relationship wi th CR for non-parametric and parametric 
tests, respectively; and audit type is significant (at the 99% confidence level) w i th CR fo r 
both parametric and non-parametric tests. The multivariate analysis implies that type sector 
and type audit has an insignificant impact on CRs in the Jordanian context. This result 
suggest that it is the quality o f the companies rather the quality o f the auditing firm, that is 
important to the CR, although the bivariate (parametric) test reveals same auditing in 
attracting a big 4 audit company. 
Based on the above discussion, i t can be illustrated that two out o f four variables o f the 
market and regulatory category have at the prescribed levels a significant association w i t h CR 
in the Jordanian context in both bivariate and multivariate analyses. T w o variables, namely, 
type o f sector and audit has been found to have insignificant impact on CR regarding the 
multivariate analysis. Nevertheless, the staristical results support the significant influence o f 
some o f the variables in the market and regulatory category on CR in the Jordanian context. 
8.3.3.3 Ownership Structure Category 
Six different aspects structures o f ownership structure are examined in the current study to 
investigate their impact on CR in the Jordanian context. The findings fo r these variables are 
presented in Table 8-12. 
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Table 8-12: T h e Significance of Ownership Structure Variables for C R s of Jordanian 
F i r m s 
Variables Bivariate Analysis Multivariate Regression 
Analysis 
P NP U _ O L S T _ O L S 
B L O C K _ O W N 
I N S T _ O W N *** *** (**) 
I N S I D _ O W N *** 
G O V _ O W N 
F A ] V I I L Y _ O W N i f * *** 
F O R E N _ O W N *** *** ** *** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level o f significance. 
P= Parametric (Pearson, t-test), N P= Non Parametric (Spearman, Mann-Whitney). 
As indicated in Table 8-12, multivariate and bivariate analyses report that several ownership 
structure variables have a strong influence on the Jordanian listed CR. Yet, foreign ownership 
is the only ownership structure variable that has identical results from both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. The stafistic results reveal that there is a posifive relationship between 
the foreign ownership o f the Jordanian listed companies and CR at a confidence level o f 99 
% . Bivariate analysis finds this associafion at level significance o f 1%, whi le untransformed 
and log transformafion models find it at a significance level o f 5%, and 1 % respectively. This 
reveals that the existence o f foreign ownership o f Jordanian listed companies has a strong 
influence on the level o f CR. 
Supportive o f legitimacy theory, the influence o f foreign ownership in Jordanian companies 
may push firms to seek ways to enhance their CRs as an information tool by providing 
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stakeholders w i th greater security in the firm's abil i ty to cover future debt through 
obligations future cash flows to legitimate themselves above rival companies. 
The findings o f the current study are supported by A y d i n et al (2007), who find a significant 
association between foreign ownership and firm performance. Thus, this role should be more 
prominent through greater foreign ownership in the Jordanian listed companies. 
Pertaining to institutional ownership both bivariate and multivariate regression analyses 
demonstrate on association w i t h CR in the Jordanian context but at different levels o f 
significance; bivariate showing a posifive significance at the 99% level o f confidence, and a 
negative significance at the 95% level o f confidence for the multivariate analysis, namely, fo r 
U _ O L S . Institutional ownership can be a threat to creditor's interests as this class o f 
shareholders can expend enormous energy on blocking debt holder benefits. The multivariate 
( U OLS) analysis suggests that a lower institutional ownership is beneficial from a creditor's 
point o f view; so there may be an opt imum level o f institutional ownership which balances 
the costs and benefits associated w i t h more shareholder control. 
Only multivariate analysis reports significant positive relationship between fami ly ownership 
and CR o f the Jordanian listed companies at 95% and 99% confidence levels for each model, 
respectively. Stewardship theory supports this result, whereby management and f ami ly 
ownership should lead to corporate success (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997), as 
f ami ly owners have inside knowledge about their business, wh ich gives them an edge in 
running their business profi tably, as Westhead (2003) explains, they are part o f the 
management and have a vested interest in the company's success, they w i l l act as stewards to 
ensure that there is continued success, and w i l l work to solve organizational problems and 
take on tasks to f u l f i l business goals. 
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Thus, higher fami ly ownership firms have better CRs reflecting their firms' ability to create 
more than sufficient fiature cash flows to cover debt interest and capital repayments. These 
findings demonstrate that for Jordanian listed companies there is a key role played by fami ly 
owners in enhancing the creditworthiness o f companies. Also, legitimacy and stakeholder 
theories can explain this positive relationship. Family ownership may help attain higher CRs 
to avoid both l i t igat ion and reputation costs resulting from lower creditworthiness. Further, 
these companies are in the public eye and therefore, should enhance their communication 
w i t h various stakeholders and legitimize themselves by attaining higher CRs. Finally, fami ly 
ownership may be enforced by different stakeholders to provide a higher CR as evidence o f 
the abi l i ty o f these f i rms to cover capital repayments through the generation o f future cash 
flows to mitigate any bad effect otherwise resulfing from a reduced need for fami ly owners to 
press for greater accounting disclosure because o f their inside knowledge. 
Both bivariate and multivariate regression analyses show disagreement in the results o f 
insider ownership by managers and other corporate officers. Only multivariate analysis 
reports a strong positive relationship between insider ownership and CR o f the Jordanian 
listed companies at a significant level o f 99% confidence. The multivariate fmdings 
demonstrate that Jordanian listed companies w i t h a higher proportion o f insider ownership 
can attain a higher CR. O n the other hand, bivariate analyses show a negative relationship 
between insider ownership and CR at the 95% confidence level. These empirical f indings 
may be attributed to both signalling and stewardship theories. A higher proportion o f insider 
ownership o f Jordanian companies may attract higher CRs to signal their good performance 
and secure creditworthiness, which anticipates higher l iquidi ty fo r these companies and 
strong fi i ture cash flows. According to stewardship theory, higher managerial ownership can 
help prevent the misuse o f shareholders' wealth, due to a convergence in interests between 
them, supporting a higher CR. 
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No empirical evidence, based on both bivariate and multivariate analyses, in the current study 
has been found to support the relationship between CR and either the Jordanian listed 
company's blockholders or governmental ownership. This means that Jordanian listed 
companies with a lower proportion of governmental ownership do not necessarily decrease 
their level of CR. Skaife et al (2006) hypothesized neither a positive or negative effect for 
blockholders although they reported a negative effect for their sample of US firms. In case o f 
a high proportion of governmental ownership, governmental owners have the authority to 
access the required information without the need of CR reports. Therefore, Jordanian listed 
companies with a higher proportion of governmental ownership do not need CRs, as the 
required information is available internally, and vice versa. Therefore, there wi l l be no 
conflict between the shareholders and management, which can reduce the agency problem in 
this case, and hence reduce the level of credit ratings. To summarise, the results reveal that 
the listings of blockholders and governmental owners of Jordanian companies in the ASE has 
no impact on CR. 
8.3.3.4 Financial Transparency and Disclosure Category 
Two financial transparency variables were investigated in the current study. 
Table 8- 13: The Significance of Financial Transparency and Disclosure Variables for 
CRs of Jordanian Firms. 
Variables Bivariate Analysis Multivariate Regression Analysis 
P NP U O L S T O L S 
W C A O ** • 
T I M E L I N E S S * 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. 
P= Parametric (Pearson, t-test), N P= Non Parametric (Spearman, Mann-Whitney). 
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Working capital accruals is the only financial transparency variable that has identical results 
from both bivariate (parametric) and multivariate analyses. Bivariate analysis indicates a 
significant positive relationship between WCAQ and CR at the 95% level of confidence. The 
statistical results reveal that there is a positive relationship between the working capital 
accruals of the Jordanian listed companies and CR at a confidence level of 95% and 90% for 
each multivariate model respectively. This reveals that the existence of working capital 
accruals as a measure for financial transparency of Jordanian listed companies has a clear 
influence on the level of CR. Greater fmancial transparency, through its beneficial reduction 
in information asymmetry, has a favourable impact on a firm's credit rating. This supports an 
agency theoretic perspective of the minimisation of information asymmetry induced by 
higher credit ratings reflecting stronger cash flows associated with working capital accruals. 
The multivariate analysis, namely, for T OLS finds timeliness attracts a positive and 
significant association with CR at the 90 per cent of confidence. When the earnings of a firm 
are of high quality regarding their timeliness in their fmancial reporting this may act as a 
signal indicating that there is greater confidence in the strength of their future cash flows to 
the f i rm since it has a positive significant effect on its CR. Timeliness wi l l lend credence to 
the fmancial and accounting operations of the f irm, which for a creditor is very important. It 
can thus be agued that innovative firms are more likely to utilise internet technology for 
information diffiision with a positive impact on both information flows to the investor and 
credit rating assessments. Also high quality in the timeliness of earnings and the 
consequential credit rating effect should help firms to legitimize themselves with the 
authorities, indicating that the findings here support legitimacy theory in this context. 
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8.3.3.5 Corporate Governance Category 
From analysing the impact of corporate governance on CR, mixed results have been found 
from applying both bivariate and multivariate techniques. These results are presented in 
Table 8-14. 
Table 8- 14: The Significance of Corporate Governance Variables for CRs of Jordanian 
Firms 
Variables Bivariate Analysis Multivariate Regression 
Analysis 
P NP U O L S T O L S 
BRD IND *** * 
R D (**) 
BRD E X P E R T *** 
BRD S T O C K *** *** ** 
BRD S I Z E *** *** ** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. 
P= Parametric (Pearson, t-test), N P= Non Parametric (Spearman, Maan-Whitney). 
As seen from Table 8-14, biviariate analysis show a significant association for all the 
corporate governance variables, except the existence of role duality, while multivariate 
analysis (for the transformed model) indicates this result for board independence, role 
duality, board stock and board size. 
With regard to board size, while bivariate analysis indicate a positive significant association 
between board size and CR at level 99% of confidence, the multivariate analysis indicates 
this result to be significant and negative for the first model and positive for the second model 
at the 95% level of confidence. This finding shows that the larger the size of the Jordanian 
listed companies' board of directors, the higher the level of CR. Yet, it has been argued that a 
board size that is too large can disrupt the functioning of the board and an ideal board size is 
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around 7 to 10 members (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993), which compares 
favourably for Jordan in which the mean size of the board is 7. But, agency theory can 
explain the view that increasing board size wi l l be a good sign of good corporate governance 
practices, which may encourage CRAs to increase the rating for the companies with a higher 
board size. As the board size of a firm increases it is thus more than likely that the firm wil l 
move into a higher category of credit rating by enhancing the experience diversity on the 
board. This diversity is useful for sharing knowledge between members and is reflected in the 
quality of the firm's activities and its credit worthiness. Companies may be motivated to be 
governed by a larger size of director's board in order to legitimize themselves to their 
stakeholders, which in turn should have a beneficial impact on credit worthiness and hence 
on its CR. 
The role duality on the board of directors has been found to bear a negative significant 
relationship with CR in only the multivariate analysis for the second model, which found 
such a relationship at a significance level of 5 %. So, the separation between the chairman 
and CEO roles in the Jordanian listed companies has a negative impact on the level of CR. A 
negative effect supports the management disciplining hypothesis and suggests that role 
duality could lead to domination of management over the board and untimely lead to poorer 
firm performance (Keasey et al., 2005). The dominant prevailing form in the Jordanian listed 
companies is the combination of roles, not the separation between chairman/CEO roles. This 
is consistent with findings by the World Bank (2004 a), which observers that most of the 
board chairmen in Jordanian companies are also insider officers. Therefore, it is highly 
recommended for the Jordanian listed companies to separate the role between their chairman 
and CEO, and when this happens it tends to have a favourable effect on the level of their CR. 
By contrast, to combine roles between the chairman and CEO may weaken the board's 
independence due to the concentration of the power in one person. This lack of independence 
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represents a weak governance system, which may even lead to companies not attaining higher 
CRs because of detrimental effect, on their stakeholders, especially bondholders. 
Similarly, board expertise has been found to have a positive significant association in only 
the bivariate analysis at a level of 99% confidence. Again multivariate analysis is not able to 
provide empirical evidence for a significant influence of board expertise on CR in the 
Jordanian context. I would suggest that further research is needed as to why board expertise is 
not as important as expected. Expertise from serving on other boards of directors should have 
been useful. It could be that they lack the internal knowledge that managers, for example, 
possess and the CR agency realises this. 
With regard to board stock, while bivariate analysis indicate a positive significant association 
between board size and CR at 99% level of confidence, the multivariate analysis (transformed 
model) indicate this result at the 95% level of confidence. A positive effect supports agency 
theory, which can explain the suggested result. Increasing board stock wi l l push the firm to a 
good performance. These director stock and option awards are useful in tying directors' pay 
more closely to stock performance, which helps in attaining a higher CR. Consequently, this 
indicates that as the board stock of a firm increases it is more than likely that the firm wi l l 
move into a higher category of CR. 
Interestingly, both the parametric bivariate analysis and the second model in the multivariate 
analysis reveal a positive association between the number of independent directors and CR at 
different levels of significance, i.e. at the 99% and 90% level of confidence, respectively. 
The management disciplining hypothesis supports the boards of directors having a majority 
of outside directors as they are independent of the management and are more willing to 
monitor the management more effectively. This monitoring role supports to fu l f i l the 
shareholders' and other stakeholders', especially bondholders' interests, and it wi l l tend to 
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push the firm into a higher category of CR. Therefore, Jordanian companies should attempt to 
attain higher CRs and in also achieving these interests would tend to alleviate any conflict 
between management and their shareholders. According to signalling theory, bondholders can 
have better monitoring procedures by the board of directors through greater independence on 
the board, and this can be regarded as a significant signal of good firm performance leading it 
to attain a higher CR. 
8,4 Bivariate and One-way Analysis 
8.4.1 Bivariate Analysis 
We investigate the relationship between each group of independent variables and CR. Table 
8.15 summarises the results of all tests. 
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8.4.1.1 Accounting and Financial Category 
Table 8- 15: Results of ANOVA and other statistical analysis (Accounting and Financial 
L E V FM C A F J N T E N LOSS 
Average (Mean) 
BB3-BB 0.303774 0.41134 0.0679 0.4690 
B3-B 0.322834 0.50143 0.07821 0.3130 
C3-C 0.334143 0.5297 0.05577 0.2321 
D 0.3532 0.2524 0.197 0.8 
Standard deviation 
BB3-BB 0.2258 0.708152 0.07083 0.50015 
B3-B 0.23138 0.79114 0.1612 0.4634 
C3-C 0.20574 0.6653 0.06786 0.4260 
D 0.045207 0.15156 0.07804 0.4472 
Standardized Skewness 
BB3-BB 5.28689 18.2113 8.6483 0.7669 
B3-B 6.5385 26.9938 76.4031 5.7297 
C3-C 1.2509 5.1111 4.71368 3.98396 
D -1.01756 1.72584 -1.80392 -2.04124 
Standardized Kurtosis 
BB3-BB 1.43266 28.8394 3.7942 6.1440 
B3-B 3.357 74.0514 547.913 -4.623 
C3-C -1.07887 3.12358 2.54633 -0.476 
D -0.043039 1.76567 1.79101 2.2822 
Fisher's least significant difference test 
(BB3-BB) to (B3-B) -0.01906 -0.09011 -0.01033 0.15868** 
(BB3-BB) to (C3-C) -0.030368 -0.1183 0.01210 0.23688** 
(BB3-BB) to (D) -0.04943 0.15894 -0.1291** -0.33097 
(B3-B) to (C3-C) -0.01131 -0.0283 0.0224 0.07820 
(B3-B) to (D) -0.03037 0.24903 -0.11879** -0.48965** 
(C3-C) to (D) -0.019057 0.27728 -0.14123** -0.56785** 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio 0.47 0.90 2.30* 7 75*** 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C Test 0.359535*** 0.392901 0.623311*** 0.295539 
Bartlett's Test 1.01809** 1.02385*** 1.36266*** 1.00494 
Levene's Test 1.81851 0.63048 0.916748 6.56105*** 
Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Average range 
BB3-BB 277.761 258.15 299.321 317.814 
B3-B 292.676 308.786 283.61 272.034 
C3-C 309.473 309.223 256.411 249.473 
D 354.5 309.3 500.1 413.3 
Test statistic 2.7846 12.7224*** 11.329*** 22.447*** 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively. 
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As seen from Table 8-15 CR is related accounting and financial, market and regulatory, 
ownership structure, financial transparency and corporate governance variables. Table 8-15 
summarise the ANOVA and other test statistics for the main four accounting and financial 
variables used as determinants of CR. From the ANOVA test, there is evidence of differences 
between the means of some of the accounting and financial variable categories items. As 
shown in the table above, the ANOVA F-Ratio was 0.47, 0.90, 2.30, and 7.75, respectively, 
for leverage, profitability, capital intensity and loss. The latter two are significant at the 
prescribed 90% and 99% levels of confidence, respectively. Thus, there are significant 
differences between the mean levels of capital intensity and the mean degrees of loss 
propensity among the different credit rated categories. Borrowing levels should have an 
impact on CR. Yet, it seems suprising that the mean average levels are not significantly 
different between the credit rating categories, even though it can be observed that as the mean 
level increases (from 0.304 to 0.323 to 0.334 to 0.353) the credit rating category is lowered. 
The more sophisticated multivariate analysis conducted later may, however, pick up these 
effects which are not strongly observed in this preliminary data analysis. 
As to differences in rating categories, the above results are confirmed for capital intensity and 
loss, as are significant by Fisher's least significant difference test at the 95% level of 
confidence, and reveal that the lowest rated group has greater loss propensity and greater 
capital intensity (fixed assets/total assets). 
Thus, a statistically significant difference in means was found between (BB3-BB) to (B3-B) 
and between (BB3-BB) to (C3-C) for loss only, while significant difference was found 
between (BB3-BB) to (D) for capital intensity only, while significant difference was found 
between (B3-B) to (D) and between (C3-C) to (D) for both capital intensity and loss. 
Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic shows statistically significant differences 
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at the 99% confidence level for profitability, capital intensity and loss with test statistics of 
12.7224, 11.329 and 22.447, respectively. The Cochran's C / Bartlett's / Levene's tests 
revealed significantly unequal variances. 
It is interesting to observe that the mean leverage increase from 30%, to 32%, to 33%, and to 
35% as the categories for credit rating are lowered from BB3-BB to B3-B to C3-C to D. This 
is as predicted. However, the mean leverage figures are not statistically different from each 
other at the prescribed levels of confidence (see Fisher tests discussed earlier). 
A normal distribution has a Skewness of zero and a kurtosis of 3 (see Campbell et al, 1997, 
pp. 16-17). However, financial data often exhibit non-normality. We observe that for PM, for 
example, the C3-C category exhibit a kurtosis of 3.12, which is normal but the B3-B and the 
BB3-BB categories have huge kurtosis of 74.05 and 28.84, respectively. 
The non-normality suggests that more reliance should be placed on the medians rather than 
the means for comparative purposes. The kruskal-wallis test reveals in this regard significant 
differences between the medians at the 99% level of confidence. 
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8.4.1.2 Market and Regulatory Category 
Table 8- 16: Results of ANOVA and other statistical analysis (Market and Regulatory 
SIZE TSQ TYF_SECT A U T _ B I G 
Average (Mean) 
BB3-BB 6.93165 1.4765 0.3363 0.40 
B3-B 7.2959 1.6345 0.4034 0.60 
C3-C 8.0132 1.7686 0.4642 0.77 
D 8.6564 3.3928 0.00 1.00 
Standard Deviation 
BB3-BB 0.421495 0.7234 0.4735 0.492 
B3-B 0.592959 0.6894 0.4914 0.491 
C3-C 0.60460 0.8561 0.5032 0.426 
D 0.12428 1.2864 0.00 0.00 
Standardized Skewness 
BB3-BB 3.45592 12.1497 4.2821 2.453 
B3-B -46.5859 9.66599 2.7508 -2.853 
C3-C -6.58504 5.02339 0.4497 -3.983 
D 0.25576 1.79024 
Standardized Kurtosis 
BB3-BB 12.6813 21.3116 -4.6852 -5.698 
B3-B 273.774 10.3957 -6.4527 -6.411 
C3-C 9.6777 6.2785 -3.1360 -0.476 
D -0.36983 1.8288 
Fisher's Least Significant DifTerence Test 
(BB3-BB) to (B3-B) 0.364277** 0.15793** -0.06716 -0.197** 
(BB3-BB) to (C3-C) 1.08156** 0.29211** -0.1280 -0.365** 
(BB3-BB) to (D) 1.72475** 1.9163** 0.3363 -0.597** 
(B3-B) to (C3-C) 0.717287** 0.13417 -0.0608 -0.168** 
(B3-B) to (D) 1.36047** 1.7584** 0.4034 -0.4 
(C3-C) to (D) 0.643186** 1.62418** 0.4643** -0.232 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio 77.87*** 13.57*** 2.44* 13.22*** 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C Test 0.399087 0.488685*** 0.352247 0.36389 
Bartlett's Test 1.06832 1.01554** 1.00089 1.00328 
Levene's Test 2.05885* 0.752554 2.43588* 3.10484** 
Kruskai-Wailis Median Test Statistic 
Average range 
BB3-BB 178.354 253.803 276.518 248.666 
B3-B 330.602 303.869 295.895 305.6 
C3-C 494.938 331.33 313.446 354.027 
D 570.8 543.4 179.5 421.0 
Test statistic 217.355*** 27.6349*** 7.2534* 37.281 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively. 
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Table 8-16 also reveals that the summarised the ANOVA test statistics for main four market 
and regulatory variables used to determinants of CR. However, the ANOVA F-ratio for this 
group is significant at the 99% of confidence for size, growth opportunity and big audit, 
while significant at the 90% of confidence for the sector type. It can be observed that there is 
is a large mean in category D for both size and Tobin's q, while the big mean in category C3-
C for sector type and category BB3- BB for audit type. 
According to Fisher's least significant difference test, there are differences between the 
means for different categories of WVB CR. A statistically significant difference is found 
between (BB3-BB) to (B3-B), and between (BB3-BB) to (C3-C), and (BB3-BB) to (D) for 
size, Tobin's q and audit type, and significant difference between (B3-B) to (C3-C) for size 
and audit type, while significant difference between (B3-B) to (D) for size and Tobin's q, and 
finally a significant difference between (C3-C) to (D) for size, Tobin's q and sector type. 
At the 99% level of confidence there are significant differences in the standard deviations for 
Tobin's q and audit type for the different credit rating categories using Cochran's C test 
(Toben's q), Bartlett's test (Toben's q) and Levene's test (audit type). At the 90% level of 
confidence there are also significant differences in the standard deviations for size and sector 
using Levene's test for each. 
The ANOVA test for means makes an implicit assumption that the standard deviations are 
equal for each category. This assumption is therefore seriously challenged for Tobin's q and 
audit. Hence, more reliance can be placed on the inference that mean size differences are 
significant. Basically, the size factor would seem to be especially important in credit rating. 
Furthermore, the larger firms tend to have lower ratings. 
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According to the Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic this shows statistically significant 
differences at the 99% confidence level for size and Tobin's q with a test Statistic of 217.355, 
27.6349 respectively, and at 90% confidence level for sector type with a test Statistic of 
7.2534. 
It can be observed, that the mean Tobin's q, sector type and audit type increase from (1.477, 
to 1.635, and to 1.769) for Tobin's q, and (0.336, to 0.403, and to 0.464) for sector type, and 
(0.40, to 0.60, and to 0.77) for audit type, as the categories for CR are lowered from BB3-BB 
to B3-B to C3-C. These results are interenting because of the implied consistent relationships 
between credit rating categories and the hypothesized factors. 
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8.4.1.3 Ownership Structure Category 
Table 8- 17: Results of ANOVA and other statistical analysis (Ownership Structure 
BLOCK_ 
OWN 
INST_ 
OWN 
INS1D_ 
OWN 
GOV-
OWN 
FAMILV_ 
OWN 
FOREN_ 
OWN 
Average (Mean) 
BB3-BB 0.5596 0.30693 0.037588 0.0236 0.1133 0.0510 
B3-B 0.5595 0.3204 0.05140 0.00617 0.1405 0.1010 
C3-C 0.5889 0.3892 0.04621 0.03030 0.1124 0.1586 
D 0.8616 0.8882 0.00 0.2432 0.0 0.5188 
Standard Deviation 
BB3-BB 0.2421 0.28092 0.08468 0.10293 0.16439 0.15179 
B3-B 0.2154 0.25459 0.1159 0.03295 0.1695 0.194369 
C3-C 0.2217 0.25081 0.14437 0.08593 0.1684 0.191843 
D 0.0491 0.060697 0.0 0.05386 0.0 0.100964 
Standardized Skewness 
BB3-BB -1.3369 5.24437 21.978 36.9501 12.0051 24.047 
B3-B -1.2877 4.9797 29.173 54.2418 9.6551 17.9169 
C3-C -0.1794 1.36177 17.031 9.4736 6.8823 3.5406 
D 0.3396 -1.68599 -2.0254 -0.2282 
Standardized Kurtosis 
BB3-BB -2.1526 -0.575166 45.761 132.585 11.832 50.624 
B3-B -2.4138 -0.93865 73.656 249.161 5.309 23.956 
C3-C -1.4556 -0.960029 54.493 14.066 7.911 0.1173 
D 0.0787 1.51848 2.253 -0.7751 
Fisher's Least Significant Difference Test 
(BB3-BB) to (B3-B) 0.0000945 -0.013462 -0.01382 0.01745** -0.0272 -0.050075** 
(BB3-BB) to (C3-C) -0.0294 -0.08227** -0.00863 -0.00668 0.00087 -0.10762** 
(BB3-BB) to (D) -0.30205** -0.58128** 0.0376 -0.2196** 0.1133 -0.46783** 
(B3-B) to (C3-C) -0.02949 -0.06881 0.0052 -0.02413** 0.02808 -0.05754** 
(B3-B) to (D) -0.30214** -0.56781** 0.05140 -0.2370** 0.14051 -0.41775** 
(C3-C) to (D) -0.2727** -0.4990** 0.0462 -0.2129** 0.1124 -0.36021** 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Rado 3.18** 9.06*** 0.99 18.98*** 2.24* 16.42*** 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C Test 0.37437*** 0.375212*** 0.502796 0.482303** 
* 
0.341623 0.3504*** 
Bartlett's Test 1.0211*** 1.01903** 1.06756 1.96116*** 1.00042 1.03104*** 
Levene's Test 3.084414** 2.29454* 0.948806 3.24742** 2.03279* 5.7996*** 
Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Average range 
BB3-BB 286.416 271.967 278.199 289.445 270.281 242.681 
B3-B 284.134 288.762 307.076 279.5 308.229 303.498 
C3-C 304.223 335.563 254.83 311.964 283.938 377.857 
D 517.5 551.2 111.5 562.7 76.5 546.5 
Test statistic 10.1618** 19.1148*** 13.130*** 48.756 15.1611*** 59.031*** 
Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively. 
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According to the Table 8-17 there is evidence of significant differences between ownership 
structure groups. The ANOVA F-Ratio was 9.06, 18.98 and 16.42 for institution, 
governmental and foreign ownership respectively significant at the 99% of confidence level, 
while A N O V A F-Ratio was 3.18 for block ownership significant at the 95% of confidence 
level, while ANOVA F-Ratio was 2.24 for family ownership significant at the 90% of 
confidence level, which infer that there are significant alterences between the mean levels of 
capital intensity and the mean degrees of loss prosperity amongal the different credit rated 
categories 
However, the governmental and foreign ownership between categories (BB3-BB) to (B3-B) 
and (B3-B) to (C3-C) are significantly different as revealed by Fisher's least significant 
difference test, while the institution and foreign ownership are significantly different as 
revealed by Fisher's least significant difference test between category (BB3-BB) to (C3-C), 
and finally all variables except insider ownership are significantly different as revealed by 
Fisher's least significant difference test between (BB3-BB) to (D), (B3-B) to (D) and (C3-C) 
to (D) categories. 
Besides, the ownership structure group, namely, institution, governmental and foreign 
ownership are significantly as revealed by Fisher's least significant difference test. The 
Cochran's C / Barltett's / Levene's tests revealed unequal variances. 
There is also significant at the 99% level of confidence for all variables except insiders 
ownership to both Cochran's C and Bartlett's Test respectively except institution ownership is 
significant at 95% with Bartlett's Test, while variables with Levene's Test are significant at 
the 99% level of confidence for foreign ownership, while block and governmental at 95%, 
and institution and family ownership at 90% level of confidence. 
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Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic shows statistically significant differences 
at the 99% confidence level for all ownership variables except block at the 95%with a test 
Statistic of 10.1618, 19.1148, 13.130, 15.1611 and 59.031 respectively except governmental 
is 48.756 and insignificant. 
The results for ownership structure so far reveal a few surprises (re: foreign and institutional 
ownership) but it is clear that there are logical negative relationship between CR and 
blockholder ownership and governmental ownership, respectively, which are supported in the 
review of the literature (see chapter four) . 
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8.4.1.4 Financial Transparency and Disclosure Category 
Table 8- 18: Results of ANOVA and other statistical analysis (Financial Transparency 
WCAQ TIMELINESS 
Average (Mean) 
BB3-BB -0.1718 -0.4081 
B3-B -0.1460 -0.4371 
C3-C -0.1433 -0.3679 
D -0.1646 -1.231 
Standard deviation 
BB3-BB 0.2252 0.7493 
B3-B 0.16067 0.6042 
C3-C 0.113605 0.4015 
D 0.076568 1.551 
Standardized Skewness 
BB3-BB -16.172 -33.287 
B3-B -15.2849 -20.65 
C3-C -4.24957 -4.5395 
D -1.77402 -0.62656 
Standardized Kurtosis 
BB3-BB 28.9429 117.104 
B3-B 20.0019 37.607 
C3-C 4.00263 2.717 
D 1.85774 -1.2144 
Fisher's Least Significant DifTerence Test 
(BB3-BB) to (B3-B) -0.02574 0.0290 
(BB3-BB) to (C3-C) -0.02850 -0.0401 
(BB3-BB) to (D) -0.00715 -0.8229 
(B3-B) to (C3-C) -0.00276 -0.0691 
(B3-B) to (D) 0.01858 0.7939** 
(C3-C) to (D) 0.02135 0.8631** 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio 0.92 2.70** 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C Test 0.532097*** 0.688645*** 
Bartlett's Test 1.09786 1.07875 
Levene's Test 2.86955** 3.34657** 
Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Average range 
BB3-BB 295.091 297.606 
B3-B 291.064 282.64 
C3-C 262.393 289.545 
D 192.0 262.8 
test statistic 3.4654 1.1485 
denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively. Note: * ** *** 
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There is evidence of significant differences between financial transparency variables group. 
As shown in table above, the ANOVA F-Ratio is 0.92 which is very insignificant, and 2.70 
which is significant at 95%, respectively, for WCAQ and TIMELINESS. The latter two are 
significant at the prescribed at the (90% level of confidence), which infer that there are 
significant alterences between the mean levels of WCAQ and the mean degrees o f 
TIMELfNESS prosperity amongal the different credit rated categories. 
Besides, the financial transparency group, namely, TIMELfNESS is significantly as revealed 
by Fisher's least significant difference test. The Cochran's C / Barltett's / Levene's tests 
revealed unequal variances. There is also a reduction in the standard deviation of WCAQ and 
TIMELINESS in category C3-C, and increased in category BB3-BB, which is significant at 
the 99% level of confidence for both WCAQ and TIMELINESS to Cochran's C, while 
significant at the at 95% level of confidence for group to Levene's Test. Consequently, 
difference test between each group, and a statistically significant difference is found between 
(B3-B) to (D) and between (C3-C) to (D) for group. Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis Median 
Test Statistic shows statistically insignificant differences for this group. 
As predicted, it is worthy of observation that the mean timeliness increases fi-om - 41%, to -
44% to - 37%) as the categories for credit rating are lowered fi-om BB3-BB to B3-B to C3-C, 
and fi-om -17% to -15%> to -14% for WCAQ for same categories. However, the mean 
leverage figures are not statistically difference from each other of the prescribed levels of 
confidence. We observe that for timeliness the C3-C category exhibit a kurtosis of 2.717, 
which is normal but the all categories have huge kurtosis. The non-normality suggests that 
more reliance should be placed the median rather than the mean for comparative purposes. 
249 
8.4.1.5 Corporate Governance Category 
Table 8- 19: Results of ANOVA and other statistical analysis (Corporate Governance 
B R D J N D R_D BRD_ 
E X P E R T 
BRD_STOCK BRD_SIZE 
Average (Mean) 
BB3-BB 0.3399 0.19027 0.4747 0.8794 7.6770 
B3-B 0.3246 0.2586 0.5443 0.8748 8.3310 
C3-C 0.2946 0.25 0.5728 0.7473 9.6607 
D 0.2018 0.6 0.4594 0.7684 11 
Standard Deviation 
BB3-BB 0.16799 0.3934 0.2205 0.2025 2.0628 
B3-B 0.145398 0.4386 0.2325 0.5325 2.2447 
C3-C 0.126179 0.4369 0.2250 0.2728 2.5246 
D 0.107199 0.5477 0.0266 0.3312 2.9155 
Standardized Skewness 
BB3-BB 2.8836 9.75089 2.1171 -7.1350 1.1048 
B3-B 4.1665 7.70472 1.9427 85.1349 0.7738 
C3-C 0.9076 3.6255 -0.4801 -3.4433 -1.8758 
D 0.1408 -0.5555 0.7143 -0.8855 -0.5526 
Standardized Kurtosis 
BB3-BB 1.8646 1.62285 -1.4671 20.0179 -1.8429 
B3-B 2.24524 -2.70168 -0.01573 656.338 0.7286 
C3-C 2.01207 -0.93936 -0.8757 0.6273 0.4176 
D -0.9557 -1.52145 0.5032 -0.5775 -0.7297 
Fisher's Least Significant Difference Test 
(BB3-BB) to (B3-B) 0.01534 -0.0684 -0.0696** 0.00467 0.6540** 
(BB3-BB) to (C3-C) 0.05432** -0.0597 -0.9819** 0.1322** 1.9837** 
(BB3-BB) to (D) 0.1381** -0.4097** 0.01525 0.1110 -3.3230** 
(B3-B) to (C3-C) 0.02998 0.0086 -0.02859 0.12752** 1.3297** 
(B3-B) to (D) 0.12281 -0.3414 0.084842 0.1064 -2.6698** 
(C3-C) to (D) 0.09283 -0.35 0.1134 -0.02115 -1.3393 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio 2.52* 2.42* 5.27*** 1.79 15.36*** 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C Test 0.3676*** 0.35797** 
* 
0.351051*** 0.557402*** 0.351709*** 
Bartlett's Test 1.0177** 1.00664 1.02461*** 1.4406*** 1.00888 
Levene's Test 3.45031** 1.41841 2.47017* 1.22267 0.575436 
Kruskai-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Average range 
BB3-BB 302.381 276.392 255.973 306.097 250.33 
B3-B 286.453 296.112 307.816 289.234 296.693 
C3-C 260.875 293.625 327.902 219.902 391.188 
D 146.9 394.6 254.8 276.5 446.2 
Test statistic 6.7799* 7.1972* 15.8488*** 13.659*** 38.9974 
denote significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of confidence, respectively 
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Note: * ** *** 
Table 8-19 summarised the ANOVA test statistics for main five corporate governance 
variables used to determinants o f CR. There is evidence of significant differences between 
corporate governance variables groups. As shown in table above, the ANOVA F-Ratio was 
2.562, 2.42, 5.27, 1.79 and 15.36 respectively for board independence, role duality, board 
expertise, board stock and board size. The board expertise and board size are significant at 
the 99% level of confidence, while board independence, role duality are significant at the 
90% level of confidence. 
Besides, the accounting and financial groups, namely, capital intensity and loss are 
significantly as revealed by Fisher's least significant difference test. The Cochran's C / 
Barltett's / Levene's tests revealed unequal variances. There is significant at the 99% levels 
of confidence for all corporate governance to Cochran's C Test, while at the 99% level of 
confidence for board expertise and board stock to Bartlett's Test and at 95% for board 
independent, while at the 95% level of confidence to Levene's Test for board independent but 
the board expertise at the 90% level of confidence. 
Consequently, difference test between each group, and a statistically significant difference is 
found between (BB3-BB) to (B3-B) for board expert and board size, and significant 
difference between (BB3-BB) to (C3-C) for board independence, board expertise, board 
stock and board size, while significant difference is found between (BB3-BB) to (D) for 
board independent, role duality and board size, while significant difference is found between 
(B3-B) to (D) for board stock and board size, and finally significant difference between (B3-
B) to (D) for board size. Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Stadstic shows 
statistically significant differences at the 99% confidence level for board expert and board 
stock with a test Statistic of 15.8488 and 13.659 respectively, while significant differences at 
the 90% confidence level for independent and role duality with a test Statistic of 6.7799 and 
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7.1972 respectively. It is interesting to observe that the mean board size increase from 7.68%, 
to 8.33% and to 9.66% as the categories for credit rating is lowered from BB3-BB to B3-B to 
C3-C. This is as predicted. However, the mean board size figures are not statistically 
difference from each other of the prescribed levels of confidence. Distribution a skeurence 
and a kurtosis of the corporate governance data offer exhibit non-normality. We observe that 
for board independent, for example, the BB3-BB an C3-C categories exhibit a kurtosis of 
2.884 and 0.908 which is normal but the B3-B category have huge kurtosis of 4.167. The 
non-normality suggests that more reliance should be placed the median rather than the mean 
for comparative purposes. The kurskal-wallins test reveals in this regards significant 
differences between the medians at the 99% level o f confidence. 
8.5 Advanced Multivariate Regression Analysis 
For both binary logistic regression and ordinal logit regression analysis, five models wi l l be 
tested to enable an analysis to be undertaken of the impact of control variables, ownership 
structure, fmancial transparency and disclosure, corporate governance, and all variables 
combined. 
8.5.1 Logistic Regression (LR) 
8.5.1.1 Result of the Logistic Regression ( L R ) 
A basic logistic regression utilizes a binary split, which here reflects a higher or lower credit 
rating. The dependent variable is the probability of a higher rating as a proportion of the 
probability of a lower rating. This is a useful categorization, which wil l later be extended to 
incorporate more than two categories. In this basic logistic regression, I investigate the 
significance of variables in their contribution to the respective higher or lower rating 
categories. Table 8-20 shows the results of this model. 
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Table 8- 20: Logistic Regression (LR) Model 1 for Control Variables 
variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
L E V -2.021*** 15.884 
S I Z E 3.662*** 125.775 
TSQ 0.799*** 25.329 
It is worth being reminded of the fact that there are several variables within each of the four 
categories which would be too many to include in one overall model without further analysis. 
The main focus is upon three categories, namely, ownership structure, fmancial transparency 
including disclosure, and corporate governance. Control variables are thus chosen from the 
remaining two categories, namely, accounting and financial aspects and market and 
regulatory factors. The control variables are leverage, firm size and Tobin's q. Table 8-20 
confirms that these variables are highly significant (at the 99% level o f confidence). Having 
dealt with the control variables for presentational purposes, the logistic regressions that 
follow (Models 2, 3, 4 and 5) only record the variables within each category even though the 
control variables were also included in the models and were significant in each case at the 
99% level of confidence. 
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8.5.1.1.1 The results of the LR model 2 (Ownership Structure Category) 
Table 8- 21: logistic regression model for ownership structure variables 
Variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
B L O C K _ O W N 0.715 1.082 
INST_OWN -0.839 1.747 
INSID_OWN -0.220 0.048 
G O V _ O W N -13.124*** 12.937 
F A M L _ O W N 1.704** 4.658 
F O R E N _ O W N 2.065*** 8.223 
Chi-square (Model) 289.153*** 
-2Log likelihood 510.598 
R-square 39.4 
Constant -30.279 
The ownership category reveals an adjusted R-square of 39.4%. Three from six variables 
have been revealed to have a significant association with CR, namely, governmental, family 
and foreign ownership. The results show block holder, institution and insiders ownerships 
have insignificant associations with CR. Governmental ownership is significantly negatively 
associated with CR at the 1% level. Foreign ownership indicates a positive relationship to CR 
at the level of 1%>, while family ownership is associated is positively and significantly with 
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CR at the 5% level. These three significant results confirm the correct signs as previously 
hypothesized. 
8.5.1.1.2 The results of the LR model 3 (Financial Transparency and Disclosure 
Category) 
Table 8-22: logistic regression model for financial transparency and disclosure variables 
Variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
W C A Q 0.297 0.297 
T I M E L I N E S S 1.285 0.058 
Chi-square (Model) 253.858*** 
-2Log likelihood 545.893 
R-square 35.6 
Constant -26.820 
Financial transparency category refer to the R-square is 35, 6% and insignificant associated 
with CR, but it needs to be mentioned that the control variables were significant and included 
in the model. 
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8.5.1.1.3 The results of the LR model 4 (Corporate Governance Category) 
Table 8- 23: logistic model for corporate governance variables 
Variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
B R D J N D -0.536 0.598 
R_D 0.119 0.219 
B R D _ E X P E R T 0.902** 3.585 
B R D _ S T O C K -0.917** 3.239 
B R D _ S I Z E 0.020 0.141 
Chi-square (Model) 260.704*** 
-2Log likelihood 539.047 
R-square 36.4 
Constant -25.212 
Regarding to the corporate governance dimension, CR is associated positively with board 
expertise at the 5% level of significance, while board stock negatively associated with CR at 
the 5% level o f significance. With regard to the previous models, it can be noticed that the 
ownership model had the highest R2, which underlines the power of ownership structures 
variables in explaining CR. 
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8.5.1.1.4 The results of the full LR model 5 (All Categories Variables) 
Table 8- 24; Full Logistic Regression Model for all Categories Variables 
variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
Accounting and Financial Variables 
L E V -1 994*** 10.883 
PM 0.339** 4.045 
CAP I N T E N 1.994 1.503 
L O S S -1112*** 11.473 
Market and Regulatory Variables 
S I Z E 3.682*** 90.209 
TSO 0.648*** 15.408 
T Y P S E C T 0.330 1.053 
AUD B I G 0.301 1.531 
Ownership Structure Variables 
B L O C K OWN 0.724 0.903 
INST OWN -1.303* 3.382 
INSID OWN -0.638 0.367 
G O V OWN -12.506*** 0.560 
F A M L OWN 1.658** 4.078 
F O R E N OWN 2.225*** 9.081 
W C A Q 0.560 0.650 
T I M E L I N E S S 1.452 6.344 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BRD IND -0.746 0.789 
R D 0.238 0.603 
BRD E X P E R T 0.906* 2.673 
BRD S T O C K -1.579*** 6.919 
BRD S I Z E 0.058 0.978 
Constant -26.729 
Chi-square (Model) 318.226*** 
-2 Log Likelihood 481.526 
R-square 42.4 
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Table 8- 25: Classification* Logistic Regression Model for all Categories Variables 
Observed 
Predicted 
LR4 
Percentage Correct 0 1 
Step 1 LR4 0 241 43 84.9 
1 50 243 82.9 
Overall Percentage 83.9 
Note: *. The cut value is .500 
As table 8-24 indicates the adjusted R-square is 42.4% for the ful l logistic model, the results 
of the basic logistic model demonstrate that each independent group has at least two 
significant variables in relation to the CR. Company size indicates positive significance at the 
99%, confidence level. Similarly, leverage is highly significant (at 99%) confidence level and 
negative, as expected. Growth opportunity (Tobin's q) is highly significant (at 99%) 
confidence level and positive, again as expected. Loss and leverage show negative 
significance at the 99% confidence level of significance with CR, which is supported by 
expectations. Profitability is significant and positively associated with CR (at 5% 
significance). Concerning the ownership structure category, institution and governmental 
ownership are negatively associated with CR at a level of 10% and 1% significance, 
respectively, while family and foreign ownership are related positively to CR at the 5% and 
1% level, respectively. In respect of the corporate governance category, CR is associated 
positively with board expertise at the 10% level of significance, while CR is associated 
negatively with board stock at the 1% level of significance. 
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The classification table reveals an overall correct classification rate of (241+243)/ 
(241+43+50+243) = 83.9%,. Of those predicted to be of lower rating 241/ (241+43) = 84.9%> 
were correctly classified. 
Similarly, the model is virtually equally accurate at predicating higher credit, with a correct 
classification rate of 243/ (50+243) = 82.9%. For the purpose of the classification matrix a 
cutoff rate of 50% is used. This means that where a firms profile has a predicted higher 
category greater than 50% probability it is treated as being allocated to category 1, whilst an 
implied probability of less than 50% results in an allocation to category 0 for predictive 
purposes. There are two types of error: prediction higher rating when it is of lower rating, and 
predicting lower rating when it is actually of higher rating. There errors are 100% - 84.9% = 
15.1% and 100% - 82.9% = 17.1%, respectively, which are relatively low error rates. 
However, the prime purpose of the modelling is to assess the relevance of ownership, 
transparency and governance to f irm CR. 
8.5.2 Ordinal Logit Regression (OLR) 
8.5.2.1 The results of the Ordered Logit Regression ( O L R ) 
Model 1 in Table 8-26 represents the control variables models which do not relate to 
ownership structure, fmancial transparency and disclosure, and corporate governance, but 
which should have an impact on credit rating and thus need to be accommodated. Indeed the 
Wald statistics from Model 1 indicate very significant coefficients for each control variables, 
namely, leverage, size and Tobin's q. Capital intensity is not included as a control variable 
because it is not significant. 
Models 2, 3 and 4 include ownership, financial transparency and corporate governance 
variables, respectively. The control variables have the same signs as their benchmark model. 
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They were indicated in the subsequent Models 2, 3, and 4 but excluded from the tables which 
summarise the results. Model 5 looks at the impact, of all the groups' variables together, on 
the credit rating o f the firm. 
Table 8-27, 8-28, 8-29, and 8-30 present the results from an ordered logit regression for the 
each groups variables sample firms. The coefficients obtained from ordered logit regressions 
are interpreted as follows: a positive (negative) sign means that the dependent variable wi l l 
move into a higher (lower) category when there is a one unit increase in the independent 
variable controlling for the other variables in the model. For models 2, 3, 4 and 5, the 
adjusted R-square are 45.9%, 42.8% 43.3% and 48%, respectively. A l l these adjusted R-
squares are reasonably acceptable. 
Table 8- 26: Ordered Logit Model 1 for Control Variables 
variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
L E V -1 347*** 9.951 
S I Z E 3.626*** 203.650 
TSQ 0.644*** 25.621 
According to all models (2, 3, 4 and 5) the control variables are significantly associated with 
CR at the 1% level of significance. For presentational purposes, the control variables are 
excluded from the associated tables for each category, namely, ownership structure, financial 
transparency including disclosure, and corporate governance. The use of these control 
variables follows the same strategy as earlier for the basic logistic models. 
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8.5.2.1.1 The results of the OLR model 2 (ownership structure category) 
Table 8- 27: Ordered Logit Model for Ownership Variables 
Variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
B L O C K _ O W N 0.747 1.641 
INST_OWN -1.082** 4.095 
INSID_OWN 2.031** 4.979 
G O V OWN -0.900 0.393 
F A M L _ O W N 1.234* 3.439 
F O R E N _ O W N 1.986*** 12.328 
Chi-square (Model) 354.406*** 
-2Log likelihood 790.334*** 
R-square 45.9 
Note: control variables not shown. 
The second model for the ownership structure category reveals an adjusted R-square of 
45.9%. Many variables have been found to explain significantly the variability in CR in each 
ownership category; indeed four variables have been revealed to have a significant 
association with CR. The results show block holder and goverrmiental ownerships have 
insignificant associations with CR. Institution ownership is significantly negatively 
associated with CR at the 5% level. Insider ownership indicates a positive relationship to CR 
at the level 5%, while family ownership is associated is positively and significantly with CR 
at the 10% level. Further, foreign ownership is positively associated, at the 1% level o f 
significance with CR. 
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8.5.2.1.2 The Results of the OLR Model 3 (Financial Transparency and 
Disclosure Category) 
Table 8- 28: Ordered Logit Model for Financial Transparency and Disclosure Variables 
Variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
W C A Q 0.516 0.983 
T I M E L I N E S S -0.089 0.367 
Chi-square (Model) 321.874*** 
-2Log likelihood 822.566*** 
R-square 42.8 
Note: control variables not shown. 
Model 3, dealing with financial transparency, reveals that both working capital accruals and 
timeliness are associated insignificantly with CR. Nevertheless, the Cox and Snell R-square is 
42, 8%), but it needs to be mentioned that the control variables are significant and included in 
the model. 
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8.5.2.1.3 The Results of the OLR model 4 (Corporate Governance Category) 
Table 8- 29: Ordered Logit Model for Corporate Governance variables 
Variables Estimated Coefficient Wald 
B R D J N D -0.871 . 2.017 
R_D 0.098 0.198 
B R D _ E X P E R T 0.361 0.758 
B R D _ S T O C K -0.375 0.818 
B R D _ S I Z E 0.084* 3.542 
Chi-square (Model) 326.906*** 
-2Log likelihood 817.834*** 
R-square 43.3 
Note: control variables not shown. 
In respect to model 4, the corporate governance dimension, CR is associated positively with 
only board size at the 10% level of significance. With regard to the previous models, it can be 
noticed that the ownership model had the highest R^, which underlines the power of 
ownership structures variables in explaining CR. 
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8.5.2.1.4 The Results of the Full OLR Model 5 (All Categories' Variables) 
Table 8- 30: Full Ordered Logit Model for all Categories Variables 
variables 
Estimated Coefficient 
Wald 
Control Varia l)les 
L E V -1.665*** 12.606 
S I Z E 3.657*** 146.107 
TSQ 0.559*** 17.712 
Firm Characteristics Variables 
PM 0.358** 5.771 
C A P J N T E N 1.124 0.679 
T Y P _ S E C T 0.088 0.117 
A U D _ B I G 0.052 0.062 
L O S S -0.441* 2.832 
Ownership Structure Variables 
B L O C K _ O W N 0.872 1.992 
INST_OWN -1.5290*** 7.071 
INSID_OWN 2.342** 5.776 
G O V _ O W N 0.003 .000 
F A M L _ O W N 0.938 1.862 
F O R E N _ O W N 2.403*** 14.294 
Financial Transparency Variables 
W C A Q 0.582 1.098 
T I M E L I N E S S -0.025 0.028 
Corporate Governance Variables 
B R D J N D -1.238* 3.422 
R_D -0.021 0.008 
B R D _ E X P E R T 0.613 1.876 
B R D _ S T O C K -0.693 2.290 
B R D _ S I Z E 0.123*** 6.597 
Cbi-square (Model) 377.132*** 
-2Log likelihood 767.607*** 
R-square 48.00 
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As indicated from Table 8.30 the adjusted R-square is 48% for the ful l logit model and higher 
than the 42% of the previous binary model logistic. According to ful l logit model, all control 
variables have been revealed to have a significant association with CR at the 1% level. There 
are many variables which have been found to explain significantly the variability in CR and 
each category. According to the f irm characteristic variables, two variables have been 
revealed to have a significant association with CR. Profitability is the only variable that is 
associated with the CR positively and significantly at the 5% level with the CR, while loss 
has a significant negative relationship with CR at the 10% level of significance. 
Regarding the f irm characteristic category, which encapsulates firm characteristics not 
already accommodated by control variables, the findings provide evidence for the influence 
of these variables on CR. Two variables significant associated with CR (profit margin and 
loss propensity). Firm size and growth opportunity (Tobin's q) are positively associated with 
CR at a significance level of 1%. The other control variable (leverage) is highly significant 
(at 1%), but negative as expected and attract the correct signs, namely positive and negative. 
With respect to the ownership structure category, three variables out of six are significantly 
associated with CR namely, institution (at 1%), insider (at 5%) and foreign ownership (at 
1%), while three variable are insignificantly associated with CR, namely, blockholders, 
govenmiental and family ownership. Insider and foreign ownership have a positive impact on 
the CR, whilst institutional ownership has a negative effect. Institutional ownership bears a 
negative significant relationship with CR at the 1 % level. However, insider ownership reveals 
a positive relationship with CR at the 5% level. In addition, foreign ownership is related 
positively to CR at the 1 % level of significance. 
According to the financial transparency category, all financial transparency related variables 
are associated insignificantly with CR namely, working capital accruals and timeliness. 
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Regarding the corporate governance category, only two variables are associated with CR, 
namely board independence and the board size. While the board independence is negatively 
associated with CR at the level of 10% significance, board size is positively related to CR at 
the 1% level. 
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8.5.3 Discussion of the results of L R and O L R models for C R 
The results of the advanced muhivariate regression analyses for both the logit and logistic 
analysis models of CR in association with their different corporate governance categories 
explanatory variables wi l l be discussed in this section. Each models of this analysis. Next 
point presents the second model, namely ownership structure model for LR, and OLR. 
8.5.3.1 Discussion of the Results of L R , and O L R (Model 2): Ownership Structure 
Category 
Table 8- 31: Model 2 (Ownership structure category) 
Variables Advanced Multivariate Regression analysis 
L R O L R 
B L O C K _ O W N 
INSTIT_OWN *^*^  
INSID_OWN ** 
G O V _ O W N 
FAM_OWN ** * 
F O R E N _ O W N *** 
R-square 39.4 45.9 
This point tests the governance practices related to ownership variables in the study and the 
CR. Six ownership variables are used to investigate their relationship with the CR. The 
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likelihood ratio tests for LR and OLR analysis for model 2 yield significant results, which 
indicates that key ownership variables add value to the benchmark case, and R-square are 
39.4, and 45.9, respectively. Only one variable namely, blockholders has insignificant 
association with CR regarding to LR, and OLR models, while institution and insider 
ownership have insignificant association with CR regarding to the OLR model, only 
governmental ownership has insignificant with CR regarding to LR. 
Regarding institutional ownership, we find negative significant effect on the CR at the 95% 
confidence level for OLR. Jordanian listed companies with low percentage of institutional 
ownership led to a higher CR. From a creditor's point of view an increase in institutional 
investors can be undesirable as institutional investors tend to push shareholder-oriented 
causes with management. This negative association can be attributed to agency theory. A low 
proportion of institutional investor ownership may be representative of a small number of 
members on the companies' board of directors. That small number of institutional investor 
representatives may have limited opportunity to obtain their required information about the 
future cash flows to the firm. Therefore, Jordanian listed companies with a low percentage of 
institutional investor ownership tend to attain a lower CR. Therefore, firms are already a 
heavy treated as a threat to creditor interests. 
OLR analysis indicates that insider ownership has a positive significant effect on CR at the 
95% of confidence. It is quite surprising to see that an increase in insider ownership wi l l push 
a firm into a higher credit rating category. This is in contrast to what shareholders expect. 
However, we are looking at this fi-om a creditor's point of view. Such a finding implies that 
Jordanian listed companies with a high proportion of insider ownership improve their chances 
of attaining a higher CR. The Jordanian firms prefer to maintain good relations with all stake-
holders, especially creditors of the fuin . Firm management may prefer to raise further capital 
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using debt instead o f diluting the existing ownership structure. According to stewardship 
theory, management of the Jordanian listed companies with a large insider ownership 
structure monitor the interests of the shareholders due to a meeting o f interests between them. 
Agency theory would suggest that managers within the public sector may be less efficient and 
create greater agency costs, so that greater governmental ownership would tend to be 
associated with a lower credit rating. This is confumed by the LR analysis which indicates 
that governmental ownership is negatively significant at the 99% level of confidence. 
Increases in govenunental shareholders are generally against creditor interests. Regarding the 
family ownership, I find a positive significant effect on CR at a level o f 95% confidence, for 
LR, while family ownership has a positive significant effect on CR at the 90% level o f 
confidence for OLR. This implies that Jordanian listed companies with family ownership are 
more likely to attaining a higher CR. This result can be explained by stakeholder theory. 
Stakeholders of the Jordanian listed companies that have family ownership may expect 
greater cash flows from these companies due to the good financial position in these 
companies, and a higher CR to the satisfaction of stakeholders. In general, family owners try 
to maintain good relations with all stake-holders especially creditors of the firm. 
According to foreign ownership, I fmd a strong positively significant effect on CR at the 99% 
level of confidence for LR, and OLR, which reveals that Jordanian listed companies with 
foreign ownership increase their chances of attaining a higher CR. Such a result can be 
justified by legitimacy theory. Jordanian listed companies with foreign ownership may want 
to legitimize themselves to present their good position as holding foreign ownership which 
represents a good sign for the market. As investors like to allocate more in companies that 
have a high foreign ownership, Jordanian listed companies tend to attain a higher CR through 
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their response to their investors. Consequently, increased foreign ownership has led to an 
increased push for firms to attain a higher CR. 
8.5.3.2 Discussion of the results of L R , and O L R (Model 3): Financial transparency and 
disclosure category 
Table 8- 32: Model 3 (Financial Transparency and Disclosure Category) 
Variables Advanced Multivariate Regression Analysis 
L R O L R 
W C A Q 
T I M E L E N I S S 
R-square 35.6 42.8 
This part deals with the governance practices related to financial transparency and its impact 
on credit ratings o f the firm. The results relating to this category of variables are presented in 
Model 3 of Tables for LR and, OLR. The R-square for Model 3 are 35.6, and 42.8 
respectively. However, the individual indices show the likelihood ratio test reveals that for 
the sample firms the financial transparency and disclosure variables do not add value to the 
credit ratings of the firm. This means that the financial transparency of fmns taken in 
isolation on this real index is of no interest to the creditors of the firm. 
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8.5.3.3 Discussion of the results of L R , and O L R (Model 4): Corporate governance 
category 
Table 8- 33: Model 4 (Corporate Governance Category) 
Variables Advanced Multivariate Regression Analysis 
L R O L R 
B R D J N D 
R_D 
B R D _ E X P ** 
B R D _ S T O C K *^*^  
B R D _ S I Z E 
R-square 36.4 43.3 
Under LR board expertise is positively significant at the 95% level of confidence and thus 
beneficially impact upon CR. However, at the same confidence level board stock impacts 
negatively, which is counter-intuitive. Five variables are used to examine the relationship 
between corporate governance and the CR. Board size variable has a significantly positive 
effect on CR at a level of 10% significance level for OLR. This implies that Jordanian listed 
companies with a larger number of boards of directors' members attain a higher CR. This 
finding may attribute to the management disciplining hypothesis which assumes that 
increasing the level of CR mitigates the conflict that may occur between the management and 
the shareholders. Therefore, Jordanian listed companies with a larger board o f directors' 
members may tend to attain a higher CR to reduce the agency costs that can arise from the 
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information asymmetry between management and shareholders. Board independence and role 
duality are not significant at the prescribed levels perhaps other corporate governance factors 
are more impact in the Jordanian environment. 
For LR, board stock is negatively significantly associated with CR at the 95% level o f 
confidence; such a finding implies that Jordanian listed companies with a lower proportion of 
board stock increase the level of their CR. Contrary to agency stewardship theory, 
management of the Jordanian listed companies with a larger board stock do not necessarily 
monitor the interests of the shareholders better despite the meeting of interests between them. 
8.5.4 Discussion of the Results of Full Analysis Models for L R and O L R for C R 
The results of different advanced multivariate regression models, including binary logistic 
and ordinal logit analyses for CR, in association with their explanatory variables, wi l l be 
discussed in this section. The R-square for models are 42.4, and 48, respectively for LR and 
OLR. Each group of variables w i l l be examined to determine the influence of the explanatory 
variables on the CR as a dependent variable. Table 8.34 summarises the results of these 
associations. The next sub-section presents the first explanatory variables' category. 
8.5.4.1 Accounting and Financial Category 
Four accounting and financial variables are used to investigate their relationship with the CR. 
The findings of these relationships for all models analysed are summarised in Table 8.34. 
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Table 8- 34: Full Analysis Results of Accounting and Financial Category Variables 
Variables L E V PM C A P J N T E N L O S S 
Bivariate Analysis 
Fisher's Test 
(BB3-BB)-(B3-B) 
(BB3-BB)-(C3-C) ** 
(BB3-BB)-(D) (**) 
(B3-B)-(C3-C) 
(B3-B)-(D) ^**^ ^**^ 
(C3-C)-(D) (**) 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio * *** 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C Test *** *** 
Bartlett's Test ** *** 
Levene's Test *** 
Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Test Statistic *** *** 
Advanced Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Logistic Model ** 
Logit Model ** (*) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence, respectively. 
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Consistent with the results of the bivariate ful l model analyses, the results reveal that the 
variance of leverage differs between CR categories under the Cochran C test at the 99% level 
o f confidence, and at the 95% level of confidence with Bartlett's test, while loss propensity 
only bears different variance under the Levene's test at the 99% level of confidence. 
However, only loss as to mean values, for F is significant Fisher's test for (BB3-BB)-(B3-B), 
(BB3-BB)-(C3-C), (B3-B)-(D) and (C3-C)-(D) categories, and as well significant at the 99% 
level of confidence as revealed by the ANOVA F-Ratio. As for the medians, profit margin, 
capital intensity and loss are significant at the 99% level of confidence as evidenced by the K-W 
statistical tests. 
As seen fi-om Table 8-34, under the multivariate models leverage, profitability and loss 
variables have an impact on the CR but not capital intensity in any of the analyses. According 
to the multivariate analyses, leverage is significantly associated negatively with CR at the 99 
per cent level of confidence for Jordanian listed firms for both models. Loss propensity is 
significant at 90% (Logit), and 99% (logistic) level of confidence, as expected. Thus, there is 
a clear inverse relationship between financial risk, as evidenced by the leverage, i e. relative 
debt level, and the firm's credit rating, and lower leverage and loss propensity has led to a 
decreased debt servicing ability has an which effect on credit rating by increasing their level 
CR. This suggests that lower leverage listed companies with lower loss ratio increase the 
attaining of higher CR. A negative effect supports agency theory, which assumes that these 
companies should seek a higher credit rating as a requirement from both debt-holders and 
shareholders to lessen the disagreement between them, and for satisfy the bondholders' needs 
for this higher CR. This in turn should lead to an increase in the confidence o f those 
bondholders pertaining to the ability of Jordanian companies to repay debt capital in a timely 
marmer. This finding shows consistency with some of the previous studies (Blume et al. 
1998; Doumpos and Patsiouras 2005; Skaife et al., 2006). Agency theory has supported the 
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relationship between both leverage and loss, and CR. Jordanian companies with a reduced 
loss propensity and a lower leverage ratio demonstrate that they want to fu l f i l the different 
needs of bondholders by providing greater financial reliability. Jordanian listed companies 
aim to signal their strong financial capabilities to their bondholders to make them more 
confident about the ability of companies to pay their liabilities. 
Regarding profitability, for bivariate analysis, there are significantly different variances 
between the CR categories at the 99% level of confidence as revealed by a Bartlett's test. 
There are also significant differences in their median CR as show by the kruskal-wallistest, 
which is significant at the 99% level of confidence. Under multivariate analysis reflecting is 
positively significant in its impact on CR at the 95 per cent confidence for both models. So, 
high profitability fmns have good credit ratings firms reflecting a ability to create fiiture cash 
flows to cover debt interest and capital repayments, for which signalling theory can support 
the strong association of probability with CR. Thus, Jordanian companies with higher 
profitability can also expect greater and stronger fiiture cash flows to the firms, which can 
signal their ability to meet debt financing obligations as they fall due, and expect a higher 
CR. This finding is similar to other studies (Galil 2003; Pettit et al., 2004; Skaife 2006), 
which find a positive association between corporate profitability and CR. 
Finally, bivariate analysis indicates that capital intensity is significant related to CR as 
revealed by Fisher's test for comparing means between categories (BB3-BB)-(D), (B3-B)-(D) 
and (C3-C)-(D), while significant at 99% level of confidence with Cochran's C and Levene's 
variance tests and K-W median tests and at the 90% level of confidence for the ANOVA F-
Ratio indicating different mean capital intensities between CR categories. According to 
multivariate analysis the results show that greater tangibility of the firm's assets structure for 
Jordanian listed companies in our sample is not an important criterion in determining 
financing policy nor in achieving a higher CR. 
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8.5.4.2 Market and Regulatory Category 
Four market and regulator variables were investigated in the current study. Table 8-45 
surrunarises the results of these variables. 
Table 8- 35: Full Analysis Results of Market and Regulatory Category Variables 
Variables S I Z E 1 TSQ T Y P _ S E C T BIG_AUD 
Bivariate Analysis 
Fisher's test 
(BB3-BB)-(B3-B) ** ** 
(BB3-BB)-(C3-C) ** 
(BB3-BB)-(D) ** ** ^**^ 
(B3-B)-(C3-C) ** (**) 
(B3-B)-(D) ** ** 
(C3-C)-(D) ** ** (**) 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio *** *** * *** 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C T *** 
Bartlett's T ** 
Levence's T * * *** 
Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Test statistic *** *** * 
Advanced Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Logistic Model *** *** 
Logit Model *** 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence, respectively. 
Consistent with the results of all models, the result of bivariate tests indicate that firm size 
and Tobin's q are significantly related to CR as revealed by Fisher's test for (BB3-BB)-(B3-
B), (BB3-BB)-(C3-C), (BB3-BB)-(D), (B3-B)-(D) and (C3-C)-(D) [except (BB3-BB)-(D) 
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only for size, not Tobin's q], while the ANOVA F-Ratio is significant at the 99% level o f 
confidence for both. As to differences between variances amongst CR categories, Tobin's q is 
significant under Cochran's C and Barlett's test at the 99% and 95% level of confidence, 
respectively and size at the 90% level of confidence Levene's test. Both variables are 
significant at the 99% level of confidence with the K-W stafistic tests to investigate different 
medians amongst categories. 
Multivariate results reveal that both firm size and growth opportunity (Tobin's q) are 
positively and significantly impacting on CR at the 99 % level o f confidence. This suggests 
that large Jordanian listed companies with higher growth opportunities can increase their 
chance of attaining higher CR. According to legitimacy theory, large companies with growth 
opportunities want to legitimate themselves to signal their good performance. To achieve this, 
large Jordanian listed companies attempt to increase their CR. This significant positive result 
is consistent with other studies (Potter and Sommer 1999; Adams at al 2003; Altman and 
Rijken, 2004; Skaife et al., 2006; Demirovic and Thomas, 2007). Larger firms with higher 
growth are less susceptible to default risk due to their market position, and consequently have 
better credit ratings and try to provide good signals to their investors to illustrate their higher 
performance measured, for instance, which resulted from their higher profits. This can be 
attributed to signalling theory which states that large companies signal their creditworthiness 
to their investors to show their ability to meet their financial obligations. Therefore, large 
companies with growth opportunities an attain high credit ratings, and thus provide evidence 
of their ability to generate greater future cash flows to the firm that should enable them to 
convey the required information about repayments of debt to bondholders in a timely 
manner. 
There is evidence of significance between type of sector and CR and between audit and CR, 
under the bivariate analysis. Fisher's T is significant for audit type between categories (BB3-
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BB)-(B3-B), (BB3-BB)-(C3-C), (BB3-BB)-(D) and (B3-B)-(C3-C), but only the category 
comparison (C3-C)-(D) is significant for sector type. Audit type is significant at the 99% 
level of confidence for the ANOVA F-Ratio, while sector type a 90% level of confidence. 
Finally, sector type is significant with Levene's variance and K-W median tests at the 90% 
level o f confidence, while audit type is significant at the 99% level of confidence with 
Levene's test. Thus, there are same notable differences in medians and variances among CR 
categories for sector type, and notable differences between variances of audit type amongst 
CR categories. 
8.5.4.3 Ownership Structure Category 
This point tests the relationship between ownership structure variables in the study and the 
CR. The findings of these relafionships summarise in table 8.36. 
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Table 8- 36: Full Analysis Results of Ownership Structure Category Variables 
Variables 
B L O C K _ 
OWN 
INST_ 
OWN 
INSID_ 
OWN 
G O V _ 
OWN 
F A M I L Y _ 
OWN 
F O R E N _ 
OWN 
Bivariate Analysis 
Fisher's Test 
(BB3-BB)-(B3-B) ** ** 
(BB3-BB)-(C3-C) ** 
(BB3-BB)-(D) (**) ** 
(B3-B)-(C3-C) ^**^ ** 
(B3-B)-(D) (**) (**) (**) ** 
(C3-C)-(D) (**) ** 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio ** *** *** * *** 
Test of variances 
Cochran's C T *** *** *** *** 
Bartiett's T *** ** *** *** 
Levene's T ** * ** * *** 
Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Test statistic ** *** *** *** *** 
Advanced Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Logistic Model (*) ** *** 
Logit Model ** *** 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence, respectively. 
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As seen from Table 8-36, an analysis of paired comparisons indicates an associated with all 
ownership categories. However, multivariate analysis indicates two variables namely, 
institution and foreign ownership has a significant association for both the models of the CR 
analysis, namely, LR, and OLR, while the other variables are associated with CR for some of 
the models of CR. 
Therefore, bivartiate analysis indicates that Fisher's test is significant at the 95% level of 
confidence for paired comparisons (BB3-BB)-(B3-B) for institution, governmental and 
foreign ownership; while it is significant at the same level of confidence for (BB3-BB)-(C3-
C) for blockholders, and institutional and foreign ownership, for (BB3-BB)-(D) and (C3-C)-
(D) only for governmental and foreign ownership. Finally, for (B3-B) - (C3-C) and (B3-B) -
(D) all ownership variables are significantly associated at the 95% level of confidence, except 
insider and family ownership which are insignificant. 
Regarding the A N O V A F-test, all variables are significant at the 99% level o f confidence 
except blockholders and family ownership which are significant at the 95% and 90% level of 
confidence, respectively, and except for insider ownership, which is insignificant. A l l 
variables are significant at the 99% level of confidence under Cochran's C test, except 
insider, and family ownership. Bartlett's test is similarly significant at the 99% level of 
confidence for the same variables, except institutional ownership, which is significant at the 
95% level of confidence. Under Levene's test blockholders and governmental ownership are 
significant at the 95%, and institutional and family ownership at the 90% level of confidence, 
while foreign ownership is significant at the 99% level of confidence. Regarding the K-W 
statistic test all variables are significant at the 99% level of confidence, except blockholders 
at the 95% level o f confidence, and insider ownership which bears an insignificant 
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relationship. From all this, it can be seen that there are some fundamental differences in 
ownership attributes between different CR categories. 
Regarding the multivariate analysis blockholders have insignificant impacts on CR in the 
Jordanian context. So, Jordanian listed companies that have shareholders who own 5% of the 
companies' shares have no impact on CR. 
According to governmental ownership, the logistic model result reveals a negatively 
significant effect on CR at the 99% level of confidence, and so the fmdings demonstrate that 
Jordanian listed companies with a larger proportion of governmental ownership depress the 
CR to a lower level. Legitimacy theory should have provided evidence for supporting the 
obtained result. In Jordan, listed companies with a large proportion of governmental 
ownership may want to legitimate themselves to show benefits of a higher level of control by 
government in their ownership, which ought to have been confirmed by good performance 
and confidence from the investors as these companies are fmancially supported by 
government. 
The analysis pertaining to the OLR model indicates that insider ownership has a positively 
significant effect on CR at the level 95% level of confidence. Such a fmding means that 
Jordanian listed companies with a high proportion of insider ownership push firms to attain a 
higher level of CR. According to stewardship theory, management o f the Jordanian listed 
companies with a large insider ownership structure monitor the interests of the shareholders 
due to meeting of interests between them. This drives management to increase the level o f 
CR to a higher level. Management in the Jordanian listed companies may need to attract 
many investors and as such, they need to attain a higher CR. 
The management try to shed light upon the firm's ability to cover interest debt and 
repayments in a timely way through strong current and future cash flows to the f i rm by 
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attaining an investment grade of CR which should enable them to access more easily 
international financial markets and enhance their ability to provide the required information 
instantly to attract international investors to the capital market, namely, Jordan. 
With higher managerial ownership the management are arguably more strongly motivated to 
increase the firm's profit and performance which in turn should be refiected in a higher CR, 
as indeed indicated by these fmdings. 
Regarding institudonal ownership, both models had a negatively significant effect on CR at 
the 99% level and 90% level of confidence for the ordinal logit model and the binary logistic 
model, respectively. This indicates that Jordanian listed companies with a higher proportion 
of insfitutional ownership are less likely to attain higher CR. According to management 
disciplining hypothesis, there may be no conflict between management and their institutional 
investors who have access to the required information which would affect the CR. 
Consequently, it can be a threat to creditor interests as this class o f shareholder can expend 
enormous energy on blocking debtholder benefits, and so an increase in the value of this 
variable could lead to reduced credit ratings of the firm. Thus, ideally creditors would like to 
use the monitoring powers of institutional investors while ensuring their own interests are not 
undermined. 
Regarding the family ownership, only the binary logistic regression model demonstrates a 
significantly positive effect on CR at the 95% level of confidence. This implies that Jordanian 
listed companies with greater family ownership are more likely to push firm to attain a higher 
CR. According to stakeholder theory, the Jordanian listed companies that have greater family 
ownership may want to provide their stakeholders with a good financial position which 
reflects their ability to meet their financial obligations. Consequently, Jordanian listed 
companies may achieve a higher CR for their family stakeholders to increase their shares in 
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the companies. Legitimacy theory can explain this finding, for a Jordanian listed company 
with family ownership would want to legitimate itself to the market by indicating their sound 
financial performance. Therefore, these companies should enhance their communication with 
society and legitimise themselves by attaining a high CR. From a creditor's point of view, 
increases family shareholding in means that this class of shareholder wi l l be inclined towards 
promoting debt holder's interests, and provide greater financial security. 
According to foreign ownership, this has had a strong positive significantly effect on CR at 
the 99% level of confidence for both models. Therefore, high foreign ownership firms wi l l 
tend to attract a higher CR. According to legitimacy theory, foreign ownership companies 
may push firms to attain a higher CR, as high foreign ownership represents a good sign 
including a market a high anticipated performance of these companies. Foreign owners, 
looking to the credit rated categories o f these firms through big international rating agencies, 
assess as good or bad signal of the extent of the financial capabilities of firms to create 
current and future cash flows to the firm. Of course, foreign ownership can push a firm to 
help enable big international rating agencies to award a higher CR. 
According to innovation diffusion theory, companies with greater foreign ownership may 
press their clients to obtain higher credit ratings and so provide information to indicate 
financial safety regarding the service o f debt by future cash flows. Additionally, innovative 
firms may be more likely to apply internet-based technology for the diffusion of financial 
information, and so these results would also support innovation theory. 
8.5.4.4 Financial Transparency and Disclosure Category 
Two variables are used to examine the relationship between financial transparency and CR. 
Table 8-37 summarises the fmdings of these variables. As indicated fi-om Table 8-37, all 
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models reveal that working capital accruals and timeliness, as proxies for financial 
transparency, produce insignificant effects on CR. 
Table 8- 37: Full Analysis Results of Financial Transparency and Disclosure Category 
Variables 
Variables W C A Q T I M E I L I N E S S 
Bivariate Analysis 
Fisher's Test 
(BB3-BB)-(B3-B) 
(BB3-BB)-(C3-C) 
(BB3-BB)-(D) 
(B3-B)-(C3-C) 
(B3-B)-(D) ** 
(C3-C)-(D) ** 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio ** 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C T *** *** 
Bartlett's T 
Levene's T ** ** 
Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Test statistic 
Advanced Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Logistic Model 
Logit Model 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level o f confidence, respectively. 
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As indicated in Table 8.37, the only variable under the bivariate analysis to reveal significant 
paired comparison is timeliness according to Fisher's test, and indicates significant 
relationship for (B3-B)-(D) and (C3-C)-(D) and CR a. The ANOVA F-Ratio is significant at 
the 95% level of confidence for timeliness. Levene's test is significant at the 95% level o f 
confidence for both financial transparency variables. The K-W statistic's shows that there are 
difference in the medians of working capital accruals at the 95% level of confidence amongst 
the CR categories, and again regarding the medians o f timeliness at the 99% level of 
confidence. 
8.5.4.5 Corporate Governance Category 
Five variables are used to examine the relationship between corporate governance and CR. 
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Table 8- 38: Full Analysis Result of Corporate Governance Variables 
Variables 
B R D J N D R_D B R D _ E X P E R T B R D _ S T O C K B R D _ S I Z E 
Bivariate Analysis 
Fisher's Test 
(BB3-BB)-(B3-B) ** 
(BB3-BB)-(C3-C) ** ** ** 
(BB3-BB)-(D) i f * 
(B3-B)-(C3-C) ** ** 
(B3-B)-(D) 
(C3-C)-(D) 
Test of Means 
ANOVA F-Ratio * * ... ... 
Test of Variances 
Cochran's C Test *** *** ... 
Bartlett's Test ... 
Levene's Test ** * 
Kruskal-Wallis Median Test Statistic 
Statistic Test * * *** *** 
Advanced Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Logistic Model * 
Logit Model (*) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level o f confidence, respectively. 
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As indicated from Table 8-38, the bivariate analysis under Fisher's test reveals all at the 95% 
level of confidence significant differences means between categories: (BB3-BB)-(B3-B) for 
board expertise and board size, and between (BB3-BB)-(C3-C) for all variables except role 
duality, while there is a significant association between CR and board independence, role 
duality and board size for the (BB3-BB)-(D) category, paired categories; (B3-B)-(C3-C) are 
significant for board stock and board size, but only board size is significant associated with 
CR for the (B3-B)-(D) paired categories. 
The ANOVA F-Ratio is significant at the 99% level of confidence for board stock, board 
expertise and board size, while significant at the 90% level of confidence for board 
independence and role duality. Cochran's C test is significant at the 99% level of confidence 
for all corporate governance variables, while Bartlett's test is significant at the 99% level of 
confidence for board expertise and board stock, and at the 95% level for board independence. 
Only board independence is significant, at the 95% level of confidence, under Levene's test. 
However, role duality, board expertise and board size are significant at the 99% level of 
confidence for the K-W statistic tests, while board independence is significant at the 95% 
level of confidence. 
According to the multivariate analysis at varying levels of confidence two variables, namely 
board independence and board size, are significant to the OLR model analysis, and board 
expertise and board stock are significant for the LR model. Regarding the board size variable, 
the OLR model indicates a significant positive effect on CR at a level of confidence of 99%. 
This shows that Jordanian listed companies with a large number of board of directors 
membership can attain a higher CR. This finding may be attributed the management 
disciplining hypothesis which assumes that increasing the level of CR can mitigate the 
conflict which can occur between the management and the shareholders. Therefore, Jordanian 
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listed companies with a larger board of directors' membership may attain a higher CR to 
reduce the agency costs that can arise from the information asymmetry between management 
and shareholders. 
Consistent with the OLR model there are negatively significant values for the board 
independence effects on CR at the 90% level of confidence. Interpretation of the result is that 
i f there is an additional independent director on the board it wi l l tend to push the firm into a 
lower credit rating category, and would seem that the independence of directors w i l l require a 
combination of execufive and non-executive. Contrary to agency theory, which posits a 
positive relationship suggesting more effective control over agent-managers by independent 
directors, the Jordanian evidence reveals that independent directors have not been able to 
exert such influence. Thus, it appears that instead, supporting stewardship theory executive 
directors of Jordanian companies are performing an effective stewardship role on behalf of 
their stakeholders. 
Regarding board expertise, this has a positively significant effect on CR at the 90%) of 
confidence for the LR model, so board expertise is beneficial fi^om a creditor's point view. 
Therefore, i f a firm has at least one director, who has experience on boards of other firms, 
then this wi l l tend to push the firm into a higher credit rating category. This negates an 
agency theoretic perspective of conflicts arising from memberships of different boards in 
favour o f net benefits arising from external knowledge and experience (Klein, 1998; Skaife et 
al., 2006). This supports the recommendation by Mallin (2007), that at least one member of 
the board should an independent director, who has relevant and recent financial expertise at 
the level. It is recommend that board members should have a range of skills in areas of 
finance, marketing, operations, law, technology and public policy (Moore, 2002). 
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Incidentally, theory might also be to deal more effectively with the remuneration o f 
management. 
Finally, only the LR model indicates that board stock has a significant negative effect on CR 
at the 99% level of confidence. This demonstrates that a greater propensity to hold board 
stock may have caused the directors to be engaged in wealth transfer activities beneficial to 
shareholders at the expense of bondholders, and duly reflected in a lower CR, according to 
the wealth-transfer hypothesis. 
8.6 Classifying Credit Risk Assessments as B B Category or Below 
For practical purposes it is important for a firm not to attract a low CR. Furthermore, many 
bond portfolio managers are restricted fi-om owning lower rated bonds (Grinblatt and Titman, 
2002), and as such, firms themselves incur significant costs i f they receive a lower bond 
rating. 
CRs convey ordinal risk assessments. Because of the difficulty in quantifying the marginal 
effects of changes in each governance variable on CRs with multiple categories, I use an 
alternative classification scheme that partitions CRs into two categories—BB or below. 
Furthermore, using a dichotomous CR classification allows me to more readily assess the 
economic impact of corporate governance on the firms' ratings. 
8.6.1 Logistic Regressions 
The results presented before are based on ordered logit regressions which take into account 
the ordinal risk characteristic of credit ratings. It is difficult to understand the economic 
impact of these corporate governance variables on the CR of firms as ordered logit 
regressions have multiple categories for the dependent variable. Following the methodology 
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set out by Skaife et al., (2006) the sample is divided into two alternative classifications and 
this splits the firms into two distinct groups based on their WVB score. 
Firms in the default risk categories BB3 to BB are given the value T and '0 ' i f of lower 
category. It is obvious that firms with a score o f ' 1' are more desirable and can be considered 
to be of higher credit worthiness. 
This type of division wi l l help us calculate the marginal effects of changes in the governance 
variables on the CR of firms. The new dependent variable is known as 'higher ratings' and I 
use logistic regressions to analyse the following model: 
Grade of CR = f (corporate governance variables, ownership variables, financial 
transparency, control variables denoting firm characteristics). 
Table 8.39 presents the results o f a logistic regression on the fiiU sample of firms based on the 
new binary dependent variable ( '0', ' 1'). The interpretation of the results wi l l be simplified i f 
we take the exponential value of the coefficients, i . e. the odds ratio. For example, i f the value 
of the odds ratio coefficient of variable Xk is 2, it wi l l mean that a unit change in the variable 
Xk w i l l make the event, Y, twice as likely to occur or for each unit increase in there wi l l be 
a 100% increase in event Y. I f the coefficient is negative it wi l l mean the odds ratio wi l l be 
below one which w i l l make the event less likely. 
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Table 8- 39: Logistic regression results of the effects of ownership structure, financial 
transparency/ disclosure and corporate governance on firm credit risk assessments 
(dependent variable = BB category of W V B C R or below) 
Variables Estimated Coefficient 
Ownership Structure Variables 
B L O C K _ O W N 0.724 
INST_OWN -1.303* 
INSID_OWN -0.638 
G O V _ O W N -12.506*** 
F A M L _ O W N 1.658** 
F O R E N _ O W N 2.225*** 
Financial Transparency Variables 
W C A Q 0.560 
T I M E L I N E S S 1.452 
Corporate Governance Variables 
B R D J N D -0.746 
R_D 0.238 
B R D _ E X P E R T 0.906* 
B R D _ S T O C K -1.579*** 
B R D _ S I Z E 0.058 
The result show from this table family ownership, foreign ownership and board expert are 
significant positive determinants of higher CRs. Insfitution ownership, governmental 
291 
ownership and board stock are negatively significantly related to higher CRs. In contrast, the 
coefficients for block holders, insider ownership, working capital accruals, timeliness, board 
independent, role duality and board size are insignificantly related to the higher CRs category 
for Jordanian firms. 
According to the ownership structure group variables, family and foreign ownership are 
positively significant for a higher CR at the level 95% of confidence. An increase of family 
and foreign ownership wi l l tend to push a firm to a higher CR, with odds of 5.249 and 9.257, 
respectively, given zero parameter values for other variables. We fmd that a unit increase in 
the percentage of institution and governmental ownership wi l l make it less likely for a firm to 
move into a lower rating CR category. In addition, the coefficient for blockholders and an 
insider's ownership are no longer significant when using BB grade of CR as the proxy for 
higher credit risk. 
The coefficients for the fmancial transparency and disclosure group, namely, working capital 
accruals and timeliness are no longer significant when using the BB category CR as the credit 
risk proxy. 
Finally, according to the corporate governance group of variables, the coefficients of board 
expertise is significantly positively related to the BB category of CR at 90 % confidence 
level, for an increase in board expertise wi l l generate an odds of 2.474 times for a firm 
moving into the higher CR. Board stock is significantly and negatively related to the BB 
category of CR at 99% confidence level. We can see that the coefficients on board 
independence, role duality and board size are no longer significant when using BB grade as 
the proxy for higher credit risk. However, it wi l l be more prudent for firms seeking debt 
financing to reduce the independence of their directors. 
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8.6.2 Marginal Effects 
Table 8.40 presents the marginal effects of the logistic regression model. We can see that the 
blockholders, family and foreign ownership variables are positively associated with a higher 
CR, whilst on other hand, the institution, insider and governmental ownership variables are 
associated with lower ratings. 
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Table 8- 40: Assessment of marginal effect of ownership structure, financial 
transparency/ disclosure and corporate governance on probabilities of BB W V B _ C R 
Variables Predicted sign Marginal effects standardized 
variables 
Ownership Structure Variables 
B L O C K _ O W N ? 0.145 
INST_OWN ? -0.261 
INSID_OWN ? -0.128 
G O V _ O W N ? -0.502 
F A M L _ O W N ? 0.332 
F O R E N _ O W N ? 0.446 
Financial Transparency Variables 
W C A Q ? 0.112 
T I M E L I N E S S ? 0.291 
Corporate Governance Variables 
BRD_IND ? -0.149 
R_D ? 0.048 
B R D _ E X P E R T ? 0.182 
B R D _ S T O C K ? -0.316 
B R D _ S I Z E ? 0.012 
Note 1: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%. 
Note 2: The Marginal effects column shows the effects o f receiving BB category o f CR due to a one unit change 
in the variable o f interest after standardizing the independent variables. 
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The probability of the frnn achieving a BB category of CR is increased by 0.145 per unit 
increase in blockholder-ownership around its mean (57%). As the probability is low it shows 
that firms are close to the optimum blockholders required. Meanwhile, unit increases in 
family and foreign ownership can the probability o f the firm's rating to BB grade by 0.332 
and 0.446, respectively, i.e. fi-om the lower to the higher CR. 
According to institutional ownership we find that an increase of a unit in the percentage of 
institutional ownership around its mean (33%) decreases the probability of receiving BB 
category by 0.261, while a shift in governmental ownership would push the firm's rating BB 
category of CR to lower CR with an increase in probability of 0.502. I find that the 
probability of receiving an investment grade decreases by 0.128 for insider ownership. 
Therefore, insider ownership wi l l push the frnn fi-om the BB category to the lower category 
of CR with a low probability. 
Financial transparency group variables can push a fum from lower to higher CR , and the 
probability of the firm attaining a BB category of CR increases by 0.112, 0.291, respectively, 
per unit around the financial transparency mean for WCAQ and timeliness of earnings of 
0.16 and 0.43, respectively. 
The probability of the frnn achieving an investment grade is increased by 0.012 per unit as 
there is an addition to the board near its mean board size (8.27). As the probability is quite 
low it shows that firms are close to the optimum board size required. 
When the CEO of a firm fulfils a dual role by also being the chair of the board of directors, 
the probability of receiving an investment grade increases by 0.048. The data indicate that, an 
average, only around 33% of firms have board independence of directors. I can see that i f 
firms adopt this stance there wi l l be a slight tendency to decrease their CR from to higher 
grade lower grade. Marginal effects of the governance related variables for the percentage of 
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board independence reveal that an increase of a unit in the percentage of board independence 
around its mean (33%) decreases the probability of receiving BB grade by 0.149. This may 
be because the board independent directors do not properly exercise their fiduciary duties and 
ensure that the management is serving the best interests of all shareholders. Thus, an increase 
in the value of this variable wi l l lead to a low marginal effect. Thus, despite the corporate 
governance practice/codes, the degree of director independence through higher shareholdings 
does such produce the desired effect. 
The probability o f the higher credit rating decreases when there is a 100% shift in board 
independence by owning the stock. I find that an upward shift in board stock pushes the firm 
to a lower CR by 0.316 per unit shift as there is an addition to its board stock around its mean 
ofO.85. 
Yet, it also shows that though creditors should prefer board independence the optimum is 
reached around the mean and in addition the wi l l be a very low probability of pushing the 
firm into an investment grade rating. However, in attaining a higher CR, namely, a BB grade 
there is a positive change in probability associated with an increase in the board expertise for 
the firm. FOr the average firm, the average degree of board expertise is around 52%. We can 
see that i f frnns adopt this tactic, there wi l l be tendency to increase their CR from a lower to a 
higher grade. 
8.7 Results of Hypotheses for all Models 
The former section presents the various models for the five relationship groups assigned in 
this study. Based on these models, this section draws together the results for discussion, and 
testing of the study hypotheses. This section starts with discussions and testing of the first 
group hypotheses according to the results of bivariate and multivariate analyses. Some 
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differences in the results between logit models versus OLS may be due to the nature of CR 
(as the dependent variable), which is measured by log of the odds-ratio (rating categories) in 
the logit model, whereas there is a numerical score (continuous) dependent variable in the 
OLS model. In the Tables that follow, an asterisk (*, **, ***) with brockets identities a 
positive (negative) significant relationship at a prescribed level of confidence, whilst a tick 
(V , VV, V V V ) identifies a significant difference (not necessarily positive or negative) at a 
prescribed level of confidence. 
8.7.1 First Category Hypotheses (HI) 
The first category of hypothesis deal with whether there is a relationship between accounting 
and fmancial variables and CR. A l l variables have been found to have a relationship with CR. 
Table 8- 41: Bivariate and One-way Findings of Accounting and Financial Category 
Variables 
Variables Bivariate/ one way Analysis 
P NP F T T o f V A F K _ W 
1 2 3 4 5 6 C T B T L T 
L E V E 
PM *** VA/A/ 
C A P J N T (**) (**) (**) A/ A/A/V 
L O S S (***) ** ** (**) (**) A/VV 
Note: P= parametric analysis, NP= non parametric.FT= Fisher's least significant difference test, 1=(BB3-BB) to 
(B3-B), 2=(BB3-BB) to (C3-C), 3=(BB3-BB) to (D), 4=(B3-B) to (C3-C), 5=(B3-B) to (D), 6=(C3-C) to (D). 
T of V= Test of Variances, CT= Cochran's C Test, BT= Bartlett's Test, LT= Levene's Test. AF= ANOVA F-
Ratio (Test ofMeans), K_W= Kruskal-Wallis test statistic. 
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Table 8- 42: Multivariate Findings of Accounting and Financial Category Variables 
Variables Multivariate Analysis 
U _ O L S T _ O L S L R O L R 
L E V ^***^ (***) (***) *^**^  
P M ** ** ** ** 
C A P J N T E N 
L O S S (*) (***) n 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. 
U_OLS= untransformed ordinary least square, T_OLS= transformed ordinary least square, LR= logistic 
regression, OLR= ordinal logit regression. 
8.7.1.1 Leverage 
Hypothesis H l - 1 suggests a negative relationship between leverage and CR. The results of 
the multivariate (but not bivariate) models confidence a strong negative relationship at the 99 
per cent level of confidence for Jordanian listed companies. Thus, H l - 1 is not only supported 
by this analysis, but the results of this study shows consistency with some of the previous 
studies (Blume et al. 1998; Doumpos and Patsiouras 2005; Skaife et al., 2006). 
8.7.1.2 Profitability 
Hypothesis HI-2 suggests a positive relationship between PM and CR. The results of the 
bivariate (non-parametric) models, supports this hypothesis, as there is a highly significantly 
positive result at the 99% level of confidence, and the multivariate analysis supports this 
hypothesis at the 95 per cent level of confidence for all models. These findings which support 
Hl -2 are consistent with many previous studies (Galil 2003; Pettit et al., 2004; Skaife et al 
2006). 
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8.7.1.3 Capital Intensity 
Hypothesis HI-3 suggests a positive relationship between capital intensity and CR. Instead, 
the results of the bivariate analysis reveal a negative association between capital intensity and 
CR for three pairs of CR categories at the 95% level of confidence. No empirical evidence 
based on four of the multivariate models (U-OLS, T OLS, LR and OLR) in the current study 
supports the relationship between the Jordanian listed company's capital intensity and CR. 
The result reveals that the capital intensity of Jordanian listed companies in the ASE has not 
an impact on WVB CR, Hence, H1 -3 is rejected in the current study. 
8.7.1.4 Loss 
Hypothesis HI-4 suggests a negative relationship between loss and CR. The results of the 
bivariate analysis support this hypothesis for the non-parametric models and for the Fisher 
tests for pairs 5 and 6, which distinguish the lower D rating from others categories, although 
there are some wrong signs for higher category pairs, 1 and 2 not including the D rating. So, 
there is a highly significant negative relationship between loss and the CR score with the non-
parametric test 99% level of confidence and at the 95% level of confidence for several of the 
Fisher tests. According to the multivariate analysis there is a significantly negative affect on 
CR for three out four models, namely, at the 90% level of confidence for T OLS and OLR, 
and at the 99% level of confidence for LR. Thus, it can be stated that HI-4 is in the current 
study, a finding which is consistent with (Skaife et al., 2006). 
To sum up the previous section, which deals only with the accounting and financial category 
of determinants of CR, they generally have a strong significant relationship with CR. These 
supports the first hypothesis for the categories of variables of the Jordanian listed companies, 
and demonstrate a significant influence on CR. This confirms a role for accounting and 
financial variables in credit rating determination. 
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8.7.2 Second Category Hypotheses (H2) 
The H2 group of hypothesis suggests a relationship between market and regulatory factors 
and CR. The following discussion represents all models for all independent variables for this 
category. 
Table 8- 43: Bivariate and One-way Findings of Market and Regulatory Category 
Variables 
Variables Bivariate/ one way Analysis 
P NP F T T o f V A F K _ 
w 
1 2 3 4 5 6 C T BT L T 
S I Z E *** *** ** ** ** ** vvv 
TSQ *** ** ** ** ** ** vvv 
F I N _ T Y P *** (**) (**) V 
AUD_TYP *** (***) (**) (**) (**) (**) vvv 
rNOie: r = parametric analysis, i N r = non parameinc. r i = risner s leasi signiiitani uiiicrcni;c I C M , I - ^ D O J - D D ; 
to (B3-B), 2=(BB3-BB) to (C3-C), 3=(BB3-BB) to (D), 4=(B3-B) to (C3-C), 5=(B3-B) to (D), 6=(C3-C) to (D). 
T of V= Test of Variances, CT= Cochran's C Test, BT= Bartlett's Test, LT= Levene's Test. AF= ANOVA F-
Ratio (Test of Means), K_W= Kruskal-Wallis test statistic. 
Table 8- 44: Multivariate Findings of Market and Regulatory Category Variables 
Variables 
Multivariate Analysis 
U _ O L S T _ O L S L R O L R 
S I Z E *** ... ... ... 
TSQ ** ... *** *** 
F I N _ T Y P 
A U D _ T Y P 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. 
U_OLS= untransformed ordinary least square, T_OLS= transformed ordinary least square, LR= logistic 
regression, OLR= logit ordinal regression. 
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8.7.2.1 Firm Size 
Hypothesis H2-1 suggests a positive relationship between f m n size and CR. The results of 
the bivariate and multivariate analyses clearly demonstrate that firm size (log assets) is highly 
significantly positively related to the CR score. The positive relationship between firm size 
and CR for the multivariate models in the current study is consistent with many prior studies, 
(for example: Horrigan, 1966; Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979; Altman and Rijken, 2004; Skaife et 
al., 2006; Demirovic and Thomas, 2007). Consequently, H2-1, proposing a positive 
association between the size of Jordanian listed companies and CR, can be supported in the 
current study. 
8.7.2.2 Growth opportunity 
Hypothesis H2-2 suggests a positive relationship between growth potential and CR. The 
results of all models namely, bivariate and multivariate analysis support this hypothesis and 
these results are highly significant positively. Jordanian listed companies with high growth 
potential have a higher credit rating than those with lower level of growth. This fmding is 
supported by others (Potter and Sommer, 1999; Adams et al., 2003). Consequently, the 
significant association between growth potential of the Jordanian listed companies and CR 
supports H2-2 in the current study. 
8.7.2.3/ 8.7.2.4 Type of Sector / Type of Audit 
Type of sector and big audit f u m propensity show mixed results for the parametric and non-
parametric bivariate models. Only bivariate parametric analysis indicates a significant 
positive association between both type sector and / big audit and the CR of Jordanian listed 
companies, for which the parametric and non-parametric bivariate analyses indicate a 
significance at the 99%, and 95% level of confidence, respectively but with different signs. It 
can be shown that under the multivariate analyses sector type and audit type have 
insignificant impacts on CR in the Jordanian context. Consequently, the current study fails to 
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find evidence for the theories that explain the relationship between both the type of audit and 
type o f sector o f the Jordanian listed companies and CR. Therefore, H2-3 and H2-4 are 
rejected in the current study. 
This result suggests that it is the quality of the companies, rather the quality of the auditing 
firm that is important to the CR, although the bivariate (parametric) test reveals that there is 
some CR benefit in attracting a big 4 audit company. The binary classification for sector type, 
was one for the financials and zero for the non-financials, the latter covering the service and 
industrial subsectors. An earlier table (Table 8-1) revealed that for each sector (financials, 
service and industrials) the typical classification was C3-C. Although the proportion of firms 
in higher credit categories was greater for financials than non-fmancials, the difference was 
not strong enough to be statistically significant. 
According to the above discussion, the market and regulatory factors have some significant 
relationships with CR, for there are two (firm size and growth opportunities) out of four 
variables with a strong positive significant association with CR in the Jordanian context in all 
models. This confirms a role for market and regulatory factors impinging on credit ratings. 
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8.7.3 Third Category Hypotheses (H3) 
The H3 group of hypothesis address the relation between ownership structure and CR. The 
following discussions represent the all models for all variables. 
Table 8-45: Bivariate and One-way Findings of Ownership Structure Category 
Variables 
Variables Bivariate Analysis/ one way Analysis 
P NP FT T o f V AF K_W 
1 2 3 4 5 6 CT BT LT 
BLOCK_OWN (**) (**) (**) A/VA/ A/VA/ A/V A/A/ VA/ 
INSTIT_OWN *** *** (**) (**) (**) (**) VA/A/ A/A/ A/ A/VA/ A/A/A/ 
INSID_OWN (**) A/A/A/ 
GOV_OWN ** (**) (**) (**) (**) A/A/A/ VA/A/ A/V VA/A/ 
FAM_OWN A/ V V V A / 
FOR_OWN *** *** ** ** ** ** ** A/VA/ A/VA/ A/A/A/ A/A/A/ A/A/A/ 
Note: P= parametric analysis, NP= non parametric. FT= Fisher's least significant difference test, 1=(BB3-BB) 
to (B3-B), 2=(BB3-BB) to (C3-C), 3=(BB3-BB) to (D), 4=(B3-B) to (C3-C), 5=(B3-B) to (D), 6=(C3-C) to (D). 
T of V= Test of Variances, CT= Cochran's C Test, BT= Bartlett's Test, LT= Levene's Test. AF= ANOVA F-
Ratio (Test ofMeans), K_W= Kruskal-Wallis test statistic. 
Table 8-46: Multivariate Findings of Ownership Structure Category Variables 
Variables 
Multivariate Analysis 
U _ O L S T _ O L S L R O L R 
B L O C K _ O W N 
INST_OWN (**) (*) (***) 
INSID_OWN *** ** 
G O V _ O W N 
F A M I L Y _ O W N ** *** ** 
F O R E N _ 0 \ V N ** *** *** *** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. 
U_OLS= untransformed ordinary least square, T_OLS= transformed ordinary least square, LR= logistic 
regression, OLR= ordinal logit regression. 
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8.7.3.1 Blockholders 
Hypothesis H3-1 suggests a significant relationship between blockolder ownership and CR. 
Bivariate analysis indicates a significant negative association between blockholder ownership 
and CR for three pairs of CR categories at the 95% level o f confidence. No empirical 
evidence based on all of the multivariate models in the current study supports the relationship 
between the Jordanian listed company's blockholders and CR. Consequently, the current 
study fails to find evidence for the theories that explain the relationship between both the 
blockholders of the Jordanian listed companies and CR. Therefore, H3-lis rejected in the 
current study. 
This means that Jordanian listed companies with a lower proportion of blockholder 
ownership do not necessarily decrease their level of CR. Skaife et ai, (2006) hypothesized 
'neither a positive nor negative effect for blockholders although they reported a negative 
effect for their sample of US firms. Therefore, Jordanian listed companies with a higher 
proportion of blockholder ownership do not sufficiently reduce conflict between the 
shareholders and management, which otherwise would reduce the agency problem in this 
case. However, earlier (Table 8-17) it was fourd that the category D rating had a higher level 
of blockholder value, although the other categories were similar to each other. So, i f there is 
negative blockholder effect it is not strong enough. 
8.7.3.2 Institutional Ownership 
Hypothesis H3-2 suggests a significant relationship between institutional ownership and CR. 
The results of bivariate and multivariate analysis support this hypothesis. Bivariate 
parametric and non-parametric analysis indicates a significant positive association between 
institutional ownership and CR at the 99% level of confidence, and a negative relationship for 
four pairs of CR categories at the 95% level of confidence. According to multivariate analysis 
there is a significantly negative effect on CR for three out of four models: at the 95% level of 
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confidence for U OLS, and at the 90% level of confidence for LR, and at the 99% level of 
confidence for OLR. Thus, it can be stated that H3-2 is supported in the current study, a 
finding which is consistent with other studies firm performance is linked to institutional 
ownership (Zeitun, R, 2009). 
8.7.3.3 Insider Ownership. 
Hypothesis H3-3 suggests a significant relationship between insider ownership and CR. The 
results of bivariate and multivariate analysis support this hypothesis. Bivariate parametric 
analysis indicates a significant negative relationship at the 95% level of confidence. 
According to the multivariate analysis there is a significantly positive effect on CR for two 
out of four models, namely, at the 99% level of confidence for T OLS, and at the 95% level 
of confidence for OLR. These results which support H3-3 are confirmed by other to the 
extent that in their snidies firm performance is linked to insider ownership (Chung and Pruitt, 
1996). 
8.7.3.4 Governmental Ownership 
Hypothesis H3-4 suggests a significant relation between govenmiental ownership and CR. 
Fisher's analysis indicates a significant association between governmental ownership and CR 
at the 95% level of confidence for four pairs of CR categories, namely, 3, 4, 5 and 6, and at 
the 95%) level of confidence for one pair. No empirical evidence based on three of the 
multivariate models (U OLS, T OLS, and OLR) the current study supports the relationship 
between the Jordanian listed company's governmental ownership and CR. Only LR supports 
a significant relationship at the 99% level of confidence a negative sign. This result is 
confirmed by others to the extent that in their studies firm performance is linked to 
governmental ownership (Zeitun, R, 2009). Hence, H3-4 is supported. 
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8.7.3.4 Family Ownership. 
Hypothesis H3-5 suggests a significant relationship between family ownership and CR. The 
results of bivariate analysis show no support for this hypothesis although the one-way 
ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests provide support. At this level of analysis the relationship is 
not clear. However, the multivariate analysis indicates a significantly positive association 
between family ownership and CR at the 99% level of confidence for T OLS, and at the 95% 
level o f confidence for U OLS and LR respectively. This result is confirmed by others to the 
extent that in their studies f u m performance is linked to family ownership (Aziz and 
Mahmoud 2009). Hence, H3-5 is supported. 
8.7.3.5 Foreign Ownership 
Hypothesis H3-6 suggests a significant relationship between foreign ownership and CR. The 
results o f the bivariate (and one way tests) and multivariate analyses reveal a highly 
significant positive relationship with CR. Bivariate parametric and non-parametric analysis 
indicate a significant positive association between foreign ownership and CR at the 99% level 
of confidence, and at the 95% level of confidence for all pairs of rating using the Fisher tests. 
The positive relationship between foreign ownership and CR for the multivariate models in 
the current study is consistent with other study (Zeitun and Tian, 2007), although they 
discover a positive relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. 
Consequently, H4-5, proposing a significant association between the foreign ownership of 
Jordanian listed companies and CR can be supported in the current study. 
To sum up the previous section, for the ownership stmcture group-determinants of CR there 
is a strong significant relationship with CRs of the Jordanian listed companies for all 
variables except blockholders. This supports a role for ownership structure in CR 
determination. 
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8.7.4 Fourth Category Hypotheses (H4) 
The H4 group of hypothesis suggests that there is a relationship between financial 
transparency and CR. The following discussions represent all the models for working capital 
accruals and timeliness. 
Table 8-47: Bivariate and One-way Findings of Financial Transparency and Disclosure 
Category Variables 
Variables Bivariate/ one way Analysis 
P NP F T T o f V A F K _ W 
1 2 3 4 5 6 C T B T L T 
W C A Q ** A/A/ 
T I M E L I N E S S ** ** A/A/ 
Note: P= parametric analysis, NP= non parametric. 
FT= Fisher's least significant difference test, I=(BB3-BB) to (B3-B), 2=(BB3-BB) to (C3-C), 3=(BB3-BB) to 
(D), 4=(B3-B) to (C3-C), 5=(B3-B) to (D), 6=(C3-C) to (D). 
T of V= Test of Variances, CT= Cochran's C Test, BT= Bartlett's Test, LT= Levene's Test. 
AF= ANOVA F-Ratio (Test ofMeans), K_W= Kruskal-Wallis test statistic. 
Table 8- 48: Multivariate Findings of Financial Transparency and Disclosure Category 
Variables 
Variables Multivariate Analysis 
U_OLS T _ O L S L R O L R 
W C A Q * 
T I M E L I N E S S * 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level o f significance. 
U_OLS= untransformed ordinary least square, T_OLS= transformed ordinary least square, LR= logistic 
regression, OLR= ordinal logit regression. 
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8.7.4.1 Working Capital Accruals 
Hypothesis H4-1 suggests a significant relationship between WCAQ and CR. The results of 
the bivariate and multivariate lend some support for this hypothesis, for the bivariate 
parametric test indicates a significant positive association at the 95% level of confidence. 
Multivariate analysis indicates a positive significant relationship at the 95%, and 90% level of 
confidence for U OLS and T OLS, respectively. This reveals that the existence of the 
WCAQ as measure o f fmancial transparency of Jordanian listed companies has an influence 
on the level of CR. This fmding is supported by Skaife et al., (2006). Consequently, the 
significant association between working capital accruals of the Jordanian listed companies 
and CR, which was postulated in H4-1, is supported in the current study, although not by all 
multivariate models. This suggests that internal (numerical) scoring by WVB reflects 
working capital accruals but these effects are not strong enough to show up in the (non-
numerical) rating levels. 
8.7.4.2 Timeliness 
Hypothesis H4-2 suggests a significant relationship between timeliness and CR. The results 
of the Fisher tests for pairs of categories including the D credit rating category support this 
hypothesis, since they reveal a significant positive association at the 95% level of confidence. 
Multivariate indicates a significant positive relationship between timeliness and CR at the 90 
per cent o f confidence but only for the T OLS model. Timeliness wi l l lend credence to the 
financial and accounting operations of the firm and for a creditor it wi l l be important for 
Jordanian listed companies, a finding supported by others (Skaife et al., 2006). Consequently, 
the significant association between timeliness of the Jordanian listed companies and CR 
which is postulated in H4-2 is supported in the current study. Again this reveals a role for 
fimeliness in the numerical data internally provided by WVB. 
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According to the above findings, it can be noticed that financial transparency category shows 
a significant association with CR of the Jordanian listed companies in both variables. This 
leads us to suggest support for financial transparency (including disclosure) having a role in 
CR determination. 
8.7.5 Fifth Category Hypotheses (H5) 
The H5 group of hypotheses suggest that a relationship between corporate governance and 
CR. The following discussions represent all the models for all variables in this category. 
Table 8- 49: Bivariate and One-way Findings of Corporate Governance Category 
Variables 
Variables Bivariate/ on way Analysis 
P NP F T T o f V A F K - W 
1 2 3 4 5 6 C T B T L T 
B R D J N D *** ** ** V 
R_D (**) A/ V 
B R D _ E X P *** *** (**) ( * * ) 
B R D _ S T O C K *** *** ** ** A/A/A/ 
B R D S I Z E *** *** ** ** (**) ** (**) 
Note: P= parametric analysis, NP= non parametric. FT= Fisher's least significant difference test, 1=(BB3-BB) 
to (B3-B), 2=(BB3-BB) to (C3-C), 3=(BB3-BB) to (D), 4=(B3-B) to (C3-C), 5=(B3-B) to (D), 6=(C3-C) to (D). 
T of V= Test of Variances, CT= Cochran's C Test, BT= Bartlett's Test, LT= Levene's Test. AF= ANOVA F-
Ratio (Test of Means), K_W= Krusical-Wallis test statistic. 
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Table 8- 50; Multivariate Findings of Corporate Governance CategoryVariables 
Variables Multivariate Analysis 
U_OLS T_OLS L R OLR 
BRDJND (*) 
R_D (**) 
BRD_EXPERT * 
BRD_STOCK ** 
BRD_SIZE (**) ** *** 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% level of significance. U_OLS= 
untransformed ordinary least square, T_OLS= transformed ordinary least square, LR= logistic regression, OLR= 
ordinal logit regression. 
8.7.5.1 Independence of Board of Directors 
Hypothesis H5-1 suggests a significant relationship between board independence and CR. 
The preliminary analysis indicates some significant positive association between board 
independence and CR at the 99% level of confidence, while at the 95% level of confidence 
for Fisher tests o f category pairs labelled 2 and 3. For the OLR model in the multivariate 
analysis the results interestingly reveal a negative association between the number of the 
independent directors and CR at the 90% levels of confidence. The T OLS model finds this 
relationship to be positive at the 90% level of confidence. This result is consistent with other 
studies (Bhajarj and Segnupta, 2003; Skaife el al., 2006). It follows that the internal scoring 
systems used by WVB are consistent with earlier findings about rating levels of other 
agencies. 
However, the other multivariate models results are either not significant or negative. 
Consequently, hypothesis H5-1 which suggests a positive association between independence 
310 
on the board of directors and CR of the Jordanian listed companies is not fiilly supported in 
the current study. 
8.7.5.2 Role Duality 
Hypothesis H5-2 suggests a significant relationship between role duality and CR. Fisher's 
analysis indicates a negatively significant association between role duality and CR at the 95% 
level of confidence for the paired CR categories (BB3-BB) to (D) only. The role duality has 
been found to have a significant negative relationship with CR in the multivariate analysis 
only for the T OLS model. T OLS model found this relationship to be highly significant 
negative at the 95 per cent level of confidence. This result is confirmed by others to the extent 
that in their studies firm performance is linked to role duality (Aziz and Mahmoud 2009). 
This means that the separation between the chairman and CEO roles in the Jordanian listed 
companies have a negative impact on the level of CR, but only for one o f the multivariate 
models. 
Consequently, H5-2 testing for a significant negative association between role duality and CR 
of the Jordanian listed companies is not fully supported in the current study. 
8.7.5.3 Board Expertise 
Hypothesis H5-3 suggests a significant relationship between board expertise and CR. 
Preliminary and multivariate analyses (to some extent) have supported this hypothesis. 
Bivariate parametric and non-parametric analysis indicates a significant positive association 
at the 99% level of confidence; while Fisher's tests indicate a significant negative association 
between board expertise and CR at the 95% level of confidence. Board expertise has been 
found to have a positively significant association in the multivariate analysis, but only for the 
LR model at a level of 90 % confidence. Multivariate analysis fails to provide much 
empirical evidence for the significant influence of board expertise on CR in the Jordanian 
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context. But the extent of limited support (by LR) is consistent with Skaife et al., (2006). The 
empirical fmdings of the current study find mixed support for the relationship between the 
board expertise and CR. Hence, H5-3 is supported current study 
8.7.5.4 Board Stock 
Hypothesis H5-4 suggests a significant relationship between board stock and CR. With 
regard to board stock, the bivariate analysis indicates a significant positive association 
between board stock and CR at the 99% level of confidence for parametric and non-
parametric tests, and at the 95% level of confidence for some of the Fisher tests. Multivariate 
analysis, namely for the T_OLS model only, indicates a positive significant association with 
CR at level 95% of confidence, yet the LR model indicates this result to be negadvely 
significant at the 99 % of confidence. Other studies found a positive association between the 
board stock and firm performance CR (Skaife et al., 2006). It follows that the internal scoring 
systems used by W V B are consistent with earlier fmdings about rating levels of other 
agencies. However, overall H5-4, which purports to show a significant association between 
the board stock and CR of the Jordanian listed companies, is not fully supported in the 
current study. 
8.7.5.5 Board Size 
Hypothesis H5-5 suggests a significant relationship between board size and CR. With regard 
to board size, bivariate parametric and non-parametric analysis indicates a significant positive 
association between board size and CR at the 99% level of confidence, although the Fisher 
analysis indicates a significant positive relationship at the 95% level of confidence for parties 
1, 2, and 4, and negatively for parties 3 and 5. According to the multivariate analysis all 
models, except the LR model, indicate a significant association between board size and CR; 
U OLS indicates a negative significant relationship at a level 95% of confidence, while a 
posifive significant relationship is found at the 99% of confidence for OLR, and at the 95%) 
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level of confidence for T OLS. Although other studies have not considered the link between 
board size and CR, they have found a positive association between the board size and firm 
performance (Aziz and Mahmoud 2009). According to this study, H5-5 of a significant 
positive association between board size and CR of the Jordanian listed companies is 
supported. 
To sum up this section which focuses on the corporate governance category determinants of 
CR there is generally a strong significant relationship between corporate governance and CR 
of the Jordanian listed companies in some variables. This leads us to support the role of 
corporate governance in the determination of CR in Jordan. 
8.8 Summary: 
Based on bivariate and other preliminary tests, and multivariate regression analyses, it is 
found that there is a significant relationship between CR and many variables in different 
categories. Both parametric and non parametric tests are performed in the bivariate analysis 
to examine the relationship between CR and each explanatory variable either continuous or 
nominal. Pearson correlation and t-test as a parametric test are used for continuous and 
dummy variables, respectively, while Spearman's rank correlation and Mann Whitney's test 
as non parametric tests are used for continuous and dummy variables, respectively. In the 
multivariate analysis, the study runs various models. Fisher tests of category pairs Kruskall-
Wallis tests of medians, ANOVA tests of means and Cochran/ Barlett/ Levene tests of 
variances are also employed. The first one is an un-transformed OLS model. After checking 
the assumptions of this model, it was discovered that the normality assumption was not met. 
Therefore, it was decided to transform the model by using the log method. The transformed 
OLS model is the second model which is adopted in the current study. The third model is an 
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ordinal logistic regression model for levels of CR. The fourth model, the binary logistic 
regression model is conducted for two levels (high and low) of CR. 
This thesis investigates the impact of key factors upon the CRs of Jordanian firms under five 
categories: accounting and financial aspects, market and regulatory factors, influence of 
ownership structure, fmancial transparency and information disclosure, and corporate 
governance factors. The use of several models enables the researcher to obtain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the key determinants of CR. for a higher propensity of a 
significant variable across several models should provide a stronger indication of its 
importance to the determination of CRs. 
The strength of importance of a variable to the determination of CR can be labelled 1 (low 
strength) to '4 ' (high strength), such that the numbers T to '4 ' represent for how many 
models be significant at any one of the prescribed levels of confidence, whether at 90, 95 or 
99 per cent. Thus, a score of ' 1 ' indicates that a variable significant in only T of the '4 ' 
multivariate models, whereas a score of 4 reveals that it was significant in all 4 models. As to 
the accounting and financial variables there is strong support for a higher CR being 
associated with: lower leverage (score 4), higher profit margin (score 4) and lower loss 
propensity (score 3). Capital intensity is not an important factors (score 0). 
Within the category of market and regulatory variables, two factors are particularly important 
to the CR of a Jordanian firm. These factors are size (score 4) and Tobln's q (score 4). Thus 
greater size and higher Tobin's q are linked to a higher rating. However, the classification 
into financial and non-financial firm's (score 0) and audit type (score 0) are not important. 
We next consider ownership structure and find that foreign ownership (score 4), institutional 
and family ownership (score 3) are very important to a firm's CR. Greater foreign ownership, 
and lower institufional ownership are associated with a higher CR. Insider ownership is 
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moderately important (score 2) and bears a positive relationship with CR. Governmental 
ownership (score 1) is not critical to the CR, and, finally, blockholders ownership (score 0) is 
not important. 
The next category for consideration is financial transparency and disclosure. In their 
association with CR, namely, WCAQ (score 2) is moderately impact, but not timeliness 
(score 1). 
The final category for consideration was corporate governance variables. Within this category 
board size (score 2 positive, score 1 negative) is important to the CR. Generally, a larger 
board of directors is associated with a higher CR. The other corporate govemance variables 
showed less clear associations with CR: board expertise (score 1), board independence (score 
1 positive, score 1 negative), board stock (score 1 positive, score 1 negative) and role duality 
(score 1). Thus, it is clear than 9 out of the 21 selected variables have a strong role in the 
determination of the CR of Jordanian listed companies. These variables are: leverage, profit 
margin, loss propensity, size, Tobin's q, institutional ownership, family ownership, foreign 
ownership, and board size. 
315 
C H A P T E R NINE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the impact of key factors upon the CRs of Jordanian firms under five 
categories: accounting and financial factors, market and regulatory perspectives, ownership 
structure, fmancial transparency including disclosure, and corporate governance. Jordanian 
firms have been selected because the developments in the last few years in the Jordanian 
capital market have been considerable and significant. Among these steps are the economic 
reforms and privatisation program, which began around 1990. Such steps required a strong 
financial regulatory framework and the availability of trustworthy corporate information. 
These regulations and procedures which have more recently been introduced to the Jordanian 
capital market have attracted attention in terms of evaluating the compliance of Jordanian 
corporations with international corporate governance principles, such as those issued by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Indeed, the OECD with 
the World Bank completed a survey for the first time in the Middle East in 2001. This survey 
assessed the application of corporate governance standards on the Jordanian capital market 
and in the Jordanian economy, and was last updated in 2006. 
At the same time, the underlying aim o f various accounting and financial regulatory 
modifications in Jordan is to create an attractive investment climate to encourage both 
domestic and foreign investors. In addition, due to the Jordanian government's commitment 
to the WTO in 2000, the Jordanian government has commenced a process o f comprehensive 
economic reform. Consequently, Jordanian listed companies are required to supply various 
types of timely and accurate information to aid the different needs of their investors. 
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Based on the above discussion, this chapter summarises the main results of the current study 
revealing the importance and motivation to conduct it. This chapter is structured in four 
sections. Section 9.2 is devoted to discussing the findings and wider implications and is 
where some of the significant empirical findingsare briefly discussed. Section 9.3 the 
contribution of this thesis to knowledge is presented. Section 9.4 the limitations of the study 
are discussed and suggestions for ftirther research directions are made. 
9.2 Focus of research and Main Findings 
9.2.1 Focus of research 
The primary focus of this research is a study of the impact of corporate govemance, 
ownership structure, financial transparency and disclosure on CR in the context of Jordanian 
firms. The research aims to achieve five objectives. 
The first objective was to evaluate the impact of market and regulatory factors upon the CR 
of Jordanian firms, after allowing for firm specific factors. The second objective was to 
examine the extent to which the varied dimensions pertaining to ownership structure, 
particularly under-researched aspects, such as family and foreign ownership, impact on the 
CRs of Jordanian firms. The third objective was to evaluate the role of financial transparency 
and disclosure for the CRs of these Jordanian listed companies. The fourth objective was to 
investigate the effects of good corporate govemance practices and procedures which other 
researchers have demonstrated to impact upon firm performance and firm value (but not 
necessarily investigated the impact on CR), in order to determine whether they also have a 
strong influence on CR. The fifth and final objective was to explore the determinants of both 
intemal (unpublished) and external (published) WVB scores in the Jordanian context. 
To fu l f i l these objectives, certain key questions needed to be answered. The main research 
question was: what factors determine the intemal and extemal WVB credit ratings in Jordan? 
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The subsidiary research questions flow fi-om this main question: 
1) What are the general features of W ^ B CRs? How prevalent are they in Jordan? 
Which sector has the highest propensity of WVB ratings? 
2) Which accounting and financial aspects are important to CRs? Is financial leverage a 
key factor? 
3) Is there a strong link between CRs and market and regulatory factors? 
4) What are the effects of ownership structure? Are there specific factors, such as family 
ownership, which influence CRs? 
5) What is the association between financial transparency including disclosure and CR? 
Is the attribute of better timeliness of reporting linked to higher CRs? 
6) How do corporate governance factors impinge upon credit ratings? Does good 
corporate governance practice improve ratings? 
7) Finally, do the internal WVB scores, vis-a-vis their externally published ratings, 
provide deeper insights into the determinants o f CR through the identification of 
differences in variable impact that are otherwise hidden beneath the external CRs? 
9.2.2 Main findings 
To answer the first question and its sub-questions, a descriptive analysis was conducted of the 
Jordanian listed CR companies from 2005 to 2007. The study finds that the CRs of this 
agency are spread from a minimum of D to a maximum of BB. The percentage of Jordanian 
firms which have WVB_CR is 85% for 2005, 82% for 2006 and 79% for 2007. The 
percentage of Jordanian firms with CRs scores from BB3 to BB is just under 10%, whilst for 
firms with CRs from B3 to B it is just over 10%, on the other hand just over 56% have CRs 
fi-om C3 to C but namely 24% have a D credit rating. The mean for all Jordanian firm CRs is 
C2. It can be observed that a significant minority has a very low rating. 
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It can be seen that as to the CR in the BB3-BB category there are more in the finance sector, 
compared with service sectors. It is quite interesting to note that at the D credit rating a 
significant minority has a very low rating, namely 23.75% for all sectors, comprising 
financial 7.45%, service 5.55% and industry 10.75%. We fmd that the fmancial sector has a 
greater representation for category C3-C for all sectors. Finally, within the B3-B category the 
financial sector also has a greater representation. This answers research question (1). 
This thesis draws upon a number of theorerical perspectives: agency, signalling, stakeholder, 
stewardship, diffiision of innovation and legitimacy theory. These theories can be applicable 
in the Jordanian context and help cast light upon the relationship between WVB credit risk 
assessments and inter alia corporate governance factors, ownership structure, fmancial 
transparency and disclosure. 
The results of this research have been confirmed by different techniques using W V B CR 
(internal and external) data models for U OLS, T_OLS, OLR and LR analysis. 
9.2.2.1 Accounting and financial aspects 
The first relationship represents the relationship between the determinants of accounting and 
financial aspects and WVB credit risk assessments. This study uses four indicators for 
accounting and financial aspects as independent variables, namely, LEV, PM, CAP INTEN, 
and LOSS. 
The results in summary confrnn that accounting and financial aspects have a significant 
impact on CR. Profitability is positively associated with CR for all models, while leverage 
and loss propensity are associated negatively with CR for all (or nearly all regarding loss 
propesity) models, in the Jordanian context. However, capital intensity is not important. Such 
findings answer research question (2). A summary is shown in the following table and details 
in depth have been discussed in chapter eight. 
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Table 9- 1: Summary of Results for Accounting and Financial Aspects and Credit Risk 
Assessments (Relationship 1) 
Variables Research 
result 
Explained 
theories 
Hypothesis Hypothesis 
prediction 
Approved 
L E V (-) all models Agency and 
signalling theory 
H l . l (-) Yes 
PM + all models Signalling, 
stewardship, and 
legitimacy 
theories 
H1.2 (+) Yes 
C A P _ I N T E N ? Agency, 
signalling and 
stakeholder 
theories 
H1.3 (+) No 
L O S S (-) all models 
except 
U_OLS model 
Agency and 
signalling 
theories 
H1.4 (-) Yes 
Note: + = positive significant, - = negative significant, U_OLS = untransformed 
= transformed ordinary least squares, L R = logistic regression, OLR = ordered 
ordinary least squares, T_OLS 
logit regression. 
9.2.2.2 Market and regulatory perspectives 
The second relationship represents the relation between the market and regulatory factors and 
W V B credit risk assessments. The WVB CRs are applied to both numerical and level ratings 
data with results for all four methods (U OLS, T OLS, LR and OLR models). The market 
and regulatory perspectives' results reveal only size and growth potential (Tobin's q) are very 
strongly positively associated with CR. By contrast, type of sector and audit are not related to 
CR. By revealing this, research question (3) is answered. The following table summarizes the 
results o f the second relationship, and a f i i l l discussion has been presented in the previous 
chapters. 
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Table 9- 2: Summary of Results for Market and Regulatory Perspectives and Credit 
Risk Assessments (Relationship 2) 
Variables Research 
result 
Explained 
theories 
Hypothesis Hypothesis 
prediction 
Approved 
S I Z E + all models H2.1 Agency, signalling 
and legitimacy 
theories 
(+) Yes 
TSQ + all models H2.2 Agency, signalling 
and legitimacy 
theories 
(+) Yes 
T V P _ S E C T ? H2.3 Signalling theory (+) No 
A U D _ B I G ? H2.4 Agency, signalling, 
stewardship 
diffusion of 
irmovation and 
legitimacy theories 
(+/-) No 
Note: + = positive significant, - = negative significant, U_OLS = un-transfomied ordinary least squares, 
T_OLS = transformed ordinary least squares, L R = logistic regression, OLR = ordered logit regression. 
9.2.2.3 Influence of ownership structure 
The third relationship represents the association between ownership structure variables and 
WVB credit risk assessments. This relationship has been tested by the four methods of 
analysis. For the WVB CR using both intemally and extemally determined data, this 
relationship has been analysed by six ownership stmcture variables (BLOCK-OWN, INST-
OWN, INSID-OWN, GOV-OWN, FAML-OWN and FOR-OWN) as independent variables. 
The results of the WVB CR (intemal and extemal) models confirm foreign ownership (+) to 
be very strongly related to CR, and institutional ownership (-) and family ownership (+) to be 
strongly related to CR. Also insider ownership (+) is moderately important. Governmental 
ownership is quite important but the percentage of blockholders is not a critical factor. These 
findings address research question (4). The following table summarizes results of relationship 
(3) which has been discussed in detail in the previous two chapters. 
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Table 9- 3: Summary of Results for Influence of Ownership Structure and Credit Risk 
Assessments (Relationship 3) 
Variables Research 
result 
Explained 
theories 
Hypothesis Hypothesis 
prediction 
Approved 
B L O C K _ O W N ? H3.1 Agency theory (+/-) No 
INST_OWN (- )all models 
except 
T_OLS 
model 
H3.2 Agency, 
signalling, 
diffusion of 
innovation and 
legitimacy theories 
(+/-) Yes 
INSID_OWN + all models 
except 
U_OLS and 
LR models 
H3.3 Agency theory, 
signalling and 
stewardship 
theories 
(+/-) Yes 
G O V _ O W N ( - ) L R 
model 
H3.4 Agency and 
legitimacy theories 
(+/-) Yes 
F A M L _ O W N + all models 
except OLR 
model 
H3.5 Agency, 
signalling, 
stakeholder 
legitimacy, 
diffusion of 
irmovation and 
Stewardship 
theories 
(+/-) Yes 
F O R E N _ O W N + all models H3.6 Signalling, 
diffusion of 
innovation and 
legitimacy theories 
(+/-) Yes 
Note: + = positive significant, - = negative significant, U_OLS = un-transformed ordinary least squares, 
T_OLS = transformed ordinary least squares, L R = logistic regression, OLR = ordered logit regression. 
9.2.2.4 Financial transparency and information disclosure 
The fourth relationship tests the association between financial transparency and disclosure 
variables and the firm's numerical and level of WVB credit risk assessments. A l l of these 
regressions are summarized in Chapter Eight. These regressions use four models for analysis. 
This identifies to the researcher a clear role for the internal WVB scores, vis-a-vis their 
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externally published ratings through the identification of differences in variable impact that 
are otherwise hidden beneath the external WVB CRs. The results in general reveal that 
financial transparency and disclosure are moderately important to CR assessments, as far as 
WCAQ is concerned, and timeliness is quite important. These issues address research 
question (5) which is answered. 
Table 9- 4: Summary of Results for Financial Transparency and Information Disclosure 
and Credit Risk Assessments (Relationship 4) 
Variables Research 
result 
Explained 
theories 
Hypothesis Hypothesis 
prediction 
Approved 
W C A Q + U_OLS and 
T_OLS 
models 
H4.1 Agency theory (+/-) Yes 
T I M E L I N E S S + T_OLS 
model 
H4.2 Agency and 
diffusion of 
irmovation 
theories 
(+/-) Yes 
Note: + = positive significant, - = negative significant, U_OLS = un-transformed ordinary least squares, 
T OLS = transformed ordinary least squares, L R = logistic regression, O L R = ordered logit regression. 
9.2.2.5 Corporate governance factors 
The fifth relationship represents the relation between corporate governance factors and WVB 
credit risk assessments. Summaries for the fifth relationship using different models for 
analysis for the fifth group of corporate governance variables, namely, BRD-fND, R-D, 
BRD-EXPERT, BRD-STOCK and BRD-SIZE, reveal a significant impact on credit rating. 
According to corporate governance factors, the study finds empirical evidence for a degree of 
association between corporate governance and CR. Board size is an important determinant of 
CR in a multivariate framework. Board stock and board independence are moderately 
important, whilst role duality and board expertise are quite important to CR. These findings 
shed light upon research question (6). 
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Table 9- 5: Summary of Results for Corporate Governance Factors and Credit Risk 
Assessments (Relationship 5) 
Variables Research 
result 
Explained 
theories 
Hypothesis Hypothesis 
prediction 
Approved 
BRD_IND + T_OLS 
model. (-) 
OLR model 
H5.1 Agency, 
signalling and 
stewardship 
theories 
(+/-) Yes 
R_D (-) T_OLS 
model 
H5.2 Agency and 
stewardship 
theories 
(+/-) Yes 
B R D _ E X P E R T + LR model H5.3 Agency theory (+/-) Yes 
B R D _ S T O C K + T_OLS 
model. (- )LR 
model 
H5.4 Agency theory (+/-) Yes 
B R D _ S I Z E + T OLS and 
OLR 
models.(-) 
U_OLS 
model 
H5.5 Agency and 
legitimacy 
theories 
(+/-) Yes 
Note: + = positive significant, - = negative significant, U_OLS = un-transformed ordinary least squares, 
T_OLS = transformed ordinary least squares, L R = logistic regression, OLR = ordered logit regression. 
Overall, CR in Jordan is determined primarily by accounting and fmancial perspectives 
(leverage, profit margin and loss propensity), market and regulatory aspects (size, Tobin's q), 
ownership structure (foreign, institutional, family and insider ownership), financial 
transparency and disclosure (WCAQ) and corporate governance factors (board size, board 
stock and board independence). 
The access to numerical data scores generously allowed by the WVB agency which are not 
otherwise available to the public has enabled this research to make finer distinctions between 
CR categories than would otherwise be possible. However, it is reasonable to say that 
generally for most category groups the OLS regressions produced broadly similar results to 
the multivariate LR and OLR models. However, there are three aspects whereby the enriched 
data have provided some key insights. Firstly, role duality is evidently more important to 
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WVB's intemal (numerical) rating assessments than is evidenced by the WVB extemal 
(credit level) assessments. Yet, the significance of role duality is missed by the other 
multivariate models that use less refined data inputs. Secondly, fmancial transparency and 
disclosure variables also reveal more support for the more refmed intemal scores of WVB 
than for the less refined extemal rating levels evaluated under the LR and OLR multivariate 
models. Thirdly, family ownership has been shown to be important in the intemal WVB score 
than generally is the case in the extemal rating evaluation in the OLR analysis. Hence, 
research question (7), and the fifth research objective are directly addressed. 
In general, all regressions models using intemal and extemal WVB_CR measures are 
significant overall, and it has been confirmed that each category of independent variables has 
some impact on credit risk rating. Thus, these results lend support to the selected theories 
(discussed below). Therefore, I conclude that ownership stmcture, financial transparency 
including disclosure and corporate govemance each impacts upon credit rating in Jordan. 
9.3 Research Contribution to Knowledge 
The contribution of the current study has many dimensions. Firstly, according to the theory 
dimension, the current study extends the extant literature on CR by focusing on how 
important theories, such as those pertaining to corporate govemance and ownership stmcture, 
impact on CR. However, only two studies (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003 and Skaife et al., 
2006) discuss the application of such theories to CR in a developed country context. These 
theories enrich the research in the area of CR by adding supportive power to the explanation 
of using factors which have an influence on the CR. Such a power can increase the awareness 
of the current situation of CR as a subject in one of the developing countries that has unique 
political and economic characteristics. 
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Legitimacy and iimovation theories have not had widespread use in this branch of literature 
neither in the developed or developing countries' context. The inference of legitimacy theory 
is that Jordanian companies try to legitimize themselves to different investors distinguishing 
themselves fi-om those companies that do not have a CR to present their good financial 
position and the future cash generating which can potentially affect their growth and 
performance. In this research the link between family ownership and CR lends support to 
legitimacy theory. 
The inference of iimovation theory is that certain investors /auditors are more likely to apply 
internet and other technologies in collecting information on firm credit ratings. But it is this 
group of investors and advisors, namely large international audit fums, institutional and 
foreign investors, and their demand for timeliness of earnings which are more likely to 
pressurize firms to obtain higher CRs. It could also be suggested that rating agencies may 
look to the big audit firms to be assured more confidently of a firm's creditworthiness. The 
research has found some support for iimovation theory through the role of foreign investors, 
whose presence has a positive impact on CR. However, iimovation theory finds less support 
in terms o f big 4 auditing firms, institutional ownership and timeliness of earnings. 
The investigation of corporate governance in the Jordanian environment is another 
contribution o f this current study on CR. Most of the studies focus on the corporate 
governance topic in general without seeking to link this topic within the CR area. Only two 
studies have forged a link between corporate governance and CR (Bhojrajand Sengupta, 2003 
and Ashbough-Skaife, et ai, 2006). 
Further, as to the application, the current study makes a contribution by investigating some 
new variables not used before in this context of CR. These variables relate both to company 
ownership structure, namely, governmental ownership, family ownership and foreign 
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ownership, and to corporate governance variables, such as, role duality and board size, which 
together represent the main contribution of the current study. Role duality negatively impact 
on internal WVB credit rating scores, whilst board size impacts positively on credit risk 
assessments internal and external levels under the T OLS and OLR models, respectively. 
The current study has drawn upon data pertaining to Jordanian corporations listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) as an emerging capital market. Most of the studies which 
address CR are applied to developed countries. By contrast, the current study has sought to 
investigate the CR topic in a developing country, namely, Jordan by using an array of models 
(U OLS, T OLS, LR and OLR). In addition control variables were used to reflect key 
market/ regulatory and accounting/ fmancial aspects, ownership structure, financial 
transparency and corporate governance. Marginal effects were also investigated for 
dichotomous CR categories. A l l the results of these models add to the value of the study and 
enrich our understanding of CR in Jordan. 
Finally, this research has demonstrated that there are differences in variable impact on CR 
that are evident fi-om the analysis of internal WVB scores that are otherwise hidden beneath 
the broader externally published WVB CRs. Thus, this research has enabled deeper insights 
to be gained into CR determinants within the Jordanian context. 
9.4 Study Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The current study is limited to an investigation of the CRs of Jordanian companies listed in 
the Jordanian Stock Market. The current study is obviously restricted to examining the credit 
worthiness of listed corporations which only have a CR since the scope of the study is to 
investigate the key factors which determine whether the corporations have a higher or lower 
CR. 
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The period for this study is not longitudinal as it only covers years fi-om 2005-2007. In 
addition, the study relies on secondary data as a main source for collecting it. There were 
some difficulties in obtaining primary data due to the nature of the CR data. Therefore, the 
study indirectly depends heavily on the annual report. 
Quantitative methods have been used in collecting and analysing data to ftilfil the objectives 
of the current study. Qualitative methods may add some power to the current research, but 
again due to the subjective application of such methods, the current study depends on 
quantitative methods. 
Considering to the above, it would be useful to demonstrate some recommendations for 
fiiture research. Many research opportunities in CR studies could be raised from the findings 
of the current study. These opportunities are: 
Firstly, the current study is applied to Jordanian firms. Future research may be conducted 
comparing Jordan wi l l other countries either developed or developing, examining the 
importance of current practices of CR and cultural differences. 
Secondly, future research could consider a comparison between firms with a CR and those 
without a CR, and perhaps differentiate between CRs from different agencies. 
Thirdly, and finally, regarding corporate governance in the Jordanian context, there is a need 
for more research in this area. Future research into CR could examine the effect of applying 
the corporate governance code, especially in a new area such as the banking sector. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 3-1: Rating Deflnitions 
Appendix 3-1 (A): S t a n d a r d a n d P o o r ' s R a t i n g s G r o u p - L o n g term credi t rat ing 
s c a l e 
A A A The highest rating assigned by Standard and Poor's. Capacity to 
pay interest and repay principal is extremely strong. 
AA A very strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal and 
differs from the highest rated issues only in small degree. 
A A strong capacity to pay interest and repay principal although it is 
somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in 
circumstances and economic conditions than debt in higher rated 
categories. 
BBB Regarded as having an adequate capacity to pay interest and 
repay principal. 
Whereas it normally exhibits adequate protection parameters, 
adverse economic conditions, or changing circumstances are 
more likely to lead to a weakened capacity to pay interest and 
repay principal for debt in this category than in higher rated 
categories. 
Speculative grade Debt Debt rated 'BB, B, CCC, CC and C is regarded as having 
predominantly speculative characteristics with respect to, capacity 
to pay interest and repay principal. 'BB' indicates the least degree 
of speculation and 'C the highest. 
While such debt wi l l likely have some quality and protective 
characteristics, these are outweighed by large uncertainties or 
major exposures to adverse conditions. 
BB Less near-term vulnerability to default than other speculative 
issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure 
to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions which 
could lead to inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and 
principal payments. 
This category is also used for debt subordinated to senior debt 
that is assigned an actual or implied 'BBB-' rating. 
B A greater vulnerability to default but currently has the capacity to 
meet interest payments and principal repayments. Adverse 
business, financial, or economic conditions wi l l likely impair 
capacity or willingness to pay interest and repay principal. 
The 'B' rating category is also used for debt subordinated to senior 
debt that is assigned an actual or implied 'BB or BB-' rating. 
CCC A currently identifiable vulnerability to default, and is dependent 
upon favourable business, financial, and economic conditions to 
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meet timely payment of interest and repayment of principal. In 
the event of adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, 
it is not likely to have the capacity to pay interest and repay 
principal. 
The 'CCC rating category is also used for debt subordinated to 
senior debt that is assigned an actual or implied 'B or B-' rating. 
C C Typically applied to debt subordinated to senior debt that is 
assigned an actual or implied 'CCC. 
c Typically applied to debt subordinated to senior debt which is 
assigned an actual or implied 'CCC-' rating. The 'C rating may be 
used to cover a situation where a bankruptcy petition has been 
filed, but debt service payments are continued. 
C I Reserved for income bonds on which no interest is being paid 
D In payment default. The '0' rating category is used when interest 
payments or principal payments are not made on the date due 
even i f the applicable grace period has not expired, unless S&P 
believes that such payments wi l l be made during such grace 
period. 
The 'D' rating also wi l l be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition i f debt service payments are jeopardized. 
R An obligor rated 'R' is under regulatory supervision owing to its 
financial condition. During the pendency of the regulatory 
supervision, the regulators may have the power to favour one 
class of obligations over others or pay some obligations and not 
others. 
SD An obligor rated 'SD' (Selective Default) has failed to pay one or 
more of its financial obligations (rated or unrated) when it 
became due. An 'SD' rating is assigned when Standard & Poor's 
believes that the obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific 
issue or class of obligations but it wi l l continue to meet its 
payment obligations on other issues or classes of obligations in a 
timely manner. 
Intermediate 
Categories 
Plus'+' or minus'-': The ratings from' A A to CCC may be 
modified by the addition of a plus or minus sign to show relative 
standing within the major rating categories. 
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Appendix 3-1 (B): Moody's Investors Service - Long term credit rating scale 
Moody's 'Aaa-C long-term ratings are applied to bonds and other obligations with an 
original maturity in excess of one year. 
Aaa Obligations are judged to be of the best quality. 
They carry the smallest degree of investment risk are generally referred to as 'gilt 
edged'. Interest payments are protected by a large or by an exceptionally stable 
margin and principal is secure. 
While the various protective elements are likely to change, such changes as can be 
visualized are most unlikely to impair the ftindamentally strong position of such 
issues. 
Aa Obligations are judged to be of high quality by all standards. 
Together with the' Aaa' group they what are generally known as high-grade bonds. 
They are rated lower than the best bonds because margins of protection may not be 
as large as in 'Aaa' securities or fluctuation of protective elements may be o f 
greater amplitude or there may be other elements present which make the long-
term risk appear somewhat larger than the 'Aaa' securities. 
A Obligations possess many favourable investment attributes and are to be 
considered as upper- medium-grade obligations. 
Factors giving security to principal and interest are considered adequate, but 
elements may be present which suggest a susceptibility to impairment some time 
in the future. 
Baa Obligations are considered as medium-grade obligations ( i . e., they are neither 
highly protected nor poorly secured). 
Interest payments and principal security appear adequate for the present but certain 
protective elements may be lacking or may be characteristically unreliable over 
any great length of time. Such bonds lack outstanding investment characteristics 
and in fact have speculative characteristics as well. 
Ba Obligations are judged to have speculative elements; their future cannot be 
considered as well- assured. Often the protection of interest and principal 
payments may be very moderate and thereby not well safeguarded during both 
good and bad times over the future. Uncertainty of position characterises bonds in 
this class. 
B Obligations generally lack characteristics of the desirable investment. Assurance of 
interest and principal payments or of maintenance of other terms o f the contract 
over any long period of time may be small. 
Caa Obligations are of poor standing. Such issues may be in default or there may be 
present elements of danger with respect to principal or interest. 
Ca Obligations are speculative in a high degree. Such issues are often in default or 
have other marked shortcomings. 
C Obligations are the lowest rated class, and issues so rated can be regarded as 
having extremely poor prospects of ever attaining any real investment standing. 
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Appendix 3-1 (C): Fitch - Long term credit rating scale 
AAA Highest credit quality. 'AAA' ratings denote the lowest expectation of credit 
risk. They are assigned only in case of exceptionally strong capacity for 
timely payment o f financial commitments. This capacity is highly unlikely 
to be adversely affected by foreseeable events. 
AA Very high credit quality. 'AA' ratings denote a very low expectation of 
credit risk. They indicate very strong capacity for timely payment of 
financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly vulnerable to 
foreseeable events. 
A High credit quality. 'A' ratings denote a low expectation of credit risk. The 
capacity for timely payment of financial commitments is considered strong. 
This capacity may, nevertheless, be more vulnerable to changes in 
circumstances or in economic conditions than is the case for higher ratings. 
B B B Good credit quality. 'BBB' ratings indicate that there is currently a low 
expectation of credit risk. The capacity for timely payment of financial 
commitments is considerd adequate, but adverse change in circumstances 
and in economic conditions is more likely to impair this capacity. This is 
the lowest investment grade category. 
B B Speculative. 'BB' ratings indicate that there is a possibility of credit risk 
developing, particularly as the result of adverse economic change over 
time; however, business or financial alternatives may be available to allow 
financial commitments to be met. Securities rated in this category are not 
investment grade. 
B Highly speculative. 'B' ratings indicate that significant credit risk is present, 
but a limited margin of safety remains. Financial commitments are 
currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is contingent 
upon a sustained, favourable business and economic environment. 
ccc, cc, c Default. Securities are extremely speculative, and their worth cannot 
exceed their recovery value in any liquidation or reorganization of the 
obligor. 'DDD' designates the highest potential for recovery of amounts 
outstanding on any securities involved. For U. S. corporates, for example, 
'DD' indicates expected recovery of 50% - 90% of such outstandings, and 
'D' the lowest recovery potential, i . e. below 50%. 
DDD, DD, D Default. Securities are extremely speculative, and their worth cannot 
exceed their recovery value in any liquidation or reorganization of the 
obligor. 'DDD' designates the highest potential for recovery of amounts 
outstanding on any securities involved. For U. S. corporates, for example, 
'DD' indicates expected recovery of 50% - 90% of such outstandings, and 
'D' the lowest recovery potential, i . e. below 50%. 
Intermediate 
Categories 
'+' (plus) or -' (minus) may be appended to ratings to denote relative status 
within major rating categories. Such suffixes are not added to the 'AAA' 
long -term rating category or to categories below 'CCC. 
378 
Appendix 3-1 (D): Capital Intelligence - Long term credit rating scale 
AAA The highest credit quality. Exceptional capacity for timely fulfillment of 
financial obligations and most unlikely to be affected by any foreseeable 
adversity. Extremely strong financial condition and very positive non-
financial factors. Very strong and stable operating environment. 
AA Very high credit quality. Very strong capacity for timely fulfilment of 
financial obligations. Unlikely to have repayment problems over the long 
term and unquestioned over the short and medium terms. Strong operating 
environment. Adverse changes in business, economic and financial 
conditions unlikely to affect the institution significantly. 
A High credit quality. Strong capacity for timely fulfillment o f financial 
obligations. Possesses many favourable credit characteristics, but may be 
slightly vulnerable to adverse changes in business, economic and financial 
conditions. However, operating environment is solid. 
BBB Good credit quality. Satisfactory capacity for timely fulfillment of financial 
obligations. Acceptable credit characteristics, but some vulnerability to 
adverse changes in business, economic and financial conditions. Medium 
grade credit characteristics and the lowest investment grade category. 
B E Speculative credit quality. Capacity for timely fiilfillment o f financial 
obligations is vulnerable to adverse changes in internal or extemal 
circumstances. Financial and/or non financial factors do not provide 
significant safeguard and the possibility of investment risk may develop. 
Unstable operating environment. 
B Significant credit risk. Capacity for timely fulfillment o f financial obligations 
is very vulnerable to adverse changes in internal or extemal circumstances. 
Financial and/or non financial factors provide weak protection; high 
probability for investment risk exists. Weak operating environment. 
C Substantial credit risk is apparent and the likelihood of default is high. 
Considerable uncertainty as to timely repayment of financial obligations. 
Credit is of poor standing with financial and/or non financial factors 
providing little protection. 
D Obligations are currently in default. 
Intermediate 
Categories 
Long term ratings from A A A to C may be modified by the addition of a plus 
'+' or minus sign to indicate that the strength of a particular institution is 
respectively, slightly greater or less than that of similarly rated peers. 
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Appendix 3-1 (E): WVB Credit risk rating 
The W V B Credit Risk ratings are represented by letters going from A A A (the best rating) to 
D. There are 20 classes in total: 
* A A A 
* A A 1 , A A 2 , A A 3 
* A 1 , A 2 , A3 
* BBB1,BBB2, BBB3 
* BB1,BB2,BB3 
* B1,B2, B3 
* C1,C2, C3 
* D 
W V B Ratings Comment 
A A A 
The company has both a extremely strong capacity to pay interest and 
repayment of principal and is of the highest quality. 
A A l 
The company has a very strong capacity to pay interest and repayment 
of principal and difference only in a small degree from the higher rated 
companies. 
AA2 
The company has a very strong capacity to pay interest and repayment 
of principal and difference only in a small degree from the higher rated 
companies. 
AA3 
The company has a very strong capacity to pay interest and repayment 
of principal and difference only in a small degree from the higher rated 
companies. 
A l 
The company has a strong capacity to pay interest and repayment of 
principal, although it is somewhat more susceptible to adverse effects of 
changes in circumstances and economic conditions than debt of higher 
rated categories. 
A2 
The company has a strong capacity to pay interest and repayment of 
principal, although it is somewhat more susceptible to adverse effects of 
changes in circumstances and economic conditions than debt of higher 
rated categories. 
A3 
The company has a strong capacity to pay interest and repayment of 
principal, although it is somewhat more susceptible to adverse effects of 
changes in circumstances and economic conditions than debt of higher 
rated categories. 
B B B l The company indicates an adequate and medium grade capacity to pay 
interest and repayment of principal. Although it normally exhibits 
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adequate protection parameters, adverse economic conditions or 
changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity 
to pay interest and repay principal than debt in higher rated categories. 
BBB2 
The company indicates an adequate and medium grade capacity to pay 
interest and repayment of principal. Although it normally exhibits 
adequate protection parameters, adverse economic conditions or 
changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity 
to pay interest and repay principal than debt in higher rated categories. 
BBB3 
The company indicates an adequate and medium capacity to pay and 
interest and repayment of principal. Although it normally exhibits 
adequate protection parameters, adverse economic conditions or 
changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity 
to pay interest and repay principal than debt in higher rated categories. 
B B l 
The company indicates less near-term vulnerability to default than other 
speculative issues. However, it faces ongoing uncertainties or exposure 
to adverse business, financial or economic conditions which could lead 
to inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and/or principal payments 
BB2 
The company indicates less near-term vulnerability to default than other 
speculative issues. However, it faces ongoing uncertainties or exposure 
to adverse business, financial or economic conditions which could lead 
to inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and/or principal payments 
BB3 
The company indicates less near-term vulnerability to default than other 
speculative issues. However, it faces ongoing uncertainties or exposure 
to adverse business, financial or economic conditions which could lead 
to inadequate capacity to meet timely interest and/or principal payments 
B l 
The company indicates greater vulnerability to default, but currently has 
the capacity to meet interest and principal repayments. Adverse 
business, financial or economic conditions wil l likely impair the 
capacity or willingness to pay interest and repay principal. Speculative. 
B2 
The company indicates greater vulnerability to default, but currently has 
the capacity to meet interest and principal repayments. Adverse 
business, financial or economic conditions wil l likely impair the 
capacity or willingness to pay interest and repay principal. Speculative at 
best. 
B3 
The company indicates greater vulnerability to default, but currently has 
the capacity to meet interest and principal repayments. Adverse 
business, financial or economic conditions wil l likely impair the 
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capacity or willingness to pay interest and repay principal. Speculative, 
ranging on very speculative. 
C I 
The company indicates a current identifiable vulnerability to default and 
is dependent upon favourable business, financial and economic 
conditions to meet timely payment of interest ad repayment of principal. 
In the event of adverse business, financial or economic conditions, it is 
not likely to have the capacity to pay interest and repay principal. Highly 
speculative. 
C2 
The company indicates a current identifiable vulnerability to default and 
is dependent upon favourable business, financial and economic 
conditions to meet timely payment of interest ad repayment of principal. 
In the event of adverse business, financial or economic conditions, it is 
probable the company wi l l not likely have the capacity to pay interest 
and/or repay principal. Highly speculative. 
C3 
The company indicates a current identifiable vulnerability to default and 
is dependent upon favourable business, financial and economic 
conditions to meet timely payment of interest ad repayment of principal. 
In the event of adverse business, financial or economic conditions, it is 
very likely that the company wil l not have the capacity to pay interest 
and repay principal. Highly speculative. 
D 
Indicates that payment is in default, is technically or actually in 
bankruptcy 
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Appendix 4-1: Summary of previous studies of the determinants of credit ratings 
Study Methodology Independent variables/ratios selected 
Adams et al., 
(2003) 
Ordered Probit models, 
multinomial logit model, 335 
insurers firms from Standards 
and Poor's; 
Leverage, profitability, liquidity, 
growth, company size (natural 
logarithm of total admitted assets), 
reinsurance and business activity; 
Altman (1968) Multiple discriminant analysis, 
66 corporations that went 
bankrupt; 
Working capital/ total assets, retained 
earnings/total assets market value 
equity/book value of total debt, 
sales/total assets; 
Altman and 
Katz (1967) 
Quadratic 
discriminant/multivariate 
analysis; 
Financial ratios: Interest coverage, 
standard error of interest coverage and 
cash flow; 
Ang and Patel 
(1975) 
Regression, Moody's, 424 
industrial bonds; 
Financial ratios and non- accounting 
data, compared models of Horrigan, 
West, Pogue and Soldifsky and Pinches 
and Mingo; 
Badue et al., 
(2002) 
Ordinal probit model, 
Moody's, 136 municipalitities 
of Commonwealth of Virginia; 
17 variables: population size, population 
change, ratio o f long-term debt/total 
debt, real estate taxes, per capital 
income, organisation from of 
government, credit risk premium, net 
interest cost; 
Baran et al., 
(1980) 
MDA, S and P, 202 industrial 
bonds; 
Financial ratios and beta variables: 
cash/sales, total earnings, current asset/ 
current liabilities, standard deviation of 
accounting rate of return, cash/ total 
assets, net working capital/ total assets, 
payout ratio, long term debt/ total 
assets, beta; 
Barnive et al., 
(2002) 
Logistic regression, 62% for 
entire sample, 49% for hold 
out sample, 237 firms filed 
in bankruptcy; 
Net income/total assets, log total 
assets/GDP deflator, intangible assets/ 
net sale, interest bearing debt/total 
liabilities, secured interest bearing 
debt/total liabilities, fraudulent 
activities, resignation by top 
management, number o f major classes 
of bondholders, price weighted and 
special index of competition; 
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Belkaoui 
(1980) 
M D A , Financial and market data and 
subordination status: total assets, total 
debt, long term debt/ total invested 
capital, short term debt/ total invested 
capital, current assets/ current liabilities, 
(net income + total interest expense)/ 
(interest expenses+ preferred dividend 
requirement), stock price/ common 
equity per share, and subordination 
statue; 
Blume et al., 
(1998) 
Modified ordered probit model, 
S and P, 7324 firm; 
Ten variables as published by S and P: 
five measuring interest coverage, two 
profitability and three leverage; 
Cantor and 
Packer 
(1996) 
OLS, economic variables, 
consistent between rating and 
these variables, 49 sovereign 
bonds from Moody's and 
Standard and Poor; 
Income per capital, GDP growth, 
inflation rate, fiscal balance, external 
balance, external debt, indicators for 
economic developments and FX debt; 
Carleton and 
Lerner(1969) 
Multiple discriminant analysis, 
Moody's, 700 municipal bonds 
rated Ba and above; 
School district, debt/assessed value, 
debt/population, log debt, average 
collection ratio; 
Demirguc and 
Detragiache 
(1998) 
Multivariate logit econometric 
model, 31 aimual 
macroeconomic variables; 
GDP growth, real interest rates, 
inflation rate, trade shocks, credit 
growth; 
Ederington 
(1985) 
Linear regression, ordered 
probit, linear discriminant, 
unordered logit; 
Financial ratio and subordination data: 
subordination, average total assets, long 
term debt/ total capitalisation, forecast 
interest coverage; 
Gentry and 
Newbold 
(1988) 
Ordered probit model, 
Moody's, 206 industrial bonds; 
Subordination statue, issues size, 
cumulative years of dividends, net 
income/total assets, funds flow data; 
inventories, other current liabilities, 
dividends, long term financing, fixed 
coverage charges; 
Gray et al., 
(2006) 
Modified ordered probit 
models, S&P, 362 firms from 
Standards and Poor's; 
Eight financial variables: EBIT interst 
coverage, EBITDA interest coverage, 
operating funds/ total debt, operating 
cash flows/total debt, return on capital, 
operating margin, LT debt leverage. 
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total debt leverage, and two industry 
variables: industry beta and industry 
concentration; 
Hardy and 
Pazarbasioglu 
(1999) 
Multinomial logit model, 
different macroeconomic 
variables; 
GDP, inflation, adverse trade shock; 
Horrigan 
(1966) 
3 samples: 1) 201 firms with 
stable Moody's ratings, 151 
firms with stable S&P ratings; 
2) 70 firms newly rated by 
Moody's and 60 newly rated 
by Standard and Poor; 3) 27 
firms with changed by 
Moody's, 568 by Standard 
andPoor; regression model; 
Total assets, working capital/Sales, net 
worth/total debt, sales/net worth, net 
operating profit /sales, long term 
solvency ratio, short term capital 
turnover ratio, long term capital 
turnover ratio, profit margin ratio; 
Kamstra et a/., 
(2001) 
Ordered logit, Moody's, 354 
industrial bonds; 
Interest coverage, debt ratio, return on 
assets, total firm assets, subordination 
status; 
Kaplan and 
Urwitz (1976) 
Ordered probit model, 120 
industrial bonds with 
unchanged Moody's ratings 
and 207 new issues rated by 
Moody's; 
Financial ratio and non- accounting 
data: interest coverage ratio, 
capitalisation ratios, profitability ratio, 
size variables, and stability variables; 
Liu and 
Seyyed (1991) 
Moody's, 92 municipal bond 
issues per year, per capital 
revenue, city's total revenue, 
issuer's total general obligation 
debt, city's debt burden, 
unemployment rate; 
18 variables measuring debt burden, tax 
revenue sources, tax collection 
efficiency; 
Mar-
Molinero and 
Cinca (2001) 
MDS, accounting ratios, 66 
Spanish sample,29 of which 
failed; 
Current assets/total assets, current 
assets-cash/total assets, current 
assets/loans, reserves/loans, net 
income/total assets, net income/total 
equity capital, net income/loans, cost of 
sales/sales, cash flow/loans; 
Mar et aL, 
(1996) 
Multimensional scaling 
models, cluster analysis, 
property fitting and 
discriminant analysis, Standard 
andPoor, 10 short term foreign 
24 financial ratios reflecting 
profitability, debts, capital structure and 
number of employees; 
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currency bonds; 
Martin (1977) Logit and discriminant 
analysis, 58 banks that went 
bankrupt; 
25 financial variables measuring asset 
risk, liquidity, capital adequacy, 
eamings; 
Peavy and 
Edgar (1983) 
M D A , Moody's, 83 bank 
holding companies with 
commercial paper ratings; 
Net income, return on assets, 
shareholders' equity/ total assets, return 
on equity, reserve for loan losses/ loans, 
net charge-off/ loans, growth rate of 
assets over last 5 years; 
Peavy and 
Edgar (1984) 
M D A , Standard and Poor, 224 
industrial companies with 
commercial paper ratings; 
Total assets, long term debt/ investment 
capital, net sales/ cash, receivables/ total 
assets, net income/ total assets, sales/ 
total assets; 
Perry et al., 
(1985) 
Moody's, 152 industrial bonds; Ratio reflecting profitability, debt and 
capital structure, SIC codes for industry 
classification; 
Pinches and 
Mingo 
(1973, 1975) 
Factor analysis and MDA, 35, 
180 firms from Moody's; 
Issue size, year of consecutive dividend, 
net income / total assets, five years 
mean of net income, long term 
debt/total assets and subordination, net 
income + interest/interest. 
Pogue and 
Soldofsky 
(1969) 
Logistic regression model, 
Moody's; 
20 industrials and 20 utilities rated Baa 
and above, five variables: leverage, 
profitability, eamings instability, size, 
eamings overages; 
Poon et al., 
(1999) 
Ordinal logistic regression, 
Moody's, 100 firms; 
Financial ratios, long term bond ratings 
and country risk: three factors 
representing dimensions of risk, loan 
provision ratios, and profitability, 
STDR, LTDR, CRISK; 
Reiter and 
Emery (1991) 
OLS, ordered probit analysis, 
Moody's and Standard and 
Poor, 281 newly issue utilities 
bonds; 
Cash flow/ constmction expenditure, 
debt/ equity, property funding ratio, 
permanent capitalisation, coefficient of 
variation of retum on equity, pretax 
interest coverage; 
Skaife et al., 
(2006) 
Ordered logit model. Standard 
and Poor, 894 firms; 
Total debt/total assets, net income 
before extraordinary items/total assets, 
operating income before 
depreciation/interest expense, natural 
log of total assets, gross property, plant 
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and equipment /total assets. 
Taffler (1983) Multi- discriminant analysis, 
46 failed and 46 sovent 
companies (predominantly 
manufacturing) 
Four financial variables: profit before 
tax/average current liabilities, current 
assets/total liabilities, current liabilities 
/total assets, no-credit interval; 
Trevino and 
Thomas (2000) 
Ordered probit and OLS 
models; 
Economic indicators, debt/borrowing, 
total borrowing / deposits; 
West 
(1970) 
Logistic regression, 48 bonds 
rated from Moody'; 
nine year earnings variability, period of 
solvency, debt equity/debt ratio, bonds 
outstanding; 
West (1985) Factor analysis/logit 
model]900 banks; 
19 variables 
Note: Discriminant Analysis, MDS: Multidimensional Scaling, FX: Foreign Exchange, OLS: 
Ordinary Least Square, BFSRs: Bank financial strength ratings, STDR: Moody's Short term debt 
rating, LTDR: Moody's long term debt rating, S&P: Standards and Poor's, CRISK: Country risk, 
MV: Market value, BY: Book value. 
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Appendix 4-2: The studies which relate to corporate governance 
Study Variables | 
Abdelsalam and Street, (2007), U.K. Board composition, role duality, board 
experience, board cross-directorship, diffusion of 
ownership and type of equity ownership. 
Abdel-shahid, (2003), Egypt Ownership concentration. 
Akimova and Schwodiauer, (2004), 
Ukraine 
Ownership structure. 
AL-Khor i , (2005), Jordan Concentration of block holders. 
Aziz and Mahmoud (2009), Jordan Ownership concentration and board 
characteristics 
Dahya, et al., (1996), U.K. Role duality. 
Ghazali, (2004), Malaysia Ownership concentration, director ownership, 
govenmient ownership, foreign ownership, 
family members on the board, board 
composition, role duality and regulatory change. 
Haniffa, and Cooke, (2002), 
Malaysia 
Diffusion of ownership, foreign ownership, 
board composition, board dominated by family 
members, role duality, cross holdings of 
directorships, institutional investors' ownership 
and finance director on the board. 
Haniffa, (1999), Malaysia Diffusion of ownership, foreign ownership, 
board composition, board dominated by family 
members, role duality and cross holdings of 
directorships. 
Kato, and long, (2005), China CEO turnover, ownership structure and 
independent directors. 
Kim, (2005), Korea Board of directors'. 
Kula, (2005), Turkey Structure and role of board of directors and role 
duality. 
Leng, (2004), Malaysia Proportion of shares held by institutional 
investors. 
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Lins, (2003), Many countries Managerial ownership, non-management and 
block-holder ownership. 
Mangena, (2004), U.K. Institutional investors, executive directors' 
ownership, board composition and presence of 
audit committee. 
Shen, and Chen, (2006), Taiwan Managerial ownership, institutional ownership 
and board of directors. 
Tsamenyi, and Onumah, (2007), 
Ghana 
Ownership structure. 
Wong and Hu, (2004), China Ownership structure. 
Zeitun and Tian, (2007), Jordan Ownership structure. 
Zheka, (2004), Ukraine Shareholder rights and role duality. 
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Appendix 5-1: Map of Jordan 
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Appendix 5-2: Main Economic Indicators during the period 2001-2008 (JD Million) 
Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Population 4,940,000 5,070,000 5,200,000 5,350,000 5,485,0 
00 
5.600 5.723 5.850 
Gross National Product (GNP) 
at current market prices 
6491.1 6858.3 7287.5 8310.7 9334.2 10,932.6 12,293. 14,86-
Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) at current market prices 
6363.3 6778.5 7203.6 8164.0 9118.1 10,520.9 11,721. I4,18< 
Growth rate of GDP at 
constant market prices (%) 
5.3 5.7 4.1 7.7 7.2 8.0 6.6 5.6 
Gross National Disposable 
Income (GNDI) at current 
prices 
7955.9 8408.8 9556.4 10609.2 11219. 
7 
13,017.1 14,263. I7,37( 
Growth rate of GNDI at 
constant market prices (%) 
3.3 5.6 10.6 5.4 1.5 7.8 4.8 6.2 
GDP per capital at current 
prices 
1288 1337 1809 1534 1650 
Unemployment rate (%) 14.7 15.3 14.5 12.5 14.8 14.0 13.1 12.7 
Change in the consumer price 
index (%) (Inflation rate) 
1.8 1.8 1.6 3.4 3.5 8.8 4.5 14.6 
Change in GDP denator (%) 0.8 0.8 2.1 5.3 4.2 
Ratio of total consumption to 
GDP at current market prices 
(%) 
104.0 100.9 101.3 102.3 106.8 102.5 N. A N. A 
Ratio of gross fixed investment 
to GDP at current market 
prices 
19.4 19.0 20.6 24.8 30.5 28.3 N. A N. A 
Ratio of domestic saving to 
GDP at current market prices 
(%) 
-4.0 -0.9 -1.3 -2.3 6.8 2.5 N. A N. A 
Average exchange rate against 
US dollar 
1.410 1.410 1.410 1.410 1.410 1.410 1.410 1.410 
Sources: 1- Central Bank of Jordan. Annual Repon, 2009. 
2- M inistiy of Planning and International Coiporaiion, Main Economic. 
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Appendix 5-3: The Jordanian companies' law related to credit rating and 
corporate governance 
Due to the orientation towards intemational markets, trade and agreements, and under a new 
reform programme, the Company Act of 1997 was recently amended by the temporary 
Securities Law No. 4 and No. 40 in 2002. We selected articles o f the Jordanian companies 
law wi l l be covered, the selection of the articles presented here is based on their relation to 
the firm's credit ratings and corporate governance. 
Due to the orientation towards intemational markets, trade and agreements, and under a new 
reform programme, the Company Act of 1997 was recently amended by the temporary 
Securities Law No. 4 and No. 40 in 2002. 
In this section, selected articles of the Jordanian companies law wi l l be covered, the selection 
of the articles presented here is based on their relation to the firm's credit ratings and 
corporate govemance. According to the most important point in the Act, Jordanian firms 
must follow the Intemafional Accounting Standards (IAS) as stated in Article (184-a) 
"A public shareholding company shall organize its accounts and keep its registers and books 
in accordance with the recognized intemational accounting and auditing standards." 
Firms have the right to have debt financing by issuing bonds, Articles (113-131) organize this 
procedure. Firms can issue converted bonds but there are a number of provisions. Article 
(125) sets these provisions: 
"The company may issue corporate bonds convertible into shares in accordance with the 
following provisions: 
• The decision o f the board o f directors shall include all rules and conditions on the 
basis of which bonds are converted into shares. This should be accomplished with the 
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written consent o f the owners and in accordance with the conditions and in pursuance 
to the basis defined therefore; 
• The corporate bondholder shall express his desire to convert at the dates stated in the 
prospectus. I f the holder does not express his interest during that period he wi l l lose 
his right to convert the said corporate bonds; 
• The shares obtained by corporate bond owners shall have rights to divide proportional 
to the time period between the date of conversion and the end o f the fiscal year; and 
• At the end of each fiscal year, a statement shall be made of the number of shares 
issued during the year against corporate bonds whose owners exercised their option to 
convert the same into shares during such year. 
Firms also have the right to redeem their bonds. Article (131) gives firms such a right 
"The prospectus may provide for the Company right to aimually redeem the issued bonds by 
a lottery throughout the duration of the Corporate Bonds." 
It is worth noting that Jordanian firms may buy back their shares in certain conditions, Article 
(114) protects this right. In addition, article (8) of the bylaws o f the Jordanian Security 
Commission in 2006 organises this procedure. It reveals that Jordanian firms should hold 
their treasury stocks for a period between six and eight months. 
The 1964 Companies Act is considered to be the first legislation regarding companies in 
Jordan. Before that, establishment and registration of companies were addressed by the Civil 
Law and Othman Commercial Law, which was replaced by the registration of Jordanian 
Companies Act in 1927 (Suwaidan, 1997). Economic development and the increase in the 
number of companies forced the regulators to revise the Companies Act of 1964. Several 
amendments of this Act and economic growth led to a newer version of the Companies Act in 
1989. 
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The Companies Act No. 1 for the year of 1989 was more comprehensive than the Companies 
Act 1964. It provided different types of companies such as parmership, limited partnership, 
private limited, partnership limited by shares and public shareholding (Article 6). 
Shareholding companies must issue shares to the public according to the provision of this 
law. Therefore "Compared to other types of companies, pubHc shareholding companies are of 
greater economic significance and as a sequence subject to more stringent disclosure 
requirements" (Suwaidan, 1997). 
This Act covered different issues related to public shareholding companies. It included ten 
sections (Articles 90-219) explaining the essential issues of public shareholding companies, 
for example, formation of public shareholding companies, capital requirements and 
disclosure requirements. In addition, the law contains a section (Articles 220-231) illustrating 
the responsibility of the auditors, particularly towards the disclosure requirements. Therefore, 
the concern of this study is the disclosure requirements imposed by the law. These 
requirements are mentioned as follows: 
Article 168: The board of directors of every public shareholding company must prepare, 
within the first three months o f the end of the financial year, the following documents which 
together constitute the company's aimual reports: 
Article 170: The board of directors of the company has to file with the CC and A F M a half 
yearly report showing the financial position of the company and the results of operations for 
the interim period signed by the Board's Chairman. 
Article 172: The documents in Article 168 (A, B and C) shall be presented to the 
shareholders' annual general meeting, and at least 14 days before the meeting, a copy of the 
annual report must be sent to each shareholder, accompanied by invitation to the annual 
general meeting. 
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Article 199: The auditor's report must be presented and discussed at the shareholder's annual 
general meeting. 
Article 220: Every public shareholding company is obliged to appoint an auditor. 
Article 221: The main responsibility of the auditor is to report to shareholders on the 
company's accounts. 
Article 223: The auditor must address the following in his report: 
• Whether he or she has obtained all the information and explanation necessary to 
perform the audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards; 
• Whether the company's account and financial records are adequate and necessary for 
performing his or her duty in a satisfactory manner. 
• Whether the balance sheet, profit and loss account and the statement of resources and 
application of fiinds present fairly the company's financial position and comply with 
generally accepted accounting principles; 
• Whether the financial matters cited by the directors in their report are in agreement 
with the company's records; 
• Whether there have been any violations by the company and its directors of the 
provisions of the Act, or the company's articles of association, and the extent to which 
the violation had an impact on the company's financial position and the results of its 
operations; and 
• Any other information or remarks which the auditor considers important for the 
company's shareholders to know which are not covered by the above. 
Article 225: The auditor should be independent fi-om the company and its directors. 
Therefore, an auditor who is partner or an employee of any director should not be appointed. 
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The criticism of this law is that it did not include any provisions regards consolidated 
financial statements. "In practice, companies, which maintain branches, prepare and present a 
combined balance sheet and a combined profit and loss account" All-inter branch transactions 
are eliminated in the accounts" (Al-Shiab, 2003). 
In addition, although public shareholding companies should prepare comparative audited 
financial statements, there are no legal requirements to the format and content of these 
statements (Suwaidan, 1997). For example, the Companies Act of 1989 did not provide any 
regulations for inventory and depreciation valuation (Al-Shiab, 2003). Therefore, the 
Companies Act of 1989 was limited in its scope and general in its content. The latest 
improvements in Jordan during the 1990s and the open-economy have attracted different 
investments to Jordan. Moreover, the free open market economy, the investments 
encouraging policy and the privatization strategy required a new regulation to manage, 
organize and create a stable regulatory environment in Jordan. Thus, a new Companies Act 
became essential. The Companies Act No. 22 of for the year of 1997 was enacted with other 
regulations (e. g. Investment Promotion Law 1995, Securities Law No. 23 for the year 1997) 
in order to deal with the deficiencies of the previous Laws. 
The Companies Act 1997 introduced the following financial statements requirements: 
Article 140: A- the board of directors of the public shareholding companies shall, within a 
maximum of three months from the end of the company's fiscal year, prepare the following 
accounts and statements to be presented to the annual general meeting: 
• the annual balance sheet of the company and its profit and loss account, cash flows 
statements and notes compared with those of the last year's accounts, all duly certified 
by the company's auditor; 
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• the board of director annual report on the company's activities and performance and 
forecasts of activities for the following year; and 
• the board of director is required to file copies of the above documents to the CC at 
least 21 days before the general meeting; 
Article 141: The board of directors is required, within three days of the annual general 
meeting to publish the balance sheet and the profit and loss account along with the auditor's 
report in a daily newspaper. 
Article 142: The board of directors of public shareholding companies have to file with the CC 
and A F M a half yearly report showing the financial position and the results of the operations 
for the company, signed by the Board's Chairman, within two months of its handing over to 
him. 
Article 143: The board of directors of the public shareholding company shall annually place 
in the company's head office at the disposal of the shareholders, at least three days prior to 
the meeting of the company's annual general meeting a detailed report including the 
following statements copies shall be sent to the CC: 
• The amounts received fi-om the company during the fiscal year by the Chairman and 
each of the members of the board of directors, in the form of wages, fees, salaries, 
allowances, remuneration and others; 
• Any benefits that the Chairman and the members of the board of directors enjoy such 
as free housing, cars and other benefits; 
• Amounts that have been paid to the Chairman and members of the board of directors 
during the fiscal year such as travel and transport allowances in and outside Jordan; 
and 
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• Donations paid by the company during the fiscal year in details and parties who 
received them. 
Article 144: The documents in Article 140 shall be presented to the shareholders annual 
general meeting, and a copy of the annual report shall be sent to each shareholder at least 14 
days before this meeting, accompanied by an invitation to this meeting. 
Article 145: The board o f director of the public shareholding company shall announce the 
company's annual general meeting date in at least two local newspapers within a maximum 
fourteen days prior to the date provided that the meeting shall be held within the four months 
follow the end of the company's fiscal year. 
Article 171: Every public shareholding company is obliged to appoint an auditor who has to 
report to the shareholders on the company's accounts. Moreover, the auditor's report must be 
presented and discussed at the shareholders' annual general meeting along with the company's 
accounts. 
Article 184: Every public shareholding company shall organize its accounts and keep its 
registers and books in accordance with "generally accepted accounting principles ". 
Article 185: The fiscal year of the public shareholding company shall start on the first of 
January each year and shall end on the thirty first of December of the same year, unless 
otherwise provided for in the company's memorandum of association. 
Article 197: The auditor must be independent from the company and its directors. Therefore, 
an auditor who is a partner to any member of a company board of director, a member of its 
board of director, or works permanently in any technical, administrative or consultancy work 
should not be appointed for auditing the company's accounts. 
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Article 203: The Company's auditor and his employees shall not be permitted to speculate in 
the shares of a company whose accounts he audits, whether such a speculation is direct or 
indirect. Otherwise, the auditor shall be penalised by dismissal fi-om his job as an auditor of 
the company and shall be requested to compensate for any damages he has caused by this 
speculation. 
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Appendix 5-4: Final conclusion of the World Bank and (OECD) report 
Principle 
O LO PO MO NO Comment 
1. The rights of shareholders 
1.1 Basic shareholder 
rights 
X Basic rights observed. Some 
compliance gaps in clearing and 
settlement 
1.2 Rights to participate 
in fiindamental decisions 
X Shareholders participate in most 
fundamental decisions with 66/75 
percent supermajority. 
1.3 Shareholders AGM 
rights 
X No major reported problems. Notice 
period 15 days. 
1.4 Disproportionate 
control disclosure 
X Companies disclose at 5 percent level. 
Most ownership reportedly formally 
and informally well understood. 
1.5 Control 
arrangements should be 
allowed to function. 
X Very limited takeover rules. CMA 
Enforcing informally mandatory bid 
rule. 
1.6 Cost/benefit to 
voting 
X At present, uncommon for institutional 
investors to have voting policies and 
some do not vote. 
2. Equitable treatment of shareholders 
2.1 All shareholders 
should be treated 
equally 
X Share voting information may be 
difficult to obtain. Slow court system. 
ASE has powerful redress mechanism. 
2.2 Prohibit insider 
trading 
X Insider trading not specifically 
addressed in law, but is 
administratively enforced 
2.3 Board/Mgrs. 
disclose interests 
X Accounting standards follow IAS 24. 
New listing rules add to RPT 
disclosure requirements 
3. Role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
3.1 Stakeholder rights 
respected 
X Stakeholders have a number of legal 
protections. Employee board 
representation relatively rare. 
400 
3.2 Redress for violation 
of rights 
X Stakeholders have access to legal 
process to obtain redress. 
3.3 Performance 
enhancement 
X Company law grants employees 
automatic rights to 10 percent profit 
sharing. Employee share ownership in 
some privatized companies. 
3.4 Access to 
information 
X Employees, bondholders, others have 
rights to information by law. 
4. DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
4.1 Disclosure standards X Annual and quarterly reports. Some 
missing non-financial disclosure 
(forward-looking mergers, disposed 
and acquisitions, risk factors, 
governance). 
4.2 Standards of 
accounting and audit 
X Standards generally close to IAS; 
compliance uncertain 
4.3 Independent audit 
annually 
X No audit oversight of board (but 
included in draft accounting law). New 
listing rules require audit committee, 
but slow adoption. 
4.4 Fair and timely 
dissemination 
X Many channels of information 
5. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BOARD 
5.1 Acts with due 
diligence, care 
X Single tier boards. Frequently, 
Chairman and CEO are the same 
person. Two members can be 
appointed "experts." 
5.2 Treat all 
shareholders fairly 
X Limited legislative guidance on duty of 
care and duty of loyalty, but some 
jurisprudence. 
5.3 Ensure legal 
compliance 
X Company law requires board to take 
interests of employees into account. 
5.4 The board should 
fulfil certain key 
functions 
X In practice, boards of most companies 
do not play central / strategic role, and 
are not clearly different from 
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management. 
5.5 The board should be 
able to exercise 
objective judgment 
X No rules that govern independence. 
Few companies appoint independent 
directors. 
5.6 Access to 
information 
X Most directors are insiders and have 
access to information. Can be more 
difficult for non-executives sometimes, 
because information is not available. 
(Source: adopted, ROSC, February 3, 2005) 
where: 
Observed (O) means that all essential criteria are met without significant deficiencies. Largely observed 
(LO) means only minor shortcomings are observed, which do not raise questions about the authorities' 
ability and intent to achieve full observance in the short term. Partially observed (PO) means that while 
the legal and regulatory framework complies with the Principle, practices, and enforcement diverge. 
Materially not observed (KO) means that, despite progress, shortcomings are sufficient to raise doubts 
about the authorities' ability to achieve observance. Not observed (NO) means no substantive progress 
toward observance has been achieved. 
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Appendex 6-1: Summary of Research Methodology 
Research Methodologies Concepts Methods 
Research Philosophy Positivistic 
Phenomenological 
Positivistic 
Research Method Quantitative 
Qualitative 
Quantitative 
Research Types Pure 
Applied 
Exploratory 
Applied Research 
Research Model Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Credit Rating 
Accounting and financial, 
market and regulatory, 
ownership structure, 
financial transparency and 
disclosure and corporate 
governance categories. 
(Source) adapted from Saunders et al., (2007). 
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Appendex 6-2: Summary of Research philosophy 
The types of Research Philosophy 
Epistemology (thetheory 
of knowledge): Starts 
with facts and seeks to 
justify these facts, 
depending on the 
knowledge developed 
from the research process. 
Ontology (the natureof 
reality): Seeks to 
discover the reality of the 
facts and then provides 
links between this reality 
and the knowledge of 
these facts. 
Positivism: Seeks 
to understand 
causality within 
society, without 
direct reference to 
the opinions of 
actors within 
society. 
Interpretivism: 
Interpretation of 
the phenomena 
depending on 
differences 
between humans 
as social actors-
regarding their 
opinions. 
J 
Axiology (the value 
system): Depends on the 
values of the researcher as 
a basis for make 
judgement about 
conducting the research. 
Objectivism: The 
separation 
between the 
researchers and 
the cases which 
are studied. So, 
the researcher 
wil l be value-free 
and view the 
problem 
Subjectivism: 
Social 
phenomena are 
created from the 
perceptions and 
consequent 
actions of social 
actors, who are 
concerned with 
the existence of 
J 
Source: Saunders et al., (2007). 
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Appendix 8-1 Normality of Residuals 
Appendix 8-1 (A): H is togram 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: W V B _ R A T i N G 
Moan =~6.26B-15 
Std. Dov. ^ 0.9S2 
N =576 
Regression Standardized Residual 
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Appendix 8-1 (B ) : Normal P -P Plot 
Normal P -P Plot of R e g r e s s i o n S t a n d a r d i z e d 
R e s i d u a l 
D e p e n d e n t Var iab le : W V B _ R A T I N G 
E 0.6i 
O 0.4-^  
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
O b s e r v e d C u m Prob 
r 
0.6 
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Appendix 8-2 Scatterplot of Dependent Variables: W V B _ C R 
S c a t t e r p l o t 
D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e : W V B _ R A T I N G 
R e g r e s s i o n S t a n d a r d i z e d P r e d i c t e d Value 
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